Bacon v. Arey

WATTS, J. Appellant, Gregg Daniel Bacon, 1 a property owner, appeals a decision of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granting a motion to strike his fourth amended complaint and entering Declaratory Judgment and a Nunc Pro Tunc Order, dismissing his tort and constitutional claims as well as his claim of an ingress/egress easement to his property, against appellees, Macris, Hendricks & Glascock, P.A. (“MHG”) and Douglas H. Riggs, III (“Riggs”) (collectively the “MHG Group”); 2 the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (the “Commission”), Royce Hanson, Debra Y. Daniel, Faroll Hamer, R. Bruce Crawford, Gwen Marcus Wright, Rose Krasnow, and Adrian R. Gardner (collectively the “Commission Group”); 3 Audrey D. Hill; Christine Hill; 4 ⁶¹⁷ Paul Arey and Sara Arey (the “Areys”); Sandy Spring Ban-corp, Inc.; Gaither & Associates LLC; Milton Johnson; Charles Mess and Marilyn E. Mess (the “Messes”); William P. Rounds; McCants and Associates LLC; and Warren Lee Brown. 5 Appellant noted an appeal raising four issues, 6 which we have rephrased as follows: I. Whether the circuit court erred in entering declaratory judgment in favor of appellees as to appellant’s claims for an easement?

II

Whether the circuit court erred in entering a Nunc Pro Tunc Order dismissing appellant’s tort and consti ⁶¹⁸ tutional claims in favor of appellees on the ground of the statute of limitations?

III

Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in striking appellant’s second and fourth amended complaints?

IV

Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing appellant’s claims without ruling on appellant’s motions to compel discovery? For the reasons set forth below, we answer each question in the negative and shall, therefore, affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case concerns appellant’s claim of entitlement to an easement to access property he owns in Sandy Spring, Montgomery County, Maryland. The property is a two acre lot which appellant purchased on September 27, 2002, for $40,000.

On October 1, 2002, appellant recorded a quitclaim deed for the property. Gold Mine Road lies to the north of appellant’s property, and Brooke Road lies to the south. Appellant alleges entitlement to an easement identified as Farm Road, running in a northerly direction from Brooke Road across his property and continuing northward through a Commission conservation easement, 7 until its termination at Gold Mine Road. Appellant claims that Farm Road, his means of ingress and egress to the property (i.e. how he reached Gold Mine Road and Brooke Road), was blocked, thereby depriving him of access to his property and landlocking the property.

According to appellant, Farm Road is a “historic right-of-way” or an easement. Before the circuit court, in the third amended complaint, appellant alleged that Brown and his attorney, Alper, hired ⁶¹⁹ the MHG Group to conduct a survey and prepare subdivision plans and record plats for the Dellabrooke subdivisions that were allegedly prepared inaccurately and failed to include Farm Road. Appellant alleged that Farm Road’s access to Gold Mine Road “was permanently cut” in 1994, with the initial approval of Brown’s subdivisions, and that northward access of Farm Road to Gold Mine Road was prohibited, in 2001, with approval of the Dellabrooke subdivisions and the “recordation of Plat 21707.” 8 MHG prepared Plat 21707 and according to appellant, “did not include or recognize the Farm Road and related rights-of-way.” The Complaint On June 9, 2006, appellant filed a Complaint for Equitable Relief and Declaratory Judgment Granting an Easement and Action to Quiet Title Based on Adverse Possession. 9 In the complaint, appellant alleged that the Commission and its predecessor, the Montgomery County Department of Planning, “acted impermissibly, by in effect abandoning the Historic Chandlee Mill Road Lalso identified as Farm Road] and rendering [appellant] landlocked, without recording any appurtenant easements for properties affected.” The Amended Complaint On November 8, 2006, appellant filed an amended complaint, alleging that he had employed a professional land surveyor who concluded that a “historic right-of-way does indeed exist as the ‘Old Chandlee Mill Road’ that has been described as the ‘Farm Road’ in various deeds.” 10 Appellant alleged entitlement to an “easement by prescription” or an ⁶²⁰ “easement by necessity under the common law.” On December 7, 2006, the Commission filed an answer to the amended complaint, raising several affirmative defenses, including lach-es, estoppel, waiver, and the statute of limitations. The Second Amended Complaint On September 21, 2007, appellant filed a second amended complaint, adding Brown, the Commission Group, and the MHG Group, among others, as defendants 11 and causes of action “based upon recently obtained evidence.” 12 In a section labeled “Overview,” appellant alleged that he “recently learned the events that led to [] lost ingress/egress access and other property rights were caused by a series of fraudulent acts perpetrated in a concert of action among the Defendants.” On September 27, 2007, Christine Hill filed a motion to strike the second amended complaint, urging the circuit court ■ to strike the complaint for failure to comply with Maryland Rule 2-303. 13 Defendants, including the Commission, the ⁶²¹ Areys, Alper, Hanson, Daniel, Hamer, Crawford, the MHG Group, Wright, Johnson, Krasnow, the Messes, and Gardner joined in and filed motions to strike the second amended complaint.

Other defendants filed motions to dismiss the second amended complaint, including the Maryland Department of the Environment, arguing that appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA), and Brown, arguing that appellant’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant filed oppositions to many of the motions to strike and dismiss. On January 30, 2008, McCants & Associates filed an answer to the second amended complaint, a cross-claim against the defendants, and a motion to file the answer and cross-claim out of time. The Commission Group, Johnson, and Alper each moved to strike the cross-claim.

On March 13, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions to strike and dismiss the second amended complaint. During the hearing, the circuit court stated: The aspect of this case that stands out, from my perspective, at this point is the current posture of the pleadings and that primarily is the second amended complaint ..., which is 58 pages and names a number of individuals, causes of action against individuals. And in reviewing the motions to strike, it’s clear to me that the 58-page second amended complaint does violate Rule 2-303 in that it includes argument, unnecessary recitals of law, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. I don’t like striking complaints because I just think in essence it prolongs the inevitable, but in this instance, given the contents of the paragraph contained within the second amended complaint that there is an overriding interest to have the complaint conform with the pleadings’ require ⁶²² ments—and I certainly will give [appellant] an opportunity to amend[.] After hearing argument from counsel, the circuit court granted the motions to strike the second amended complaint, ruling orally from the bench as follows: Since [appellant] is being required to file a third amended complaint in the requirement will be that that third amended complaint is to comply with the rules that govern pleading, that it is to be simple, concise, and direct, contain only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleaders’ entitlement to relief.

