Ball v. State

¹⁶⁶ CHASANOW, Judge. This appeal is before the Court pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.VoL), Article 27, § 414. The appellant, Wallace Dudley Ball, was tried by jury in the Circuit Court for Charles County, the Honorable Joseph S. Casula presiding, for the murder of Debra Anne Goodwich and related offenses. The jury found Appellant guilty of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, second degree murder, robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon, robbery, daytime housebreaking, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.

Appellant elected to be sentenced by the judge and received a sentence of death for the first degree murder conviction. With regard to the lesser offenses, Appellant was sentenced to a total of fifty years imprisonment. 1 On this appeal of the imposition of the death penalty, Appellant presents eight issues for our review. In a somewhat different order from their presentation in Appellant’s brief, they are: (1) Whether the lower court erred in refusing to suppress Appellant’s inculpatory statements to police. (2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to compel disclosure to the defense of a video tape shown, for the purpose of training, to trial judges who preside over capital trials.

(3) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to propound a jury instruction on the offense of theft. (4) Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon and the aggravating circumstance of murder in the course of a robbery. (5) Whether the trial court erred in considering certain victim impact evidence, at sentencing. ¹⁶⁷ (6) Whether the trial court erred in admitting at sentencing evidence of Appellant’s prior convictions for nonviolent offenses, and of offenses not resulting in convictions. (7) Whether the prosecution engaged in improper closing argument at sentencing.

(8) Whether Maryland’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Following a brief summary of the pertinent facts, we shall address the above issues, and their attendant sub-issues, seriatim. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND At approximately 3:45 p.m. on September 30, 1994, Arlene Goodwich arrived at her Baltimore County residence to find her house ransacked and her nineteen-year-old daughter, Debra Anne Goodwich, dead of numerous gunshot wounds. A subsequent autopsy report revealed that Debra had been shot six times in the torso and once in the arm.

Police officers who were called to the scene found evidence of a forced entry through a rear window of the Goodwich home. They also discovered that the telephone line had been cut and the alarm system disabled. Debra Goodwich, it was later determined, had interrupted a burglary in progress. Preliminary investigation of the crime led to the questioning of Appellant, Wallace Dudley Ball, at his home on October 12, 1994.

The identification of Appellant as a potential suspect apparently resulted from the police learning that the victim’s father, Walter Goodwich, was the former employer of Appellant’s wife, Sharon Ball. Shortly before the murder of Debra Goodwich, Ms. Ball had terminated her employment with Walter Goodwich’s firm in the wake of allegations that she had embezzled firm funds. Appellant informed Baltimore County police detectives at this initial meeting that he had done some roofing work at the Goodwich home and that he knew the victim. Six months later, a warrant was issued for Appellant’s arrest. ¹⁶⁸ Following his arrest in Knoxville, Tennessee,, on April 27, 1995, Appellant was interviewed by Terry Clowers, an investigator in the Criminal Investigation Division of the Knoxville Police Department.

Investigator Clowers testified that he informed Appellant that he would be audio taping the interview and that he advised Appellant of his Miranda rights. Appellant indicated that he understood his rights and elected to waive them. Soon after the interview began, however, Appellant motioned to Investigator Clowers to turn off the tape recorder. Investigator Clowers complied with this request.

According to Investigator Clowers, Appellant then stated that he would continue the discussion, but that he did not wish to talk on tape. The information that Appellant provided to Investigator Clowers at that point did not implicate him in the crime. Upon learning of Appellant’s arrest, Baltimore County police detectives Carroll Bollinger and William Cordwell proceeded to Knoxville and arranged to question Appellant. At the beginning of the interview, at which Investigator Clowers also was present, Detective Bollinger verified that Appellant had been advised of and understood his Miranda rights.

