Baldwin v. Spriggs

Stone, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ■There is no dispute about the material facts in this case. ■James Spriggs, of Anne Arundel County, on the 25th of ³⁷⁹ July, 1865, duly executed his will. By that will he disposed of all the property, real and personal, which lie then owned. James Spriggs, at the time of the execution of the said will, had a wife, Euth Spriggs, then living, and several children by her also living: — By his said will he devised all his property to said wife and children. His wife Euth died in 1871, and said James soon after the death of said Euth, about 1874, intermarried with Maggie E. Vane, and also had by her several children.

Said James Spriggs died in January, 1886, leaving, a widow, the said Maggie E. Spriggs, and a child by the said Euth, and children by the said Maggie E., surviving him. After the execution of the will, the said James Spriggs purchased certain other real estate which was unaffected by said will. His will as to his real estate contained no residuary clause, but disposed of all the real estate he owned at its date, by specific description. After the death of James Spriggs, his will was offered for probate in the Orphans’ Court of Anne Arundel, and a caveat was filed thereto by his second wife, Maggie E. Spriggs, in behalf of herself and her children, and upon such caveat plenary proceedings were had, and the Orphans’ Court ordered and decreed that said will was revoked by his subsequent marriage, and the birth of issue, and refused to admit the paper to probate.

From this decree the daughter of the testator by his first wife, and two of his grandchildren have appealed to this Court. These are all the facts necessary to elucidate the legal proposition which we are called “upon fo decide, and which is simply, whether upon this state of facts, the will of James Spriggs has been revoked by operation of law. It would be a profitless task to review all the English cases on the subject. They may be found by the curious fully discussed by Chancellor Kent with his usual ability, in the case of Brush vs. Wilkins, 4 Johnson’s Chan.

Rep., 506. It is enough for us to say that after a good deal of doubt and hesitation, it was finally ³⁸⁰ settled in England, before our Revolution, that marriage and issue taken together did amount to an implied revocation of a will previously made, and that süch implied revocations were not within the Statute of Frauds, hut that such implied revocations might be rebutted and controlled by circumstances. The final determination of the matter seems to have been reached by the cases of Christopher vs. Christopher, decided by the Court of Exchequer, Parker, C. B., presiding, in 1771, 2 Dickens, 445, and the case of Spraae vs~ Stone, decided in 1773, Ambler, 721. These cases appear to have definitely settled the law,, that a subsequent marriage and birth of a child standing alone, and unaccompanied by other circumstances, amount to an implied revocation of a will.

The whole subject, says Chancellor Kent, has continued to receive great discussion in the English Courts since the era of our Revolution, growing out of new cases constantly arising amidst the endless variety of human affairs. The most important of the English cases since the Revolution, is the case of Marston vs. Roe, dem. Fox, decided in 1838, hy fourteen out of the fifteen English Judges, (8 Adol. & Ellis, 14,) where the general doctrine we have stated was re-affirmed. We will recur to this case again for another purpose.

But we are not without decisive authority in our own State. The unreported case of Sedwick vs. Sedwick, decided at June Term, 1844, was a case similar to the one at bar, and the Court of Appeals decided that the subsequent marriage and birth of a child did revoke the will, and they affirmed the decree of the Orphans’ Court refusing it prohate. No opinion Was filed in the case although a large amount of property was involved, and the case was argued by some of the most eminent counsel in Maryland. But they did ³⁸¹ flatly decide the question by a decree, declaring the will revoked by the subsequent marriage and birth of a child.

But while such is the general rule, like other general rules, it has been held in England subject to some exceptions. Among the exceptions is the one where, the testator has made provision for his children born after the execution of the will. As the origin of the rule was the duty of the parent to provide for his offspring, this exception seems right and proper. Another matter upon which the English Courts have exercised themselves, is the determination of the ground upon which the doctrine of implied revocation ought to be rested.

This is of practical importance in this case, and will require some examination. Lord Mansfield, in the case of Brady vs. Cubitt, 1 Douglas, 31, thought the rule should rest on the presumption that the testator intended to revolee Ms