Maryland case law › Attorney Grievance v. Culberson

Attorney Grievance v. Culberson

483 Md. 294 (2023) · Supreme Court of Maryland
Supreme Court of MarylandDisposition: OtherBooth, J.✓ Good law
HoldingThe Attorney Grievance Commission charged Wendy Barrow Culberson with violating MARPC 1.4, 1.5(a), 1.7, 1.15(a), 8.1(a), 8.4(a)-(d), and Md.

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Wendy Barrow Culberson, AG No. 3, September Term, 2022, Opinion by Booth, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT Respondent Wendy Barrow Culberson violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest— General Rule), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(2)–(4) (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping). During a period spanning several years, Ms. Culberson misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars from her client by using her client’s power of attorney to make cash withdrawals from bank accounts held for her client’s benefit. Ms. Culberson failed to provide her client with any contemporaneous invoices, accounting, or other documentation that might reflect any legitimate use of the cash withdrawals. Ms. Culberson failed to maintain any client matter records or client ledgers.

During Bar Counsel’s investigation into this matter, Ms. Culberson made knowing and intentional misrepresentations of material facts to Bar Counsel and created inaccurate and false documentation in an effort to conceal her misappropriation. The Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. Circuit Court for Harford County Case No.: C-12-CV-22-000314 Argued: March 2, 2023 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND* AG No. 3 September Term, 2022 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. WENDY BARROW CULBERSON Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Filed: March 27, 2023 * At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of document is authentic.

Maryland. The name change took effect on 2023-08-04 10:17-04:00 December 14, 2022. Gregory Hilton, Clerk The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“the Petition”) against Respondent, Wendy Barrow Culberson, a member of the Maryland Bar, arising out of her representation of Gabrielle Buck and Bar Counsel’s subsequent investigation. The Commission alleged that Ms. Culberson violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”)1 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest—General Rule), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(2)–(4) (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping).2 The hearing judge assigned to this matter found by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Culberson committed all of the violations alleged by the Commission.

The hearing judge also determined the presence of eight aggravating factors and one mitigating factor. Bar Counsel recommends a sanction of disbarment. Ms. Culberson filed exceptions to a number of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and to all of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. For the reasons set forth herein, we determine that the hearing judge’s 1 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules, were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19, Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules.

For ease of reference and comparison with our prior opinions and those of other courts, we will refer to the MARPC rules using the numbering of the model rules, as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22). 2 The Petition also charged Ms. Culberson with violating Rule 8.1(b), but Bar Counsel later withdrew that charge. findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, concur with the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, and impose a sanction of disbarment. I Procedural Background The Commission filed the Petition on March 16, 2022. On June 30, Bar Counsel served interrogatories and a request for production of documents on Ms. Culberson’s counsel. Ms. Culberson, through counsel, requested a ten-day extension, which Bar Counsel granted.

Thereafter, Ms. Culberson’s counsel withdrew from the case. On August 17, Bar Counsel sent Ms. Culberson an email advising her that her discovery responses were overdue and inquiring as to when Ms. Culberson intended to provide them. Having received no response, on August 29, Bar Counsel sent a follow-up email advising that if discovery responses were not provided by September 1, Bar Counsel would seek sanctions. Ms. Culberson failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s emails and failed to respond to the outstanding discovery.

Bar Counsel filed a motion for sanctions on September 2. Ms. Culberson wrote to the hearing judge on September 23 and advised that she had not received the motion for sanctions. Thereafter, Bar Counsel filed a renewed motion for sanctions and a motion to shorten time, which were served on Ms. Culberson. In its motion to shorten time, Bar Counsel acknowledged that, due to an internal administrative error, Ms. Culberson had not been served with the initial motion.

