Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax

HARRELL, J. On 14 April 2003, Helen and John Skevofílax (Respondents here), individually and as next friends of their eight-year-old son, Michael, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking damages from Defendants (Petitioners here), several corporations engaged in the manufacture of pediatric vaccines and the ingredients incorporated in the vaccines. 1 The Plaintiffs-Respondents claimed that Michael’s autism spectrum disorder was caused by thimerosal, a mercury-containing preser ⁴⁰⁹ vative used in pediatric vaccines administered to Michael as an infant. The disposition of the complaint on preliminary motions is what brings this case to us. On 21 December 2004, the Circuit Court denied Respondents’ motion for dismissal of the complaint without prejudice, and granted summary judgment in Petitioners’ favor. The court, having extended discovery three times by way of amended scheduling orders, determined that summary judgment was appropriate in light of Respondents’ “conceded inability to produce an expert witness on the area of specific causation in connection with this proceeding.” Respondents noted a timely appeal, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to dismiss without prejudice pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-506(b). 2 The Court of Special Appeals, in a reported opinion, 3 agreed with ⁴¹⁰ the Skevofílaxes and reversed.

The intermediate appellate court reasoned that the need to protect Michael’s rights as a minor warranted a voluntary dismissal, in lieu of the summary judgment entered in Petitioners’ favor. For reasons we shall explain, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. It was neither an abuse of discretion by the Circuit Court to deny Respondents’ motion to dismiss nor error of law to enter summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. BACKGROUND Respondents’ complaint in the Circuit Court alleged that toxic levels of mercury in the thimerosal contained in vaccinations, administered to Michael as a baby, caused his autism. 4 This lawsuit thus became one of many thimerosal vaccine cases maintained throughout the country.

On 30 September 2003 Judge Stuart R. Berger of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City was assigned specially to preside over the case. 5 The parties met on 13 November 2003 in order to discuss a scheduling order for discovery, preliminary motions, oppositions and replies, pre-trial conferences, and the trial itself. The court issued, on 18 November 2003, a Scheduling Order requiring completion of all discovery, including depositions and resolution of any fact discovery disputes, no later than 30 July 2004. The Order further directed the identification of Respondents’ expert witnesses on or before 1 September 2004 and identification of Petitioners’ experts by ⁴¹¹ no later than 1 November 2004. The experts were required to be available for deposition no later than by 30 September and 30 November 2004, respectively.

The Order also called for completion of all discovery of experts, including depositions, no later than 15 December 2004, required all dispositive motions to be filed no later than 15 February 2005, and directed that the parties attend a pre-trial conference on 4 April 2005. Trial was set for 2 May 2005. Discovery began with the depositions of Mr. and Mrs. Skevofilax, and the scheduling of several other depositions to be taken at a later date. By letter dated 24 May 2004, however, Respondents’ counsel expressed doubt to the Circuit Court that the 30 July 2004 deadline for completion of fact discovery could be met.

According to Respondents, GlaxoSmithKline recently was added as a defendant by the Second Amended Complaint filed on 24 May 2004, and Wyeth had served Respondents’ counsel with approximately 20,000 documents in response to Respondents’ discovery requests. The Skevofilaxes accordingly filed a Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order on 15 June 2004. Following a hearing, the court ordered on 13 July 2004 (the Amended Scheduling Order) that the following changes be made in the Scheduling Order: (1) the date for completion of fact discovery was extended from 30 July 2004 to 15 December 2004; (2) the deadline for designation of Respondent’s expert witnesses was pushed-back two weeks to 15 September 2004, and the time for deposing those experts was likewise moved to 15 October 2004; (3) the date for identification of Petitioner’s witnesses was moved back one week to 8 November 2004; and, (4) the deadline for deposing them was changed to 7 December 2004 from 30 November 2004. Judge Berger refused, however, to grant Respondents’ request to move the trial date to 19 September 2005 because time constraints imposed by operation of the Circuit Court’s docket rotation system mitigated against such a delay. 6 ⁴¹² Respondents filed a Motion to Modify Amended Scheduling Order on 2 August 2004, citing the “extensive document production, numerous depositions of fact witnesses and corporate designees, and the appearance of [GlaxoSmithKline] ....” 7 After another hearing, the Circuit Court, on 2 September 2004, again extended discovery (Second Amended Scheduling Order).

