Baker v. Montgomery County

WATTS, J. This appeal arises from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Montgomery County (the “County”), the Mayor and Council of Rockville (“Rockville”), the City of Gaithersburg (“Gaithersburg”), and Chevy Chase Village (“Chevy Chase”), appellees, 1 against Matthew C. Baker; Thomas J. Wheatley; Aristone L. Pereira, Jr.; Johnny R. Garza; Kenneth K. Sleeman; David A. Schiller; Walter McKee; Janet Marburger; and those similarly situated, collectively referred to as appellants. The lawsuit in this matter was initiated by appellants, all of whom received speeding citations resulting from photographs taken by speed monitoring systems located in appellees’ respective jurisdictions. Appellants claim that appellees violated Md. Ann.Code. ⁶⁴⁶ Transportation Article (“T.A.”) § 21-809 by entering into contracts in which contingent fees were paid to ACS State & Local Solutions Inc., (“ACS”), the contractor who allegedly operated appellees’ speed monitoring systems, and as such, the fines were unlawful. Appellants raised the following issues, which we have rephrased and reordered 2 as follows: I. Does a private cause of action exist for appellants to challenge appellees’ alleged misapplication of T.A. § 21-809?

II

Does T.A. § 21-809 apply equally to the County and the Municipalities?

III

Were the contracts between appellees and ACS in violation of T.A. § 21-809? ⁶⁴⁷ IV. Did appellants waive the right to challenge T.A. § 21-809 by paying the $40 citation fines? V. Does the Local Government Torts Claims Act (“LGTCA”) notice requirement apply in this case and, if so, did appellants comply? We answer the first question in the negative and, as such, we need not address the other issues raised by appellants.

We shall, therefore, affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2006, the Maryland General Assembly passed House Bill (“H.B.”) 443 and enacted T.A. § 21-809, granting Montgomery County authority to place speed cameras throughout the County and impose a civil penalty not to exceed $40.00 in the event of a violation of the subtitle. T.A. § 21-809 (2006) 3 provides: (a) Definitions.—(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. (2) “Local police department” means: (i) The Montgomery County Department of Police; and (ii) The police department of any municipal corporation in Montgomery County.

(3) (i) “Owner” means the registered owner of a motor vehicle or a lessee of a motor vehicle under a lease of 6 months or more. (ii) “Owner” does not include: 1. A motor vehicle rental or leasing company; or 2. A holder of a special registration plate issued under Title 13, Subtitle 9, Part III of this article.

(4) “Recorded image” means an image recorded by a speed monitoring system: (i) On: 1. A photograph; ⁶⁴⁸ 2. A microphotograph; 3. An electronic image; 4.

Videotape; or 5. Any other medium; and (ii) Showing: 1. The rear of a motor vehicle; 2. At least two time-stamped images of the motor vehicle that include the same stationary object near the motor vehicle; and . 3.

On at least one image or portion of tape, clearly identifying the registration plate number of the motor vehicle. (5) “Speed monitoring system” means a device with one or more motor vehicle sensors producing recorded images of motor vehicles traveling at speeds at least 10 miles per hour above the posted speed limit. (6) “Speed monitoring system operator” means an individual who operates a speed monitoring system. (b) In general.—(1) This section applies to a violation of this subtitle that occurs in Montgomery County recorded by a speed monitoring system that meets the requirements of this subsection and has been placed: (i) On a highway in a residential district as defined in § 21-101 of this title: 1.

With a maximum posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour; and 2. Thát has a speed limit that was established using generally accepted traffic engineering practices; or (ii) In a school zone established under Section 21-803.1 of this subtitle. (2)(i) A speed monitoring system operator shall complete training by a manufacturer of speed monitoring systems in the procedures for setting up and operating the speed monitoring system. ⁶⁴⁹ (ii) The manufacturer shall issue a signed certificate to the speed monitoring system operator upon completion of the training. ■ (iii) The certificate of training shall be admitted as evidence in any court proceeding for a violation of this section. (3) A speed monitoring system operator shall fill out and sign a daily set-up log for a speed monitoring system that: (i) States that the speed monitoring system operator successfully performed the manufacturer-specified self-test of the speed monitoring system prior to producing a recorded image; (ii) Shall be kept on file; and (iii) Shall be admitted as evidence in any court proceeding for a violation of this section.

