Attorney Grievance v. White

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Landon Maurice White, Misc. Docket AG No. 7, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Eaves, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTION — DISBARMENT Respondent, Landon Maurice White, violated several provisions of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) when he failed to communicate with clients; refused to refund client funds; made intentional misrepresentations to various courts and Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland; failed to cooperate with Petitioner during the investigatory process; and mismanaged client funds in a variety of ways. Respondent’s conduct violated the following MARPC: 1.1 (Competence); 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4 (Communication); 1.5 (Fees); 1.8 (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; Specific Rules); 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation); 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions); 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal); 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); 8.4 (Misconduct); and Maryland Rules 19-407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping) and 19-410 (Prohibited Transactions).

These violations warrant disbarment. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-21-002573 Argued: June 2, 2022 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 7 September Term, 2021 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. LANDON MAURICE WHITE Fader, C.J. Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. Opinion by Eaves, J. Filed: August 12, 2022 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2022-08-12 09:28-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Landon Maurice White, Respondent, a member of the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, maintained a solo practice in Baltimore.

On May 24, 2021, Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) in this Court, alleging that Respondent violated the following 13 Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and two Maryland Rules regarding attorney trust accounts: 1. 19-301.1 (Competence) (1.1); 2. 19-301.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer) (1.2); 3. 19-301.3 (Diligence) (1.3); 4. 19-301.4 (Communication) (1.4); 5. 19-301.5 (Fees) (1.5); 6. 19-301.8 (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; Specific Rules) (1.8); 7. 19-301.15 (Safekeeping of Property) (1.15); 8. 19-301.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) (1.16); 9. 19-303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) (3.1); 10. 19-303.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) (3.3); 11. 19-303.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney) (3.4); 12. 19-308.1 (Bar Admissions and disciplinary Matters) (8.1); 13. 19-308.4 (Misconduct) (8.4); 14. 19-407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping); and 15. 19-410 (Prohibited Transactions). Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-772(a), this Court referred the matter to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and designated the Honorable Myshala E. Middleton (the “hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and provide findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a three-day hearing held on January 4, January 19, and February 1, 2022, the hearing judge found clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated 14 of the 15 allegations in the Petition.1 Respondent filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and this Court heard oral arguments on June 2, 2022. On June 6, 2022, we issued a per curiam Order imposing the sanction of immediate disbarment of Respondent from the practice of law.

Att’y Grievance Comm'n v. White, 479 Md. 83 (2022). We now overrule the exceptions and hold that the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Our reasons are as follows. I. FINDINGS OF FACT The hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize.

A. Background Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on June 16, 2015, and maintained a solo practice of law in Baltimore, Maryland. On September 9, 2019, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a Conditional Diversion Agreement (“CDA”) 1 At the conclusion of the trial, Petitioner withdrew the Rule 3.4 charge. 2 and an Agreement Concerning the Appointment of a Law Practice Monitor. 2 These agreements related to Respondent’s representation of Orlando Hamilton and Don Crudup. Along with these clients’ cases, however, the allegations in the Petition also concern three other clients’ cases (Robert Frazier, Kenneth Cole, and the Nelson Contracting Company) and Respondent’s attorney trust account. B. Representation of Orlando Hamilton In 1986, Orlando Hamilton was convicted of first-degree murder in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and received a life sentence.3 On September 9, 2017, Mr. Hamilton’s mother, Mary Hamilton, retained Respondent to file a Petition for Post- Conviction Relief, for which she agreed to a flat fee of $8,000.00 and provided a cashier’s check for $4,500.00.

Neither Mr. Hamilton nor his mother signed a retainer agreement with Respondent. After several months of unsuccessful attempts to contact Respondent both by telephone and in person, Mary Hamilton terminated Respondent’s services and requested a refund. Instead of immediately refunding Ms. Hamilton, Respondent wrote to Mr. Hamilton to inquire if he wished Respondent to continue representation. Even though Mr. 2 The CDA required Respondent to refrain from representing any clients in post- conviction cases for one year, attend six continuing legal education programs, attend the program on attorney trust account management offered by Petitioner, execute written retainer agreements with all clients, and obtain professional liability insurance to be maintained for the duration of the CDA. 3 We mean no disrespect in mentioning the nature of the convictions and sentences of Mr. Hamilton or any other clients that are cited in this Opinion.

We do so only to illustrate the seriousness of the reasons for which they retained Respondent. 3 Hamilton did not respond to the letter, Respondent drafted a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Mary Hamilton filed a complaint with Petitioner, following which Respondent fully refunded her via two checks. Petitioner docketed on June 22, 2018, the Hamilton complaint and requested that Respondent provide a copy of Mr. Hamilton’s client file, a copy of any financial record- keeping pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-407, and an explanation of whether he provided Mary Hamilton with an accounting of the legal services he performed. Instead of complying with this request, Respondent advised Petitioner that he refunded Mary Hamilton in full and that he would also provide the information requested.

After three more requests from Petitioner that also went unanswered,4 Respondent provided a written response. C. Representation of Don Crudup In October 2016, Don Crudup filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging negligence by employees of the institution where he is incarcerated—Eastern Correctional Institution. In response to the defendants’ motions to dismiss, Mr. Crudup retained Respondent to represent him and signed a retainer agreement, which provided for a fee on a contingency basis, whereby Respondent would receive 40% of any settlement proceeds awarded. On May 26, 2017, Respondent entered his appearance and sought an extension to file a response to the defendants’ motions.

The district court granted the request and set a deadline for responses to be filed no later than 4 The hearing judge found that Respondent did not respond to Petitioner’s July 23, 2018, August 22, 2018, and September 26, 2018 requests. 4 July 27, 2017. After a review of the pending motions, however, Respondent determined that Mr. Crudup had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before the complaint was filed,5 and Respondent advised Mr. Crudup to pursue the administrative remedies before he (Respondent) took any further action in the case. In turn, Mr. Crudup advised Respondent that he no longer wished to pursue the federal complaint. Respondent, however, did not take any action to dismiss the case or to withdraw his appearance.

