Attorney Grievance v. Dailey

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Jonathan Christian Dailey, Misc. Docket AG No. 1, September Term 2019. Opinion by Raker, J. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT – DISCIPLINE – DISBARMENT – Respondent Jonathan Christian Dailey violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) and the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d) when he solicited, received, and mismanaged financial transactions from a client shortly after the client received her settlement.

Respondent took advantage of his client’s lack of legal sophistication and trust in him as an attorney to induce her into giving him money as “investments,” misappropriated it, and provided her repeatedly with misleading and false information about it. Disbarment is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 464961 Argued: December 9, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 1 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISION OF MARYLAND v. JONATHAN CHRISTIAN DAILEY ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Raker, Irma S.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Raker, J. ______________________________________ Filed: March 18, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2020-03-18 12:02-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed in this Court a Petition for Disciplinary Action against Jonathan Christian Dailey, respondent, alleging violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”).1 The Commission charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.6(a) (Confidentiality of Information), 1.15(a) and (d) (Safekeeping of Property),2 5.4(a) (Professional Independence of a Lawyer), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). The Commission also charged respondent with violating MARPC 19-308.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) and 19-308.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct). Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-727, we referred the matter to Judge Margaret M. Schweitzer in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to make findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law. Judge Schweitzer held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that respondent violated MLRPC 1.6(a) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) for his conduct occurring before July 1, 2016 and MARPC 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d) for his conduct occurring after July 1, 2016.3 1 The Commission charged respondent under both MLRPC, which were in effect prior to July 1, 2016, and MARPC, which became effective July 1, 2016, because respondent’s acts of misconduct occurred before and after July 1, 2016.

Effective July 1, 2016, MLRPC were renamed MARPC. Rules Order (June 6, 2016). 2 The Commission withdrew its MLRPC 1.15(a) charge following the hearing. The MLRPC 1.15(d) charge remained, but Judge Schweitzer did not discuss or state her conclusion of law on this charge. The Commission did not except to Judge Schweitzer’s lack of legal conclusion on this charge. 3 Judge Schweitzer’s summary of her conclusions of law referenced “MARPC 19- 308.4(a)–(d).” It appears, however, that she did not mean to include MARPC 19-308.4(b), which applies to “a criminal act that reflects adversely on the (footnote continued . . .) I. Before the commencement of the July 30, 2019 hearing, Judge Schweitzer heard Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Discipline or Remedial Action as a Matter of Law and denied it pursuant to Md. Rule 19-725(c).4 At the end of the hearing, the Commission withdrew the MLRPC 1.15(a) charge,5 and Judge Schweitzer made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney in other respects” (emphasis added).

The Commission’s only ground for charging respondent with MARPC 19- 308.4(b) was for testifying falsely under oath and thus committing an act of perjury on June 20, 2018, and Judge Schweitzer found that respondent did not testify falsely under oath. Furthermore, in Petitioner’s Recommendation for Sanction, the Commission excluded MARPC 19-308.4(b) when summarizing Judge Schweitzer’s conclusions of law. 4 Md. Rule 19-725(c) provides that in proceedings on a petition for disciplinary or remedial action, “[m]otions to dismiss the proceeding are not permitted.” 5 MLRPC 1.15(a) provides as follows: “(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other property shall be identified specifically as such and appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be created and maintained.

Complete records of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years after the date the record was created.” 2 FINDINGS OF FACT “The Respondent, Jonathan Christian Dailey, was admitted to the Maryland Bar on December 12, 1995. *** Representation of Sherry Gaither “Since 2009, the Respondent has operated the Law Office of Jonathan C. Dailey, a sole proprietorship.[] The Respondent’s practice is focused primarily on representing plaintiffs in medical malpractice and personal injury matters. . .. “Sherry Renee Gaither has spent most of her career working in the security services industry. Ms. Gaither has also, at times, been employed as a driver for Uber Technologies, Inc. The highest level of education completed by Ms. Gaither is 12th grade. “On April 11, 2011, Ms. Gaither retained the Respondent to represent her in an employment discrimination case in the United States District Court in the District of Maryland, Sherry Gaither v. Paragon Systems, Inc, Case No. 8:12-CV-00086-RWT. Around May 5, 2012, the parties reached a settlement for $17,000 with Paragon Systems, and 3 Ms. Gaither received $10,108.70 as her portion of the settlement funds. The Respondent Solicits Ms. Gaither to ‘Invest’ her Settlement Proceeds “As of May 2012, the Respondent was representing . . .