(4) (i) A speed monitoring system shall undergo an annual calibration check performed by an independent calibration laboratory. (ii) The independent calibration laboratory shall issue a signed certificate of calibration after the annual calibration check, which: 1. Shall be kept on file; and 2. Shall be admitted as evidence in any court proceeding for a violation of this section.

(c) Civil penalty.—(1) Unless the driver of the motor vehicle received a citation from a police officer at the time of the violation, the owner or, in accordance with subsection (f)(4) of this section, the driver of a motor vehicle is subject to a civil penalty if the motor vehicle is recorded by a speed monitoring system while being operated in violation of this subtitle. (2) A civil penalty under this subsection may not exceed $40. (3) For purposes of this section, the District Court shall prescribe: ⁶⁵⁰ (i) A uniform citation form consistent with subsection (d)(1) of this section and § 7-302 of the Courts Article; and (ii) A civil penalty, which shall be indicated on the citation, to be paid by persons who choose to prepay the civil penalty without appearing in District Court. (d) Citation.—(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) through (4) of this subsection, the local police department shall mail to the owner, hable under subsection (c) of this section, a citation that shall include: (i) The name and address of the registered owner of the vehicle; (ii) The registration number of the motor vehicle involved in the violation; (hi) The violation charged; (iv) The location where the violation occurred; (v) The date and time of the violation; (vi) A copy of the recorded image; (vii) The amount of the civil penalty imposed and the date by which the civil penalty should be paid; (viii) A signed statement by a duly authorized agent of the local police department that, based on inspection of recorded images, the motor vehicle was being operated in violation of this subtitle; (ix) A statement that recorded images are evidence of a violation of this subtitle; (x) Information advising the person alleged to be hable under this section of the manner and time in which liability as alleged in the citation may be contested in the District Court; and (xi) Information advising the person alleged to be hable under this section that failure to pay the civil penalty or to contest liabihty in a timely manner: 1.

Is an admission of liability; 2. May result in the refusal by the Administration to register the motor vehicle; and ⁶⁵¹ 3. May result in the suspension of the motor vehicle registration. (2) The local police department may mail a warning notice instead of a citation to the owner liable under subsection (c) of this section.

(3) Except as provided in subsection (f)(4) of this section, the local police department may not mail a citation to a person who is not an owner. (4) Except as provided in subsection (f)(4) of this section, a citation issued under this section shall be mailed no later than 2 weeks after the alleged violation if the vehicle is registered in this State, and 30 days after the alleged violation if the vehicle is registered in another state. (5) A person who receives a citation under paragraph (1) of this subsection may: (i) Pay the civil penalty, in accordance with instructions on the citation, directly to the Montgomery County Department of Finance; or (ii) Elect to stand trial in the District Court for the alleged violation. (e) Evidence.—(1) A certificate alleging that the violation of this subtitle occurred and the requirements under subsection (b) of this section have been satisfied, sworn to, or affirmed by a duly authorized agent of the local police department, based on inspection of recorded images produced by speed monitoring system, shall be evidence of the facts contained in the certifícate and shall be admissible in a proceeding alleging a violation under this section without the presence or testimony of the speed monitoring system operator who performed the requirements under subsection (b) of this section.

(2) If a person who received a citation under subsection (d) of this section desires the speed monitoring system operator to be present and testify at trial, the person shall notify the court and the State in writing no later than 20 days before trial. ⁶⁵² (3) Adjudication of liability shall be based on a preponderance of evidence. (f) Defenses.—(1) The District Court may consider in defense of a violation: (i) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, that the motor vehicle or the registration plates of the motor vehicle were stolen before the violation occurred and were not under the control or possession of the owner at the time of the violation; (ii) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, evidence that the person named in the citation was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation; and (iii) Any other issues and evidence that the District Court deems pertinent. (2) In order to demonstrate that the motor vehicle or the registration plates were stolen before the violation occurred and were not under the control or possession of the owner at the time of the violation, the owner shall submit proof that a police report regarding the stolen motor vehicle or registration plates was filed.in a timely manner. (3) To satisfy the evidentiary burden under paragraph (l)(ii) of this subsection, the person named in the citation shall provide to the District Court a letter, sworn to or affirmed by the person and mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, that: (i) States that the person named in the citation was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation; (ii) Provides the name, address, and, if possible, the driver’s license identification number of the person who was operating the vehicle at the time of the violation; and (iii) Includes any other corroborating evidence.