On September 25, 2017, the district court dismissed Mr. Crudup’s complaint. On April 23, 2018, Mr. Crudup filed a complaint with Petitioner. In a July 20, 2018, letter, Petitioner asked Respondent to provide a complete copy of Mr. Crudup’s client file. Respondent ignored that request, as well as two subsequent requests.

Respondent finally provided in October 2018 a copy of Mr. Crudup’s client file. On July 2, 2019, Petitioner took Respondent’s statement under oath, during which Respondent admitted that he periodically failed to provide written retainer agreements and settlement disbursement sheets to clients in contingency cases. D. Representation of Robert Frazier Robert Frazier was convicted on October 25, 1988, of first-degree murder in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and was sentenced on December 12, 1988, to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On July 28, 2016, Mr. Frazier, in proper person, filed a Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence and Request for Hearing in the Circuit 5 One of Respondent’s character witnesses, Russell Neverdon, who is discussed in more detail below, see infra Part VI, testified that he informed Respondent about the exhaustion requirement in administrative appeals. 5 Court for Baltimore City to which the State filed a response.

The circuit court scheduled a hearing on the matter for December 16, 2016. Mr. Frazier’s son, Robert Johnson, retained Respondent to represent Mr. Frazier in the above matter and paid Respondent a flat fee of $4,000.00 in cash. Respondent neither deposited nor maintained the funds in an attorney trust account, as required by Maryland Rule 19-407(a), and Respondent did not obtain written, informed consent to deposit the funds in a non-attorney trust account. Respondent entered his appearance on behalf of Mr. Frazier and was successful in obtaining a postponement of the hearing.

Although the court rescheduled the hearing to March 8, 2017, between December 14, 2016, and March 8, 2017, Respondent did not communicate with Mr. Frazier or prepare Mr. Frazier for the hearing. Respondent also produced no evidence that he had any communication or visitation with Mr. Frazier prior to the March 8th hearing. In short, Respondent did no substantive work in preparation for the hearing, and, as a result, both Respondent and Mr. Frazier were unprepared. The court denied the petition, issued an opinion, and entered an order denying the Writ on February 9, 2018.

Respondent neither advised Mr. Frazier of the court’s decision nor provided him with a copy of the opinion. Like his pre-hearing preparation, Respondent’s post-hearing actions also were lacking in the following respects: (1) Respondent filed an untimely Notice of Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals without notifying Mr. Frazier and without paying a filing fee; (2) the appeals clerk’s emails to Respondent on March 26, March 30, and April 6, 2018, and multiple telephone calls on April 10, 2018, regarding the outstanding filing fee went 6 unanswered6; and (3) Respondent’s check for $121.00 mailed to the Clerk’s Office was written from Respondent’s attorney trust account, despite the fact that the funds provided by Mr. Frazier had been deposited into a different, non-attorney account. Although the appeal was docketed in the Court of Special Appeals, which issued a Session Briefing Notice including the schedule for briefs and oral argument, Respondent advised neither Mr. Frazier nor Mr. Johnson of the Session Briefing Notice and schedule, did not prepare or file an appellate brief, and did not request additional fees from Mr. Frazier or his son to file an appellate brief. Respondent eventually filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief, claiming that his paralegal had “lost or misplaced the flash drive containing the completed copy of the brief.” While this statement was a knowing and intentional misrepresentation, the Court of Special Appeals granted Respondent’s motion and required the appellant’s brief to be filed by November 1, 2018.

Even with the additional four months, Respondent did not file a brief on behalf of Mr. Frazier, and, on January 22, 2019, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602(c)(5), the Court of Special Appeals dismissed Mr. Frazier’s appeal for failure to file a brief. Respondent did not advise Mr. Frazier or Mr. Johnson that he failed to file the brief or that the appeal had been dismissed. Instead, one month later, Respondent filed a Motion to Extend the Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Decision to Dismiss the Appellant’s Appeal. 6 With respect to the telephone calls on April 10, 2018, Respondent’s voicemail inbox was full, and the Clerk’s Office was unable to leave any messages regarding the filing fee. 7 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602(e)(1), however, a motion for reconsideration must be filed no later than 10 days after the order of dismissal.7 Respondent’s motion was filed 31 days after the court’s dismissal. In addition, although Respondent’s last contact with Mr. Frazier was March 8, 2017, Respondent stated in that motion that he had “set up a meeting with Appellant’s family member, but the meeting never took place.” Respondent further stated in the motion that, “[u]ntil recently, [he] has not received any communication from the Appellant in this case or fees or costs associated with appeal.” The hearing judge found that these statements were knowingly and intentionally false.

When Mr. Johnson learned of the circuit court’s opinion, he contacted Respondent and scheduled a meeting for April 6, 2019. It was then that Respondent informed Mr. Johnson that in February 2018, the circuit court had denied Mr. Frazier’s Writ of Actual Innocence. Respondent, however, lied to Mr. Johnson about Respondent’s failure to file a brief, which led to the Court of Special Appeals’ dismissal of Mr. Frazier’s appeal. Instead, Respondent led Mr. Johnson to believe that Mr. Frazier had until April 15, 2019, to file a direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and Respondent offered to handle the appeal if Mr. Johnson paid an additional fee; Mr. Johnson replied that he could not afford to pay an additional fee.

After his meeting with Mr. Johnson, Respondent received a telephone call from Mr. Frazier, during which he lied to Mr. Frazier about work he had performed on the appeal, 7 Prior to the April l, 2022, amendment of Maryland Rule 8-602, section (e) was amended in a February 9, 2022, Order, which changed the deadline of this rule for a motion for reconsideration from 10 days to 20 days after the entry of an order dismissing an appeal. 8 promising to send to Mr. Frazier a copy of the circuit court opinion and the appellate brief. As with Mr. Johnson, Respondent also did not inform Mr. Frazier of the dismissed appeal due to Respondent’s failure to file a brief. Respondent did not provide Mr. Frazier with any documents relating to the appeal. The Court of Special Appeals denied as untimely Respondent’s Motion to Extend the Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Decision to Dismiss the Appellant’s Appeal; the mandate was issued by the Clerk on April 11, 2019.

Respondent did not advise Mr. Frazier or Mr. Johnson of the court’s decision. On September 12, 2019, Mr. Frazier filed a complaint against Respondent with Petitioner. Petitioner sent two written requests to Respondent, seeking a written response to the complaint. Respondent replied on October 18, 2019, stating, “I represented Mr. Frazier in circuit court in front of Judge Peters.