Ms. Culberson filed a response to the renewed motion for sanctions, stating that she had advised Bar Counsel “on 2 numerous occasions” that she “ha[d] no other information or documents to provide” and Bar Counsel therefore was “not prejudiced” by her failure to respond. On October 7, the hearing judge granted Bar Counsel’s motion and entered an order striking Ms. Culberson’s answer to the Petition and prohibiting Ms. Culberson from calling witnesses, presenting records, or testifying on anything other than mitigation at the evidentiary hearing.3 The hearing judge held an evidentiary hearing on October 19, 2022. 3 Ms. Culberson excepts to the hearing judge’s entry of the sanctions order. She argues that if Bar Counsel had properly served her with the first motion, the motion to shorten time would not have been necessary and the motion for sanctions “would not have [been] ripe to be ruled upon by the [hearing judge] prior to the expiration of the discovery deadline[.]” We overrule Ms. Culberson’s exception. After Bar Counsel discovered that the motion had not been properly served, Bar Counsel promptly filed a renewed motion, which was properly served.

Ms. Culberson filed a response to Bar Counsel’s renewed motion for sanctions in which she admitted that she had no intention of complying with her discovery obligations under the Maryland Rules because “all information and documentation” was provided to Bar Counsel “long ago” in response to Bar Counsel’s requests for documents and information in connection with its initial investigation. On October 7, 2022—four days after Ms. Culberson filed her response to the motion and two days after the discovery deadline—the hearing judge entered her order granting the motion for sanctions. Given Ms. Culberson’s unwillingness to comply with her discovery obligations, the hearing judge did not abuse her discretion in entering the sanctions order. In overruling Ms. Culberson’s exception, we point out that, unless a party files a motion for a protective order under Maryland Rule 2-403 that is granted by the court, there is nothing in the Maryland Rules that excuses a party from answering interrogatories in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-421, or from serving a written response to a request for production of documents under Maryland Rule 2-422.

As part of her exceptions, Ms. Culberson also asserts that Bar Counsel failed to properly answer discovery that she propounded. We overrule this exception. Other than Ms. Culberson’s unsupported assertion in her exceptions, there is nothing in the record to reflect that she served discovery. Moreover, assuming she in fact propounded discovery under the Maryland Rules, she did not file a motion with the hearing judge asserting that Bar Counsel failed to respond to discovery requests and requesting any relief in connection therewith. 3 Ms. Culberson did not appear.

The hearing judge admitted Bar Counsel’s Exhibits 1-30.4 Bar Counsel called its investigator, Charles E. Miller, IV, CPA, who provided testimony concerning his review of Ms. Buck’s bank records and the various withdrawals and transactions undertaken by Ms. Culberson in connection with her client’s bank accounts over a span of several years. Bar Counsel submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Ms. Culberson filed a response to Bar Counsel’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Thereafter, the hearing judge issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions. As noted above, Ms. Culberson filed exceptions to the factual findings and legal conclusions rendered by the hearing judge. With this Court’s permission, Ms. Culberson appeared remotely via Zoom at oral argument and presented her argument in support of her exceptions as well as her request that this Court not disbar her but instead impose an “alternative resolution.” Ms. Culberson also excepts to Bar Counsel’s failure to provide her with the transcript from the evidentiary hearing until she requested it. She acknowledges that, when she requested the transcript, it was provided.

Ms. Culberson’s exception is overruled. 4 Bar Counsel’s exhibits included: a retainer agreement dated February 27, 2014 between Gabrielle Buck and Ms. Culberson; Ms. Buck’s Power of Attorney dated March 24, 2016; emails between Ms. Buck and Ms. Culberson dated July 10, 2019; Ms. Buck’s Complaint to Bar Counsel; correspondence between Bar Counsel and Ms. Culberson; legal invoices that were prepared by Ms. Culberson and provided to Bar Counsel but never delivered to Ms. Buck; records for PNC Bank accounts under Ms. Buck’s control for the years 2014–2019; an affidavit of the PNC Bank records custodian attesting that the records were produced pursuant to a subpoena; charts prepared by Bar Counsel’s investigator, Charles E. Miller, IV, CPA, summarizing the bank records; and the transcript of Ms. Culberson’s statement under oath taken on November 30, 2020. 4 When no exception is made to a hearing judge’s finding of fact, this Court may accept it as established. Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). When a party excepts to a finding, we must determine whether the finding is established by the requisite standard of proof—in the case of an allegation of misconduct, clear and convincing evidence. Maryland Rules 19-740(b)(2)(B), 19-727(c).