(4) (i) If the District Court finds that the person named in the citation was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation or receives evidence under paragraph (3) of this subsection identifying the person driving the vehicle at the time of the violation, the clerk of the court shall provide to the local police department a copy of any evidence substan ⁶⁵³ tiating who was operating the vehicle at the time of the violation. (ii) On receipt of substantiating evidence from the District Court under subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, the local police department may issue a citation as provided in subsection (d) of this section to the person who the evidence indicates was operating the vehicle at the time of the violation. (iii) A citation issued under subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph shall be mailed no later than 2 weeks after receipt of the evidence from the District Court. (g) Effect of failure to pay penalty.—If a person liable under this section does not pay the civil penalty or contest the violation, the Administration: (1) May refuse to register or reregister the motor vehicle cited for the violation; or (2) May suspend the registration of the motor vehicle cited for the violation.

(h) Nature of violation—A violation for which a civil penalty is imposed under this section: (1) Is not a moving violation for the purpose of assessing points under § 16-402 of this article; (2) May not be recorded by the Administration on the driving record of the owner or driver of the vehicle; (3) May be treated as a parking violation for purposes of § 26-305 of this article; and (4) May not be considered in the provision of motor vehicle insurance coverage. (i) Chief judge to establish procedures for issuance of cita tions.—In consultation with the Montgomery County Department of Finance and the local police departments, the Chief Judge of the District Court shall adopt procedures for the issuance of citations, the trial of civil violations, and the collection of civil penalties under this section. Cl) Restrictions on contractor’s fee.—If a contractor operates a speed monitoring system on behalf of Montgom ⁶⁵⁴ ery County, the contractor’s fee may not be contingent on the number of citations issued or paid.[ 4 ] (Emphasis added). Following the enactment of T.A. § 21-809, the County’s Department of Police proposed to implement a Photo Speed Enforcement Program in the County.

On August 3, 2006, the County issued a Request for Proposal seeking a qualified contractor to provide for the implementation, use, and servicing of photo speed enforcement technology and services as requested by the County. The County entered into a contract with ACS. Pursuant to the contract, ACS was “compensated ... at a rate of $16.25 per paid citation or $18,000 per month for the Program, whichever is greater.” The contract provided that ACS would “install and support all traffic camera equipment” and “supply an automated violation processing services solution that is capable of supporting high volume program operations.” On February 21, 2007, Rockville entered into a contract with ACS employing them to perform services in connection with a Photo Speed Enforcement Program. The Rockville contract provided that ACS would be compensated as follows: “The Contractor shall be compensated under this agreement at a rate of $16.25 per paid citation or $2,999 per month per mobile unit for the program, whichever is greater.” On May 23, 2007, Gaithersburg entered into a contract with ACS employing them to perform services in connection with a Photo Speed Enforcement Program.

The Gaithersburg contract provided that ACS would be compensated as follows: “The contractor shall be compensated under this Agreement at a rate of $16.25 per paid citation or $2,999.00 per month per mobile unit for the Program, as defined in the Montgomery County Contract, ⁶⁵⁵ whichever is greater.” On March 12, 2007, Chevy Chase entered into a contract with ACS employing them to perform services in connection with a Photo Speed Enforcement Program. The Chevy Chase contract provided that ACS would be compensated as follows: “The Contractor shall be compensated under this Agreement at a rate of $16.25 per paid citation or $6,000 per month for the program, whichever is greater.” Each agreement between ACS and the Municipalities contained the following language: “The Contractor agrees to provide all goods and services described and be bound by the terms and conditions set forth in [the] Montgomery County Contract.” Original Complaint & Amended Complaint On May 2, 2008, Timothy P. Leahy 5 filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County seeking $20 million on behalf of himself and others similarly situated against the County, Rockville, and Chevy Chase for the alleged violation of T.A. § 21-809. In the Complaint, Leahy alleged: “Defendants violated [T.A.] § 21—809(j) by entering into a contract with ACS, Inc., which provided that the contractor’s fee is contingent on the number of citations issued or paid.” On May 16, 2008, Leahy filed an Amended Complaint adding Gaithersburg as a defendant. On May 21, 2008, Leahy filed a Motion to Certify Class, seeking the circuit court to allow Leahy “to represent all individuals who have received traffic citations and paid fines as a result of the contracts between any Maryland government, including, but not limited to, the City of Rockville, Montgomery County and the Town of Chevy Chase and ACS, Inc., ... for speed monitoring camera equipment at various intersections in Montgomery County[.]” In response, appellees filed motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment and oppositions to Leahy’s Motion to Certify Class. 6 ⁶⁵⁶ On August 26, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing on Leahy’s Motion to Certify Class and the County’s, Rockville’s, and Chevy Chase’s 7 Motions to Dismiss and/or Motions for Summary Judgment.