I was never paid to do his appeal.” The hearing judge found that this statement was intentionally misleading given that by this time an appeal had been filed but dismissed due to Respondent’s actions (or lack thereof). Petitioner emailed and mailed a letter to Respondent, requesting a more detailed response to Mr. Frazier’s complaint and asked that a copy of Mr. Frazier’s client file be provided no later than November 4, 2019. Yet, in his untimely letter dated November 8, 2019, Respondent again misleadingly stated that he had not been retained or paid to handle Mr. Frazier’s appeal and that he had informed Mr. Johnson to contact the Office of the Public Defender (“OPD”) to assist with the appeal. Before the hearing judge, Respondent stated that, after the appeal was dismissed, he advised Mr. Johnson to contact the OPD to 9 assist Mr. Frazier in refiling the Writ of Actual Innocence.

Respondent did not provide a copy of Mr. Frazier’s client file to Petitioner as requested. Petitioner requested information regarding Respondent’s communications with Mr. Frazier and again requested a copy of Mr. Frazier’s client file to be provided no later than March 30, 2020. By letter dated April 13, 2020, Respondent falsely stated that he agreed to file an appeal on Mr. Frazier’s behalf on the condition that he be paid. Respondent also stated that he filed the notice of appeal to preserve Mr. Frazier’s right to appeal.

Again, however, Respondent did not provide a copy of Mr. Frazier’s client file. E. Representation of Kenneth Cole In February 1992, Kenneth Cole was convicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County of first-degree rape, burglary, and other charges and was sentenced to life in prison in April 1992. He filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, in proper person, in January 1994, which the circuit court denied in May that same year. Mr. Cole retained Respondent on December 10, 2016, through Mr. Cole’s brother- in-law, Richard Henson.

On Mr. Cole’s behalf, Mr. Henson paid Respondent a flat fee of $4,000.00 in cash for assistance with additional post-conviction proceedings. Respondent did not deposit or maintain the funds in an attorney trust account and did not receive written, informed consent to deposit the funds into a non-attorney trust account. Mr. Cole 10 sought to file either a second petition for post-conviction relief or, in the alternative, a motion to re-open his closed post-conviction, and to argue the case in court.8 Although Respondent visited Mr. Cole in prison on multiple occasions between December 2016 and June 2019, Respondent was unprepared to discuss Mr. Cole’s case on each occasion and did not take any meaningful, substantive action on Mr. Cole’s behalf during that timeframe: he neither filed a supplemental petition nor a motion to re-open. He further failed to explain to Mr. Cole why he did not file anything on his behalf.

On June 24, 2019, Mr. Cole sent Respondent a letter terminating Respondent’s services and requesting a full ($4,000.00) refund. Respondent did not provide Mr. Cole with a refund, and, instead, Respondent requested Mr. Cole’s trial transcripts to continue representation for the post-conviction matter. In a letter dated September 25, 2019, Mr. Cole requested Respondent return the original transcripts and requested Respondent represent him in filing a motion for drug and alcohol treatment. He also informed Respondent that if he (Respondent) declined to represent him in the filing of that motion, then he wanted a refund.

Respondent did not respond to Mr. Cole’s correspondence, did not provide a refund, and did not return the original transcripts. On November 4, 2019, Mr. Cole filed a complaint against Respondent with Petitioner. Petitioner mailed and emailed Mr. Cole’s complaint to Respondent and requested a written response no later than November 25, 2019. Respondent received these 8 Mr. Cole asserted that he is eligible to file a second post-conviction petition because his conviction and sentence were entered prior to 1995.

See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-103(a). 11 communications but did not respond. Petitioner mailed and emailed a second request to Respondent, seeking a response to Mr. Cole’s complaint.

Respondent eventually provided an incomplete response, so Petitioner requested additional information and documentation, including a copy of Mr. Cole’s client file. In an April 13, 2020, letter, Respondent provided a written response in the Cole matter but did not provide a copy of Mr. Cole’s client file or any evidence of work performed on Mr. Cole’s behalf. F. Representation of Nelson Contracting Company Baltimore Glass Company, represented by Tracy Steedman, Esquire, filed on March 7, 2019, in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore City a suit alleging breach of contract against Nelson Contracting Company, owned by Richard Nelson. The District Court granted a Consent Motion for Continuance filed by Ms. Steedman and scheduled trial for October 22, 2019.

Ms. Steedman emailed Respondent a copy of the Order because Respondent’s appearance had not yet been entered in the case, and she requested copies of any filings from Respondent. Respondent filed on October 4, 2019, a Notice of Intention to Defend on behalf of Nelson Contracting but did not serve a copy on Ms. Steedman. Almost two weeks later, Respondent filed a Counterclaim against Baltimore Glass but did not provide a certificate of service. Ms. Steedman asked Respondent to email her a copy of the Counterclaim, but she received the Counterclaim by mail on October 25, 2019. 12 On the day of trial,9 Ms. Steedman advised the District Court that her client did not intend to file a response to Respondent’s Counterclaim because Respondent did not file a motion for leave to file out of time and did not cite any reason for good cause to do so.

The District Court ordered Respondent to file within seven days on behalf of Nelson Contracting a motion for leave, to which Respondent agreed. The District Court issued a notice to the parties that the trial was rescheduled to November 19, 2019. Respondent filed on October 29, 2019, a Motion for Leave to File Counter Complaint. Like in certificates of service attached to earlier filings, the certificate of service to this motion indicated that Respondent mailed the motion to Ms. Steedman on October 26, 2019, but the motion was not mailed on that date.

Ms. Steedman did not receive it until November 5, 2019. Baltimore Glass opposed Respondent’s motion, and Ms. Steedman emailed Respondent a courtesy copy of her opposition. At the rescheduled trial, Respondent and Nelson Contracting failed to appear, and the District Court contemporaneously entered a default judgment in the amount of $6,157.00 plus $2,170.00 in interest, $46.00 in costs, and $2,498.34 in attorney’s fees. The court also denied Respondent’s Motion for Leave to File Counter Complaint and found that Nelson Contracting’s Counterclaim was untimely.