And that the third amended complaint will supersede all previous complaints that have been filed and will operate as the complaint in this case. So, I’m going to grant the motions to strike the second amended complaint. I’m going to defer on the motion to dismiss with respect to the statute of limitations pending the filing of the third amended complaint. I’m going to establish a new set of dates within which events must take place and, essentially, this operates as a new scheduling order.

The third amended complaint is to be filed by March 28th. On March 13, 2008, consistent with its oral ruling, the circuit court issued a Nunc Pro Tunc Order providing, in pertinent part, as follows: 1. The Motion to Dismiss [Appellant’s] Second Amended Complaint filed by the Defendant, State of Maryland Department of Environment ... is GRANTED; and [Appellant’s] Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED. 4. Defendants’ Motions to Strike [Appellant’s] Second Amended Complaint filed by Defendant Christine Hill [], Maryland Capital Park and Planning Commission [ ], Paul and Sara Arey [ ], Richard Alper [ ], Douglass Riggs and Marcis Hendricks and Glascock, PA [ ], Royce Hanson, et al. [], Warren Brown [], Audrey Hill [], Gwen Wright [], Milton Johnson [ ], Rose Krasnow [ ], Charles and Marilyn Mess [ ], and Adrian Gardner [ ] are GRANTED, without Prejudice with Leave to Amend by filing a Third Amended ⁶²³ Complaint by March 28, 2008 which complies with Maryland Rule 2-308(b); and it is further ORDERED, that the Third Amended Complaint supersedes all previous Complaints as the only operative Complaint requiring responses from the Defendants.

The Third Amended Complaint and Remand On March 28, 2008, in compliance with the circuit court’s ruling, appellant filed a third amended complaint for the purpose of “adding additional Defendants based upon recently obtained evidence and [ ] providing a consolidated pleading.” 14 The nine counts set forth in the second amended complaint remained in the third amended complaint. Christine Hill and the Commission Group moved to dismiss the third amended complaint, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The MHG Group moved to dismiss the third amended complaint, arguing that appellant’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations or, in the alternative, that the MHG Group did not owe a duty of care to appellant. 15 On June 17, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing on the pending motions. Following argument, the circuit court dismissed the third amended complaint, ruling orally from the bench as follows: The defendants have filed a motion, several motions, to dismiss the third amended complaint that’s been filed, which is actually the fourth complaint that’s been filed in this case. ⁶²⁴ The legal proceedings in this case began, the initial filing, in June of 2006.

There have been subsequent defendants added, subtracted; amendments have been made. The Court has granted leave to make the amendments to the complaint; to comply with the rules of the pleading. And the defendants are making a motion to dismiss on the substantive basis that the statute of limitation precludes [appellant’s] claim with respect to Counts 3 through 9. The undisputed facts in this case reveal that on January 11, 2001, plat 21707 was recorded.

The undisputed facts reveal that [appellant] took title to the[] property, which was subsequently recorded on October 1st, 2002. The law is clear that [appellant was] on notice at the time that [he] took title. As to what is contained in the[ ] actual chain of title, even if [he] had not seen it, heard it, or imagined that it existed, accordingly the statute of limitations applies to Counts 3 through 9 in [the] third amended complaint. In addition, the local government Tort Claims Act applies with respect to the Commission’s motion to dismiss.

With respect to [the MHG Group], there was a failure to state a claim against those defendants based upon a lack of duty owed by those defendants to [appellant]. The remaining issues before me with respect to Counts 1 and 2, and that is the failure to state a claim in the third amended complaint. The difficulty that I’m having is that this has been a torturous proceeding. The remaining defendants that would apply to those counts need to be on notice as to what it is they are alleged to have done so that they can respond.

I have reviewed the third amended complaint in an effort to make that determination. To determine whether or not there is sufficient allegations contained within the third amended complaint that would permit the remaining defendants to respond to the causes of action that have been alleged against them. ⁶²⁵ I can’t find that there are sufficient causes of action that have been alleged in the amended complaint. I can’t find that there is relief that’s being sought against those defendants for any causes of action that they are alleged to have done. Accordingly, I am going to grant the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with respect to Counts 1 and 2 of the third amended complaint without leave to amend.

On June 17, 2008, the circuit court issued Orders consistent with its oral ruling, including: (1) an Order granting the Commission Group’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint with prejudice, without leave to amend; (2) an Order granting the MHG Group’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint "with prejudice; (3) an Order granting Christine Hill’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint with prejudice; (4) an Order granting Audrey Hill’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint as to the claims asserted against her; (5) an Order granting Milton Johnson’s motion to dismiss the case against him with prejudice; (6) an Order granting Brown’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint with prejudice; and (7) an Order granting the Areys’ motion to dismiss the third amended complaint with prejudice. On July 7, 2008, appellant filed a motion to alter or amend. On August 6, 2008, the circuit court issued an Order denying the motion. On September 5, 2008, appellant noted an appeal.

On September 30, 2009, this Court issued an Order remanding the case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County without affirmance or reversal, stating as follows: It appears from the record of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in the above-captioned matter that appellants’ third amended complaint requested the circuit court to “declar[e] the existence of an express ... easement from the Bacon’s [sic] property to Brooke Road and/or Goldmine Road, as identified in Exhibit 1, and order that this easement shall be the ingress/egress for the Plaintiffs,” or, “in the alternative order that the Plaintiffs possess landlocked property and that an implied easement by neces ⁶²⁶ sity along the Farm Road ... is the ingress/egress for the Plaintiffs’ property....” Some, but not all, defendants filed motions to dismiss appellants’ amended complaint. On June 17, 2008, after a hearing on the motions to dismiss appellants’ amended complaint, the circuit court (Rupp, J.) dismissed all claims against the movants. In that oral ruling, the court specified dismissals as to certain movants and then dismissed the case as to “the remaining defendants,” and the docket reflects a dismissal as to the “remaining defendants.” It further appears that defendant McCants & Associates, allegedly joined in an earlier complaint as a necessary party by virtue of ownership of property along the Farm Road in question, filed a cross-claim in response to that earlier complaint. The docket does not reflect an adjudication of that cross-claim.

Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and noted that the record did not contain orders as to all parties. The court denied the motion on August 7, 2008, and Appellant noted this appeal on September 5, 2008. The appellant and some appellees have filed briefs in this Court, and the appeal is presently scheduled for argument on October 7, 2009. The oral ruling and docket entry dated June 17, 2008 do not conform to the principle that a trial court should declare in writing the rights of all parties who properly seek declaratory relief.

Griffin v. Anne Arundel County, 25 Md.App. 115, 137 [ 333 A.2d 612 ], cert. denied 275 Md. 749 (1975); Secure Financial Service, Inc. v. Popular Leasing USA Inc., 391 Md. 274, 281 [ 892 A.2d 571 ] (2006) (“[W]hen entering a declaratory judgment, the court must, in a separate document, state in writing its declaration of the rights of the parties, along with any other order that is intended to be part of the judgment.”). Additionally, the record does not reflect a final judgment as to the cross-claim filed by McCants and Associates and does not reflect a clear intention by the court to dismiss appellants’ claims against each party who had not moved for dismissal. ⁶²⁷ Until the circuit court addresses the claim for declaratory relief and adjudicates the cross-claim, neither the orders entered on June 17, 2008 nor the order entered on August 7, 2008 is a final judgment under Maryland Rule 2-602. Since those orders are not certified under subsection (b), they are not yet appealable. It is, therefore, this 30th day of September, 2009, by the Court of Special Appeals, on its own initiative, ORDERED, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-604(d), that the case is hereby remanded to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, without affirmance or reversal, for further proceedings, including, without limitation, a declaration of the respective rights of the parties and adjudication of all of the claims in the action in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-602.

Each party is to bear its own expenses in the above-captioned matter; and it is further ORDERED that following the declaration of the rights of the parties on remand, any aggrieved party may note an appeal to this Court and may file a motion in this Court for waiver of filing fees as to that appeal. The parties may also file a motion in this Court to use the briefs and record extracts filed in No. 1616, September Term, 2008, and to be permitted to file supplemental memoranda addressing only the judgment on remand. (Alterations and omissions in original). On April 6, 2010, in response to the remand order, the circuit court held a hearing and discussed the remand order as follows: This order doesn’t express any views one way or the other on the merits.

It just says basically we keep telling the Circuit Courts in declaratory judgment cases to enter a piece of paper that says declaratory judgment. It doesn’t matter who wins. Just set out what with the rest of the party, do it, and then we’ll look at it and tell you whether you messed it up or not. That’s what they told me to do.

At the hearing, the circuit court directed the parties to submit proposed “forms of declaratory judgment” with respect to the ⁶²⁸ third amended complaint, within forty-five days, by May 21, 2010, stating as follows: [L]et’s assume that the operative pleading is the third amended complaint. Let’s assume that Judge Rupp dismissed all of the claims in there, which he apparently did for the reasons that you all think he did it. Submit your proposed declaratory judgments in respect to the third amended complaint. And each side will incorporate in its proposed form of declaratory judgment the rulings that it believes Judge Rupp made or the rulings it wishes Judge Rupp had made, and brief it.

I will read it. And if we need to do anything else we’ll be in touch. On May 21, 2010, appellees filed responses in accordance with the circuit court’s directions. The Fourth Amended Complaint On May 21, 2010, appellant filed two pleadings: (1) a Fourth Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Declaratory Judgment and Damages 16 and (2) a Motion for Declaratory Judgment as to Counts I, II and III of [Appellant's Verified Fourth Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Declaratory Judgment.

The fourth amended complaint contained eleven counts, adding two counts not included in the third amended complaint—Count Three for Declaratory Relief, alleging that appellant had an implied easement by prescription, and Count Eleven for Injunctive Relief. On June 8, 2010, the Commission Group filed a motion to strike the fourth amended complaint and a motion for declaratory judgment, arguing that the filing of the amended complaint and motion “[was] undertaken without leave of the Court, and without citation to any legal authority.” The ⁶²⁹ Commission Group argued that pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322(c), if the court orders dismissal of an action, a party may only file an amended complaint with express leave of the court to amend, and, in this case, no such leave was given. 17 On June 15, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions and discussed the remand order as follows: Well, as I read the entirety of [the remand order], as I read it that the panel was of the view that the case was not in a posture before them to decide the merits. And that what they were sending it back to the Circuit Court for was number one, to enter a declaration consistent with Judge Rupp’s rulings, and two, to dispose of, resolve, make final decisions on any ancillary matters such as the hanging cross-claim. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court granted the motion to strike the fourth amended complaint, ruling orally from the bench as follows: The motion to strike is granted for three reasons.

Number one, as I read the directions from the Court of Special Appeals that in the main, they’ve indicated quite clearly that the Circuit Court was to do a number of things so that there was a final judgment that could be properly reviewed. And that was the purpose for the remand. Number two. While the Court of Special Appeals was being polite to the Circuit Court in saying, well, we’re not tying your hands, the notion, I’ve read enough remand orders I think in my life both as a trial Judge and as a lawyer to know what they mean.

So without being presumptuous as to what the panel members were subjectively thinking, it’s clear to me based on their jurisprudence of the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals is that they have gotten the message from the Court of Appeals, and they are no longer willing to expend their judicial resources reviewing cases, making decisions, only to be told ⁶³⁰ by the Court of Appeals there is no final judgment. So they’ve now made it clear to the trial Court, give me a final judgment, then we’ll do our job. Those two reasons. Actually there are four reasons.

