Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Medical Center

HOLLANDER, Judge. Robert Fulton Bagwell, Jr., appellant, was terminated from his employment as a Special Commissioned Police Officer at Peninsula Regional Medical Center (“Peninsula”). 1 Thereafter, he filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County against Peninsula, Alonzo Tull (head of Peninsula’s security division), Craig Koppenhaver (Peninsula’s Director of Personnel), and Jeffrey Corrigan (Peninsula’s Vice President of Human Resources), appellees herein. In his Second Amended Complaint, Bagwell asserted a plethora of claims against appellees: breach of contract, abusive discharge, intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective relations, defamation, invasion of privacy/false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent investiga ⁴⁸¹ tion. The court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment on all counts. 2 Appellant presents one broad issue for our review: “Whether the trial judge erred in granting, without a hearing, Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to all causes of action asserted by Appellant.” He contends that the court erred in failing to recognize actual disputes of material fact.

As we perceive no error, we shall affirm. Factual Background The summary of facts that follows was gleaned from the pleadings and the evidence produced in connection with appellees’ motion for summary judgment. To the extent there is any factual dispute, we have cast the facts in the light most favorable to Bagwell, as we are reviewing the trial court’s resolution of the motion for summary judgment. On December 4, 1989, Peninsula, a hospital located in Salisbury, Maryland, hired Bagwell as a security officer. 3 The parties did not execute a written contract of employment.

But, upon hiring Bagwell, Peninsula gave him a copy of its “Employee’s Handbook,” which discusses, among other things, the hospital’s policies on discipline and termination. Bagwell was supervised by Tull who, in turn, reported to Koppenhaver and Corrigan. Bagwell’s duties primarily concerned controlling the flow of visitors in the hospital emergency room, and occasionally assisting in controlling violent patients. For about two and a half years, all of Bagwell’s job performance evaluations were exemplary. ⁴⁸² Bagwell was terminated by Peninsula on July 17,1992.

The event precipitating Bagwell’s discharge occurred on July 9, 1992. At about 11:30 p.m., while Bagwell was on duty, Juan Rivero was brought into the emergency room. Rivero had been suffering from multiple epileptic seizures over a thirty minute period, apparently brought about by his consumption of twelve cans of beer. He had been treated en route with valium, and by the time he arrived at the emergency room, the convulsions had ceased.

Nevertheless, Rivero thrashed violently and shouted abusively, threatening to kill hospital staff if they did not immediately release him. The attending physician ordered that Rivero, as he lay on a gurney, be restrained, and three people attempted to comply: Karen Malone, a nurse; Willie Ames, a nursing assistant; and Bagwell. Ames and Malone positioned themselves by Rivero’s legs, and Bagwell stood by Rivero’s head. Although they initially secured Rivero with soft restraints, Rivero quickly broke free.

Then, while Bagwell, Ames, and Malone attempted to secure Rivero with leather straps, Rivero bit Bagwell on the right wrist. Other than Bagwell, no one saw Rivero bite appellant. Bagwell thereafter struck Rivero on the top of the head. There is essentially no dispute that Rivero bit Bagwell.

What the parties dispute is the time interval between the bite and the strike. In the light most favorable to Bagwell, he reflexively hit Rivero during the bite in an attempt to get Rivero to let go. Rivero became even more angry and violent after being struck. Bagwell was asked to leave the room and another security officer, who had been waiting outside the emergency room, took over for Bagwell.

After leaving the emergency room, Bagwell went to the security office and prepared a statement concerning the incident. He never sought medical treatment for the bite. In the meantime, after calming down somewhat, Rivero began complaining about having been punched by the security guard and he threatened to sue the hospital. He claimed that Bagwell’s punch had broken his nose, but Ann Lynch, a nurse present in the emergency room ⁴⁸³ during the incident, saw no evidence that Rivero had suffered any injury from Bagwell’s blow.

Within an hour of his arrival at Peninsula, Rivero discharged himself against medical advice. Rivero’s wife called Trina Powell, Peninsula’s Administrative Supervisor of Nursing, on July 10, 1992, demanding to know the identity of the officer who hit Rivero. Powell contacted Tull who, along with Koppenhaver, initiated an investigation. Tull immediately placed Bagwell on paid leave pending the outcome of the investigation.

