Baker v. State

HARRELL, Judge. We consider here whether the Circuit Court for Harford County erred in denying a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, without holding an evidentiary hearing, where the defendant relied principally on an empirical, government-sponsored study of Maryland’s implementation between 1978 and 1999 of its death penalty statute, released publicly in early 2003 and published formally in 2004, to support an allegation of constitutional error in the 1992 imposition on him of the sentence of death. We hold that the Circuit Court neither erred as a matter of law nor abused its discretion; therefore, we affirm. I. On 26 October 1992, Wesley Eugene Baker (“Baker”) was ¹³⁰ convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County 1 of the first-degree murder of Jane Frances Tyson, robbery of Mrs. Tyson with a deadly weapon, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.

The court, 2 four days later, sentenced Baker to death for the conviction of murder, as well as to forty years of incarceration — twenty years for robbery with a deadly weapon and a consecutive twenty years for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Baker’s convictions and sentence of death. Baker v. State, 332 Md. 542 , 632 A.2d 783 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078 , 114 S.Ct. 1664 , 128 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994) (“Baker I”). Baker filed subsequently a number of petitions and motions in Maryland state courts.

Their dispositions, none favorable to Baker, are explained in Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648 , 790 A.2d 629 (2002), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1050 , 122 S.Ct. 1814 , 152 L.Ed.2d 817 (2002) (“Baker II”) (affirming denial of a motion for new sentencing based on newly discovered evidence and denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)); 3 Baker v. State, ¹³¹ 377 Md. 567 , 833 A.2d 1070 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 944 , 124 S.Ct. 1673 , 158 L.Ed.2d 370 (2004) (“Baker III”) (affirming denial of a motion to quash an illegal sentence and warrant of execution on grounds that the sentencing circuit court judge changed his county of residence for a period of time during his term and thus violated the judicial residency requirement of Article IV, Section 2 of the Maryland Constitution); Baker v. State, 383 Md. 550 , 861 A.2d 48 (2004), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1931 , 161 L.Ed.2d 775 (2005) (“Baker TV”) (affirming denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence based upon a constitutional challenge, grounded on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), to the preponderance of the evidence standard used to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances during the sentencing proceeding). Most recently and the instigation for the present appeal, Baker filed in the Circuit Court on 18 October 2004 a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, a Motion to Reopen the Post-Conviction Proceeding, and a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Principally relying on a statistical study, commissioned by Governor Parris N. Glendening in September 2000, conducted by Professor Raymond Paternoster of the University of Maryland, 4 and published formally in the Spring of 2004, 5 Baker argued that his death sentence was imposed in a ¹³² racially-biased (Baker is African-American and the victim of his crimes was Caucasian; Baker alleged that the death penalty was sought more frequently in such situations than in other racial combinations of accused and victim) and geographically-biased (Baker asserted that the State’s Attorney for Baltimore County, who elected to pursue the death penalty and whose office prosecuted the case against him, sought such punishment in eligible cases more frequently than state’s attorneys for other Maryland jurisdictions) manner. The Paternoster Study essentially examined the statewide implementation of Maryland’s death sentence scheme between 1978 and 1999. 6 Baker argued the death penalty statute was applied to him unconstitutionally. 7 All motions were denied by the Circuit Court on 18 November 2004, as was Baker’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

Although we denied Baker’s application for leave to appeal the denial of his post-conviction initiatives, Baker v. State, 384 Md. 537 , 865 A.2d 563 (2005), 8 we granted his application for leave to appeal the denial of the Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. ¹³³ II. Under Maryland Rule 4-345(a), “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” 9 Generally such a motion is “not appropriate where the alleged illegality ‘did not inhere in [the defendant’s] sentence.’ ” Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 278 , 855 A.2d 291, 309 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1150 , 125 S.Ct. 1325 , 161 L.Ed.2d 113 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 185 , 742 A.2d 508, 517 (1999)). Consequently, a motion to correct an illegal sentence historically was entertained only where the alleged illegality was in the sentence itself or the sentence never should have been imposed. See, e.g., Evans, 382 Md. at 251 , 855 A.2d at 292-93 (alleging an illegal sentence because the trial judge’s application of an amendment to the death penalty statute, which became effective a few months after the murders, violated the ex, post facto clauses of the U.S. and Maryland constitutions); Jones v. State, 384 Md. 669, 672 , 866 A.2d 151, 152-53 (2005) (alleging an illegal sentence because the verdict was not announced orally in open court so as to allow the jury to be polled and hearkened to the verdict, and thus violated Maryland Rule 4-327); State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496-97 , 659 A.2d 876, 882 (1995) (alleging an illegal sentence because the imposition of a greater offense followed by the imposition of a sentence for a lesser included offense created a cumulative sentence prohibited by double jeopardy ¹³⁴ protections); Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427 , 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985) (alleging an illegal sentence because “the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation d[id] not authorize a trial court to order restitution to a victim of a crime of which [the defendant] was not convicted”); Roberts v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 206 Md. 246, 249 , 111 A.2d 597, 598 (1955) (alleging an illegal sentence on two convictions of assault because the sentence exceeded that which was permitted by law); 10 Bond v. State, 78 Md. 523, 524 , 28 A. 407, 407 (1894) (alleging an illegal sentence because the two sections of the Maryland Code, under which the sentence was imposed, were “repugnant and totally inconsistent, and cannot therefore be enforced”). 11 Thus, where the sentence or sanction was itself lawful, a Rule 4-345(a) motion was not an appropriate vehicle to challenge the legality of a sentence.