The District Court sent notice of the default judgment to all parties. Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate the Judgment and to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice. Respondent argued that the judgment should be vacated 9 Respondent, Nelson Contracting, and Ms. Steedman appeared for trial; Baltimore Glass was not present due to health concerns of the owner. 13 pursuant to Maryland Rule 3-535(a).10 In the motion, Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to the District Court that neither he nor his client were notified of the rescheduled trial date when, contrary to this representation, Respondent agreed in open court to that date. Respondent also falsely claimed in the certificate of service that he mailed and emailed to Ms. Steedman a copy of the motion.

Ms. Steedman never received a copy of the motion by mail, email, or any other manner. When the District Court scheduled the matter for a hearing on January 29, 2020, and sent a Notice of Hearing, Ms. Steedman learned of Respondent’s motion. She filed an opposition, arguing that Respondent did not file the motion within 30 days, as required by Maryland Rule 3-535(a) and requested attorney’s fees under Maryland Rule 1-341. The District Court denied as untimely Respondent’s Motion to Vacate and canceled the scheduled hearing.

Ms. Steedman subsequently filed a Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Attorney’s Fees, citing Maryland Rule 1-341.11 In a February 20, 2020, Order, the District 10 Maryland Rule 3-535(a) provides “[o]n motion of any party filed within 30 days after entry of judgment, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment and may take any action that it could have taken under Rule 3-534.” 11 Section (a) of Maryland Rule 1-341 (Bad Faith—Unjustified Proceedings) states that [i]n any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in maintaining or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial justification, the court, on motion by an adverse party, may require the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of them to pay to the adverse party the costs of the proceeding and the reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing it. 14 Court awarded Plaintiff attorneys’ fees of $4,247.00, finding that Respondent “acted in bad faith in the handling of this matter and his representations to this Court by way of certifications and statements made in pleadings and motions” and that Respondent “filed pleadings and motions that lack[ed] substantial justification.” Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the February 20, 2020, Order and requested a hearing to vacate the default judgment. Although Respondent requested a hearing to vacate the court’s judgment, he did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying the motion to vacate. Respondent certified that he mailed the motion to Ms. Steedman on March 23, 2020, but the envelope containing the motion was postmarked March 31, 2020.12 Baltimore Glass filed an Opposition to Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, as well as a second Maryland Rule 1-341 Motion for Sanctions. Respondent filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration.13 On April 27, 2020, the District Court denied Respondent’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration and directed Ms. Steedman to file for the court’s consideration a second supplemental motion to award attorney’s fees supported by an affidavit.

Ms. Steedman complied. Respondent filed on May 27, 2020, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City a Notice of Appeal of the April 27th Order and a response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions. In a 12 While it is possible that this mailing may have been delayed due to the postal delays that occurred at the inception of the COVID-19 pandemic, it nevertheless fits the pattern of misleading certificates of service similar to those that Respondent attached to other pleadings. 13 For reasons unknown, the original was not docketed with the court. 15 May 29, 2020, Order, the District Court found that Respondent “acted in bad faith in the handling of this matter and his representations to this Court by way of certifications and statements made in pleadings and motions” and “found that [Respondent] filed pleadings and motions that lack substantial justification.” Accordingly, the District Court awarded Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,708.00 to be paid by Respondent. On June 9, 2020, the District Court notified the parties of the amended judgment in which the court added the $1,708.00 in attorney’s fees awarded on May 29th to the $4,247.00 awarded on February 20th against Respondent.

On September 21, 2020, the circuit court docketed Respondent's appeal. Respondent’s appellate memorandum was due October 21, 2020: 30 days after the appeal was entered on the docket. See Md. R. 7-113. Respondent filed an untimely Motion to Extend the Time to File the Appellants’ Memorandum on the Merits and requested an extension to obtain an audio CD of the June 4, 2020, hearing in the District Court, but the hearing before the District Court was held on June 4, 2019—not 2020.

Ms. Steedman filed an opposition and a Motion for Dismissal of Appeal and Sanctions. On November 4, 2020, the circuit court denied Respondent’s Motion to Extend the Time to File as untimely, citing Maryland Rule 1-204(a)(3),14 finding that Respondent failed to demonstrate excusable neglect. Baltimore Glass’s Motions to Dismiss the Appeal 14 Maryland Rule 1-204(a)(3) states, in pertinent part, that the court may “on motion filed after the expiration of the specified period, permit the act to be done if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.” 16 and for Sanctions would be heard on December 8, 2020. Respondent disregarded the court and filed an untimely appeal memorandum.

Respondent again knowingly and intentionally misrepresented in the certificate of service attached to the appeal memorandum that he served the memorandum on Ms. Steedman on November 6, 2020. In a November 9, 2020, email, Respondent provided Ms. Steedman with the memorandum for the first time. Respondent filed with the circuit court a Motion for Reconsideration of its November 4, 2020, Order, which the circuit court denied. On December 8, 2020, the parties appeared before the circuit court for oral arguments on the record appeal.

In an Order dated that same day, the circuit court ruled that Respondent’s failure to file timely the memorandum prejudiced Baltimore Glass, and the court dismissed the appeal; it denied Ms. Steedman’s motion for sanctions at a later hearing. Respondent filed in the Court of Special Appeals an untimely and improper Notice of Appeal of the November 4 and December 2, 2020, Orders.15 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132, the Court of Special Appeals transferred the appeal to this Court.16 Ms. Steedman 15 Respondent did not appeal the circuit court’s December 8, 2019, Order dismissing the appeal. 16 Maryland Rule 8-132 states: If the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals determines that an appellant has improperly noted an appeal to it but may be entitled to appeal to another court exercising appellate jurisdiction, the Court shall not dismiss the appeal but shall instead transfer the action to the court apparently having 17 filed a Motion to Strike Respondent’s Notice of Appeal for failing to comply with Maryland Rule 8-302(b), noting that an appeal from the circuit court “may be filed not later than 30 days after entry of the judgment of the circuit court.” In a January 19, 2021, letter, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals notified Respondent that his Notice of Appeal would be treated as a petition for writ of certiorari. The Clerk further advised Respondent that if he wished to supplement the petition in accordance with the provisions of Maryland Rule 8- 303, the supplement was due on March 5, 2021. Respondent filed an Amended Notice of Appeal- Request for Writ of Certiorari, but that filing was untimely, as Respondent filed it more than 30 days after the January 11, 2020, and December 14, 2020, Orders.