Terry Hedgepeth[] in a medical malpractice lawsuit filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in 2005. (Terry Hedgepeth v. WWC, et al.). The Respondent was representing Mr. Hedgepeth on a contingency fee basis and, as such would get a percentage of the proceeds. “In May 2012, within days after Ms. Gaither received her settlement funds from the Respondent, the Respondent approached Ms. Gaither with what he described to her as an opportunity to invest in his upcoming case. The Respondent advised Ms. Gaither that if she invested funds with his law firm, those funds would be used to finance the litigation of one of his firm’s pending case[s].

The Respondent told Ms. Gaither that whatever amount she invested would be ‘guaranteed’ and that he could possibly ‘double [her] money[.]’ The Respondent described the transaction to Ms. Gaither as ‘a real money-maker[.]’ 4 “On May 15, 2012, only ten days after the Paragon settlement, the Respondent sent Ms. Gaither an email attaching a document entitled ‘Letter Agreement.’ The Letter Agreement required Ms. Gaither to pay an ‘Investment Amount’ of $27,000 to the Respondent and stated that the funds would be used by the Respondent ‘for the purpose of advancing the litigation against Whitman Walker Clinic (“WWC”) in the case of Terry Hedgepeth v. WWC, et al.’ The Letter Agreement also included a section titled ‘Obligation of Entrepreneur’ which stated: ‘In consideration of the investment in the [Hedgepeth] Case, Entrepreneur shall pay to Investor the full return sum of $27,000, by or before the end of the fiscal year 2012, if the Case settles or resolves by trial by jury for less than $500,000. The return sum of $27,000 is guaranteed and is not conditioned upon the outcome of the Case. In the event that the Case settles or resolves by trial by jury for more than $500,000, Investor shall be paid a return of 100% of the investment, or a total amount of $54,000, by or before the end of fiscal year 2012. Entrepreneur shall advise the Investor of the status of the Case every month and will make payment as set forth herein within 20 days of receipt of payment resulting from a settlement or verdict of the Case.

It is the intention of the Entrepreneur to double the investment of the Investor, but only the principal investment of $27,000 is guaranteed.’ 5 “The Court does not find that the agreement dated May 15, 2012 was intended to be an agreement to share attorney’s fees with Ms. Gaither, a non-attorney. First, it should be noted that in the agreement, the $27,000 was to be repaid regardless of whether there were any fees collected by the Respondent. Despite the language in the agreement, the Court concludes based upon the actions and words of the Respondent that he never intended to share fees. Unfortunately, for the Respondent, the Court is also of the opinion that the Respondent was not intending to abide by the agreement and its assurances, and that the guarantees were empty promises by him.

The Court finds that the agreement was not an agreement to share fees but rather a vehicle containing alluring provisions to entice Ms. Gaither into turning over funds to the Respondent. This is supported by the fact that the Hedgepeth case settled in August 2012, just a few months after the agreement, for $400,000, of which Respondent received personally $140,000. When the Respondent received his fees, the Respondent did not: 1) return in full the guaranteed $27,000 by or before the end of the fiscal year 2012; 2) advise Ms. Gaither of the state of the case every month, as Ms. Gaither 6 testified she got no information other than it was a financial loss to his firm; or 3) make payment within twenty days of the receipt of payment resulting from the settlement or verdict of the case. “In his May 15, 2012 email to Ms. Gaither, the Respondent stated the following, ‘[Mr. Hedgepeth] will not accept a settlement less than $1 Million[.]’. Respondent later testified that he meant to say that his own goal was to settle for that price, rather than stating Mr. Hedgepeth’s expectations.