Appellant indicated that, indeed, he knew his rights and that he was willing to talk to the detectives. The detectives then asked Appellant to review two documents that had been prepared by Detective Bollinger prior to his arrival in Knoxville. One of the documents read as follows: “ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1994, DEBBIE GOODWICH WAS BRUTALLY KILLED IN HER PARENT’S HOME. WALLACE BALL 1. ) IS A COLD BLOODED KILLER. 2. ) HAS NO REGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE. 3. ) KILLED DEBBIE GOODWICH FOR FUN. 4. ) HAS BEEN LOOKING TO KILL SOMEONE FOR A LONG WHILE. ¹⁶⁹ 5. ) WOULD KILL AGAIN BECAUSE HE LIKED IT. 6. ) KILLED DEBBIE BECAUSE HE HATES WALTER GOODWICH.” In contrast, the other document stated: “ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1994, 2 DEBBIE GOODWICH WAS ACCIDENTALLY KILLED IN HER PARENT’S HOME.

WALLACE BALL 1. ) HAS HAD A TOUGH LIFE. 2. ) LOVES HIS SON, DILLON. 8.) KILLED DEBBIE GOODWICH BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID SHE COULD IDENTIFY HIM. 4. ) WAS TRYING TO SUPPORT HIS FAMILY WHICH IS WHY HE BROKE INTO THE GOODWICH HOME. 5. ) UNFORTUNATELY BECAME HOOKED ON DRUGS. 6. ) WALTER GOODWICH WAS AN UNREASONABLE MAN IN DEALING WITH WALLACE AND SHARON BALL. 7. ) IS SORRY IN HIS HEART FOR KILLING DEBBIE GOODWICH. 8. ) WISHES HE COULD CHANGE WHAT HAPPENED TO DEBBIE. 9. ) DEBBIE STRUGGLED WITH HIM CAUSING HIM TO SHOOT HER WHICH HE DIDN’T WANT TO DO.” Detective Bollinger testified that, after Appellant read the documents, “[h]e placed them back on the table and he asked what do they do for me.” Detective Bollinger explained to Appellant that they were two different ways of characterizing him. Soon thereafter, sensing that Appellant was uncomforta ¹⁷⁰ ble with the presence of 3 police officers, Detective Bollinger asked Detective Cordwell and Investigator Clowers to leave the room. After some discussion, Appellant confessed to Detective Bollinger that he had killed Debra Goodwich. The particulars of the oral confession were described by Detective Bollinger at a pre-trial hearing as follows: “[BOLLINGER]: [Appellant] stated he had gone to the Goodwich residence the night before the burglary occurred and the homicide occurred, that he waited outside.

Waited outside on the property, waited there all night long. Waited until the morning hours to see the residents leave____ At that point he felt it was safe to enter the residence, he broke in the residence. Q: Did he do anything to disable anything? [BOLLINGER]: Yes, Ma’am. Before entering the residence he cut the alarm wires and the phone wires for the residence.

They had a security system, an alarm system. He cut those wires. He also cut the phone lines to the residence. Q: And did he do anything while he waited outside all night? [BOLLINGER]: Yes Ma’am.

As he sat there and waited he had brought food along and he was eating barbecue chicken wings outside the residence, all night long. Q: So after he cut the phone and burglar alarm wires how did he break in the house? [BOLLINGER]: Through a basement window. * * * Once inside he wanted to make it look as if an amateur had committed the offense so he went into the kitchen area and dumped [a] household product like sugar on the ... floor to make it look like it was a juvenile committing the offense. He even wore a pair of boots, roofer[’]s boots that were larger in size than his actual foot. He did this because he had told me that once the burglary had been committed he thought the Goodwich[e]s would immediately assume that he was the one responsible.... ¹⁷¹ Q: While he was burglarizing the home did he tell you there was a time somebody came home? [BOLLINGER]: Yes, Ma’am, he said he heard someone state who is in here and at that point— Q: Where was he at that time? [BOLLINGER]: He was in the back bedroom I believe, master bedroom.

Q: And what did he hear? [BOLLINGER]: His exact words to me, who is in here. Q: What did he say next? [BOLLINGER]: Stated that he moved toward the door, the front door and as he moved toward the front door the victim, Debra Goodwich, came around the corner and they almost bumped into each other. At that point he was startled, she was startled. At that point he shot her.