Ms. Steedman filed a Motion to Strike Respondent’s Amended Notice of Appeal, asserting that Respondent’s filing was defective and untimely. Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a supplement in the Court of Appeals, which this Court granted and extended the time to file a supplement to the writ of certiorari no later than April 5, 2021. On April 6, 2021, however, Respondent filed an untimely Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court, and Ms. Steedman filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. Ten days after the response was due (April 29, 2021),17 Respondent filed an untimely opposition.

In a June 22, 2021, Order, we denied jurisdiction, upon the payment of costs provided in the order transferring the action. 17 Ms. Steedman certified that a copy of the motion was served on Respondent via MDEC on April 14, 2021. Maryland Rule 8-431(b) provides that a response to a motion before the Court of Appeals “shall be filed within five days after service of the motion.” 18 Respondent’s Petition and Supplement for a Writ of Certiorari, as well as his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile, in the District Court matter, with respect to collection on the judgment, Respondent’s oral examination was set for April 22, 2021. Although Respondent was served on December 18, 2020, with the Notice of the Oral Examination, he failed to appear.

He did not file a motion for a protective order or otherwise assert a valid reason for his failure to appear. G. Respondent’s Attorney Trust Account On November 8, 2019, Wells Fargo Bank notified Petitioner that two PayPal transactions overdrew Respondent’s attorney trust account by $63.22. In a November 15, 2019, letter, Petitioner requested that Respondent provide within 10 days of receipt of the letter an explanation for the overdraft and copies of his client ledgers, deposit slips, cancelled checks, and monthly bank statements for the period of September 2019 through November 15, 2019. Respondent submitted a copy of his attorney trust account statement for September 2019, identifying five clients who paid funds in advance.

Respondent claimed the September 2019 statement showed no activity because the clients permitted him to deposit funds into his operating account instead of his attorney trust account. Respondent did not provide any of the other requested documentation. Petitioner emailed Respondent with a second request for copies of Respondent’s client ledgers, deposit slips, cancelled checks, and monthly bank statements for the period of September 2019 to November 2019. Petitioner also requested copies of the retainer 19 agreements for the five clients that Respondent identified in the September 2019 statement.

Respondent provided copies of his October 2019, November 2019, and December 2019 bank statements. He did not provide the other requested documentation: client ledgers, deposit slips, and cancelled checks. He admitted to Petitioner that he did not have signed retainer agreements from three of the five clients, and he did not provide signed retainer agreements for the other two clients. The bank statements reflected that Respondent had a PayPal account connected to his attorney trust account, which he used to pay personal expenses including a Showtime television network subscription.

In response to a subpoena issued to Wells Fargo Bank, Petitioner received Respondent’s attorney trust account records. Charles Miller IV, CPA, Investigator for Petitioner, reviewed the records and prepared summaries. The summaries and Respondent’s admissions showed that Respondent did not properly maintain his attorney trust account for the period of September 2017 through June 2018. The summaries also showed that Respondent maintained negative client ledgers, engaged in commingling of personal and client funds, and made personal expenditures from his attorney trust account.

Specifically, in connection with clients Nate Ayer, L. Hodge, and Ed McCormick, Respondent withdrew attorney’s fees from his attorney trust account at times when he was not holding funds for those clients. In addition to the two PayPal withdrawals, which caused the account to be overdrawn, Respondent made personal expenditures from his attorney trust account using a PayPal credit card, including on November 7, 2019, withdrawing $9.31 for “Showtime Law Office of Landon White,” on November 21, 2019, 20 withdrawing $9.33 for “Tidal Law Office of Landon White,” and on March 2, 2020, withdrawing $5.37 for “DocuSign Law Office of Landon White.” In a May 19, 2020, letter, Petitioner asked Respondent to provide no later than June 5, 2020, copies of his client ledgers for the period of August 2019 through May 2020. No response having been received, Petitioner again wrote to Respondent and requested that the relevant documents be provided no later than June 22, 2020. Petitioner wrote a third letter to Respondent, requesting copies of his client ledgers and advising Respondent that a review of his attorney trust account records had been completed.

Petitioner requested that Respondent identify the client matters associated with numerous unknown transactions. Petitioner also asked Respondent to explain his disbursement of funds maintained on behalf of client Qiana Barnes, including how and when the remaining funds from her settlement check were disbursed. On August 17, 2020, Respondent wrote to Petitioner but did not identify the client matters associated with the unknown transactions. With respect to Ms. Barnes, Respondent stated that he advanced $3,000.00 to Ms. Barnes prior to receiving her settlement funds and that when he received Ms. Barnes’s settlement funds, he retained a larger share to pay back the advanced funds and to pay his fees.

Respondent provided in an August 25, 2020, letter what was purported to be client ledgers for the period requested: August 2019 through May 2020. The ledgers did not comply with the requirements of Maryland Rule 19-407 and could not be reconciled with the attorney trust account records received from Wells Fargo. Respondent provided ledgers for 39 clients, indicating that he received advance funds on behalf of those clients, yet his 21 attorney trust account records did not reflect any deposits on behalf of those clients. For example, Respondent provided a client ledger for William Barnett, which reflected that Respondent received $5,000.00 on behalf of Mr. Barnett on August 30, 2019.

Respondent’s attorney trust account records, however, reflected no transactions on behalf of Mr. Barnett nor a deposit of $5,000.00 into the account on or around August 30, 2019. Respondent’s ledgers did not show that he deposited legal fees and expenses that were paid in advance into his attorney trust account, and nothing indicated that he obtained written, informed consent to deposit the funds into his operating account. The client ledgers provided by Respondent for clients Lewis Lyles and Marcel Jacks did not reflect the funds maintained and disbursed from his attorney trust account. The client ledger for Mr. Lyles shows Respondent received on July 11, 2019, $6,000.00 on behalf of Mr. Lyles and made disbursements on July 11 ($2,000.00), August 5 ($1,000.00), September 17 ($1,000.00), and October 28, 2019 ($2,000.00).