The standard of review where a party excepts to a hearing judge’s factual findings is the clearly erroneous standard. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya, 446 Md. 576, 588 (2016). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous “if there is any competent material evidence to support it.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 (2014) (cleaned up). We review a hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo.

Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(1). Ms. Culberson’s General Exceptions Ms. Culberson has filed “General Exceptions” to the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in its entirety, except for a few pages of the findings. Because of the general nature of these exceptions, which permeate nearly all the factual findings and legal conclusions, it is appropriate to address them at the outset. First, Ms. Culberson argues that it was inappropriate for the hearing judge to adopt, in large part, Bar Counsel’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that were submitted after the evidentiary hearing.

Relatedly, Ms. Culberson asserts that there is nothing to suggest that the hearing judge conducted “an independent review” of the 30 exhibits that were entered into evidence. Second, Ms. Culberson excepts to the findings of fact because she contends that there was no “substantive evidence or direct evidence” from her client, Ms. Buck. Ms. 5 Culberson appears to suggest that Bar Counsel could not satisfy its burden of proving the alleged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence without calling Ms. Buck as a witness. Third, Ms. Culberson excepts to the fact that the hearing judge “totally disregard[ed]” information provided by her to refute the allegations.

We overrule these general exceptions for the following reasons. First, based upon our independent review of the record, the hearing judge correctly concluded that Bar Counsel met its burden of establishing Culberson’s misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. Ms. Buck’s testimony was not required to prove the misconduct alleged in this case. Indeed, in many instances, the exhibits establishing the misconduct are Ms. Culberson’s own statement under oath and her written correspondence to Bar Counsel.

As we have often repeated, “‘the hearing judge is entitled to ‘pick and choose which evidence to rely upon’ from a conflicting array when determining findings of fact.’” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kane, 465 Md. 667 , 676 n.4 (2019) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 (2006)). Second, Ms. Culberson’s exceptions recite many facts and conclusions that are not contained in the record. Ms. Culberson essentially asks this Court to accept her version of the facts that are not part of the record (due to her failure to comply with her discovery obligations and her failure to appear at the evidentiary hearing). Third, there is nothing inappropriate about a hearing judge’s decision to adopt a party’s proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law where they are supported by the record. 6 We summarize below the hearing judge’s findings of fact and other undisputed matters in the record as they pertain to the alleged violations.

To the extent that they have not already been overruled, we also address any additional exceptions in relation to the findings to which they pertain. II Findings of Fact Ms. Culberson was admitted to the Maryland bar in 1994. Between 1995 and 2020, Ms. Culberson was a solo practitioner who focused primarily on family law. She maintained an office for the practice of law in Cecil County.

She closed her law practice in September 2020. Representation of Gabrielle Buck Ms. Culberson represented Gabrielle Buck in her divorce proceeding in 2013. Following that representation, Ms. Culberson became Ms. Buck’s family attorney, and they became close personal friends. Ms. Buck lives on an approximately 800-acre farm called Mt.

Ararat Farm in Port Deposit, Maryland with her two adult sons. She is the beneficiary of two family trusts (collectively, “the DB Trusts”) that, as of September 2014, were valued at $23 million. Raymond James Financial and Esther Streete are the co-trustees of the DB Trusts. In addition, Ms. Buck is the sole trustee of the Gabrielle Brown Buck Revocable Living Trust (“the GBB Trust”), which she created in June 2015.