On July 13, 1992, Tull and Koppenhaver interviewed Malone, Ames, and Lynch. Each witness had, by that point, already prepared a handwritten statement. Ames later indicated that he had prepared his statement specifically because Powell had asked him to do so, due to her concern that Peninsula would be sued. 4 Following each interview, Tull and Koppenhaver together drafted a typed, undated statement reflecting their understanding of the witness’s version of events as related during the interview. Each witness signed the typed statement, confirming his or her agreement with the facts presented in the typed statement.

According to Lynch’s original statement, she first entered the emergency room while Bagwell, Ames, and Malone were attempting to restrain Rivero. She saw Bagwell strike Rivero with a closed fist on the top of his head, hard enough that everyone in the room heard it. [Bagwell] looked up at me and said “he bit me, nobody bites me.” After this the [patient] became more combative screaming at [Bagwell], saying he was going to sue because security had hit him. The [patient] eventually calmed down after Fulton Bagwell left the room. The typed statement indicated, in relevant part, as follows: Ms. Lynch stated that when she entered the room she observed Karen Malone ... and Willie Ames ... restrain ⁴⁸⁴ ing the arms of a combative patient.

Officer Bagwell was standing at the head and behind the patient. She stated that she did not witness the patient bite Officer Bagwell. Ms. Lynch estimated that approximately thirty (30) seconds elapsed between her arrival in the room and the point where she observed Officer Bagwell strike the patient with a closed fist on top of his head. Ms. Lynch also confirmed that she did not witness the patient biting Officer Bagwell prior to his striking the patient.

Ms. Lynch stated that after striking the patient, Officer Bagwell looked up at her and said “He bit me, nobody bites me.” Lynch never repudiated any portion of either statement. Also, in a deposition taken later, Lynch indicated that she was watching Rivero constantly during the entire thirty second period between her entry and Bagwell’s strike, but she never saw the bite. Malone wrote in her original statement that all three were attempting to restrain Rivero, with Bagwell standing by Rivero’s head and Malone standing at Rivero’s right side. While she was attempting to restrain Rivero’s right arm, she heard a SMACK, looked up and saw [the patient with his] head turned up toward [Bagwell]. [The patient] stated “You punched my face!” and [Bagwell] replied “You bit me!” I did not witness the actual incident.

The typed version of Malone’s account of events was essentially consistent with her original statement. It added that she had “indicated that she observed no marks on the patient or Officer Bagwell that were related to the incident.” Malone never repudiated any portion of either statement. According to Ames’s handwritten statement, dated July 9, 1992, he indicated that he and Bagwell entered the emergency room together to help restrain a combative patient. Ames continued: Officer Bagwell proceeded to help hold the patient, when all of a sudden Officer Bagwell said, “I will teach you not to ⁴⁸⁵ bite people.” I heard a thump.

The patient said he hit me in my face. The patient proceeded to call him nasty names. The patient said he was going to get a lawyer and sue Officer Bagwell. Ames’s typed statement indicated, in pertinent part, as follows: Mr. Ames stated that he had restrained the patient’s arm when he heard Officer Bagwell state that the patient bit him.

Mr. Ames stated that he heard Officer Bagwell say, “I will teach you not to bite people.” Mr. Ames said that he then heard a thump. Mr. Ames did not see Officer Bagwell punch the patient nor did he see the patient bite Officer Bagwell. Mr. Ames also stated that he observed a bruise on the patient’s forehead after he heard the thump. In a deposition taken during discovery, Ames repudiated the implication that he had already restrained Rivero when Bag-well first spoke; Rivero was still unrestrained at that time.

Ames affirmed the remainder of the statements. Corrigan called Rivero’s wife on July 14, 1992, and he wrote a memorandum to the file purporting to memorialize the conversation. In the memorandum, Corrigan indicated that he told Ms. Rivero that he “had become fully aware of most of the facts surrounding the situation,” and apologized to her. Corrigan then assured her that Peninsula “had thoroughly investigated the situation and that [Peninsula] took the incident very seriously and [he was] dealing with the employee involved appropriately.” On July 17, 1992, Tull and Koppenhaver ordered Bagwell to report to Tull’s office.

According to Bagwell, they accused him of committing an unnecessary act of punitive retaliation between fifteen and thirty seconds after Rivero had bitten him. Bagwell denied this, claiming he acted reflexively, while Rivero was still biting him, solely to get Rivero to cease biting. Bagwell claims Tull and Koppenhaver refused to allow him access to the written statements and, after the discussion, handed him a “pink slip”—Peninsula’s standardized disciplinary action form—that had been prepared in advance of the ⁴⁸⁶ meeting, informing him of his termination. Bagwell thus claims the meeting was a sham, that the advance preparation of a notice of termination indicated that Tull and Koppenhaver had predetermined the outcome of the meeting and were never interested in what Bagwell had to say.