The time for designation of Respondents’ experts was extended another three weeks to 8 October 2004, and those experts were to be available for deposition by no later than 5 November 2004. The deadline for identification of Petitioners’ experts was changed to 29 November 2004, and they were to be available for deposition on or before 20 December 2004. The deadline for completion of all discovery as to proposed expert witnesses was extended five days to 20 December 2004. Respondents designated four expert witnesses as to liability and four experts as to damages on 7 October 2004.

One, James Jeffrey Bradstreet, M.D., was designated to testify to specific causation, i.e., “that significant amounts of mercury to which the minor plaintiff was exposed, including bolus doses received as a result of vaccination, was a substantial factor in causing [Michael’s] current injuries and symptoms,” and further, “that the exposure to toxic levels of mercury within the vaccines [was] a substantial contributing factor to the minor Plaintiffs ultimate injuries and symptoms.” Dr. Bradstreet was the sole expert named by Respondents on the question of specific causation. 8 ⁴¹³ On 26 October 2004, Respondents notified Petitioners, by letter, that “due to unforeseen circumstances [genomic profiling] test results critical to [Dr.] Bradstreet’s opinions” would be delayed up to sixty days. 9 The relevant genomic susceptibility tests assertedly needed for Dr. Bradstreet’s expert medical opinion were being performed by a laboratory at the University of Arkansas. An affidavit completed by Dr. Bradstreet stated that an outbreak of leukemia in New Mexico caused the Arkansas lab’s director, Dr. Jill James, to be called out of town to consult on that outbreak, and that she would not be returning for several weeks. Drs. James and Bradstreet previously had collaborated on other projects.

According to Dr. Bradstreet, he would be unable to formulate an expert medical opinion regarding causation specific to Michael’s injuries until the results of the genetic test results were received from Dr. James’ lab. Respondents filed on 29 October 2004 a Motion for Continuance or, in the Alternative, Dismissal of All Claims Without Prejudice. The parties came before the court on 10 November 2004 to discuss the discovery issues raised by the motion. The court, after hearing from all parties, concluded that neither a continuance nor dismissal was appropriate, given the time constraints imposed by the court’s docket rotation system.

Judge Berger instead urged that the parties “endeavor to agree upon a Third Amended Scheduling Order.” If the parties could not settle upon a mutually agreeable schedule, they each were to provide the court with a proposed order. The parties were unable to collaborate successfully on a unified, new scheduling order, citing disputes over specific dates for deposition of Respondents’ expert witnesses. They submitted competing proposals on 17 November 2004. The Circuit Court entered a Third Amended Scheduling on 19 November 2004.

The dates for dispositive motions, pre ⁴¹⁴ trial conference, and the trial itself remained unchanged. The deadline for completion of all fact discovery, including depositions of fact witnesses and full resolution of disputes, was delayed until 31 December 2004. Of particular relevance to the posture of the case as it comes to us, the court ordered further that Dr. Bradstreet be made available for initial deposition on 19 November 2004. According to the court, [appropriate topics of inquiry for this deposition, [were to] include, but not be limited to, the nature and purpose of the GST [glutathione-S-transferase, a particular family of enzymes in the human genome] Ml [a particular gene which encodes the GST enzyme] polymorphism [i.e., difference or variation] test, the work that Dr. Bradstreet [had] performed to date in this action, his qualifications, his affidavit submitted in connection with Plaintiffs Motion for Continuance, all of his opinions on the subject of general causation, and the results of those tests that Dr. Bradstreet [had] performed or directed to be performed and that [were] available as of the date of [the] initial discovery deposition.

In the event that the genomic susceptibility tests from Dr. James’ lab became available later, the court continued, Dr. Bradstreet would be made available for additional discovery by no later than 14 January 2005 in order to explain how those results pertained to his expert opinion regarding specific causation. Counsel for Respondents informed the Circuit Court and opposing counsel, by letter dated 23 November 2004, that Dr. Bradstreet declined to participate further in the litigation. According to Respondents’ counsel, Dr. Bradstreet withdrew due to outside “professional and personal commitments and time constraints.” 10 Respondents, pursuant to Maryland Rule ⁴¹⁵ 2-506(b), renewed their Motion for Dismissal of All Claims Without Prejudice on 1 December 2004. Vaccine Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on that date.