As a result of the hearing, the circuit court: (1) granted Gaithersburg’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, dismissing Leahy’s claims against Gaith-ersburg with prejudice and without leave to amend; (2) dismissed Leahy’s claims against Rockville with prejudice and without leave to amend; (3) granted the motion to dismiss as to the County with leave to amend; and (4) denied Leahy’s Motion to Certify Class without prejudice to renew if a second amended complaint is filed. Second Amended Complaint On October 6, 2008, ten named plaintiffs, Leahy; Matthew Charles Baker; Thomas Jeffrey Wheatley; Aristone Luiz Pereira, Jr.; Michael Brody; Johnny Ray Garza; Kenneth King Sleeman; David Alfred Schiller; Walter McKee; and Janet Marburger, collectively referred to as the plaintiffs, 8 filed on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, a Second Amended Complaint against appellees. In the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs brought seven claims based in ⁶⁵⁷ tort, one count of injunctive relief and one count of declaratory judgment. 9 On November 17, 2008, Gaithersburg and Chevy Chase filed a Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint or for Summary Judgment. On November 17, 2008, the County and Rockville filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint.

On December 1, 2008, plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Gaith-ersburg’s and Chevy Chase’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. On January 5, 2009, Gaithersburg and Chevy Chase filed a reply to the plaintiffs’ opposition. A healing was held on February 12, 2009, on Gaithersburg’s and Chevy Chase’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint or for Summary Judgment. On February 18, 2009, the circuit court issued a written order which denied Gaithers-burg’s and Chevy Chase’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment without prejudice, permitting them to file a motion for summary judgment after completion of discovery.

On March 16, 2009, Gaithersburg and Chevy Chase filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. 10 Motion for Class Certification & Third Amended Complaint On July 17, 2009, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification. On August 21, 2009, appellees filed oppositions. 11 On ⁶⁵⁸ October 20, 2009, plaintiffs filed a Reply in Support of their Motion for Class Certification. On October 7, 2009, eight named plaintiffs, Baker; Wheat-ley; Pereira; Garza, Sleeman; Schiller; McKee; and Marbur-ger, 12 collectively referred to as appellants, filed a Third Amended Class Action Complaint on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against appellees. 13 The Third Amended Class Action Complaint included the following counts: (1) Violation of Article 19 and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; (2) Unjust Enrichment; (3) Conversion; (4) Constructive Trust; (5) Civil Conspiracy; (6) ⁶⁵⁹ Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (7) Constructive Fraud; (8) Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief-Maryland Rule 15-501, et seq.; and (9) Declaratory Relief. On March 25, 2010, Gaithersburg and Chevy Chase filed an Answer to the Third Amended Class Action Complaint.

On January 29, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on appellants’ Motion for Class Certification and addressed whether the appellants had “demonstrated that there should be a certification of class going forward with the lawsuit that’s been filed in this case.” The circuit court denied appellants’ class certification as to Counts 1 through 7 of the Third Amended Class Action Complaint, which are the tort claims. As to the claim for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, the circuit court granted the Motion for Class Certification. 14 On March 28, 2010, the circuit court by written order, restated the findings from the January 29, 2010, hearing—granting appellants’ Motion for Class Certification as to Count 8 (in-junctive relief) and Count 9 (declaratory relief) and denying the Motion as to all other counts. 15 On April 1, 2010, appellants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, asking the circuit court to find that ACS was an operator of the speed monitoring system on behalf of Montgomery County within the meaning of T.A. § 21-809, ie. a “contractor [who] operates a speed monitoring system.” Appellees filed oppositions to appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 16 ⁶⁶⁰ On April 2, 2010, Gaithersburg and Chevy Chase filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Class Action Complaint, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. On April 2, 2010, the County and Rockville also filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. On April 19, 2010, appellants filed a Consolidated Opposition to appellees’ Motions to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment.