The third reason is that when Judge Rupp who had the case before me granted the motion to dismiss, he did not grant leave to amend. So on the theory that I take the case as I find it, that ship sailed. I conclude that the leave in any event to file a fourth amended complaint is denied, for the fourth reason, is that amendment at this time would be futile. Also on June 15, 2010, the circuit court issued a Nunc Pro Tunc Order, dismissing the third amended complaint, stating as follows: In consideration of the Order dated September 30, 2009, from the Court of Special Appeals, and the entirety of the record before the Court, it is this 15th day of June, 2010, by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, ORDERED, that Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, & IX of the Third Amended Complaint are dismissed, as previously ordered on June 17, 2008 and memorialized by written orders entered on June 25, 2008, due to the statute of limitations, and the Local Government Tort Claims Act as applicable to the Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission, Royce Hanson, Debra Y. Daniel, Faroll Hamer, R. Bruce Crawford, Gwen Marcus Wright, Rose Krasnow, and Adrian R. Gardner; ORDERED, that the previous rulings of this Court dismissing Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, & IX of the Third Amended Complaint on June 17, 2008, and memorialized by written orders entered on June 25, 2008, are applicable to all defendants; ORDERED, that Counts I and II are hereby dismissed consistent with the Declaratory Judgment; and it is further, ⁶³¹ ORDERED, that all cross-claims are dismissed, without prejudice.

On the same day, the circuit court issued an Order granting the Commission Group’s motion to strike the fourth amended complaint and the motion for declaratory judgment. The Order stated, in pertinent part: ORDERED, that the Motion to Strike [Appellant’s Verified Fourth Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Declaratory Judgment and Damages, and [Appellant’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment as to Counts I, II and III of [Appellant’s Verified Fourth Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Declaratory Judgment be, and hereby is, GRANTED; ORDERED, that [appellant’s Verified Fourth Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Declaratory Judgment and Damages be, and hereby is, STRICKEN; and it is further, ORDERED, that [appellant’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment as to Counts I, II and III of [appellant’s Verified Fourth Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Declaratory Judgment be, and hereby is, STRICKEN. Also on June 15, 2010, the circuit court issued an order granting “Declaratory Judgment,” stating as follows: Upon consideration of the entirety of the record before the Court, it is this 15th day of June, 2010, by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, ORDERED, FOUND AND DECLARED, that the operative pleading—the Third Amended Complaint—establishes two general categories of claims: the equitable/declaratory judgment claims (Counts I & II), and the tort/constitutional claims (Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, VII, & IX). 18 ORDERED, FOUND AND DECLARED, that the Third Amended Complaint, construed in a light most favorable to [appellant], establishes the following timeline: ⁶³² a. ) 1994—the “northward access” of the farm road, the portion that allegedly runs from [appellant’s] Property north through the Commission’s conservation easement to Gold Mine Road, “... was permanently cut with the initial approval of Warren Lee Brown’s subdivision in 1994,” (Third Amended Complaint, ¶ 33); b. ) January 11, 2001—Subdivision Record Plat 21707 is recorded in the land records and the northward access “... was prohibited with the approval of the Dellabrooke Forest and Dellabrooke subdivisions along with the recor-dation of Plat 21707,” (Third Amended Complaint, ¶ 37) and (Record Plat 21707); and c. ) October 1, 2002—[appellant] obtain[s] title to the[] property per the[ ] deed. ([Appellant’s] Deed). [Appellant] took title to the[] property after all of the pertinent events averred in the Third Amended Complaint are alleged to have occurred.

This suit was filed on June 9, 2006. ORDERED, FOUND AND DECLARED, that Count I of the Third Amended Complaint sets forth allegations that [appellant is] entitled to an ingress/egress easement via express reference in the[ ] deed or chain of title. Review of the express terms of [appellant’s] Deed—which was prepared by [appellant] Gregg Bacon—reflects no language express detailing an ingress/egress easement. A further review of the Third Amended Complaint reveals no aver-ments of any express language contained in any deed or record of title specifically creating an ingress/egress easement servicing [appellant’s] property.

In the absence of any averments establishing a prima facie claim for an express easement, the Court must declare the absence of an ingress/egress easement servicing [appellant’s] property. ORDERED, FOUND AND DECLARED, that Count II of the Third Amended Complaint sets forth allegations that [appellant is] entitled to an ingress/egress easement under the theory of an implied easement by necessity. To establish a prima facie claim for an implied easement by necessity, [appellant was] required to plead three elements: ⁶³³ The prerequisites to the creation of an easement by necessity can be summed up in three parts: (1) initial unity of title of the parcels of real property in question; (2) severance of the unity of title by conveyance of one of the parcels; and (3) the easement must be necessary in order for the grantor or grantee of the property in question to be able to access his or her land, with the necessity existing both at the time of the severance of title and at the time of the exercise of the easement. Stansbury v. MDR Development, L.L.C., 390 Md. 476, 489 , 889 A.2d 403, 411 (2006).

A review of the Third Amended Complaint demonstrates that [appellant] sought to have the ingress/egress easement impinge upon or cross approximately 16 separate parcels of property identified in Exhibit 1 to the Third Amended Complaint. [Appellant] failed to plead: (1) that these 16 parcels initially had unity in title; (2) how unity in title amongst the 16 parcels was severed; and/or (3) how the usage of the ingress/egress easement was necessary, at the time of severance of the unity in title for each property, for [appellant’s] predecessor in title to access the subject property. In the absence of any averments establishing a prima facie claim for an implied easement by necessity, the Court must declare the absence of an ingress/egress easement servicing [appellant’s] property. ORDERED, FOUND AND DECLARED, that the Cross-Claim filed by McCants and Associates, LLC, against all defendants, was filed when the company charter for McCants and Associates, LLC was forfeited by the Maryland Department of Assessment and Taxation. Such filing is a legal nullity, and without legal force or effect pursuant to Md.Code Ann., Corporations & Associates Article, §§ 4A-913(d) and 4A-920.