Respondent’s proposition contradicts the plain language of his statements to Ms. Gaither. The Court finds that the Respondent intended to express Mr. Hedgepeth’s expectations for the case, and that Respondent made the statement to Ms. Gaither to induce her to ‘invest’ her funds. “In the May 15, 2012 email, the Respondent also made the following knowing and intentional misrepresentation to Ms. Gaither: ‘Please keep this Agreement, our emails and conversations confidential as instructed by [Mr. Hedgepeth]. He has authorized me to reveal details of his case to you for the purposes of this investment in his case.’ 7 “The Petitioner contends, and the Court finds, that the Respondent failed to obtain Mr. Hedgepeth’s informed consent before disclosing confidential information to Ms. Gaither, specifically the amount Mr. Hedgepeth was willing to accept in settlement. The Court notes that the Respondent offered testimony regarding his communications with Mr. Hedgepeth that conflict with his representations to Ms. Gaither.

During a statement under oath given on June 20, 2018, the Respondent testified that he never explicitly explained to Mr. Hedgepeth that he had entered into any loan arrangement with Ms. Gaither. At the hearing, when asked whether he had received authorization from Mr. Hedgepeth to share confidential information with Ms. Gaither, the Respondent testified, ‘I assured [Mr. Hedgepeth] that I was not going to share attorney- client privileged information with her. I simply said it was a loan against attorney’s fees that would have no effect on his case[.]’ Based on the Respondent’s testimony during the statement under oath and the hearing, the Court finds that the Respondent failed to obtain Mr. Hedgepeth’s informed consent before disclosing the amount Mr. Hedgepeth was willing to accept in settlement to Ms. Gaither. 8 “In a separate email to Ms. Gaither, also sent on May 15, 2012, the Respondent instructed Ms. Gaither to wire the funds to his firm’s operating account maintained at the Community Banks of Colorado.[6] Pursuant to the Respondent’s instruction, on May 16, 2012, Ms. Gaither wired $5,000 to the Respondent’s operating account, and on May 22, 2012, she wired an additional $22,000 to the account. The Respondent Uses Ms. Gaither’s Funds for his Personal Benefit “In the May 15, 2012 email, the Respondent made the following statement to Ms. Gaither: ‘I have to prepare now for trial and your investment will go toward that preparation.

I am sending funds to our infectious disease specialist and our psychiatrist as soon as investment funds are received.’ “The Court finds this statement, too, to be a knowing and intentional misrepresentation Respondent made to Ms. Gaither. The Court received as evidence the Respondent’s operating account records from NBH Bank[7] for the period 6 The Respondent has never been admitted to the Colorado Bar nor has he ever practiced law in Colorado. 7 Community Banks of Colorado is a subsidiary of NBH Bank. 9 May 2012 through January 2016. A review of the records demonstrates that, prior to Ms. Gaither’s May 16, 2012 wire transfer, the Respondent’s operating account had a balance of $55.41. During the period of May 15 through June 18, 2012, the only deposits made into the account were Ms. Gaither’s two wire transfers totaling $27,000.

The records demonstrate, and Respondent confirms, that between May 15 and June 18, 2012, the Respondent disbursed $26,200 of Ms. Gaither’s funds from his operating account to pay for a variety of personal expenses unrelated to the Hedgepeth case. Examples of his personal expenditures include: Revel Casino, Apparel Lacy Couture, Classic Beer and Wine and Netflix.com. The only transaction related to the Hedgepeth case was a check dated June 11, 2012, in the amount of $800 made payable to Dr. Donald Vogel, an expert witness. By June 18, 2012, the Respondent had disbursed the entirety of Ms. Gaither’s funds and his operating account had a negative balance of -$1,056.20. “The Court finds that the Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Gaither that her ‘investment’ would be used to fund the litigation of the Hedgepeth case.

The fact that the Respondent spent almost the 10 entirety of Ms. Gaither’s funds on personal expenses in approximately four weeks makes it clear that the Respondent never had any intention of using Ms. Gaither’s funds to pay for litigation costs in the Hedgepeth case. The Respondent’s ‘investment opportunity’ was a deception created by the Respondent for the purpose of obtaining funds from Ms. Gaither under false pretenses and then using those funds as an interest free personal loan. During her testimony, Ms. Gaither made it clear that she would never have given the Respondent any funds if she had known they would be used for his own personal expenses. The Hedgepeth Settlement “In August 2012, the Hedgepeth case settled for $400,000.