He shot her a total of 6 times.” Appellant also told the detective that after he shot Debra Goodwich, he remained inside the Goodwich residence, collecting his thoughts, for approximately thirty minutes. He then fled the scene in the victim’s car. Later, Appellant tossed incriminating evidence, consisting of jewelry, a pocket book, a gun, and a pair of boots, into Liberty Reservoir. These items and Debra Goodwich’s vehicle eventually were recovered by police during the course of their investigation.

After Appellant orally confessed to the crimes, Detective Bollinger asked him if he would like to write a letter to the Goodwich family, explaining the events that had occurred. Apparently recognizing that such a letter would amount to a written confession, Appellant initially resisted. Detective Bollinger described the exchange as follows: “Q: Did you give [Wallace Ball] an opportunity to give a statement in writing? [BOLLINGER]: Yes, ma’am, I did. Q: How did you do that? [BOLLINGER]: We went back and forth and Wallace advised that he did not want to put it on paper.

At that ¹⁷² point I explained to him, I said Wallace at that point when this comes to trial, when this all comes to trial if you don’t put it on paper then it is going to be me up on the stand telling the jury what occurred. It is going to be through you to me to the jury. I said it is much better if you told the story, not that it would get distorted through me to the jury, that it is your words, not mine, it is—I don’t want to miscommunicate anything, I don’t want to misrepresent anything, that it should be you telling the jury what occurred on that day. That is why I am here, I am here to find out the why for you to tell the people, tell everybody the why.

Q: What did the defendant say in response to that? [BOLLINGER]: He stated I like that. And he said give me those papers. I am going to convict myself.” Appellant thereupon confessed in writing to the murder of Debra Goodwich. Prior to trial, Appellant sought, unsuccessfully, to suppress the oral and written inculpatory statements.

The propriety of the court’s refusal to grant the motion to suppress is at issue in this appeal and will be developed in further detail below. Appellant’s trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty on, inter alia, the first degree murder charge. As authorized by Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 413(b)(3), Appellant elected to be sentenced by the judge, rather than the jury. At the sentencing hearing, the State introduced the mandatory pre-sentence investigation report, certified copies of court documents that evidenced Appellant’s prior convictions, and the victim impact testimony of the victim’s mother, Arlene Goodwich.

Defense counsel, in turn, elicited testimony from Appellant’s wife, Appellant’s mother, and licensed social worker Hans Selvog. The testimony of the defense witnesses appears to have been aimed, in part, at establishing that Appellant was emotionally disturbed from a young age and that he had no prior convictions for crimes of violence. Toward this end, Mr. Selvog prepared a social history of Appellant, which included information concerning Appellant’s previous convictions for drug-related and motor vehicle offenses, as ¹⁷³ well as various burglary and theft offenses. Based on the evidence presented at trial and at sentencing, the judge found as an aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery.

As a mitigating circumstance, the judge found that Appellant had no prior convictions for crimes of violence. In addition, the judge stated: “I find by the preponderance of the evidence that the following additional mitigating factors exist: That the defendant’s confession, his unstable childhood, his prior institutional history and adjustment to prison life— and I also considered mercy.” Concluding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the judge imposed a sentence of death, which Appellant now asks this Court to review. Additional facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal will be provided as needed throughout this opinion.

II

ANALYSIS A. Appellant’s Inculpatory Statements to Police The first issue that we shall address is whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress the inculpatory statements that Appellant made to Detective Bollinger. The essence of Appellant’s argument is that the oral and written confessions were not freely and voluntarily given. He also asserts, as an additional basis for suppression, that there was conflicting evidence as to whether Appellant invoked his right to remain silent during the initial interview conducted by Investigator Clowers and that the hearing judge erred in failing to articulate findings of fact that resolved this conflict. We find no merit in these various contentions. 1.

We shall begin with the issue of the voluntariness of Appellant’s confessions to Detective Bollinger. The introduction of a confession as evidence against the accused at trial is permitted only where it is determined that the confession was “ ‘(1) voluntary under Maryland non-constitutional law, (2) voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth ¹⁷⁴ Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and (3) elicited in conformance with the mandates of Miranda.’ ” Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 597-98 , 655 A.2d 370, 378 (1995) (quoting Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 480 , 536 A.2d 622, 625 (1988)). In this appeal, Appellant relies primarily on State common law grounds for asserting that his confessions were not freely and voluntarily given. Specifically, Appellant contends that the confessions were induced by improper promises, threats, and psychological coercion.