The court rendered an oral opinion from the bench on 21 December 2004 denying Respondents’ motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, and granting the motions for summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. 11 The court began by acknowledging that it was a matter of discretion whether a dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. Judge Berger recounted several factors that he considered in deciding the motion, including: effort and expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant; the sufficiency of the reason of the need for dismissal; and whether there were any dispositive motions pending. The court analyzed the facts of the case in light of these factors, and determined that dismissal without prejudice was not appropriate. Judge Berger reasoned: [t]he Court does have to take into consideration in the facts of this case that there [ ] [is a] minor plaintiff! ] involved.

And the Court is most empathetic with that issue. Nevertheless, the Court distinguishes this case from a case such as Berrain v. Katzen[,] [ 331 Md. 693 , 629 A.2d 707 (1993)], or Fulton v. K & M Associates[,] [ 331 Md. 712 , 629 A.2d 716 (1993)], relied upon by the plaintiffs, where there was either parental, or guardian neglect, or even perhaps the neglect of attorneys. That is not an issue in this case. Critical to the circuit court’s analysis was the significant time and money that had been expended in preparing pleadings and preliminary motions, and the conduct of extensive discovery. ⁴¹⁶ Turning to the pending motions for summary judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501, 12 Judge Berger opined that “[wjithout any expert testimony on the issue of specific causation, the Court must grant the vaccine defendants’ motion for summary judgment as a matter of law.” Causation, an essential element to the cause of action, according to Judge Berger, simply was not demonstrated on the record.

On appeal by the Skevofilaxes, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that [t]he effort and expense incurred by appellees, much of which will not be wasted, cannot outweigh the unexpected withdrawal of a critical expert witness for personal reasons, prior to the end of discovery and five months before trial, in a diligently prosecuted claim of a minor for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of ingesting certain pediatric vaccines. Skevofilax v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 167 Md.App. 1, 24 , 891 A.2d 416, 430 (2006). We issued a writ of certiorari, on petition by the Vaccine Defendants, to address the following questions: 13 1. Whether it was an abuse of discretion, under Fulton v. K & M Associates, 331 Md. 712 , 629 A.2d 716 (1993) and Berrain v. Katzen, 331 Md. 693 , 629 A.2d 707 (1993), for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to deny a minor plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice when there is no evidence of neglect or improper action by the minor’s next friend. ⁴¹⁷ 2.

Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion when it denied a minor plaintiffs motion to dismiss without prejudice, and instead entered summary judgment in favor of Petitioners, after the court granted three extensions of the discovery schedule at the request of Respondents, and the Respondents’ sole expert relating to specific causation withdrew from the litigation without ever having offered his expert opinion. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Regarding Dismissal Maryland Rule 2-506, as relevant to voluntary dismissal by order of court, provides: (b) By order of court. Except as provided in section (a) of this Rule, a party who has filed a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may dismiss the claim only by order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been filed before the filing of a plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal, the action shall not be dismissed over the objection of the party who filed the counterclaim unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.

(c) Effect. Unless otherwise specified in the notice of dismissal, stipulation, or order of court, a dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a party who has previously dismissed in any court of any state or in any court of the United States an action based on or including the same claim. Rule 2—506(b) is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 41(a)(2). Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Fibreboard Corp., 95 Md.App. 345, 349 , 620 A.2d 979, 982 (1993). “Under [FRCP] Rule 41(a)(2) and [Maryland] Rule 2-506(b), the granting of a motion for voluntary dismissal is within the [trial] court’s discretion, after weighing the equities ⁴¹⁸ and giving due regard to all pertinent factors.” Owens-Corning, 95 Md.App. at 349-50 , 620 A.2d at 982 ; 8 James Wm.

Moore et al, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶41.40[2] (3d ed. 1999) (“The decision to grant or deny a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is addressed to the sound discretion of the [trial] court.”); see also, e.g., Conafay v. Wyeth Laboratories, 793 F.2d 350, 353-54 (D.C.Cir.1986); Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d. Cir.1991); Gap, Inc. v. Stone Int’l Trading, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y.1997). Thus, the trial judge’s decision under Maryland Rule 2-506(b) will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the judge abused that discretion. Owens-Corning, 95 Md.App. at 350 , 620 A.2d at 982 ; 8 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 41.40[ll][a]; see also, e.g., Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46 , 49 (1 st Cir.1981) (holding that the trial court’s “decision to grant a motion to dismiss under [FRCP] 41(a)(2) is reviewable only for abuse of discretion”); Conafay, 793 F.2d at 354 .