The settlement funds were deposited in the Respondent’s firm’s attorney trust account.[8] The Respondent testified at the hearing that his firm received approximately $160,000 in attorney’s fees as a part of the settlement, and that his firm retained $140,000 and paid another firm approximately $20,000 in fees. The Respondent failed to 8 The Respondent could not provide the specific date the funds were deposited in the account. 11 inform Ms. Gaither within 20 days, as per the agreement, that the Hedgepeth case had settled, the amount of the settlement, or the fact that his firm collected a large sum in attorney’s fees. The Respondent failed to deliver any portion of the Hedgepeth settlement funds to Ms. Gaither and instead, intentionally misrepresented to her that the case ‘didn’t do well’ and was a ‘huge loss.’ When questioned at the hearing why Ms. Gaither wasn’t considered as one of the firm’s creditors and considered as part of costs, Respondent replied, ‘In retrospect, I should have made a better decision.’ The Cover-Up “In September 2012, the Respondent sent an email to Ms. Gaither stating the following: ‘Sherry, If you are interested, I am offering the same deal on my ‘severed pinky’ case that I offered on my HIV misdiagnosis case. You are currently owed $20,000[9] by the end of the year (or sooner).

I would offer a ‘100%’ return on an investment of the $20,000—or $40,000, with a guarantee of a return of the initial $20,000 when the case 9 Throughout the correspondence between Ms. Gaither and the Respondent they both state that the investment amount is $20,000; however, the Respondent’s operating account records clearly show that Ms. Gaither gave the Respondent $27,000. Neither Ms. Gaither nor the Respondent could provide an explanation for this discrepancy. 12 settles. We filed suit and the case is no [sic] on- going. We expect a trial date next year.

Because it is a permanent injury and our client is 50, we expect a jury award between $400,000– $1M. I would offer the deal of a double return if the case settles/resolves by trial jury verdict of $350,000 or higher. Let me know!’ “Ms. Gaither expressed interest in participating in the ‘investment.’ In December 2012, the Respondent sent Ms. Gaither another email and stated: ‘Sherry—I have two major HIV misdiagnosis cases that I recently signed based upon the publicity I gained in the last case. I am going to include these cases to your ‘pinky case’ to ensure that no matter what case settles, you will see the return from one of them (hence, giving you further assurance of your return, spread out to three cases, not just the pinky case, to secure your investment).

I have appreciated the faith you have placed in me and want to make sure you feel confident and comfortable with the fact that you will see a return.’ “The Respondent told Ms. Gaither that her funds would be ‘transferred’ to the three new cases. On January 1, 2013, the Respondent and Ms. Gaither entered into a second agreement. The terms of the January 1, 2013 Letter Agreement were identical to the May 15, 2012 Letter Agreement except 13 that Ms. Gaither’s funds were to be used to advance the litigation of Robert Dyer v. REL, Case No. 2012-CA-007315, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia,[10] as well as two medical malpractice cases for Bobby Russell and Robert Blount that had yet to be filed. The Respondent was representing the clients in all three of these cases on a contingency fee basis.

The Respondent told Ms. Gaither that her funds would be used, ‘[f]or the case, for the witnesses, for the filing, for the different litigations, whatever was necessary as far as to build the case.’ Like the first agreement, the January 1, 2013 agreement included a section titled ‘Obligation of Entrepreneur’ which states: ‘In consideration of the investment in the [Dyer] Case, Entrepreneur shall pay to Investor the full return sum of $20,000 if the Case settles or resolves by trial by jury for less than $250,000. The return sum of $20,000 is guaranteed and is not conditioned upon the outcome of the Case. In the event that the Case settles or resolves by trial by jury for more than $400,000, Investor shall be paid a return of 100% of the investment, or a total amount of $40,000. Entrepreneur shall advise the Investor of the status of the Case (to include the two HIV cases) every month and will make payment as set forth herein within 20 days of receipt of payment resulting from a settlement 10 In their correspondence, the Respondent and Ms. Gaither refer to the Dyer case as the ‘pinky’ case. 14 or verdict of the Case.