Moreover, even if the Cross-Claim had legal force or effect, the cross-claim consisted of a single paragraph that incorporated, and was purely derivative of, [appellant’s] Second Amended [Complaint]. [Appellant’s] Second Amended Complaint was struck by order dated March 13, 2008. Accordingly, the foundation for the Cross-Claim cased to exist. ⁶³⁴ ORDERED, FOUND AND DECLARED, that judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of all defendants consistent with this Declaratory Judgment. (Footnote in original). On June 28, 2010, appellant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment.

On July 16, 2010, the circuit court issued an Order denying the motion. 19 Upon petition by Gaither & Associates, LLC, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted an in banc review of the case. On October 6, 2010, the in banc panel issued an Order, stating as follows: This matter having come before an [i]n banc panel of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on the 24th day of September, 2010, upon Petition by Gaither and Associates, LLC’s Motion for [I]n Banc Review, oral argument having been heard on the matter, and upon consideration of the entire record herein, the Court finds that based on Gaither and Associates, LLC’s failure to preserve any issue for review as contemplated by Md. Const., Art. IV, § 22, and Md. Rule § 2-551(a), it is on this 6th day of October, 2010 hereby ORDERED that Defendant, Gaither and Associates, LLC’s Motion for [I]n Banc Review be, and hereby is, DENIED. On November 8, 2010, appellant noted an appeal. DISCUSSION I. Entry of Declaratory Judgment A. Contentions Appellant contends that the circuit court improperly granted declaratory judgment in favor of appellees as to his claims for an easement.

Appellant argues the circuit court impermis-sibly landlocked his property “by failing to presume the ⁶³⁵ existence of an easement” despite multiple deeded references to Farm Road as an express easement. Appellant maintains that exhibits accompanying the third and fourth amended complaints, specifically the Lawrence Map, “show the unity of title necessary to establish [his] easement rights via Farm Road[,]” and that he has “the right to use Farm Road as a matter of law.” The Commission Group responds that the circuit court properly granted declaratory judgment in favor of appellees as appellant failed “to establish a prima facie case sustaining his two legal theories of an ingress/egress easement [express easement and implied easement].” The Commission Group argues that “[e]ven if the ultimate effect of the Declaratory Judgment is the landlocking of [ajppellant’s property, such [a] i'uling is not contrary to established law,” and the circuit court “correctly concluded that the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint failed to satisfy the basic elements of claims for an express easement by deed or an implied easement of necessity.” B. Standard of Review In Catalyst Health Solutions, Inc. v. Magill, 414 Md. 457, 471-72 , 995 A.2d 960 (2010), the Court of Appeals stated: The standard of review for a declaratory judgment entered as a result of the grant of a motion for summary judgment is whether that declaration was correct as a matter of law. We have held that [w]hile it is permissible for trial courts to resolve matters of law by summary judgment in declaratory judgment actions, the court must, in a separate document and in writing, define the rights and obligations of the parties or the status of the thing in controversy. This requirement is applicable even if the action is not decided in favor of the party seeking the declaratory judgment[ 20 ] ⁶³⁶ (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

C. Relevant Law (1) Easements Generally In Sharp v. Downey, 197 Md.App. 123, 159 , 13 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. granted, 419 Md. 646 , 20 A.3d 115 (2011), we recently explained the “basic legal principles governing easements.” “An easement is broadly defined as a nonpossessory interest in the real property of another[.] An easement involves the privilege of doing a certain class of act on, or to the detriment, of another’s land, or a right against another that he refrain from doing a certain class of act on or in connection with his own land[.]” Id. at 159-60, 13 A.3d 1 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Private easements are easements not enjoyed by the public, and every private easement consists of “two distinct tenements—one dominant and the other servient.” Id. at 160 , 13 A.3d 1 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Sharp , with Judge Ellen L. Hollander speaking for this Court, we stated that: An easement can be described as a right of the owner of the dominant estate—often, a right of way—over the real property that comprises the servient estate. In other words: “A dominant tenant is the owner of ‘[a]n estate that benefits from an easement’; a servient tenant is the owner of ‘[a]n estate burdened by an easement.’ ” ... [T]here are several ways to create an easement. “An easement may be created by express grant, by reservation in a conveyance of land, or by implication.” An express easement, whether by grant or reservation, must be created by a written memorandum that satisfies the Statute of ⁶³⁷ Frauds; and “a right[] of way created by deed” must satisfy “ ‘the mode and manner prescribed by the recording statutes.’ ”... “An express easement by reservation often arises when a property owner conveys a portion of his property to another, which would otherwise render the retained part inaccessible, so the reservation permits a right-of-way.” In contrast, an easement by implication “ ‘may be created in a variety of ways, such as by prescription, necessity, the filing of plats, estoppel and implied grant or reservation where a quasi-easement has existed while the two tracts are one.’ ” Id. at 160-61 , 13 A.3d 1 (citations omitted).

(2) Express Easements In Kobrine v. Metzger, 380 Md. 620, 636 , 846 A.2d 403 (2004), the Court of Appeals explained: [A]n easement by express grant or reservation may be created only “in the mode and manner prescribed by the recording statutes.” Although no words of inheritance are necessary, the instrument must contain “the names of the grantor and grantee, a description of the property sufficient to identify it with reasonable certainty, and the interest or estate intended to be granted.” ... [W]e limited that requirement to rights of way created by deed and held that a right of way, otherwise sufficiently described, could validly be created by a memorandum that complied with the Statute of Frauds, ie., a writing signed by the party to be charged or that party’s authorized agent. (Citations omitted). In interpreting an instrument creating an express easement, the Court of Appeals outlined the following procedure: “In construing the language of a deed, the basic principles of contract interpretation apply. The grant of an easement by deed is strictly construed....

The extent of an easement created by an express grant depends upon a proper construction of the conveyance by which the easement was ⁶³⁸ created----“The primary rule for the construction of contracts generally—and the rule is applicable to the construction of an easement—is that a court should ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties at the time the contract was made, if that be possible.” ...” “A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. In addition, when the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed. In these circumstances, the true test of what is meant is not what the parties to the contract intend it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant. Consequently, the clear and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give [way] to what the parties thought the agreement meant or intended it to mean.” White v. Pines Cmty.