See Hoey, 311 Md. at 483 , 536 A.2d at 627 (stating that confessions that are “induced by force, undue influence, improper promises, or threats” may not be used as evidence against the accused). a. Appellant first finds fault with the manner in which Detective Bollinger responded to Appellant’s initial resistance to provide a written confession via a letter of explanation to the Goodwieh family. Detective Bollinger testified that he told Appellant that it would be “much better if you told the story, not that it would get distorted through me to the jury, that it is your words, not mine, it is—I don’t want to miscommunicate anything, I don’t want to misrepresent anything, that it should be you telling the jury what occurred on that day.” Appellant asserts that the court’s admission of a confession made in light of the assurance that it would be “much better if you told the story” runs afoul of the well-established principle of Maryland law that “if an accused is told, or it is implied, that making an inculpatory statement will be to his advantage, in that he will be given help or some special consideration, and he makes remarks in reliance on that inducement, his declaration will be considered to have been involuntarily made and therefore inadmissible.” Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 153 , 406 A.2d 415, 420 (1979). The rule against the inducement of confessions through the promise of some benefit has been repeated by Maryland ¹⁷⁵ courts on numerous occasions.

See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 505 , 610 A.2d 782, 787 (1992) (observing that “[cjourts abhor, or at least find distasteful, promises of leniency or immunity made by state agents to defendants subject to the vulnerability of custodial interrogation”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1054 , 113 S.Ct. 981 , 122 L.Ed.2d 134 (1993); State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 35-36 , 375 A.2d 1105, 1108 (explaining that “[fjor a statement to be the free and voluntary act of an accused, it must be obtained without ... hope held out or promise made on the part of the authorities”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 , 98 S.Ct. 646 , 54 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977); Kiev v. State, 213 Md. 556, 561 , 132 A.2d 494, 497 (1957) (stating that “[tjhe State must show ... that no hope or promise was held out to the accused for the purpose of inducing him to confess”); James v. State, 193 Md. 31, 41-42 , 65 A.2d 888, 892 (1949) (defining voluntary confession as “not obtained by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage”). The historical justification for excluding confessions made in reliance on a promise of some benefit is that they are, of course, inherently untrustworthy. David M. Nissman and Ed Hagen, Law of Confessions § 2:2, at 2-3 (2d ed. 1994). Examples of specific types of promises that have rendered subsequent confessions inadmissible in Maryland courts include: a promise that the suspect’s wife would not be arrested, Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155, 160 , 423 A.2d 552, 554 (1980); a detective’s assurance that he would “go to bat” for the suspect, Hillard, 286 Md. at 153 , 406 A.2d at 420 ; and an official’s statement that “ ‘it would be better for [the suspect] to tell the truth, and have no more trouble about it.’ ” Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6, 7 , 8 A. 571, 572 (1887) (emphasis added).

Notwithstanding the prohibition against the inducement of confessions by improper promises or other forms of coercion, it has been held that an officer’s mere admonition to the suspect to speak the truth does not render a statement involuntary. Reynolds, 327 Md. at 507 , 610 A.2d at 788 (citing Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 486 , 174 A.2d 163, 166 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813 , 82 S.Ct. 689 , 7 L.Ed.2d 613 (1962); State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196 , 391 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1990)). The ¹⁷⁶ following exhortations by interrogating officers, for example, all have been held to be proper: “ T want you to tell me the truth,’ ” Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140, 153 (1873); “ ‘the truth would hurt no one,’ ” Deems v. State, 127 Md. 624, 630 , 96 A. 878, 880 (1916); “ ‘get it off [your] chest,’ ” Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 442 , 199 A.2d 773, 777-78 (1964); and there’s “ ‘no sense in lying,’ ” Clark v. State, 48 Md.App. 637, 646 , 429 A.2d 287, 292 (1981). The issue is whether Detective Bollinger’s statement that it would be “better” for Appellant to tell the story in his own words falls within the former category of improper inducement.