Evans, 382 Md. at 279 , 855 A.2d at 309 . We recently recognized an exception in capital sentencing cases to these historic principles. Where a decision in an unrelated case rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court, following imposition of the death sentence in a given Maryland case, supplied a new judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision that might support an argument that an alleged error of constitutional dimension may have contributed to the imposition of the death sentence in that given case, we indicated that a motion to correct an illegal sentence was a proper vehicle to raise the new constitutional argument. In Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 184-85 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1108 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 , 124 S.Ct. 2084 , 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004), Oken raised ¹³⁵ a constitutional challenge to the Maryland death penalty statute in a Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.

He relied on two U.S. Supreme Court opinions 12 decided after his 1991 Maryland death sentence proceeding. Oken, 378 Md. at 185-86 , 835 A.2d at 1108-09 . This Court reviewed the merits of Oken’s constitutional claims, concluding that, despite the new Supreme Court cases, the Maryland death penalty statute was not unconstitutional on its face where the jury or judge may conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors. Oken, 378 Md. at 185-86, 269 , 835 A.2d at 1108, 1157-58 .

That Oken addressed the constitutional issues raised in a Rule 4-345(a) context was noted subsequently by the Court in Evans and summarized as follows: The defendant Oken argued, relying on recent Supreme Court cases, that a constitutional error in the capital sentencing proceeding contributed to the death sentence. Section 2 — 303(i) of the Maryland death penalty statute provides that the trier of facts “shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the aggravating circumstances under subsection (g) of this section outweigh the mitigating circumstances.” (Emphasis added). In Oken , the case was presented to the sentencing jury under this “preponderance of the evidence” standard. The defendant Oken had raised no objection to this in the sentencing proceeding or in a prior post conviction proceeding.

In the Rule 4-345 proceeding, however, Oken argued that the preponderance of the evidence standard violated due process and that a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard was constitutionally required. This Court, in the Rule 4-345 proceeding, re ¹³⁶ solved the merits of the constitutional issue, with the majority holding that application of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard was constitutional. See also Oken v. State, 367 Md. 191, 195 , 786 A.2d 691, 693 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1074 , 122 S.Ct. 1953 , 152 L.Ed.2d 855 (2002), where the Court decided the merits of a similar challenge by the defendant Oken. Evans, 382 Md. at 279-80 , 855 A.2d at 309 (emphasis in original).

In Evans, supra, after summarizing the general rules historically governing the proper purpose of a Rule 4-345(a) motion and the circumstances for applying the capital sentencing exception implied in Oken, we stated “this Court has appeared to recognize an exception to the above-summarized principles where, in a capital sentencing proceeding, an alleged error of constitutional dimension may have contributed to the death sentence, at least where the allegation of error is partly based upon a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of this Court rendered after the defendant’s capital sentencing proceeding.” Evans, 382 Md. at 279 , 855 A.2d at 309 . Before considering the merits of Evans’ constitutional claim, 13 we assessed the availability of a Rule 4-345(a) motion to raise such a challenge: Evans, like Oken, claims that a provision of the Maryland death penalty statute was unconstitutionally applied to him at his capital sentencing proceeding and that this alleged error may have resulted in the death sentence. Also, as in the Oken cases, Evans chiefly relies upon a United States Supreme Court opinion rendered after his 1992 capital sentencing proceeding, namely Carmell v. Texas, supra, 529 ¹³⁷ U.S. 513, 120 S.Ct. 1620 , 146 L.Ed.2d 577 [(2000)]. With regard to the availability of a proceeding under Rule 4-345(a), we perceive no significant differences between the Oken cases and the present case.

Consequently, we shall decide the merits of Evans’s ex post facto argument. Evans, 382 Md. at 280 , 855 A.2d at 309-10 . Thus, because Evans relied on a U.S. Supreme Court opinion deciding a novel constitutional question of arguable relevance decided after the imposition of his capital sentence, a Rule 4-345(a) motion was deemed an appropriate vehicle available to him to mount his arguments. Id.

This exception in capital sentencing cases to the general limitations as to the proper grounds to raise in a motion to correct an illegal sentence, as applied in Oken and followed in Evans , thus far only has been recognized where the basis of the constitutional argument in support of the alleged error was based on a decision or decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.

III

Baker’s Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence under review in the present case fails to offer grounds cognizable under either pr e-Oken general principles or the post-Oken constitutional decision exception. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have confirmed the constitutionality under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the punishment of death, including Maryland’s death penalty statute specifically. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-69 , 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2922-23 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 871-72 (1976); Baker II, 367 Md. at 676, 790 A.2d at 646 (“We have held on numerous occasions that the Maryland death penalty statute is constitutional.... ”). In addition, there is no direct and specific evidence in this record to suggest that Baker’s death sentence was surrounded by impropriety of any kind.

See Baker I, 332 Md. at 571 , 632 A.2d at 797 (“We also conclude that Baker’s death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.”). Accordingly, Baker’s death sentence is itself lawful and was imposed validly, and thus is not illegal under the pr e-Oken ¹³⁸ general analytical principles governing motions brought under Rule 4-345(a). Moreover, the grounds for Baker’s motion in the present case do not fit within the capital sentencing exception for a Rule 4-345(a) motion. Unlike in Oken and Evans , Baker does not rely principally upon a U.S. Supreme Court decision, or even one of this Court, decided after his 1992 sentencing proceeding, rendering a new constitutional interpretation.

Rather, Baker argues that the Paternoster Study, addressing the implementation between 1978 and 1999 of Maryland’s death penalty statute (available only after Baker’s trial, appellate, prior post-judgment motions, and post-conviction proceedings), demonstrates conclusively (or at least makes a prima