On May 18, 2010, Gaithersburg and Chevy Chase filed a Reply to appellants’ Opposition. On June 15, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on appellees’ Motions for Summary Judgment and appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, asking the circuit court to find that ACS was the operator of the speed monitoring system located in appellees’ respective jurisdictions. 17 On November 3, 2010, the circuit court issued a written order denying appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, granting appellees’ Motions for Summary Judgment, and dismissing with prejudice appellants’ Third Amended Class Action Complaint. In its Order, the circuit court stated its reasons for the findings, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) The version of § 21—809(j) of the Transportation Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which was codified in 2006 Md. Laws 15 , and which was in effect when each of the individually named [appellants] received their citations at issue, applied to [appellee] Montgomery County, Maryland, but did not apply to [appellees] Mayor and Council of Rockville, the City of Gaithersburg, and Chevy Chase Village; (2) Based on the undisputed material facts, and based on the terms of art “speed monitoring system,” “speed monitoring system operator,” and “recorded image” as defined in both the previous and current version of § 21-809 of the Transportation Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, the employees of [appellees], ... perform the tasks required ⁶⁶¹ to be performed by the operator of a speed monitoring system under § 21-809(b) and (e) of the Transportation Article. Therefore, this Court finds that each of the [appel-lees] operates the speed monitoring systems in their respective jurisdictions, § 21—809(j) of the Transportation Article therefore is not implicated, and the various contracts between [appellees] and [ACS] do not violate § 21-809(j) of the Transportation Article.

This finding entitles [appellees] to judgment on all counts of [appellants’] Third Amended Class Action Complaint; (3) Even if this Court were to accept the expanded definitions of “speed monitoring system,” “speed monitoring system operator,” and “recorded image” as argued by [appellants], this Court finds and declares that none of the [appellees] have delegated final authority over when a citation alleging that an individual has violated § 21-809 of the Transportation Article is to be issued, and therefore, [appel-lees] operate the speed monitoring systems in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, this Court finds that each of the [appellees] operates the speed monitoring systems in their respective jurisdictions, § 21—809(j) of the Transportation Article therefore is not implicated, and the various contracts between [appellees] and [ACS] do not violate § 21—809(j) of the Transportation Article. This finding entitles [appellees] to judgment on all counts of [appellants’] Third Amended Class Action Complaint; (4) Section 21-809 of the Transportation Article affords every individual who receives a citation alleging a violation of § 21-809 the opportunity to contest the citation in the District Court of Maryland. Further, pursuant to § 21-809(f)(1)(iii) of the Transportation Article, every individual who receives a citation alleging a violation of § 21-809 may raise any issue, and present any evidence, in defense of the citation, including the issues raised in [appellants’] Third Amended Class Action Complaint.

Therefore, § 21-809 of the Transportation Article does not create a private right of action. This finding entitles [appellees] to judgment on ⁶⁶² Counts 1-7 of [appellants’] Third Amended Class Action Complaint; (5) This Court finds, based on the undisputed evidence, as well as the allegations contained in [appellants’] Third Amended Class Action Complaint, that each of the individual [appellants], ... voluntarily paid the citations that they received, and which alleged that they violated § 21-809 of the Transportation Article. Because each of the [appellants] opted to voluntarily pay the citations they received, they did not contest their citations in a timely manner. Thus, by operation of § 21-809(d)(1)(xi) of the Transportation Article, each of the [appellants] admitted liability and a violation of § 21-809.

Therefore, each of the [appellants] waived any right that they may have had to file a later action. This finding entitles [appellees] to judgment on Counts 1-7 of [appellants’] Third Amended Class Action Complaint[.] On July 13, 2010, appellants filed a Notice of Appeal. On November 19, 2010, appellants filed a Renewed Notice of Appeal appealing the rulings of the circuit court from the January 29, 2010, hearing on appellants’ Motion for Class Certification; the June 15, 2010, motions hearing on appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and appellees’ Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment; and the November 3, 2010, Order entered pursuant to those hearings. STANDARD OF REVIEW Maryland Rule 2—501(f) states that a trial court “shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Md. Rule 2-501(f), we review the circuit court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment de novo.