The analytical paradigm by which we assess whether a trial court’s actions constitute an abuse of discretion has been stated frequently. In Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185 , 867 A.2d 1077 (2005), for example, we iterated [t]here is an abuse of discretion “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[ ]”... or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding principles.” An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is “clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court[ ]” ... or when the ruling is “violative of fact and logic.” Questions within the discretion of the trial court are “much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts, and the decisions of such judges should be disturbed where it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred.” In sum, to be reversed “[t]he decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing ⁴¹⁹ court and beyond the fringe of what that courts deems minimally acceptable.” 385 Md. at 198-99 , 867 A.2d at 1084 (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312-13 , 701 A.2d 110, 118-19 (1997)). An abuse of discretion, therefore, “should only be found in the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case.” Wilson, 385 Md. at 199 , 867 A.2d at 1084 .

II

Dismissal of Claims without Prejudice A. Factors Informing the Circuit Court’s Exercise of Discretion. “The decisional law under [FRCP] 41 serves as a guide to the circumstances under which dismissal will not be allowed [pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-506].” Paul V. Niemeyer & Lindam. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary 351-52 (2nd ed.1992) (hereinafter “Maryland Rules Commentary”). Courts will generally grant a motion for voluntary dismissal unless the defendant(s) will suffer some “plain legal prejudice” if the dismissal is granted. The mere possibility that the action could be refiled in the future, however, is not a sufficient reason to find the legal prejudice necessary to bar a court-granted dismissal.

Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2364 (2nd ed.1995); Maryland Rules Commentary 351-52 (“Court approval will usually be granted unless some prejudice is shown. The mere possibility that the action will be refiled is not sufficient reason to oppose the dismissal.”); Ellett Bros., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384 , 388 (4th Cir.2001) (holding that dismissal of a case pursuant to court order should not be denied absent “plain legal prejudice to the defendant”); accord Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.1987) (holding that the trial court “must focus primarily on protecting the interests of the defendant”); see also, e.g., Langley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 407 F.Supp.2d 897, 904 (N.D.Ohio 2005) (reasoning that plain legal prejudice is required); Manshack v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 915 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.1990) (“[T]he courts have generally followed the traditional principle that dismissal should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal ⁴²⁰ prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.”); Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 (4th Cir.1986).

Although this Court previously has not decided precisely what “plain legal prejudice” entails, we find instructive the federal case law regarding FRCP 41. 14 Whether a plaintiff is entitled to voluntary dismissal without prejudice, i.e., the defendant would not suffer “plain legal prejudice” in the event of dismissal, is resolved traditionally by analysis according to the following four factors: (1) the non-moving party’s effort and expense in preparing for litigation; (2) excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the moving party; (3) sufficiency of explanation of the need for a dismissal without prejudice; and (4) the present stage of the litigation, i.e., whether a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion is pending. Witzman v. Gross, 148 F.3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Paulucci v. City of Duluth, 826 F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir.1987)); Gross v. Spies, 133 F.3d 914 , 1998 WL 8006 , ⁵ (4th Cir.1998) (unpublished opinion); Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir.1997) citing Phillips U.S.A, Inc. v. Allflex U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir.1996); Kovalic v. DEC Int’l, Inc., 855 F.2d 471, 473-74 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Pace v. Southern Express Co., 409 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir.1969)); Langley, 407 F.Supp.2d at 904-05 (N.D.Ohio 2005) (quoting Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir.1994)); DirecTV v. Zink, 337 F.Supp.2d 984, 987 (E.D.Mich.2004) (same); Wilson v. Eli Lilly and Co., 222 F.R.D. 99, 100 (D.Md.2004) (quoting Teck General P’ship v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 28 F.Supp.2d 989, 991 (E.D.Va.1998) (in turn quoting Gross, 133 F.3d 914 , 1998 WL 8006 , ⁵)). While some courts employ slightly different or augmented tests to determine whether a defendant would suffer clear legal prejudice if voluntary dismissal is granted, 15 ⁴²¹ we believe that these four factors sufficiently weigh the equities in order to determine whether dismissal without prejudice is appropriate in a given case. B. The Circuit Court’s Exercise of Discretion Here.