Improvement Ass’n, 403 Md. 13, 31-32 , 939 A.2d 165 (2008) (omissions and alterations in original) (citing Garfink v. Cloisters at Charles, Inc., 392 Md. 374, 392-93 , 897 A.2d 206 (2006)). “The primary consideration in construing the scope of an express easement is the language of the grant.” Md. Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 412 Md. 45, 63 , 985 A.2d 565 (2009) (citation and alteration omitted). (3) Implied Easements by Necessity “An implied easement is based on the presumed intention of the parties at the time of the grant or reservation as disclosed from the surrounding circumstances rather than on the language of the deed.” Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688 , 484 A.2d 630 (1984). “[G]rants of easements by implication are looked upon with jealousy and are construed with strictness by the courts.” Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 321 , ⁶³⁹ 41 A.2d 66 (1945) (citation omitted).

An implied easement by necessity arisejs] from a presumption that the parties intended that the party needing the easement should have access over the land.... The doctrine of easement by necessity is based upon public policy, which is favorable to full utilization of land and the prescription that parties do not intend to render land unfit for occupancy. The public policy exists in recognition that to allow a landlocked parcel inadvertently to be created affects not only the initial owner of that parcel, but every subsequent owner as well. By cutting off the land from all access to public ways, landlocking a parcel renders the land unuseable for virtually any future purpose.

Sharp, 197 Md.App. at 166-67 , 13 A.3d 1 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations added). In Stansbury v. MDR Dev., L.L.C., 390 Md. 476, 489 , 889 A.2d 403 (2006), the Court of Appeals discussed the necessary requirements for creation of an implied easement by necessity: The prerequisites to the creation of an easement by necessity can be summed up in three parts: (1) initial unity of title of the parcels of real property in question; (2) severance of the unity of title by conveyance of one of the parcels; and (3) the easement must be necessary in order for the grantor or grantee of the property in question to be able to access his or her land, with the necessity existing both at the time of the severance of title and at the time of the exercise of the easement. As to the first prerequisite—unity of title—“ ‘the dominant and servient estates must at some point have belonged to the same person.’ ” Sharp, 197 Md.App. at 169 , 13 A.3d 1 (quoting Ran v. Collins, 167 Md.App. 176, 186 , 891 A.2d 1175 (2006)). As to the third prerequisite-necessity-the “necessity must arise at the time of the initial grant of the property, and cannot be established by a subsequent necessity.

And, a way of necessity exists only so long as the necessity itself remains. Therefore, the necessity must be continuous, beginning at the ⁶⁴⁰ time that the dominant and servient properties are subdivided.” Sharp, 197 Md.App. at 169-70 , 13 A.3d 1 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the necessity required is the “strictest necessity, where it would not be reasonable to suppose that the parties intended the contrary[.]” Stansbury, 390 Md. at 488 , 889 A.2d 403 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). (4) Condry, Johnson, and Boucher In Condry, 184 Md. at 321, 323 , 41 A.2d 66 , the Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor’s “grant[ of] an injunction commanding defendants to remove [an] obstruction from [a] private road, and enjoining them from interfering with complainants’s use of the road in the future.” In the complaint for injunction, complainants argued that their only access to the county road was over a private road on defendants’ property, and that the private road had been used “continuously for many years as a means of ingress and egress[.]” Id. at 319 , 41 A.2d 66 .

The Court of Appeals observed, however, that the evidence “suggested that complainants could acquire access to the county road by a rear route” by constructing a bridge over the creek in the rear of the property. Id. at 322 , 41 A.2d 66 . The Court noted that complainants had acquired a parcel of land adjacent to the parcel in dispute, which provided another means of access to the county road by way of a 10-foot road. Id.

The Court held that where a grantee of an implied easement by necessity “acquires a new way to the estate previously reached by the way of necessity, the way of necessity is thereby extinguished.” Id. at 321-22 , 41 A.2d 66 (citation omitted). The Court stated it would “not recognize a way of necessity if another road to the public highway c[ould] be made without unreasonable expense, even though the other road may be much less convenient.” Id. at 322 , 41 A.2d 66 . In Johnson v. Robinson, 26 Md.App. 568, 582 , 338 A.2d 88 , cert, denied, 276 Md. 748 (1975), we reversed and remanded the case with direction to decree a way of necessity, as Robinson, the purchaser, had adequate notice that an easement across his property “[was] necessary to provide [John ⁶⁴¹ son] ingress and egress to her land.” Johnson sold a piece of land to Robinson, but hesitated to provide a deed “because she wanted some means of ingress to and egress from her landlocked property.” Id. at 569-71, 338 A.2d 88 . Johnson eventually signed the deed, but the deed failed to include a reservation for an express easement.

Id. at 572 , 338 A.2d 88 . The chancellor determined that if Johnson had an easement, it would have been an implied reservation easement by necessity, “as she [sought] a right of way across property which she conveyed for the benefit of property which she retained.” Id. at 573 , 338 A.2d 88 . The chancellor found, however, that no easement by necessity existed because no evidence was presented showing that the “right of way was in use at the time of the sale of the property or at the time of the settlement.” Id. at 574 , 338 A.2d 88 . In reversing the chancellor’s ruling, we observed that “ ‘in use at the time of the grant’ was but one way a ‘necessary and continuous’ easement could be made ‘apparent’ to a purchaser.” Id. at 580 , 338 A.2d 88 (citation omitted).

We concluded that because Robinson “admittedly had notice of the problem [of Johnson’s access to her property] before the deed [was] signed[,]” that actual knowledge supplanted the notice generated by physical use of the easement and Robinson had “adequate notice of the existence of an easement[.]” Id. at 581-82 , 338 A.2d 88 . In Boucher, 301 Md. at 691, 694 , 484 A.2d 630 , the Court of Appeals held that application of the “plat reference theory of implied easements” led to the conclusion that the Bouchers had an easement over a street because their deed referred to a plat referencing the street as a right-of-way. The Pipers, owners of an approximate fifteen acre tract in Frederick County recorded a plat establishing two one-acre lots, bisected by a roadway designated as “George Street.” Id. at 683-83 , 484 A.2d 630 . The plat indicated that the Pipers were offering to dedicate George Street to public use.