Bonfiglio v. Fitzgerald, 197 Md.App. 327, 337 , 13 A.3d 812 (2011) (citations omitted). Our review is “two-fold,” we determine first, whether there is a ⁶⁶³ genuine dispute of material fact, and second, whether the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In determining whether a material fact is in dispute, a trial court must give great deference to the non-moving party as well as must review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Lipscomb v. Hess, 255 Md. 109, 118, 257 A.2d 178 (1969) (citations omitted). DISCUSSION I. Private Cause of Action Appellants contend that a private cause of action exists as a remedy for citizens to enforce T.A. § 21—809(j), which provides in pertinent part, that a “contractor’s fee may not be contingent on the number of citations issued or paid.” Appellants argue that they have a “right to pursue tort claims against the State government to remedy illegal acts,” and to petition for “equitable relief to prevent a defendant from continuing illegal or improper actions.” Appellants maintain that the General Assembly has the ability to prohibit a private cause of action, but, in this case, there is no such restriction in the statute. Appellants argue that the “imposition and collection of $40 fines pursuant to the contract with ACS is State action” and violates their right to due process. Appellants contend that the fines result in economic loss, a deprivation of their property interests, and constitute a “taking of property.” Appellants argue that three factors set out by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), 18 are utilized by courts to determine whether to recog ⁶⁶⁴ nize a private cause of action.

The factors include: (1) “the presence or absence of an indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy”; (2) “whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted”; and (3) “whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff.” Appellants contend that the Cort factors for establishment of a private cause of action are satisfied in this case. In contrast, appellees 19 argue that no private cause of action exists under T.A. § 21-809(j). Appellees contend that “[i]n the absence of a statutory directive, [ ] Maryland courts have uniformly held that it is not appropriate to expand a statute to include remedies that were not specified.” Appellees point out that when the General Assembly “expressly provides a remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies.” Appellees agree with appellants that the Cort factors are applicable in determining whether a private cause of action exists; however, appellees contend that the factors are not satisfied in this case. Appellees argue that T.A. § 21-809 was enacted to benefit drivers on the highways whose safety is endangered by speeding, and was not enacted for the special benefit of individuals who exceeded the speed limits and admitted liability. 20 Appel- ⁶⁶⁵ lees point out that the statute’s legislative history is silent as to providing for or prohibiting a private right of action, and this silence “weighs heavily” against an intent to create a private cause of action.

Appellees point out that T.A. § 21-809 provides a “detailed and comprehensive remedy to contest liability for a speed camera citation.” Appellees argue that the General Assembly has demonstrated that it is fully able to explicitly include a private cause of action in those statutes in which it intends a private cause of action will lie. Under the public duty doctrine, appellees maintain that “when a statute or common law ‘imposes upon a public entity a duty to the public at large, and not a duty to a particular class of individuals, the duty is not one enforceable in tort.’ ” 21 The determination of whether a private cause of action is implicit in a statute which does not expressly provide for such an action, involves an analysis of three factors. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 . The Supreme Court explained these factors in Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 .

The first factor involves determining whether the plaintiff is “ ‘one of the class for whose [ ]special benefit the statute was enacted!.]’ ” Id. The second factor involves examining whether there is “any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one[.]” Id. The third factor involves determining whether it is “consistent with the under ⁶⁶⁶ lying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff[.]” Id. In Erie Ins.

Co. v. Chops, 322 Md. 79, 82-83, 91 , 585 A.2d 232 (1991), the Court of Appeals applied the three-factor analysis in determining whether a private cause of action existed where a plaintiff sued an insurance company for negligence, alleging that the insurance company breached a duty imposed upon it by T.A. § 17-106(b) (1977 & Supp. 1987). 22 Pursuant to T.A. § 17-106(b), insurance companies are to immediately notify the Motor Vehicle Administration of the cancellation of a driver’s automobile insurance policy. Erie, 322 Md. at 83 , 585 A.2d 232 . In Erie , the Court reiterated the factors described in Cort stating that in order to determine whether a private cause of action exists, Maryland courts have analyzed three factors: (1) “the presence or absence of an indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy”; (2) “whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted”; and (3) “whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of .the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff.” Id. at 90-91 , 585 A.2d 232 . The Court acknowledged that “more recent decisions of the Supreme Court have indicated that implication of a private right of action ‘is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action.’ ” The Court nevertheless noted that earlier cases involved an analysis of all three of the factors described in Cort.