The trial judge considered, in his articulated thought processes, the four factors in reaching his determination to deny Respondents a voluntary dismissal without prejudice: This Court notes in the context of this case that the initial complaint was filed in this case on April 14, 2003. There have been several, indeed, three amended scheduling orders, extending the time for certain deadlines. Including discovery, the filing of dispositive motions. And, critically, in the context of this case, to come forward with expert evidence demonstrating causation.

The Court notes that scheduling orders are not guidelines. They’re not suggestions. They are orders. And the Court endeavored to work with counsel to arrive at scheduling orders that were acceptable to all sides.

In the context of this motion, in considering the various factors that the Court has stated, there has been significant effort and expense on all sides in preparing for trial. The vaccine defendants themselves, according to the information that has been provided, have deposed several witnesses. Indeed thirteen witnesses. And there have been many corporate designees produced, which I understand to be nineteen for their various depositions.

In addition, defendants have consulted and retained experts, and had an independent medical examination done pursuant to the Maryland rule. So, clearly, notwithstanding plaintiffs' argument, that some of those efforts and expenses were cross designated in this and other cases throughout ⁴²² the country, there has been, in this Court’s eyes, significant effort and expense in preparing for trial. In terms of the second factor, excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant. I will say, as all counsel have stated here, there has been no lack of diligence whatsoever on behalf of [local counsel] in the context of the plaintiffs’ efforts in this case.

There has been some discussion a s to other counsel. But, I believe it’s necessary to address that in the context of this motion. The third motion, insufficient explanation of a need for dismissal. There has been the explanation for this dismissal.

Whether or not it’s sufficient or not, really is dependent on the facts of this case. And, the facts of this case demonstrate that the plaintiffs have conceded that Dr. Bradstreet is, indeed, the sole expert on specific causation. And, without that opinion, they are unable to prosecute their claims. In ordering a third amended scheduling order, last month this Court accepted the affidavit presented to it that Dr. Bradstreet would be able to render an expert opinion by the end of December, based on the affidavit that was presented to me.

And, several days after that, Dr. Bradstreet was withdrawn as an expert in this case. Many could note, implicitly or explicitly, the effect of that. But that’s the factual circumstances that this case is presented to this Court. There is no other expert noted by the plaintiffs who will replace Dr. Bradstreet’s previously anticipated testimony, or that there would be any evidence available by any other expert at this point to go forward in connection with these proceedings.

In addition, the Court notes that there are two pending motions for summary judgment. Indeed, a motion for summary judgment filed by the vaccine defendants on the same day that the motion for dismissal of all claims without prejudice was filed by the plaintiffs. There has, as well, been a previous motion for summary motion [sic] filed by Eli Lilly and Company, that the Court denied, at that time, for the sole purpose of allowing additional discovery to go forward before reconsidering that issue. ⁴²³ The Court does have to take into consideration in the facts of this case that there are minor plaintiffs involved. And the Court is most empathetic with that issue.

Nevertheless, the Court distinguishes this case from a case such as Berrain v. Katzen[] [ 331 Md. 693 , 629 A.2d 707 (1993)], or Fulton v. K & M Associates[,] [ 331 Md. 712 , 629 A.2d 716 (1993)], relied upon by the plaintiffs, where there was either parental, or guardian neglect, or even perhaps the neglect of attorneys. That is not an issue in this case. In that context, the Court does not believe that a minor’s motion for voluntary dismissal is, or should be analyzed any differently than any other voluntary dismissal motion. I have considered the cases relied upon by the vaccine defendants.

Although admittedly, not all fours with this case, but a guidance to the Court in the context of determining whether good cause exist for the granting of a motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. And, under a review of all those factors, including the efforts that the Court has undertaken to allow sufficient time to present these issues to the Court, the Court finds, based on those factors that is would be inappropriate for this Court to grant a motion to dismiss a claim voluntarily without prejudice given the facts of this case. Critical to the Court is the extensive discovery that has been undertaken. The thirteen depositions.

The corporate designees that have been noted. The time, effort and expense in briefing the preliminary motions, and gathering discovery, and presenting dispositive motions to the Court, that are relevant to the Court’s consideration. As a result, under the fact specific circumstances of this case, this Court denies the plaintiffs’ renewed motion for voluntary dismissal of all claims without prejudice for the reasons so stated. Although finding it “clear from the transcript of the [21 December 2004] hearing that the circuit court carefully considered each of the [four] factors ...,” and in spite of the deferential standard of review to be accorded the trial court’s decision, the Court of Special Appeals nonetheless held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to ⁴²⁴ dismiss the complaint, without prejudice.

Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 22 , 891 A.2d at 429 . Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court “made the first factor, [Petitioners’] effort and expense, determinative of its decision when that factor (a) is not compelling under the facts of the instant case, and (b) was the only one that the court found weighed in [Petitioners’] favor.” Id. We hold that, in addition to misinterpreting the Circuit Court’s consideration of the four factors, the Court of Special Appeals failed to give the trial court’s decision the deference it deserved. 1. Effort and Expense of the Non-Moving Party in Preparing for Trial The trial court specifically found that significant time and money had been expended by both sides in this litigation.

As indicated by Judge Berger, thirty-two total depositions had been taken as of the date of the grant of summary judgment. Of these, thirteen were specific to the Skevofilaxes’ claims. 16 Other forms of discovery, including interrogatories, document production, and independent medical evaluations also were conducted in connection with the pending litigation. The Court of Special Appeals observed that some of the depositions were cross-referenced with other thimerosal cases pending elsewhere, and hypothecated that selected depositions pertaining solely to the Skevofilaxes’ suit might be reused if their suit were re-filed, with little or no need to update them. Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 16 , 891 A.2d at 426 .

It is equally likely, however, that many of the depositions would need to be updated significantly if Respondents filed anew. If Respondents were to re-file the lawsuit significantly later, following a dismissal without prejudice, but within applicable limitations periods, as Petitioners argued, some experts currently identified by the parties no longer may be available to testify. Of ⁴²⁵ additional possible consequence, Michael’s condition may change significantly such that entirely new independent medical evaluations would be necessary. The fact remains that the Skevofilaxes’ litigation had been pending for nearly twenty months at the time the dispositive motions were filed.

Even if some of the depositions could have been recycled in renewed litigation, significant effort and funds already had been expended in defending the causes of action. As Judge Berger noted, there had been significant discovery over and above the depositions, the parties had briefed significant preliminary motions, and had presented numerous dispositive motions before the trial court. That the intermediate appellate court reached a different conclusion on this factor based on the facts before the trial court does not render the Circuit Court’s decision an abuse of discretion, as long as a reasonable person could have adopted the view of the trial court. North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1031-32 (1994) (“[A] ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling.

The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what the court deems minimally acceptable.”). Based on the record before the Circuit Court at the time of its decision, we are unwilling to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the expense and effort exerted in preparing for litigation weighed in favor of denying Respondents’ request for voluntary dismissal without prejudice. 2. Excess Delay or Lack of Diligence by Movant Contrary to what the Court of Special Appeals suggests, the time and money expended by Petitioners in preparing their defense was not the only factor the trial court considered that weighed against dismissal without prejudice. As to the second factor, excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant, the intermediate appellate court held that “[t]he trial court specifically found that there was no lack of diligence on ⁴²⁶ the part of appellants.” This interpretation of the Circuit Court’s reasoning is not accurate entirely.

It is a well-established principle that “ £[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it properly.’” State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179 , 825 A.2d 452, 458 (2003) (quoting Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 206 , 699 A.2d 1170, 1194 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082 , 118 S.Ct. 866 , 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (1998)); see also Medical Mut. Liability Ins. Soc. of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 34 , 622 A.2d 103, 119 (1993); Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md.App. 1, 50 , 674 A.2d 1, 25 (1996) (££[W]e presume judges to know the law and apply it, even in the absence of a verbal indication of having considered it.”). It is equally well-settled that there is a “strong presumption that judges properly perform their duties,” and that “trial judges are not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of logic.” Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 273 , 619 A.2d 105, 110 (1993); see also Kirsner v. Edelmann, 65 Md.App. 185 , 196 n. 9, 499 A.2d 1313 , 1319 n. 9 (1985) (“[A] judge is presumed to know the law, and thus is not required to set out in intimate detail each and every step of his or her thought process.”); Zorich v. Zorich, 63 Md.App. 710, 717 , 493 A.2d 1096, 1099 (1985) (“Because trial judges are presumed to know the law, not every step in their thought process needs to be explicitly spelled out.”); Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md.App. 350, 370 , 475 A.2d 1214, 1224 (1984) (“A chancellor is not required to articulate every step in his thought processes.”).