Conversely, Respondent’s attorney trust account records reflected a $1,000.00 deposit into the account on behalf of Mr. Lyles on August 2, 2019, and disbursements of $600.00 on August 5th and $400.00 on August 12th of 2019. The client ledger for Mr. Jacks showed that Respondent received on March 2, 2020, $20,000.00 on behalf of Mr. Jacks and disbursed $10,000.00 the same day. Yet, Respondent’s attorney trust account records reflected a $10,000.00 deposit into the account on behalf of Mr. Jacks on March 2, 2020, and disbursements of $3,000.00 on March 12 and $4,500.00 on April 29, 2020. Finally, Respondent’s ledgers and his attorney trust account records indicated that he improperly split fees with an attorney outside of his firm in connection with several 22 client matters without obtaining the clients’ written agreement to the joint representation; there were no written agreements for clients Malik Smith and Ashley Johnson.

Respondent did not produce any evidence that he had obtained the clients’ agreement to the joint representation in writing or otherwise.

II

HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 1.1; 1.2(a); 1.3; 1.4; 1.5(a), (c), and (e); 1.8(e); 1.15; 1.16(d); 3.1; 3.3(a); 8.1(a)–(b); 8.4(a), (c)–(d); and Maryland Rules 19-407(a) and 19-410(b)–(c). Petitioner did not file exceptions. Respondent did not file any exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law; he challenged only the hearing judge’s findings of fact, one aggravating factor, and asserted a violation of his constitutional rights. We now address those concerns.

III

STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court analyzes a hearing judge’s findings of facts against the clearly erroneous standard. Md. R. 19-740(b)(2)(B); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 495 (2022). This Court reviews de novo all conclusions of law, Md. R. 19-740(b)(1), and Petitioner bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence a violation of the MARPC. Id. 19-727(c).

IV

EXCEPTIONS Respondent makes three exceptions. First, he believes the hearing judge erred by solely relying on the facts deemed admitted, by virtue of his failure to respond timely to Petitioner’s request for admissions, to support the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Second, 23 he contends that the hearing judge was mistaken that his alleged MARPC violations all occurred before he entered into the CDA, which, Respondent believes, the hearing judge viewed as an aggravating factor. Third, he argues that Petitioner deprived him of his due process rights by collectively handling the Frazier and Cole matters.

We address each exception in turn. A. Use of Requests for Admissions Respondent excepts to the entirety of the hearing judge’s findings of fact with respect to the Hamilton, Crudup, Frazier, and Cole matters. In his view, “the Trier of Fact erred in receiving and adopting the five hundred plus admissions propounded by the Petitioner upon the Respondent as the sole and exclusive evidence of the Respondent’s misconduct in the[se] . . . matters.” To that end, Respondent believes that “the use of Admissions in this manner is improper and that the Court cannot base its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law exclusively upon evidence derived from [his] failure to adequately respond to the Petitioner’s propounded requests for Admissions.” We disagree with Respondent. Before denying this exception, however, we first offer an instructive caveat as to Petitioner’s use of discovery.

Petitioner served on Respondent over 500 requests for admissions of facts and genuineness of documents and over 2,000 pages of accompanying exhibits. In some instances, Petitioner asked that Respondent admit representations that involved subjective opinions or legal conclusions. In other instances, Petitioner should have known that Respondent had no personal knowledge of the facts or documents for which admissions were requested (and had no way through reasonable inquiry to obtain sufficient information 24 to enable him to admit or deny the requests), and Petitioner should have known that some of the information Respondent was asked to admit would have been inadmissible at a disciplinary hearing under the applicable rules of evidence.18 18 Although the following is not the sole instance to which our caveat applies, for instance, in the Request for Admissions, Petitioner asked that Respondent admit the following: 345. The factual averments in the attached Exhibit 49 are true and correct. 346.

The factual averments in the attached Exhibit 50 are true and correct. *** 351. The factual averments in the attached Exhibit 63 are true and correct. 352. The factual averments in the attached Exhibit 64 are true and correct. These Exhibits are the memoranda of an investigator in Petitioner’s office, which describe actions the investigator took and interviews the investigator conducted with witnesses.

For example, Exhibit 49 states: On April 16, 2020, this investigator made arrangement with Jessup Correctional Institute to interview the complainant Mr. Robert Frazier an inmate at that facility. This investigator spoke to Mr. Frazier on this date at 10:30AM telephonically due to the virus. Mr. Frazier stated that he was arrested in 1988 and charged with two Homicides, he was sentenced to life without parole. This investigator asked Mr. Frazier why he chose Respondent to represent him in his hearing for Writ of Actual Innocence?

Mr. Frazier stated that he never retained Respondent his son Robert Johnson retained Respondent. Mr. Frazier stated that he prepared his own Writ and submitted it to the court. The States Attorney filed an answer and he then filed his response to that Motion. Mr. Frazier stated that a hearing was scheduled with the court.

Mr. Frazier stated that on the day of the hearing he went to court and was waiting to be called and he was approached by Respondent who identified himself as Mr. Landon White and told Mr. Frazier he had been retained by his son to represent him. Mr. Frazier stated at the hearing all he did was get the case postponed. Mr. Frazier stated that he never met with or spoke to Respondent 25 In sum, Petitioner served Respondent with 37 pages of Requests for Admissions and attached 125 exhibits totaling 2,087 pages. The Request for Admissions asked that Respondent admit the truthfulness of 391 factual representations and the genuineness of 125 documents—516 requests for admissions in total.

Although we recognize that serving requests for admission can be a useful tool to streamline a trial by enabling the parties to stipulate to undisputed facts and the admission of documents, the requests should be reasonable under the circumstances. Here, the Request for Admissions seemed to anticipate that Respondent might fail to respond and, thereby, be deemed to have admitted facts that he otherwise would not have admitted and that otherwise might not have been admissible at the disciplinary hearing. Asking Respondent to admit to the factual averments that we describe specifically in footnote 18, and many other requests for before the second hearing. This investigator asked Mr. Frazier he never heard from or was prepared by Respondent prior to going to court?