Id. The Court explained that Maryland applies a “more flexible approach” than the approach suggested in Cort , stating that the Court “has not hesitated to change the common law to permit new actions or remedies where that ⁶⁶⁷ course was appropriate.” Id. at 91 , 585 A.2d 232 . In Erie , however, the Court found that no private cause of action existed, stating: Although the [plaintiffs] may properly be said to be within the class of persons in whose favor the statute was intended, it seems equally apparent that the principal focus of the uninsured motorist laws is for the general protection of the public. Additionally, while permitting recovery by the plaintiffs would not be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme, we do not believe such a broad extension of existing law is necessary to properly implement the legislation.

We note that the legislature has provided other remedies for those who are involved in accidents with uninsured motorists, including the requirement of uninsured motorist coverage in every automobile liability policy issued, sold, or delivered in this State, Art. 48A, § 541(c)(2), and the establishment of a fund for payment of claims arising out of accidents with uninsured motorists occurring in this State. Article 48A, § 243H(a)(3). Finally, as we have noted, the legislature did not expressly or impliedly establish the sanction sought by the plaintiffs, even though the legislature has done so in other related matters involving insurance. Id. at 91-92, 585 A.2d 232 (emphasis added).

In Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n, Inc. v. Gudis, 78 Md.App. 550, 552-53, 560 , 554 A.2d 434 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, 319 Md. 558 , 573 A.2d 1325 (1990), 23 we held that no private cause of action existed for a citizens association to claim that a county council vote approving a site location for a resource recovery facility near PEPCO property, violated a conflict of interest provision of the Montgomery County Public Ethics ⁶⁶⁸ Law. 24 This Court preliminarily concluded that the statute did not expressly provide for a private cause of action. Id. at 560 , 554 A.2d 434 . We explained that in determining whether a private cause of action exists, “[t]he primary focus in resolving such a question is the legislative intent.” Id. at 556 , 554 A.2d 434 (citations omitted). We stated: In determining legislative intent, various factors are examined: including the legislative history and purposes of the statute, the identity of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was passed, the existence of express statutory remedies to serve the legislative purpose!.] Id. at 557 , 554 A.2d 434 (citation and footnote omitted).

With Judge Paul E. Alpert speaking for this Court, we explained that: “Where the legislative history does not indicate any discussion whatsoever as to whether a statute gives rise to such a right, the fact that the ordinance is silent would weigh heavily against an intent by the council to create a private cause of action.” Id. We qualified this by stating that the “vast differences in legislative record-keeping between Congress and a municipal or local government,” made us “hesitate to place such great weight on the fact that the legislative history available to us is silent as to whether the Montgomery County Council intended to create an implied private right of action.” Id. at 558 , 554 A.2d 434 . We, therefore, analyzed the purpose of the statute and the express statutory remedies within the statute. Id. at 558-62 , 554 A.2d 434 .

In examining the express statutory remedies, we explained that: [I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. ⁶⁶⁹ “When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode.” See also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 , 94 S.Ct. 690, 693 , 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974) (“A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides a remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies.”)[.] Id. at 559-60 , 554 A.2d 434 (some citations omitted). Accord, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Anderson, 179 Md.App. 613, 630 , 947 A.2d 149 (2008) (“Where the legislature has provided a remedy, the litigant must pursue that designated form of remedy, rather than to seek some alternative form to circumvent the procedures promulgated by the legislature.”) (citation omitted). In Magan v. Med. Mut.

Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md., 331 Md. 535, 538 , 629 A.2d 626 (1993), the Court of Appeals determined the definition of the term “restitution” as used in Section 55A of Maryland’s Insurance Code, which provided that the Insurance Commissioner may require that restitution be made when the Commissioner is imposing sanctions upon an insurer whose certificate of authority is subject to revocation or suspension because of a violation of the Insurance Code. The Court held that: “Given the choice of finding that the legislature intended to grant limited restitutory powers consistent with relief it has granted in similar cases of improper refusal or termination of coverage, or that it intended to give the Insurance Commissioner virtually unlimited power to award general and special compensatory damages, we are strongly inclined to believe that the legislature intended the former.” Id. at 546 , 629 A.2d 626 (footnote omitted).

In support of this holding, the Court cited Erie , stating: “We have been reluctant to find an implied grant of a private cause of action, even when the further complication of