Thus, ££[t]he trial judge need not articulate each item or piece of evidence she or he has considered in reaching a decision.... The fact that the court did not catalog each factor and all the evidence which related to each factor does not require reversal.” John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md.App. 406, 429 , 601 A.2d 149, 160 (1992); see also Cobrand v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc., 149 Md.App. 431, 445 , 816 A.2d 117, 125 (2003) (holding that when a matter is reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court, “a trial judge’s failure to state each and every consideration or factor in a particular applicable standard does not, absent more, constitute an abuse of discretion, so long as the record supports a reasonable conclusion that appropriate factors were ⁴²⁷ taken into account in the exercise of discretion.”) (internal citations omitted). The trial judge here found that there had been no lack of diligence on the part of Respondents’ local Maryland counsel, in representing the Skevofilaxes. The Circuit Court continued, however, that “[tjhere has been some discussion as to other counsel.” While the trial court did not elaborate further as to “other counsel,” it would be reasonable to infer from discussion and documents in this record that the court was referring to Respondents’ national counsel in the thimerosal litigation.

It is clear from the transcript that the trial court at least considered the possible delay or lack of diligence attributable to the movant and commented tactfully upon it. We hold, therefore, that the Court of Special Appeals misinterpreted the trial court’s consideration of this second factor. S. Sufficiency of Explanation for Need of Dismissal The Court of Special Appeals additionally misinterpreted the Circuit Court’s consideration of the third factor, the explanation of the need for dismissal. Judge Berger stated that “[tjhere has been the explanation for this dismissal.

Whether or not it’s sufficient ... really is dependent on the facts of this case.” The trial court then reiterated Respondents’ explanation that Dr. Bradstreet was their sole expert on specific causation and that they would be unable to pursue the causes of action in the absence of his expert opinion. According to the Court of Special Appeals, however, had the trial court found Dr. Bradstreet’s withdrawal pre-textual, it should have said so expressly. It therefore interpreted the trial court’s articulation to mean that the Respondents’ explanation was sufficient, and that it mitigated in favor of the requested dismissal without prejudice. Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 18 , 891 A.2d at 426 .

The Circuit Court indeed considered the factual background surrounding Dr. Bradstreet’s withdrawal from the case. A careful review of the trial court’s decision, however, reveals that the court neither expressly nor impliedly rendered an ⁴²⁸ opinion as to whether this explanation was sufficient to merit dismissal without prejudice. We simply cannot determine from the 21 December 2004 transcript, as the Court of Special Appeals purported to do, whether the trial court weighed this factor in favor of Petitioners or Respondents. Even if the trial court’s comments were construed as a determination that Respondents’ explanation was sufficient, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion nevertheless to deny Respondents’ motion.

Each of the factors need not endorse a particular disposition in order to rule in a certain way. Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537 (“Each factor need not be resolved in favor of the moving party for dismissal to be appropriate, nor need each factor be resolved in favor of the opposing party for denial of the motion to be proper.”) (quoting Phillips U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d at 358 ); see also Kovalic, 855 F.2d at 474 (“The enumeration of the factors to be considered ... is not equivalent to a mandate that each and every factor be resolved in favor of the moving party before dismissal is appropriate. It is rather simply a guide for the trial judge, in whom discretion ultimately rests.”) (quoting Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 627 F.2d 54, 56 (7th Cir.1980)). That a party provides an adequate explanation for the need to dismiss without prejudice does not compel the trial judge to grant the motion. k- Pending Motions for Summary Judgment The fourth factor counsels a trial judge to consider the current pleading status of the litigation, i.e., whether there were any motions for summary judgment pending at the time the motion for dismissal without prejudice is filed.

This factor is premised, at least in part, on the principle that a plaintiff confronting the potential for an adverse disposition of his, her, or its case may not dismiss unilaterally the case in order to file again in the future at a time when the conditions may be more favorable. See, e.g., Phillips U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d at 358 (“[A] party should not be permitted to avoid an adverse decision on a dispositive motion by dismissing a claim without prejudice.”); Grover, 33 F.3d at 719 (“At the point when the law clearly ⁴²⁹ dictates a result for the defendant, it is unfair to subject him to continued exposure to potential liability by dismissing the case without prejudice.”); Pace, 409 F.2d at 834 (affirming the denial of a motion to dismiss without prejudice on the ground that the plaintiffs were using the motion as a tactic to prevent summary judgment in favor of the defendants); see also Maryland