During the period in question, the GBB Trust received a monthly distribution in the amount of $38,000 from one of the family trusts, which Ms. Buck used to cover personal 7 expenses and the costs of operating the farm. Each month, the distribution was transmitted to a PNC Bank checking account (“the GBB Account”), and thereafter approximately $8,000 to $10,000 was transferred from the GBB Account to another PNC bank account (“the Farm Account”), which was used to subsidize Mt. Ararat farming operations. In February 2014, Ms. Buck executed an agreement with Ms. Culberson, in which Ms. Culberson agreed to help manage Ms. Buck’s business and farm interests (“the Retainer Agreement”).

Under the Retainer Agreement, Ms. Buck retained Ms. Culberson to manage her “business and farm related matters or for any other matters that [Ms. Buck] may request [Ms. Culberson’s] involvement except for matters which involve legal services (court proceedings; lawsuits; appeals; etc.).” Ms. Buck agreed to pay Ms. Culberson a monthly flat fee of $3,500, and any additional legal matters would be billed at a rate of $200/hour. The Retainer Agreement specifically stated that “no legal services, other than those directly related to the matters(s) referred to herein, will be rendered to [Ms. Buck] unless and until a separate written contract of employment is entered[.]” The Retainer Agreement also stated that Ms. Culberson would “render a full and final accounting of all sums paid to [Ms. Culberson] in connection with” the services provided under the Agreement. Under the monthly flat fee arrangement established by the Retainer Agreement, Ms. Culberson managed Ms. Buck’s interests in the family trusts and other personal and business interests that arose, including serving as a liaison between Ms. Buck and the trustees of the DB Trusts. In her statement under oath, Ms. Culberson testified that she communicated more effectively than Ms. Buck with the trustees of the DB Trusts, thereby 8 ensuring that Ms. Buck received her requested discretionary distributions from those trusts.

Ms. Culberson’s additional responsibilities included paying various bills, “getting the EzPass account straightened out,” and “working with the bookkeeper for the farm including transferring money to the farm account.” The hearing judge concluded that all such services were non-legal in nature and were covered by the monthly flat fee in the amount of $3,500. Between February 2014 and April 2016, Ms. Buck wrote checks from the GBB Account to Ms. Culberson for the monthly $3,500 flat fee. Ms. Culberson considered the $3,500 monthly fee earned upon receipt and deposited the funds into her personal account. During this period, Ms. Buck occasionally wrote checks to Ms. Culberson in excess of the monthly $3,500 flat fee.

Ms. Buck paid Ms. Culberson $66,000 in 2014, and $45,216 in 2015, for both legal and non-legal services provided under the Retainer Agreement. In March 2016, Ms. Buck executed a power of attorney naming Ms. Culberson as her agent and giving her access to both the GBB Account and the Farm Account. According to Ms. Culberson, she advised Ms. Buck to give her a power of attorney because Ms. Culberson “got tired of chasing [Ms. Buck] down” to receive funds to pay bills. Almost immediately after Ms. Buck appointed Ms. Culberson as her agent, Ms. Culberson began making cash withdrawals from the GBB Account.

Between April 2016 and July 2019, Ms. Culberson made 323 cash withdrawals from the GBB Account totaling $940,297. Of the amounts withdrawn, Ms. Culberson deposited $342,500 into the Farm Account to subsidize farm expenses. On occasion, Ms. Culberson would withdraw cash from the GBB Account, deposit a portion of the funds withdrawn into the Farm Account, 9 and retain a portion of the funds.5 Ms. Culberson was unable to account for the remaining $597,797 that was not deposited into the Farm Account. Assuming that Ms. Culberson was entitled to a monthly flat fee of $3,500 pursuant to the Retainer Agreement, the hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson would have charged and collected $133,000 between May 2016 and June 2019.