The context in which this suggestion was made clearly indicates that it does not. Detective Bollinger was not suggesting to Appellant that the police or any other State official would confer any special benefit or advantage on Appellant in exchange for a written confession. Rather, the message that Detective Bollinger was trying to convey when he stated that it would be “better” for Appellant was simply that a written confession would provide Appellant an opportunity to explain his criminal behavior in his own words. To the extent that this opportunity constituted a “benefit” to Appellant, it did not rise to the level of an improper inducement.

That Appellant was aware that no other benefit was to be realized from providing a written confession is evidenced, in fact, by his remark to Detective Bollinger that “I am going to convict myself.” b. Appellant also claims that his written confession was coerced in that Detective Bollinger implied that if Appellant failed to provide a written statement, the jury would hear a distorted version of Appellant’s oral confession. In support of his position, Appellant cites Watts v. The State, 99 Md. 30, 35 , 57 A. 542, 544 (1904), a case in which a newspaper reporter told an arrestee, in the presence of police officials, that “ ‘it would be possibly better for him if he would make a clean statement, so it would not appear erroneously in the papers; that the papers would get it anyway, and as my paper was an ¹⁷⁷ evening paper, the correct statement would come out first.’ ” Although the Watts Court held that a confession thereafter obtained was inadmissible, there were other circumstances surrounding the confession that make Watts inapposite to the present case. First, the Court noted in Watts that the newspaper reporter “frankly admitted that he found the defendant shortly after the tragedy, on the same day, in a nervous and depressed condition, covered with blood from a wound on the side of his head ... and apparently suffering from shock; and that he told [the defendant] ‘it would possibly be to his advantage’ ” to give his version of the events that had transpired.

Watts, 99 Md. at 36 , 57 A. at 545 . The defendant’s poor physical condition apparently was a factor, not present in the instant case, in the Court’s ruling that the confession should have been suppressed. Id. Furthermore, the defendant in Watts , unlike Appellant, had not confessed verbally to the crime of which he was suspected prior to the statements of the newspaper reporter.

Rather than the newspaper reporter in Watts , therefore, the conduct of Detective Bollinger is more closely akin to that of the interrogating detective in Hoey, supra. In Hoey , the detective suggested to the suspect, after the suspect had orally confessed, that he reduce the confession to writing “to ensure that there would not be a disagreement later as to what [he] actually admitted.” 311 Md. at 484 , 536 A.2d at 627 . The suspect gave a written confession. Hoey, 311 Md. at 478 , 536 A.2d at 624 .

On appeal, the suspect argued that the detective’s suggestion was improper. Hoey, 311 Md. at 480 , 536 A.2d at 625 . This Court upheld the trial court’s determination that the confession was freely and voluntarily given and found no error, under Maryland non-constitutional law, in the admission of the confession at trial. Hoey, 311 Md. at 484 , 536 A.2d at 627 .

In assessing the voluntariness of the confession under constitutional standards, the Court further characterized the detective’s conduct as follows: “We find this action to be innocuous. Even considering [the suspect]’s mental impairment, [the detective]’s action cannot ¹⁷⁸ be deemed coercive. Rather, his action can only be viewed as neutral, if not helpful, to [the suspect]. [The suspect] had already orally confessed when [the detective] suggested reducing his confession to writing, and [the detective] merely sought to protect himself and [the suspect] from the conflicts that often arise when oral statements are the only evidence of an occurrence. Consequently, we find that [the detectivefs actions were not ‘so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.’ ” Hoey, 311 Md. at 486 , 536 A.2d at 628 .

We adopt the same view of Detective Bollinger’s statement in the present case. Detective Bollinger’s suggestion that Appellant reduce his confession to writing in order to tell the story “in his own words” can be interpreted as a neutral attempt to avoid later disagreement as to the particulars of Appellant’s oral confession. It did not overbear Appellant’s free will and does not render the subsequent written confession involuntary. c. Appellant also assails the method of interrogation employed by Detective Bollinger, whereby the detective presented Appellant with two contrasting descriptions of Appellant and the murder of Debra Goodwich.