The disciplinary action notice reads, in part, as follows: On July 9, 1992, you failed to comply with Hospital policy as follows: Mistreatment of a patient. You were observed hitting a restrained patient with a closed fist to his head. Conference with employee: You have admitted that you hit this patient in the head although you indicated that it was only a reflex action. An investigation of this incident revealed that the patient was restrained and that the patient was not biting you at the time you punched him in the head.

Therefore, your action was not for the pin-pose of defending yourself, but rather a retaliatory act against the patient which you undertook at least fifteen seconds after the patient had bitten you. This constitutes an inappropriate and excessive force on your part. As a result, we therefore find it necessary to We find it necessary to terminate your employment effective immediately. (Bold type indicates pre-printed text).

Following his discharge, Bagwell was in “total shock.” He became severely depressed, had difficulty sleeping, became introverted, lost his appetite,.and was embarrassed to go out in public. Also, sometime in late July, 1992, a local newspaper reported the emergency room incident, stating that Bagwell had broken Rivero’s nose. The article further related that Donna Richardson, spokesperson for Peninsula, said that Bag-well had been terminated as a result of the incident and that Peninsula had apologized to the Rivero family. The majority of the article, however, relied on Rivero’s statements of fact and opinion. ⁴⁸⁷ Thereafter, Bagwell applied for unemployment benefits from the Department of Economic and Employment Development (“DEED”).

Upon request from DEED, Koppenhaver, on behalf of Peninsula, sent DEED a statement summarizing the reasons for Bagwell’s discharge. DEED subsequently denied Bagwell unemployment benefits for nine weeks. Bagwell and Rivero filed criminal battery charges against each other. After a court trial, both men were acquitted.

Bagwell later sought employment with the Ocean City Police Department (“OCPD”) and the Wicomico County Department of Corrections (“WCDOC”). In connection with each of these applications, Bagwell signed a consent form, expressly authorizing all prior employers to release information concerning Bagwell’s previous employment and exonerating prior employers from all liability stemming from such release. In response to requests from OCPD and WCDOC, Koppenhaver, on behalf of Peninsula, sent a statement to each, summarizing the reasons for Bagwell’s discharge. In addition, Koppenhaver discussed Bagwell’s excellent prior employment history and indicated that Bagwell would be a capable police officer notwithstanding his lapse in judgment.

Peninsula acknowledged that Koppenhaver also spoke with representatives of both prospective employers, but Koppenhaver averred that his oral comments did not include any information outside the matters in the file. Nevertheless, both OCPD and WCDOC declined to hire Bagwell. Discussion I. Scope of Review The court granted summary judgment on all counts, without a hearing and without explaining the reasons for its decision. 5 The court is, however, presumed to know the law. ⁴⁸⁸ Quinn v. Quinn, 83 Md.App. 460, 466 , 575 A.2d 764 (1990); see also Myers v. Estate of Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124 , 560 A.2d 59 , cert. denied, 317 Md. 640 , 566 A.2d 101 (1989) (appellant, in demonstrating both error and prejudice, bears burden of overcoming presumption that court knew and correctly applied the law). In deciding a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501, the trial court must decide whether there is any genuine dispute as to material facts and, if not, whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Warner v. German, 100. Md.App. 512, 516, 642 A.2d 239 (1994); Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737-38 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Bits “N” Bytes Computer Supplies, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Md., 97 Md.App. 557, 576-77, 631 A.2d 485 (1993), cert. denied, 333 Md. 385 , 635 A.2d 425 (1994); Seaboard Surety Co. v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md.App. 236, 242-45 , 603 A.2d 1357 (1992). In the absence of a dispute of material facts, our role is to determine whether the trial court was legally correct. Beatty, 330 Md. at 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 .

In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may not determine the credibility of witnesses. Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 326 , 389 A.2d 887 (1978). Rather, the court must resolve all disputes of fact, along with all inferences that can be drawn from the evidence and pleadings in the record, against the moving party. Comm’l Union Ins.

Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 97 Md.App. 442, 451, 630 A.2d 261 (1993), rev’d on other grounds, 339 Md. 150 , 661 A.2d 691 (1995). Moreover, the party opposing summary judgment must present admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a material dispute. Porter Hayden, 97 Md.App. at 451, 630 A.2d 261 . Mere formal denials or general allegations of a dispute are not sufficient to establish the dispute.