During the representation, Ms. Culberson failed to provide Ms. Buck with any time records or billing invoices to substantiate any legal services provided or additional fees incurred in excess of $133,000. Ms. Culberson never provided Ms. Buck with any accounting of the funds that she withdrew from the GBB Account using the Power of Attorney. When Ms. Buck occasionally questioned Ms. Culberson regarding the cash withdrawals from the GBB Account, Ms. Culberson advised her that the withdrawals were used to pay farm bills, insurance, or other expenses. The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson failed to advise Ms. Buck that Ms. Culberson retained the majority of the cash withdrawals for her own personal use and benefit.

In June 2019, Ms. Buck became frustrated with Ms. Culberson’s representation, in part because Ms. Culberson had failed to provide her with invoices and estimates from contractors hired to perform repair work on the farm. Ms. Buck, with the help of her financial advisor, accessed her GBB Account online and discovered Ms. Culberson’s cash withdrawals. Ms. Buck terminated Ms. Culberson’s services in July 2019. Ms. Buck sent 5 For example, the hearing judge found that, on December 1, 2016, Ms. Culberson withdrew $12,500 in cash, deposited $10,000 into the Farm Account, and retained $2,500 for herself. 10 Ms. Culberson an email on July 10 requesting that Ms. Culberson provide documentation supporting her cash withdrawals, including “detailed invoices of [her] legal bills and other services [] provided.” Ms. Culberson assured Ms. Buck that she would provide “a full accounting” of withdrawals from the GBB Account.

Between late July and early August 2019, Ms. Culberson provided Ms. Buck with numerous boxes of documents. On August 12, 2019, for the first time, Ms. Culberson provided Ms. Buck with “fee statements” purportedly for legal work performed between January 2016 and August 2019. Ms. Culberson later provided Bar Counsel with invoices summarizing the same information. The invoices totaled $293,014.24.

They included hourly charges for non-legal services that, pursuant to the Retainer Agreement, were to be provided as part of the $3,500 monthly flat fee.6 Ms. Culberson never provided Ms. Buck with an accounting of the cash withdrawals from the GBB Account and failed to provide any accounting showing how the invoices for attorney’s fees were paid. Bar Counsel Investigation In December 2019, Ms. Buck, through counsel, filed a complaint with Bar Counsel, alleging that Ms. Culberson misappropriated funds and failed to account for $594,247 that she withdrew from the GBB Account. By letter dated February 12, 2020, Bar Counsel forwarded the complaint to Ms. Culberson and requested a response. Ms. Culberson 6 For example, Ms. Culberson charged Ms. Buck her hourly rate for communicating with the co-trustees of the DB Trusts regarding Ms. Buck’s finances and preparing budgets for the trustees.

She also charged Ms. Buck her hourly rate for resolving issues surrounding Ms. Buck’s E-ZPass account, which was a service Ms. Culberson explicitly acknowledged was provided under the monthly flat fee. 11 responded in a letter dated March 2, 2020, in which she stated that: (1) in December 2015, Ms. Culberson and Ms. Buck agreed to increase Ms. Culberson’s monthly flat fee from $3,500 to $5,000; and (2) that Ms. Buck told Ms. Culberson not to send her periodic invoices. The hearing judge determined that these statements were knowing and intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel, finding that Ms. Buck never agreed to increase the monthly flat fee, and never advised Ms. Culberson not to send her invoices.7 Ms. Culberson also provided Bar Counsel with copies of various spreadsheets purporting to account for the funds that she withdrew from the GBB Account between 2016 and 2019. Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets purported to account for: the funds she withdrew and transferred to the Farm Account; the funds she withdrew to pay her fees; and the funds she withdrew to provide cash to Ms. Buck. The hearing judge found that the spreadsheets were never provided to Ms. Buck.