Characterizing this interrogation technique as a “classic example” of psychological coercion, Appellant claims his subsequent statements were involuntary. A confession clearly is not voluntary if it is the product of physical or psychological coercion. Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 379 , 402 A.2d 900, 905 (1979); Kidd, 281 Md. at 36 , 375 A.2d at 1108 ; Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462, 465 , 190 A.2d 797, 799 (1963); James, 193 Md. at 41-43 , 65 A.2d at 892 . A person who has committed an illegal act, however, is not always eager to admit his or her wrongdoing.

Police officers, charged with investigating crimes and bringing perpetrators to justice, are permitted to use a certain amount of subterfuge, when questioning an individual about his or her suspected involvement in a crime. As the Court of Special Appeals has observed, “[deception short of an overbearing inducement is a ‘valid weapon of the police arsenal.’ ” Rowe v. State, 41 ¹⁷⁹ Md.App. 641, 645, 398 A.2d 485, 488 (1979) (quoting Hopkins v. State, 19 Md.App. 414, 424 , 311 A.2d 483, 489 (1973), cert. denied, 271 Md. 738 (1974)). Similarly, an appeal to “[t]he inner psychological pressure of conscience to tell the truth does not constitute coercion in the legal sense.” Kier, 213 Md. at 562 , 132 A.2d at 498 . It is only where police conduct “ ‘overbear[s the accused’s] will to resist and bring[s] about confessions not freely self-determined____’” that the confession will be suppressed.

Rowe, 41 Md.App. at 645 , 398 A.2d at 488 (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 , 81 S.Ct. 735, 741 , 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 (1961)). Simply stated, police officers are not permitted to employ coercive tactics in order to compel an individual to confess, but they are permitted to “trick” the suspect into making an inculpatory statement. State v. Carrillo, 156 Ariz. 125 , 750 P.2d 883, 894 (1988) (observing that “[t]he police are not forbidden to outsmart— they are forbidden to compel”). The decision in Rowe, supra, illustrates this principle.

The Court of Special Appeals held in Rowe that the police did not improperly induce the appellant to confess where the interrogating officer feigned loathing of the victim and admiration for the perpetrator. The officer stated that he wanted to shake the hand of the person who killed the victim; in response, the appellant offered the officer his hand. Rowe, 41 Md.App. at 644 , 398 A.2d at 488 . Holding that the officer’s deception did not amount to an overbearing inducement, the court explained: “[t]he words used ... are certainly not such as to automatically render that which follows inadmissible.

It is barely conceivable that anyone could have interpreted the officer’s comment as anything more than an effort to ‘soft soap’ the appellant....” (Emphasis in original). Rowe, 41 Md.App. at 645 , 398 A.2d at 488 . The court reached a similar conclusion in Fuget v. State, 70 Md.App. 643, 651 , 522 A.2d 1371, 1375 (1987), where the appellant complained that he was deceived by the interrogating officer’s smile, “coddling words,” and “sympathetic sounds.” The court acknowledged that although this interro ¹⁸⁰ gation technique was “somewhat unique,” it did not “coerce [ ] the appellant into making an incriminating statement.” Fuget, 70 Md.App. at 652 , 522 A.2d at 1375 . (Emphasis added).

The same reasoning applies to the interrogation technique employed by Detective Bollinger in the case sub judice. There is no indication that Appellant’s will was overborne by the use of this interrogation method. Nor does the record support Appellant’s assertion that the police took advantage of Appellant’s ignorance that the two different scenarios both amounted to first degree murder. Detective Bollinger testified that after Appellant read the two documents, he asked “what do they do for me.” Appellant apparently recognized, therefore, that under either scenario he would be admitting to the murder of Debra Goodwich.