Seaboard Surety, 91 Md.App. at 243 , 603 A.2d 1357 ; see also King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985); Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington Co. Nat’l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. ⁴⁸⁹ 691, 712 , 467 A.2d 758 (1983). Nor will speculation concerning the existence of unproduced evidence defeat the motion. A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.

Corp., 333 Md. 245, 262 , 634 A.2d 1330 (1994). “[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence ... is insufficient to preclude the grant of summary judgment.” Beatty, 330 Md. at 738 , 625 A.2d 1005 . Rather, the evidence offered to show a dispute of fact must be sufficiently detailed and precise to illuminate its nature. Beatty, 330 Md. at 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 ; see also Bond v. Nibco, 96 Md.App. 127, 135 , 623 A.2d 731 (1993); Hill v. Lewis, 21 Md.App. 121, 133-35 , 318 A.2d 850 , cert. denied, 272 Md. 724 (1974). Finally, even if the nonmoving party demonstrates the existence of a dispute of fact, the dispute will not defeat the motion for summary judgment unless the dispute concerns a material fact, i.e., a fact that will alter the outcome of the case depending upon how the factfinder resolves the dispute over it.

King, 303 Md. at 111 , 492 A.2d 608 ; Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 583 , 420 A.2d 261 (1980); Miller v. Fairchild, 97 Md.App. 324, 340 , 629 A.2d 1293 , cert. denied, 333 Md. 172 , 634 A.2d 46 (1993). In our review, we accept as true that Bagwell hit Rivero in self-defense, reflexively, and not in retaliation. We also accept that Bagwell hit Rivero during the bite, rather than afterward. Nevertheless, we conclude that Peninsula produced evidence demonstrating that there was no dispute of material facts; Bagwell, on the other hand, failed to produce responsive evidence generating material factual disputes.

We explain.

II

Employment-Related Claims A. Breach of Contract The parties agree that appellant was an at-will employee of Peninsula. Bagwell claims, however, that he was discharged in violation of the terms of Peninsula’s Employee Handbook, which he argues created enforceable contractual rights. Appellant contends that the terms of the Employee Handbook limited Peninsula’s ability to terminate its at-will employees, effectively modifying the at-will employment. Bagwell argues ⁴⁹⁰ that, because Peninsula was contractually bound to follow the terms of its own Handbook, the court erred in resolving the issue of whether Peninsula had breached certain provisions in the Handbook.

Bagwell concedes, however, that if he actually had hit Rivero in a retaliatory manner after Rivero ceased biting, such conduct would constitute cause for immediate termination, based on the provisions in Peninsula’s Employee Handbook concerning “mistreatment of a patient.” Preliminarily, we shall address the claim as against Tull, Koppenhaver, and Corrigan. Bagwell levelled his breach of contract claim against all appellees, without distinction. Yet in his various complaints, appellant recognizes that only Peninsula was Bagwell’s employer. Bagwell presented no evidence below that he entered into an employment contract with Corrigan, Koppenhaver, or Tull personally.

As there was no contract for Corrigan, Koppenhaver, or Tull to breach, these defendants were entitled to entry of judgment as a matter of law. Generally, an employer or an employee may terminate an at-will employment relationship, for almost any reason or no reason, at any time. Lee v. Denro, 91 Md.App. 822, 829 , 605 A.2d 1017 (1992); Beery v. Md. Medical Laboratory, 89 Md.App. 81, 94 , 597 A.2d 516 (1991); Haselrig v. Publ. Storage, Inc., 86 Md.App. 116, 122 , 585 A.2d 294 (1991); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md.App. 325, 338 , 517 A.2d 786 (1986); see also Adler v. Amer.

Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35 , 432 A.2d 464 (1981). One narrow exception to this doctrine, adopted in Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 61 Md.App. 381 , 486 A.2d 798 (1985), cert. denied, 303 Md. 295 , 493 A.2d 349 (1985), concerns situations in which the at-will employment relationship is modified by provisions in a personnel policy. Here, the Handbook provided, in pertinent part, as follows: This Employee’s Handbook provides some of the main features of our personnel policies and procedures which “have been developed to assist each of us in carrying out the Hospital’s task of providing the best possible patient care. ⁴⁹¹ We hope that this will give you a good idea of the expectations of [Peninsula], as well as how many things are done at [Peninsula]. However, the Handbook does not, and is not intended to, cover these materials in detail or serve as a contract between you and [Peninsula].