It is the intention of the Entrepreneur to double the investment of the Investor, but only the principal investment of $20,000 is guaranteed.’ “The Court finds that, for the same reasons discussed in regard to the May 15, 2012 Letter Agreement, the Respondent’s January 1, 2013 Letter Agreement was not an agreement to share attorney’s fees with Ms. Gaither, a non- attorney. “For the period 2013 through 2017, the Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Gaither that her funds were being used to finance the litigation of the three cases. When Ms. Gaither requested status updates on the cases, the Respondent would tell her they were either still in litigation or that they settled but ‘didn’t do well.’ The Court finds that the Respondent made the misrepresentations to avoid repaying Ms. Gaither, and to deceive her into believing that he was still in possession of her funds and that he was using them for the purpose stated in their agreement. Ms. Gaither Requests Refunds “Beginning in or about 2013, Ms. Gaither began to experience significant financial difficulties. On April 27, 2015, Ms. Gaither, believing the Respondent was still in 15 possession of her funds, sent an email to the Respondent in which she urgently requested that the Respondent return $5,000 of her funds explaining that she was experiencing financial hardship.

At trial, Ms. Gaither testified that she was unemployed, was getting assistance from her brother, and was going through financial difficulties. She stated that she had ‘claimed’ bankruptcy and was going through depression. On the next day, April 28, 201[5], Ms. Gaither sent another email in which she requested that the Respondent return the entirety of her funds as soon as possible. On May 12, 2015, the Respondent provided Ms. Gaither with $5,000. “On August 14, 2015, in response to Ms. Gaither’s request for a status update for the Dyer case, the Respondent wrote: ‘Sherry, I need to assign other cases to your return as the ‘pinky’ case had to be settled for peanuts because my client could not pay trial costs.

The $5,000 sent earlier is a third of our attorney’s fee of $15,000 in that case—disappointing. BUT—I am going to assign the cases of Sean Taylor (assault and battery against a well-known restaurant/bar), Matthew Sateri (breach of contract against Enterprise for not paying life insurance when he was killed in a car accident with his rental) and Maurice Parker 16 (discrimination case pending in DC federal court right now). These cases WILL settle. As promised, I will get you the total principal back and a profit, through one case or another— I won’t let you down, Sherry.’ “The Court does not find . . . these statements to be admissions of sharing attorney’s fees, but rather statements by the Respondent to assure Ms. Gaither that the Respondent was above board, dealing fairly with her regarding her investment.[11] “On March 3, 2016, at the request of Ms. Gaither, the Respondent provided her with an additional $5,000.

On September 3 and 12, 2016, Ms. Gaither sent the Respondent emails requesting that he return $10,000 to her by the end of the month. The Respondent replied to Ms. Gaither’s emails and stated, ‘I will work on getting something to you, but this is a particularly tight time for my law practice.’ Notably, in the Respondent’s testimony at the hearing, the Respondent acknowledged that nowhere in his agreements with Ms. Gaither did he condition returning her funds on the financial 11 The fee sharing was pursuant to the second Letter Agreement but did not comport with the terms of the Agreement. According to the Agreement, Ms. Gaither should have received the entirety of the Dyer attorney’s fees, purportedly $15,000. 17 circumstances of his law firm. As previously noted, the Respondent admitted, however, that he viewed Ms. Gaither as a creditor that should have been considered as a part of the Respondent’s costs.

As of the date of the hearing in this disciplinary matter, the Respondent has failed to return any additional funds to Ms. Gaither. *** Bar Counsel’s Investigation “On November 15, 2017, Ms. Gaither filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. During Bar Counsel’s investigation, the Respondent gave a statement under oath on June 20, 2018. *** “The Court finds that the Respondent did not knowingly and intentionally testify falsely in this deposition with Bar Counsel on June 20, 2018. The Court finds that the May 15, 2012 Letter Agreement, expressly stating that in the event that the Hedgepeth case settles or resolves by trial for more than $500,000, the Respondent would repay Ms. Gaither $54,000, was not an agreement to share fees, but rather part of a concerted effort on the part of the Respondent to encourage Ms. Gaither to give Respondent her money. The Court does 18 not find, given the history of events in this case, that Respondent if he received a $500,000 settlement instead of the $400,000 that he did receive[] that the Respondent would have doubled Ms. Gaither’s money and returned to her $54,000.