The hearing judge also determined that, in many 7 In finding that Ms. Culberson’s statements to Bar Counsel were knowing and intentional misrepresentations, the hearing judge relied upon Ms. Buck’s complaint to Bar Counsel, as well as the following additional exhibits: •A budget Ms. Culberson prepared for Ms. Buck on March 29, 2019, indicating that the flat fee was $3,500 per month. •An email that Ms. Culberson sent to one of the trustees of the DB Trusts on April 16, 2019, in which she explained the following with respect to the fees paid to her: The legal expenses are two separate things. The $3,500.00 is the monthly amount [Ms. Buck] pays me for management of everything I do (which covers many, many things (basically 24/7) but does not include specific legal work). The $3,000 covers actual legal fees which includes legal work such as current pending litigation against Cecil County regarding a zoning violation issue and other ongoing legal matters. 12 instances, Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets did not match the GBB Account records that were provided by the bank pursuant to a subpoena. The hearing judge determined that Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets did not include cash withdrawals totaling $50,005, contained numerous errors and intentional misrepresentations, and were created after the fact by Ms. Culberson in an attempt to conceal her misappropriation of funds.

The hearing judge also observed that, when Ms. Culberson was questioned during her statement under oath about the discrepancies between her spreadsheets and the PNC Bank records, she was unable to explain why numerous cash withdrawals were not listed on her spreadsheet, nor was she able to account for other discrepancies and errors.8 Ms. Culberson testified that she withdrew funds from the GBB Account “however [she] wanted to do it” and did so “as she needed or wanted.” By letter dated July 16, 2020, Bar Counsel requested that Ms. Culberson provide the bank account information where she deposited fees associated with her representation of Ms. Buck. Bar Counsel also requested her client matter records and client ledger maintained on behalf of Ms. Buck. By letter dated August 10, 2020, Ms. Culberson, through counsel, told Bar Counsel that she no longer had client matter records and a client ledger maintained on behalf of Ms. Buck because her assistant’s computer crashed. Ms. 8 By way of some examples, Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets did not reflect checks written to her by Ms. Buck in 2016 totaling $6,500.

In other instances, Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets reflect that she withdrew funds but do not reflect the accurate amount withdrawn. For instance, on October 31, 2016, the bank records reflect that Ms. Culberson withdrew $6,823, but her spreadsheet only reflects that she withdrew $2,400. Nor do the cash withdrawals from the GBB Account correlate with the $3,500 monthly flat fee or the purported monthly fees reflected on Ms. Culberson’s invoices. 13 Culberson also stated that she “accounted for every dollar that was withdrawn from Ms. Buck’s” GBB Account. The hearing judge also found that, in a letter dated December 10, 2020, Ms. Culberson provided unsubstantiated explanations for why at least 26 cash withdrawal transactions were not accounted for on her spreadsheets.

She told Bar Counsel that 15 of the cash withdrawal transactions, totaling $26,700, were funds taken by Ms. Culberson as fees but mistakenly not accounted for. Ms. Culberson could not account for four cash withdrawals totaling $14,250. Bar Counsel subpoenaed Ms. Culberson’s attorney trust account records for the period between July 2018 through July 2019. Bar Counsel sent Ms. Culberson a letter in February 2021 requesting that she provide copies of her client matter records and client ledger records associated with her attorney trust account as required by Maryland Rule 19- 407(a)(3).

Ms. Culberson followed up with a letter stating that she did not have client matter records or client ledgers associated with her attorney trust account, and as a result, failed to provide them. III Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct Based upon the record and the above-summarized findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ms. Culberson violated MARPC 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest—General Rule), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(2)–(4) (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping). Ms. Culberson filed specific exceptions to all of the conclusions of law 14 with the exception of the violations of MARPC 1.15 and Maryland Rule 19-407. Bar Counsel did not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings.

Based upon our de novo review, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions of law and overrule Ms. Culberson’s exceptions. Failure to Communicate (Rule 1.4) Rule 1.4(a)(2) and (3) provide that “[a]n attorney shall . . . keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter” and “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[.]” Additionally, Rule 1.4(b) provides that “[a]n attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” The hearing judge found

This is a preview of Attorney Grievance v. Culberson. About 50% of the opinion remains. Read the complete opinion in RecordCite.