All statements are subject to change or modification without prior notice.... if: sf: if: sf: if: ifc [Peninsula] will: 1. Provide fair employee relations, policies and practices as to wages, benefits, and working conditions; provide effective supervision and management in order to insure the continued success of [Peninsula]. sf: sf: if: sfe sf: :{: 3. Require and assure that all levels of management will, through understanding supervision, apply all such policies and procedures fairly. :{: if: if: sf: if; It is the policy of the Hospital to provide an equitable, uniform and consistent procedure for administering corrective discipline for infractions of Hospital rules. Other than those instances that dictate immediate termination of employment, it should be clearly understood by both employee and supervisor that the purpose of discipline is to correct, not to punish....

When corrective discipline does not result in the necessary behavior change, termination of employment will occur. When disciplinary action is taken, such action will be in writing.... The immediate Supervisor or Department Head shall be responsible for initiating corrective action in accordance with the following procedure: A. One written warning will be given before suspension, except in circumstances listed in section C. B. One written warning will be given before discharge, except in circumstances listed in section C. ⁴⁹² C. Violation of the following may be cause for immediate dismissal without prior warning: ****** 4. Fighting, disorderly conduct, or the use of profane or abusive language on Hospital premises. ****** 11.

Mistreatment of patients. (Emphasis added). Appellant contends that the Handbook promises an opportunity to conform his conduct to Peninsula’s expectations. Relying on Staggs , Bagwell claims that Peninsula breached the provisions of its Handbook by firing him -without first either issuing him a written warning or taking some other disciplinary action short of discharge.

We see no merit to this contention. In Staggs , the appellants were at-will employees who had been discharged without having been given the benefit of the procedures specified in a company personnel memorandum. The memorandum stated specifically that an employee could be dismissed at any time for cause, and that multiple counsel-ling sessions would precede final dismissal. 61 Md.App. at 384-85 , 486 A.2d 798 . We reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment, holding that, under the circumstances, the at-will employment relationship had been so modified by the personnel policy as to require an exception to the at-will doctrine.

Id., at 388 , 486 A.2d 798 . We held that provisions in a policy memorandum that limit the employer’s discretion to terminate an indefinite employment or that set forth a required procedure for termination of such employment may, if properly expressed and communicated to the employee, become contractual undertakings by the employer that are enforceable by the employee. Id., at 392 , 486 A.2d 798 (emphasis added). At the same time, however, we explained that not all personnel policies and ⁴⁹³ employee handbooks create enforceable contractual rights.

We said: Not every statement made in a personnel handbook or other publication will rise to the level of an enforceable covenant. ... “General statements of policy are no more than that and do not meet the contractual requirements of an offer.” Id. (quoting Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn.1983)). We find the case of Castiglione, 69 Md.App. at 338-41 , 517 A.2d 786 , particularly instructive here. In Castiglione , the hospital’s employee handbook specified that, before an employee would be discharged, the supervisor would review the employee’s job performance with the employee.

Although the plaintiff, an at-will employee, attended such an evaluation meeting, her supervisor did not there discuss the plaintiffs job performance before discharging her. She sued for breach of contract, arguing that the employee handbook required the employer to review the employee’s record with the employee prior to termination. Id., at 328-29 , 517 A.2d 786 . The trial court granted summary judgment based on a disclaimer in the manual that stated that the handbook did not constitute an express or implied contract.

Id., at 329 , 517 A.2d 786 . We affirmed. Id., at 338 , 517 A.2d 786 . After reviewing Staggs , we said: The disclaimer language in the policy manual ... does not indicate any intent to limit the discretion of the appellee to discharge only for cause, as was the case in Staggs....

Finally, unlike the situation in Staggs , in this case the appellee expressly negated, in a clear and conspicuous manner, any contract based upon the handbook for a definite term and reserved the right to discharge its employees at any time. The provisions for review, when viewed in the larger context, were but “general policy statements” not amounting to an offer of employment for a definite term or requiring cause for dismissal. ⁴⁹⁴ The purpose of the Staggs exception to the at will doctrine is to protect the legitimate expectations of employees who have justifiably relied on manual provisions precluding job termination except for cause. Justifiable reliance is precluded where, as in the case at hand, contractual intent has been expressly disclaimed. Id., at 339-41, 517 A.2d 786 (emphasis added; citation omitted).