The Court is confident in this prediction since after receiving [the] $400,000 settlement, he failed to pay any of the ‘guaranteed’ $27,000. “The Court finds that the agreement is not what the Respondent purported it to be, a ‘guaranteed investment,’ but rather a personal ‘loan’ to the Respondent with ever-changing repayment and return provisions determined solely by the Respondent. The Court makes the same assessment of the August 14, 2015 email. The Court finds that the delivery of the $5,000 to Ms. Gaither, was not part of a fee but rather a token payment to support the illusion that he was abiding by the agreement and was a fair dealing partner in this venture. *** The Court views the emails and agreements as continuing empty promises solely intent on getting and retaining Ms. Gaither’s investment. Therefore, the Court does not find that 19 he made knowingly and intentional misrepresentations in his statement under oath regarding monies paid to Ms. Gaither. “Finally, Petitioner alleges that, during the Respondent’s deposition, in response to a question regarding the Respondent’s use of Ms. Gaither’s funds, the Respondent knowingly and intentionally testified falsely . . . .

The full reading of the transcript shows that when questioned about the expenditure after the deposit of Ms. Gaither’s monies, the Respondent admitted that while some expenditures were personal in nature, and some were possibly business but could be personal, only one check for $800, for an expert witness, was an expenditure to benefit a specific case. The statement by Respondent was, at best, an attempt to explain what he used the monies for, and the Court does not find it was a false statement viewed in the entirety of the deposition. Mitigating Factors “The Respondent did not present any evidence in mitigation. Aggravating Factors “The Court of Appeals has recognized the following aggravating factors: 20 ‘(1) Prior disciplinary offenses; (2) A dishonest or selfish motive; (3) A pattern of misconduct; (4) Multiple offenses; (5) Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (6) Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (7) Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct; (8) Vulnerability of victim; (9) Substantial experience in the practice of law; and (10) Whether he or she displayed indifference to making restitution.’ “See Att’y Griev.

Comm’n v. Sperling, 434 Md. 658 , 676–77, 76 A.3d 1172, 1183 (2013) (citing Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions). The Petitioner has alleged the existence of the following aggravating factors: (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple offenses; (7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; and (10) indifference to making restitution. This Court agrees. *** CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO EACH CHARGE 21 “For the reasons stated below, this Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Respondent violated the following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct and the Maryland Attorney’s Rules of Professional Conduct:[] MLRPC Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information “Rule 1.6 provides, in part, ‘(a) a lawyer shall not reveal information related to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by section (b) of this Rule.’ “The Court finds that the Respondent violated Rule 1.6 when he disclosed to Ms. Gaither, in his May 15, 2012 email, that Mr. Hedgepeth would not settle his case for less than one million dollars. Despite the Responden[t]’s insistence that he intended to express his own goals in his statements to Ms. Gaither regarding the Hedgepeth settlement, the Court cannot and will not ignore the plain and obvious meaning of ‘[Mr. Hedgepeth] will not accept a settlement less than $1 Million.’ The Court similarly rejects Respondent’s argument that disclosing a client’s expectations for settlement does not constitute a violation of Rule 1.6 simply because lawyers do so regularly; the Court will not speculate on what attorneys do in 22 their day-to-day practice, but it will not accept the argument that regularity voids culpability.

The Respondent failed to obtain Mr. Hedgepeth’s informed consent before making the disclosure, despite his assurances to Ms. Gaither that he had done so. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Respondent has violated Rule 1.6. MLRPC 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer “Rule 5.4 provides, in part: ‘(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that: (1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons; (2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a lawyer who is deceased or disabled or who has disappeared may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay the purchase price to the estate or representative of the lawyer; (3) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a