Mr. Frazier stated that Respondent sent some Para-Legal to meet with him, he does not recall his name, but this individual had no idea about the case and knew nothing of what he was trying to accomplish. Mr. Frazier stated at the second hearing Respondent was totally unprepared and did a terrible job. Mr. Frazier stated that this agency should obtain copies of the transcript of the hearing and they will clearly show how inept Respondent was. Mr. Frazier stated that at the end of the hearing Judge Peters stated he would render a decision later.

Bar Counsel’s Request for Admissions asked that Respondent admit that the averments in Exhibit 49 are true. It is one thing to ask that a respondent admit facts concerning the representation of a complainant or an interaction with a witness but quite another matter to ask that a respondent admit that Petitioner’s investigator conducted an interview on a given date, that the interviewee provided specific information to the investigator, and that the investigator accurately summarized the content of the interview in a memorandum. 26 admissions not detailed here19 and otherwise served on Respondent, was unreasonable. Nonetheless, for the reasons explained below, we do not sustain this exception. Our analysis starts, as it always does, with the plain meaning of the rule.

If it is “clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the language of the rule to inform our analysis.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Tatung, 476 Md. 45, 74 (2021) (citing Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 445 Md. 213, 221 (2015)). Maryland Rule 2-424(a) states, in pertinent part, that a party may “serve one or more written requests to any other party for the admission of . . . the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request.” (Emphasis added). Each matter for which an admission is requested is deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request or within 15 days after the date on which that party’s initial pleading or motion is required, whichever is later, the party to whom the request is directed serves a response signed by the party or the party’s attorney. Id. 2-424(b) (emphasis added). “Any matter admitted under this Rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment.” Id. 2-424(d).

In determining whether to exercise its discretion to permit withdrawal or amendment, the circuit court must consider whether: (1) such withdrawal or amendment “would assist the presentation of the merits of the action” and (2) “the party who obtained the admission [can] satisfy the court that [such action] will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits.” Id. 19 In addition, for example, Petitioner asked Respondent to confirm the genuineness of correspondence from attorneys and others to Petitioner, and from Petitioner to third parties, i.e., communications to which Respondent was not a party and would have had no way of confirming genuineness. 27 Maryland Rule 2-424 contains no quantitative limitation, and we decline to read one into the rule. The discovery process naturally will change to fit the facts of a particular case. What is reasonable for one case may not be so for another. At oral argument, the Court asked Petitioner whether 500 requests for admissions was normal, and Petitioner responded that so many requests were necessary given these particular facts: There were five separate client matters, as well as general financial mismanagement, and the sheer breadth of Respondent’s misconduct warranted the volume of requests.

Nevertheless, the absence of any express quantitative limitation in Maryland Rule 2-424 does not leave a party helpless. The rules contemplate that some discovery requests may be unreasonable and provide at least one avenue for an aggrieved party to seek refuge. Maryland Rule 2-403(a) permits a court, upon motion demonstrating good cause, to enter an order to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. The court can fashion a variety of remedies including, as relevant here, prohibiting Petitioner’s discovery altogether or limiting the scope of the discovery to certain matters.

While Respondent sought protection from Petitioner’s discovery requests, the hearing judge ultimately denied that request. We move next to the substance of Petitioner’s request for admissions. Respondent avers that requests “involving questions of ultimate issues of fact and or law are impermissible.” Resp.’s Exceptions at 2 (citing St. James Constr. Co. v. Morlock, 89 Md. App. 217 (1991), cert. denied, 325 Md. 526 (1992)).

Respondent misconstrues the intermediate appellate court’s analysis in that case. As relevant to this case, the issue in St. James was whether the circuit court erred in denying the Morlocks’ motion for attorneys’ 28 fees and other expenses pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-424(e).20 89 Md. App. at 222 . In their motion, the Morlocks argued that St. James refused to admit 15 out of 71 requests for admissions,21 but the trial court held that those refusals were made in good faith. Id. at 229 .

In sustaining the trial judge’s denial of the motion for attorneys’ fees, the Court of Special Appeals stated: “Requests for admissions of fact serve a limited but useful function. Because of their misuse, however, parties do not obtain a great deal of satisfaction from them as a discovery device. Regularly the propounding party seeks to obtain more of an admission than that to which he is entitled and consequently the answer given is all but useless. The purpose of the rule is not to press known discovery requests.

Rather, it is intended to eliminate from trial those matters over which the parties truly have no dispute . . . . The authenticity of documents, the corporate status of parties, and the undisputed foundation for evidence are but examples.” Id. at 230 (quoting Niemeyer and Richards, Maryland Rules Commentary 234–35 (1984)). 20 That rule states that if a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter requested under Maryland Rule 2-424(a) by another party, and the requesting party later proves said genuineness or truthfulness, then the requesting party may move for an order requiring the other party to pay reasonable expenses incurred in proving the genuineness or truthfulness. The court is required to enter the requested order unless it finds that (1) an objection to the request was sustained pursuant to section (c) of this Rule, or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to expect to prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. Md. R. 2-424(e). 21 Some of the facts that St. James refused to admit were those that conclusively would have established that St. James was negligent and created unreasonable risks of harm.

St. James, 89 Md. App. at 230–31. As the Court of Special Appeals put it, “[m]any of the requests additionally contained terms of such an ambiguous nature that no attorney worth his or her salt would allow their client to admit to them.” Id. at 230 . 29 Most of those requests for admissions concerned ultimate issues of fact. In essence, “in all of these requests the Morlocks were seeking to obtain more than they were entitled to. As a result, they deserved whatever responses they received.” Id. at 231 .

Excluding that any holding from St. James is not binding upon this Court, we do not read that opinion to paint with as large a stroke as Respondent would have us believe. The Court of Special Appeals did not hold that the Morlocks’ request for admissions was void ab initio because it stretched beyond matters that the rule is intended to cover. Rather, its holding, in its simplest form, can be boiled down to the following: Where (1) a party serves on another a request for admissions that addresses issues of ultimate facts in a case, (2) the receiving party refuses to admit, and (3) the propounding party eventually prevails in proving the requested admissions, then (4) the propounding party likely will not prevail on a motion for attorneys’ fees under Maryland Rule 2-424(e) because the propounding party’s request exceeds the rule’s intended scope. Respondent also cites to Gonzales v. Boas, 162 Md. App. 344 , cert. denied, 388 Md. 405 (2005), but that case factually is distinguishable from Respondent’s.