See also Hrehorovich, 93 Md.App. at 790-95, 614 A.2d 1021 (applying reasoning of Castiglione to disclaimer found in hospital by-laws, as well as in employee handbook); Fournier v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 82 Md.App. 31, 41-43 , 569 A. 2d 1299 (1990) (applying reasoning of Castiglione to disclaimer found in an application for employment, rather than in an employee handbook). As in Castiglione , Peninsula’s Handbook contained a clear disclaimer. This disclaimer, like the one in Castiglione , expressly stated that the Handbook should not be treated as a contract in any way. Peninsula’s Handbook also reserved the right to change any of the terms of the Handbook at any time, as well as the right to discharge any employee at any time.

Consequently, Bagwell cannot reasonably assert justifiable reliance on any of the terms of the Handbook. Therefore, as Peninsula was entitled to terminate the relationship without complying with the terms of the Handbook, it was entitled to entry of judgment with respect to this claim. B. Wrongful Discharge Bagwell contends that, even if the Employee Handbook did not limit Peninsula’s ability to discharge him, his termination nevertheless constituted an abusive or wrongful discharge under Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31 , 432 A.2d 464 (1981) and its progeny. As we have observed, with few exceptions, at-will employment is terminable by either party, at any time, for any reason whatsoever.

Adler, 291 Md. at 35 , 432 A.2d 464 (citing St. Comm’n on Human Rel. v. Amecom Div., 278 Md. 120 , 360 A.2d 1 (1976), Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365 , 19 A.2d 183 (1941), and W., B. & A.R.R. ⁴⁹⁵ Co. v. Moss, 127 Md. 12 , 96 A. 273 (1915)); Denro, 91 Md.App. at 829 , 605 A.2d 1017 . See also Suburban Hosp. v. Dwiggins, 324 Md. 294, 303 , 596 A.2d 1069 (1991); Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hospital, 93 Md.App. at 784-85 , 614 A.2d 1021 ; Castiglione, 69 Md.App. at 338 , 517 A.2d 786 . Nonetheless, the Court in Adler recognized a narrow exception to that rule; the discharge may not contravene a clear mandate of public policy. Adler, 291 Md. at 35 , 432 A.2d 464 .

See also Ewing v. Koppers Co., Inc., 312 Md. 45, 49 , 537 A.2d 1173 (1988) (tort is also available to contractual employees); Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md.App. 167, 179-81 , 655 A.2d 1292 , cert. granted, 339 Md. 739 , 664 A.2d 935 (Sept. 18, 1995) (discussion of wrongful discharge); Denro, 91 Md.App. at 829-30 , 605 A.2d 1017 (discussing definition of clear mandate of public policy); Townsend v. L.W.M. Mgmt., Inc., 64 Md.App. 55, 60-61 , 494 A.2d 239 , cert. denied, 304 Md. 300 , 498 A.2d 1186 (1985) (same). The tort of wrongful or abusive discharge “is defined as the willful termination of employment by the employer because of the employee’s alleged failure to perform in accordance with the employer’s expectations and the termination is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.” Allen v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 76 Md.App. 642, 652 , 547 A.2d 1105 , cert. denied, 314 Md. 458 , 550 A.2d 1168 (1988). “Specifically, in order to state a claim for wrongful discharge, the employee must demonstrate: (1) that the employee was discharged; (2) that the dismissal violated some clear mandate of public policy; and (3) that there is a nexus between the defendant and the decision to fire the employee.” Shapiro v. Massengill, 105 Md.App. 743, 764 , 661 A.2d 202 (1995) (citing Leese v. Baltimore Co., 64 Md.App. 442, 468 , 497 A.2d 159 , cert. denied, 305 Md. 106 , 501 A.2d 845 (1985)). To prevail, the employee must demonstrate the policy in question with clarity, specificity, and authority. “ ‘[Recognition of an otherwise undeclared public policy as a basis for a judicial decision involves the application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of the case,’ a practice which should be ⁴⁹⁶ employed sparingly, if at all.” Lee v. Denro, 91 Md.App. at 830, 605 A.2d 1017 (quoting Adler, 291 Md. at 45 , 432 A.2d 464 ). Bagwell contends that his discharge contravened two clear mandates of public policy: first, his duties as a security officer; second, his right to defend himself.

As in Denro , “[t]his case presents the ‘familiar common-law problem of deciding where and how to draw the line between claims that genuinely involve the mandates of public policy and are actionable, and ordinary disputes between employee and employer that are not.” Id. at 828 , 605 A.2d 1017 (citing Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471 , 427 A.2d 385, 387 (1980)). Here, the line must be drawn in favor of the employer. We turn first to appellant’s claim that derives from his position as a “Special Commissioned Police Officer.” As a Special Police Officer, appellant was officially commissioned by the Governor, pursuant to Md.Ann.Code of 1957, Art. 41 §§ 4-901 through 4-913 (1992), to protect Peninsula. Under § 4-905, a Special Police Officer “is charged with the protection and preservation of peace and good order on the property [that the officer was hired to protect],” with all the powers vested in any other police officer to protect the employer’s property.