Id. at 684 , 484 A.2d 630 . The Pipers conveyed the two lots bounded by George Street to others, in deeds that referenced the Piper Estates plat, and then conveyed the remainder of their interest in the original fifteen acre tract to the Bouchers. Id. at 684 , 484 ⁶⁴² A.2d 630 . The Court of Appeals held that the “Bouchers ha[d] an implied easement over George Street by virtue of the reference in their deed to the Piper Estates plat, which depicts George Street as a right of way to their property.” Id. at 695 , 484 A.2d 630 .

The Court stated that “a deed that is silent as to the right of way but refers to a plat that establishes such a right of way creates a rebuttable presumption that the parties intended to incorporate the right of way in the transaction.” Id. at 689 , 484 A.2d 630 . D. Analysis (1) Express Easement Returning to the case at hand, we conclude that the circuit court properly entered declaratory judgment in favor of appellees as to appellant’s claim for an express easement. In entering declaratory judgment, the circuit court stated as follows: Review of the express terms of [appellant’s] Deed—which was prepared by [appellant] Gregg Bacon—reflects no language express detailing an ingress/egress easement. A further review of the Third Amended Complaint reveals no averments of any express language contained in any deed or record of title specifically creating an ingress/egress easement servicing [appellant’s] property.

In the absence of any averments establishing a prima facie claim for an express easement, the Court must declare the absence of an ingress/egress easement servicing [appellant’s] property. As the Court of Appeals has held, an express easement can be created only through a written instrument containing “the names of the grantor and grantee, a description of the property sufficient to identify it with reasonable certainty, and the interest or estate intended to be granted.” Kobrine, 380 Md. at 636 , 846 A.2d 403 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the third amended complaint, the Lawrence Map, and appellant’s deed reveals that appellant has not alleged the existence of a written instrument expressly granting or reserving an easement over Farm Road for his ⁶⁴³ property. In the third amended complaint, appellant alleges that there is an express easement “identified by way of the deed reference to Farm Road that traverses [appellant’s] property[,]” that “Farm Road is referenced on numerous deeds, and shown on historic tax maps along with a historic survey[,l” and that his “chain of title ... show[s] an express easement.” Neither the Lawrence Map nor appellant’s deed to his property includes any express language granting or reserving an easement over Farm Road servicing appellant’s property.

The fact that other deeds between other parties may have referenced Farm Road as a boundary or that historic tax maps showed Farm Road, as appellant alleged in the third amended complaint, does not create an express easement for appellant’s property. 21 Absent “averments of any express language contained in any deed or record of title specifically creating an ingress/egress easement servicing [appellant’s] property[,]” we agree with the circuit court that appellant does not have an express easement for ingress and egress over Farm Road. (2) Implied Easement by Necessity Upon review of the third amended complaint and the record as a whole, we conclude that the circuit court properly entered declaratory judgment in favor of appellees as to appellant’s claim for an implied easement by necessity. In granting declaratory judgment, the circuit court found that ⁶⁴⁴ appellant was required to “plead three elements” in order “[t]o establish a prima facie claim for an implied easement by necessity]/]” The circuit court outlined the elements set forth in Stansbury, 390 Md. at 489 , 889 A.2d 403 , stating: A review of the Third Amended Complaint demonstrates that [appellant] sought to have the ingress/egress easement impinge upon or cross approximately 16 separate parcels of property identified in Exhibit 1 to the Third Amended Complaint [the Lawrence Map]. [Appellant] failed to plead: (1) that these 16 parcels initially had unity in title; (2) how unity in title amongst the 16 parcels was severed; and/or (3) how the usage of the ingress/egress easement was necessary, at the time of the severance of the unity in title for each property, for [appellant’s] predecessor in title to access the subject property. In the absence of any averments establishing a prima facie claim for an implied easement by necessity, the Court must declare the absence of an ingress/egress easement servicing [appellant’s] property.

From our review, the “Second Count” in the third amended complaint includes three paragraphs alleging an implied easement by necessity. In none of the paragraphs has appellant alleged any of the three elements required for finding an implied easement by necessity. In the “Second Count,” appellant alleged the following: 46. [Appellant] incorporate^] by reference all paragraphs in this pleading as if fully set forth herein. 47. That [appellant] do[es] not have access to the[ ] land.

That [appellant is] landlocked if the Court holds that [appellant] do[es] not possess an express easement. 48. In the alternative, [appellant] assert[s] the[ ] claim to a right-of-way under Maryland common law, which allows for this Court to order an easement by necessity as equitable relief for a landlocked parcel of real property such as [appellant’s]. As the Court of Appeals has noted: “Grants of easements by implication are looked upon with jealousy and are construed with strictness by the courts.” Condry, 184 Md. at 321 , 41 ⁶⁴⁵ A.2d 66 . As the circuit court observed, appellant failed to allege, for example, unity of title, how unity of title was severed, and that usage of the ingress/egress easement was necessary at the time of severance.

Although appellant argues in a reply brief that the Lawrence Map shows unity of title, appellant did not state so in the third amended complaint. Assuming we were to agree that the Lawrence Map shows unity of title, appellant has still failed to plead facts demonstrating the two other elements necessary for creation of an implied easement by necessity as outlined in Stansbury, 390 Md. at 489 , 889 A.2d 403 -how unity of title was severed and that the ingress/egress easement was necessary at the time of severance of the unity of title. We cannot read into the third amended complaint the facts necessary to substantiate a claim for an implied easement by necessity. Appellant’s argument that the circuit court erred by “failing to presume the existence of an easement” is unconvincing.

A trial court is not required or permitted to presume the existence of an implied easement by necessity where a party has not demonstrated the circumstances necessary to establish such an easement. “[A]n implied easement is based on the presumed intention of the parties at the time of the grant or reservation^]” Boucher, 301 Md. at 688 , 484 A.2d 630 (emphasis added). Appellant’s argument that the circuit court failed to apply “direct precedent” is similarly unpersuasive. A review of the holdings in Condry, Johnson, and Boucher demonstrates that the cases are obviously distinguishable from this case and support neither appellant’s claim of an easement by necessity nor the claim of an express easement. The issue in Condry, 184 Md. at 321-22 , 41 A.2d 66 was whether the complainants had another access route to a county road, in which case an implied easement by necessity over a private road on defendants’ property would have been extinguished.