Gonzales filed against Boas a complaint alleging three counts of civil battery. Gonzales, 162 Md. App. at 350 . Boas responded by filing motions to dismiss and for a more definite statement, as well as discovery requests including a request for admissions of fact. Id.

Counsel for Gonzales accidentally placed the response to the request for admissions in the client file instead of mailing it, and Gonzales missed the deadline to respond. Id. n.2. Boas subsequently moved for summary judgment; Gonzales filed a response to the motion and a late response to the request for admissions. Id. at 351.

Gonzales argued that, although 30 late, her response to the request for admissions could be stricken only upon motion, which meant there currently were material facts in dispute; she alternatively requested that she be allowed to withdraw any deemed facts. Id. Boas responded by filing a motion to strike the untimely response, and Gonzales submitted an opposition to the motion to strike. Id.

The circuit court granted Boas’s original motion to dismiss and allotted Gonzales 20 days to file an amended complaint.22 Id. Gonzales did so, and Boas filed a second motion for summary judgment, again asserting that there were no issues of material fact in dispute. Id. at 351–52. The trial court struck Gonzales’s late response and entered summary judgment for Boas.

Id. The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to strike or, in the alternative, failing to permit Gonzales to withdraw the deemed admissions under section (d), id. at 354, because “nothing in the record . . . indicate[d] that the court exercised its discretion as to whether to permit ‘withdrawal or amendment’ of the deemed admissions pursuant to Rule 2-424(d)[,]” id. at 358. In its view, the circuit court “provided no explanation for its decision to strike [Gonzales’s] response except that it was untimely,” id.; it failed to consider how withdrawal would aid in the presentation of the merits, id. at 359; and made no findings as to any possible prejudice that Boas would face if withdrawal were permitted, id. at 361. Lastly, the intermediate appellate court addressed Gonzales’s own culpability.

It found that the conduct “was not 22 The court denied as moot the motion for a more definite statement and summary judgment but did not rule on Boas’s motion to strike Gonzales’s late response to the request for admissions. 31 egregious”; counsel for Gonzales provided an adequate explanation as to why the response was late and filed one only eight days past the deadline. Id. at 357, 361. Gonzales procedurally is distinguishable from Respondent’s case. Unlike Respondent, who provided Petitioner with an exceptionally late response, Gonzales filed only eight days late a response to the request for admissions, provided an explanation as to why the response was late, asked, prior to Boas filing a motion to strike, that she be permitted to withdraw any deemed admissions, and, once Boas did file a motion to strike, filed an opposition to the motion to strike her untimely response.

See id. at 351 n.2, 357, 361. Respondent, unlike Gonzales, never asked the hearing judge to permit withdrawal of the admissions. See Md. R. 2-424(d). Thus, unlike in Gonzales where the Court of Special Appeals was asked to review the trial judge’s refusal to permit withdrawal, there is no action from the hearing judge that we can review for abuse of discretion.

See Gonzales, 162 Md. App. at 351, 354 . Respondent, therefore, cannot draw any meaningful connection between his case and Gonzales. After Petitioner sent to Respondent its request for admissions, he failed to respond timely or provide any explanation for his untimely response. That is a far cry from the facts of Gonzales.

While the Court of Special Appeals in Gonzales stated that the purpose of Maryland Rule 2-424 is to eliminate issues over which the parties truly do not dispute, citing language from St. James, Respondent ignores that the court also recognized that “deemed admissions may properly embrace material or ‘ultimate’ issues of fact in a case[.]” Id. at 360 (citing Murnan v. Joseph J. Hock, Inc., 274 Md. 528 , 529–31 (1975)). Thus, the Gonzales court stamped its imprimatur—citing precedent from this Court—on the very action that 32 Respondent now would have us reject. We decline his invitation, albeit implicit, to overrule any of our precedent in this area. Maryland Rule 2-424 similarly contains no express qualitative restrictions regarding the substance of the admissions that a party may attempt to obtain.

To the contrary, a party may request that an opposing party admit the “truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request.” Md. R. 2-424(a) (emphasis added). While the purpose of the rule may be to eliminate from trial less trivial matters, there is nothing that prevents a party from using the rule in a broader fashion. In that case, it is incumbent upon the receiving party to answer in the negative the broad request for admissions, or, in the case where the receiving party fails to respond, diligently and timely seek withdrawal or amendment of those admissions. See id. 2-424(d); Murnan, 274 Md. at 530 (noting that the request for admissions of fact in that case asked that the defendant corporation to admit to the very heart of the dispute: that the defendant installed sand to a depth of five inches instead of only two inches, as requested by the plaintiff).

In addition to those already articulated, we further find for two reasons that the hearing judge’s acceptance and reliance on the admitted facts were not an abuse of discretion. First, we permit hearing judges to use facts admitted under Maryland Rule 2- 424 to prove in a disciplinary proceeding an attorney’s misconduct. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. McCarthy, Petitioner similarly served on McCarthy a request for admissions of facts and genuineness of documents, which sought McCarthy’s admission to the genuineness of 28 exhibits and two facts: his bar admittance date and that he maintained an office for the practice of law in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. 473 Md. 33 462, 469 (2021). McCarthy responded to the request over one year later, but the hearing judge held that McCarthy’s delay warranted sanctions; the documents and facts were deemed admitted, and McCarthy was precluded from providing any testimony to contradict them.

Id. at 469, 478. McCarthy excepted to the hearing judge’s findings of facts, which were based on the admitted facts and genuineness of the documents, requesting, among other things, a new hearing. Id. at 481. In denying McCarthy’s request, this Court strictly adhered to the plain language of Maryland Rule 2-424, stating that the hearing judge’s grant of the motion for sanctions did not result in prejudice to McCarthy, given that, as discussed below, the facts and genuineness of the documents referred to in the request for admissions were automatically deemed admitted pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-424(b) once McCarthy missed the deadline for responding to the request.

Any evidence that McCarthy would have presented at the disciplinary hearing but for the hearing judge’s grant of the motion for sanctions would not have negated the facts set