See, e.g., Waters v. State, 320 Md. 52 , 575 A.2d 1244 , cert. denied 498 U.S. 989 , 111 S.Ct. 529 , 112 L.Ed.2d 539 (1990); Huger v. State, 285 Md. 347, 352 , 402 A.2d 880 (1979). Bagwell asserts that, under Art. 41 § 4-905, he had a duty to protect the safety of Peninsula’s personnel and property. He further argues that society has an interest in ensuring that all police officers, including Special Police Officers, are allowed to fulfill their official duties without fear of termination for doing so. Appellant relies for support on Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Svces. of Baltimore, Inc., 98 Md.App. 123, 135-37 , 632 A.2d 463 (1993).

In Bleich , the employee was obligated, pursuant to a comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme, to report all instances of suspected child abuse or neglect. This scheme ⁴⁹⁷ specifically included an express declaration that the policy of the scheme was “ ‘to protect minor children whose care has been relinquished to others by the children’s parent.’ ” Id., at 135-36 , 632 A.2d 463 (quoting Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law Art. § 5-502(b) (1991)). The employee made such a report, and after she was fired, she filed suit alleging wrongful discharge. For the purposes of determining whether the employee had stated a claim, the parties assumed that the employee was discharged in retaliation for having obeyed the duty imposed by the statutory scheme.

We concluded that firing the employee for obeying her duty would violate the express statutory policy. Id., at 188-40, 632 A.2d 463 . We decline Bagwell’s request to find that Art. 41 § 4-905 constitutes a clear mandate of public policy. “[J]urists to this day have been unable to fashion a truly workable definition of public policy.” Md. Nat’l Cap. P. & P. Comm’n v. Washington Nat’l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 605 , 386 A.2d 1216 (1978).

Nevertheless, “unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions, [public policy] should be accepted as the basis of a judicial determination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection.” Townsend v. L.W.M. Mgmt., Inc., 64 Md.App. at 61-62, 494 A.2d 239 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 , 50 S.Ct. 253, 261 , 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930)). Unlike the plaintiff in Bleich , Bagwell cannot point to any declaration of policy in the statute on which he can rely. Rather, he relies on his status as a Special Police Officer, with statutorily delineated duties. We are not convinced that the particular policy claimed by appellant—that society has an interest in ensuring that all police officers are allowed to fulfill their official duties—is embodied in § 4-905; it merely states that a Special Police Officer has the duty to protect the peace and order on the property he was appointed to protect.

Moreover, we have never held that every statute constitutes a clear mandate of public policy for purposes of the tort of wrongful discharge. Indeed, were we to so hold, we would open the floodgates of litigation. ⁴⁹⁸ Although not a wrongful discharge case, we find the Court’s comments in Md-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. particularly persuasive: Fearing the disruptive effect that invocation of the highly elusive public policy principle would likely exert on the stability of commercial and contractual relations, Maryland courts have been hesitant to strike down voluntary bargains on public policy grounds, doing so only in those cases where the challenged agreement is patently offensive to the public good.... This reluctance on the part of the judiciary to nullify contractual arrangements on public policy grounds also serves to protect the public interest in having individuals exercise broad powers to structure their own affairs by making legally enforceable promises a concept which lies at the heart of the freedom of contract principle.

Id., 282 Md. at 606 , 386 A.2d 1216 (citations omitted). Assuming, arguendo, that the statutory section cited by appellant expresses a “clear mandate of public policy,” Bagwell must nonetheless demonstrate a “nexus” between the discharge and the policy, i.e., that the specific basis for his discharge violates the policy in issue. Bagwell has failed to generate any evidence with respect to a subtle but key factual issue: whether the reason Peninsula fired him was for carrying out his duty. Appellees assert that Bagwell was fired for allegedly breaching his duty, by striking a patient for retaliatory purposes.

In contrast, Bagwell has alleged only that he was performing his duty (which, based on the posture of the case, we must assume is true). Bagwell relies primarily on the coincidental event of his termination to argue that he was fired as a result of the performance of his duty. In order to establish the requisite nexus between the discharge and the alleged policy, Bagwell must assert more than a mere allegation that appellees discharged him because he was executing his duty. Appellant thus claims that appellees, frightened about the prospect of a lawsuit by Rivero, discharged Bagwell to enhance Peninsula’s position in the event of a lawsuit.