In this case, appellant has not pled or established facts sufficient to infer the existence of an implied easement by necessity. Johnson, 26 Md.App. at 581-82 , 338 A.2d 88 , involved two parties who had been in contact with one another for many years, such ⁶⁴⁶ that prior to signing a deed, the purchaser had “adequate notice of the existence of an easement” across his property. In this case, there are no facts demonstrating that appellant and another party have been in consistent contact such that the other party had “adequate notice” of an existence of an implied easement by necessity over Farm Road servicing appellant’s property. 22 In Boucher, 301 Md. at 694 , 484 A.2d 630 , the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of an implied easement established by a plat reference, not an implied easement by necessity. Although appellant references Plat 21707, appellant does not claim that the plat provides him with an easement. 23 For all of the reasons set forth above, we agree with the Commission Group that the circuit court properly granted declaratory judgment in favor of all appellees as to appellant’s claims for an express and implied easement as appellant failed ⁶⁴⁷ “to establish a prima face case sustaining his two legal theories of an ingress/egress easement.” II.

The Statute of Limitations and the MHG Group’s Duty A. Appellant’s Contentions (1) Statute of Limitations Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his tort and constitutional claims on the ground that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant argues that he learned of the “concert of action to alienate [his] property rights” in August 2007, and that he timely filed the second amended complaint weeks later. Appellant maintains that the circuit court incorrectly assumed that Plat 21707 was in his chain of title. According to appellant, Plat 21707 is “void ab initio and irrelevant,” and the circuit court erred in finding that appellant should have been aware of the content of the plat and was on notice as to potential claims as early as 2001, upon recording of the plat.

Alternatively, appellant argues that, assuming he learned of the “concert of action to alienate [his] property rights at the inception of the scheme, the tort is ongoing in nature and continues[.]” According to appellant, “the time period for bringing a cause of action in [this] case is three years from the date that [a]ppellant knew, or should have known of the tort (in this case August 2007) or three years after the injury ceases, or when [ajppellant is allowed the full enjoyment, use and access of his property.” Appellant contends that appel-lees’ intentional concealment of the existence of Farm Road continues to this day and that, prior to filing suit, he did not “have any reason or cause to believe that the deeded description of Farm Road in [his] chain of title was extinguished by the acts of [a]ppellees.” In his brief, appellant maintains that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 2007, when Christine Hill blocked access on Farm Road 24 and, therefore, ⁶⁴⁸ the second amended complaint filed September 21, 2007, was filed within the statute of limitations. Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in granting a blanket dismissal as to all appellees as appellees who did not assert the defense of statute of limitations, in an answer, “must be deemed to have waived the defense[J” Alternatively, appellant maintains that dismissal on the ground of the statute of limitations is “generally considered inappropriate in equity cases where there are allegations of fraud and/or negligence[.]” (2) The MHG Group’s Duty Relying on Carlotta v. T.R. Stark & Associates, Inc., 57 Md.App. 467 , 470 A.2d 888 (1984), appellant argues that the MHG Group owed him an implied duty of care to complete an accurate survey. Appellant maintains that the MHG Group’s failure to include Farm Road in the survey “must be considered a breach of a standard of care to the public, including [a]ppellant.” Alternatively, appellant argues that the MHG Group’s actions are so grievous that they create an immediate apparent duty. B. The Commission Group’s Response 25 The Commission Group responds that the circuit court properly dismissed the tort and constitutional claims on the ground that the statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of appellant’s complaint.

According to the Commission Group, the circuit court “properly invoked the January 11, 2001 filing date of Record Plat 21707 as notice to [a]ppellant of the accrual of his constitutional and tort claims when he took ⁶⁴⁹ title to the property on October 1, 2002.” The Commission Group maintains that Record Plat 21707, contained in the public land records, is in appellant’s chain of title. According to the Commission Group, the applicable statute of limitations for the constitutional and tort claims is three years, and the statute of limitations in the case expired on October 1, 2005, as “[ajppellant was clearly on actual or constructive notice as of October 1, 2002, the date he took title to his property, of any harm or injury to the alleged express easement, the [Fjarm [R]oad, caused by Record Plat 21707.” 26 C. Brown’s Response Brown responds that the circuit court correctly dismissed the claims against him based on the statute of limitations. Brown argues that the “only date specifically referenced in the Third Amended Complaint with regards to [his] alleged actions is 1994[,]” or alternatively, Plat 21707 filed on January 11, 2001, both of which occurred “more than six years before [a]ppellant[ ] named [him] as a defendant^]” Brown argues that the statute of limitations for appellant’s claims of fraudulent concealment, deceit, civil conspiracy, and trespass to land is three years and that the statute of limitations for appellant’s claim of slander of title is one year. Brown contends that the statute of limitations has not tolled under either the fraudulent concealment doctrine or the continuing tort doctrine because Plat 21707 is recorded in the public land records and, as such, the regular limitations periods apply.

Relying on Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981), Brown contends that the facts alleged in the third ⁶⁵⁰ amended complaint “clearly demonstrate ‘knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person or ordinary prudence on inquiry!.]’ ” According to Brown, the statute of limitations as to claims against him expired in 1997, as the third amended complaint’s allegations demonstrate that appellant “would have been on inquiry notice (if not actual notice) of the alleged actions of Mr. Brown when the northern access to Gold Mine Road was ‘permanently cut’ ” in 1994. Alternatively, Brown maintains that appellant was on notice of all of the facts concerning the property at the time of its purchase in 2002, and that the statute of limitations expired—at the latest—in 2005, before appellant filed a claim against him in 2007. 27 D. The MHG Group’s Response The MHG Group responds that the circuit court properly dismissed appellant’s claims on the ground of the statute of limitations because “the limitations period running on claims