The problem with this argument becomes apparent simply by its ⁴⁹⁹ presentation; the decision to fire Bagwell had nothing to do with his compliance with or breach of his statutory duties. Consequently, it is undisputed that the reason why Bagwell was discharged was not a wrongful one. Townsend, 64 Md.App. at 69-70 , 494 A.2d 239 . What we said in Beery crystallizes our point: Had [the employee] been guilty of the alleged misconduct, it would have been entirely proper and appropriate for the employer to fire [him].

Firing [him] on the basis of ... unsubstantiated allegations, without proof and, indeed, without fully investigating the matter, may very well have been improper—even foolish—but can hardly be said to contra,vene any clear mandate of public policy. 89 Md.App. at 94-95 , 597 A.2d 516 (emphasis added). Townsend v. L.W.M. Mgmt., Inc., 64 Md.App. 55 , 494 A.2d 239 , is also instructive. The employer required several employees to submit to a polygraph test in order to determine whether any of them was guilty of stealing from the employer. One of the employees agreed to take the test, but failed it.

Following his discharge, the employee filed suit for wrongful discharge, but the circuit court granted a directed verdict in favor of the employer. On appeal, we agreed with the employee that, under Maryland law, there was a clear mandate of public policy prohibiting employers from forcing employees to submit to polygraph tests. Nonetheless, we affirmed the judgment because the employer fired the employee for stealing, and not based on whether the employee consented or refused to take the polygraph test. Id., at 69-70 , 494 A.2d 239 .

We concluded that the mere reliance on the results of the polygraph test, even if the employer had wrongfully required the employee to take the test, did not violate the public policy. Id., at 70 , 494 A.2d 239 . See also Brandon, 104 Md.App. at 194 , 655 A.2d 1292 (“Even if some unlawful animus contributed to the ultimate employment decision, liability does not necessarily attach,” particularly where the decision would have been the same with or without the animus). ⁵⁰⁰ Even assuming Peninsula was incorrect about whether Bag-well hit the patient in retaliation, appellant did not provide any evidence disputing that appellees truly believed Bagwell had acted in retaliation. Appellees may have been wrong about the facts, and they may have hoped to improve their position in the event of a lawsuit.

But they were entitled to terminate an at-will employee, like Bagwell, based on valid economic concerns or even for foolish reasons. As we said in Shapiro : The question is not whether discharging [the employee for his arguably improper conduct] was fair, justified, sensible, reasonable, or appropriate. Rather, the question is whether it was wrongful, i.e., whether it violated a clear mandate of public policy. Absent that type of violation, employers can discharge at-will employees for no reason or even for a bad reason.

What appellant overlooks ... is the fact that mere termination of employment does not give rise to a cause of action for [wrongful] discharge. [If appellant] was an ‘at-will’ employee, appellee had an absolute right to fire [him] for no reason or for almost any reason without incurring any liability for doing so. Id., 105 Md.App. at 769 , 661 A.2d 202 (quoting Beery v. Md. Medical Laboratory, Inc., 89 Md.App. 81, 94 , 597 A.2d 516 (1991), cert. denied, 325 Md. 329 , 600 A.2d 850 (1992)) (emphases in original opinions). See also Lee v. Denro, 91 Md.App. at 836, 605 A.2d 1017 (“[T]he fact that the employer does not have a good reason for the employee’s discharge does not, in the absence of a clear violation of public policy, render the discharge ‘abusive’ or ‘wrongful.’”). Appellant fares no better with respect to his claim of self-defense as another “clear mandate of public policy.” To support his claim that Maryland recognizes a clear mandate of public policy "with respect to self-defense, Bagwell relies on Watson v. Peoples Security Life Ins.

Co., 322 Md. 467 , 588 A.2d 760 (1991). In Watson , the employee was discharged for suing a co-worker for assault and battery. The Court held that a person’s right to seek legal redress for actionable torts ⁵⁰¹ represents a clear mandate of public policy sufficient to satisfy Adler. Id., at 480-81, 483 , 588 A.2d 760 .

But the Court never considered whether the right to act violently, even in self-defense, is protected by a clear mandate of public policy. Thus, the case does not support appellant’s proposition. We therefore decline to conclude that conduct in self-defense is protected by a clear mandate of public policy. Although it appears that Maryland has not considered the question of whether acting in self-defense constitutes a clear mandate of public policy, at least one other state has considered it.

In