We find no merit in Appellant’s contention that this interrogation technique rendered his subsequent statements involuntary. 2. Appellant also asserts reversible error in the alleged failure of the lower court, in ruling on the admissibility of Appellant’s extrajudicial confession, to make factual findings as to whether Appellant invoked his right to remain silent during the initial interview conducted by Investigator Clowers. This Court has indeed emphasized that in ruling on a motion to suppress “the trial court [must] ma[ke] the necessary factual findings to support its conclusion that the waiver [of constitutional rights] was valid and the statement properly admissible in evidence.” McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 623 , 526 A.2d 30, 38 (1987). If there is no conflict in the evidence with respect to the circumstances under which the statement was made, however, there is no need for articulated factual conclusions.

See Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 648 , 579 A.2d 744, 749 (1990) (holding articulated factual determinations unnecessary where, at the suppression hearing, the facts presented were undisputed and the defendant did not raise a challenge), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110 , 111 S.Ct. 1024 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1991). ¹⁸¹ The conflict in evidence that Appellant perceives is the manner in which Investigator Clowers concluded the aborted tape recording of his interview of Appellant, as evidenced by a written transcript of the recording, and the testimony of Investigator Clowers at the suppression hearing. The final passage of the transcript reads as follows: “This is going to conclude the interview with Wallace Dudley Ball. Refused to answer any questions. Subject did not request an attorney ..., just refused to answer any questions.

We just talked a little bit about his past ..., the supposed murder. [H]e advised me that ... he didn’t do it, that ... his girlfriend did it and then they pinned it on him and he left Baltimore.” (Emphasis added). Appellant asserts that this transcript indicates that Appellant invoked his right to remain silent, which Investigator Clowers then failed to honor. Investigator Clowers testified at the suppression hearing, however, that Appellant “did not want to talk on tape,” but that he was otherwise willing to continue the discussion. He further explained that the notation on the tape that Appellant “refused to answer any questions” was intended to mean that Appellant refused to answer any questions on tape.

The validity of this explanation was bolstered by the introduction of a handwritten summary of the off-tape conversation with Appellant, prepared by Investigator Clowers shortly after the conclusion of the interview, that begins with the statement that Appellant “would not talk on tape.... ” Appellant did not testify to the contrary at the suppression hearing. To the extent that the documentary evidence generated a “dispute” as to whether Appellant invoked his right to remain silent, therefore, Investigator Clowers, the only witness to testify on the issue, resolved the conflict by explaining that Appellant only refused to answer questions on tape. Investigator Clowers’ testimony at the hearing, therefore, clarified Investigator Clowers’ statements on the audio tape. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the judge’s failure to articulate that he found that Appellant had not invoked his ¹⁸² right to remain silent.

This finding was implicit in the judge’s ruling. B. The Judicial Institute Video Tapes The second issue concerns certain Maryland Judicial Institute video tapes and accompanying materials that are used to train judges who preside over capital cases. Prior to trial, defense counsel sought a court order, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-264, directing that these materials be turned over to the defense for inspection. The reason proffered by counsel for this unusual request was that review of the materials was necessary “to ensure that these materials do not contain any directives, guidelines, protocols, models, procedures, and/or statements of policy to the trial court regarding rulings on discretionary matters which might unduly prejudice the defendant and/or operate to his detriment in any way____” Appellant contends that the lower court erred in denying this motion.

Appellant’s asserted right to review these tapes is based, in part, on Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175 , 193 n. 13, 297 A.2d 696 , 706 n. 13 (1972), in which this Court observed: “Any information which might influence the judgment of the sentencing judge, not received from the defendant himself, or given in his presence, should (without necessarily disclosing its source) be called to the defendant’s attention so as to afford him an opportunity to refute or discredit it.” (Citations omitted). Appellant argues that because these tapes might have influenced the sentencing judge, they should have been disclosed. Appellant’s position suffers, however, from a fatal flaw: the sentencing judge in this case had never seen the subject video tapes. In response to defense counsel’s request for access to the video tapes, Judge Casula clearly stated that the video tapes were not presented at the training program that he attended: ¹⁸³ “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: * * * I would like the record to reflect my continuing request to see the tapes on the death penalty training.

THE COURT: Your purpose? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: To be updated on the most current state of the law and ascertain there is no prejudice towards my client in the information given out by the judicial institute to the judges specifically in this case. THE COURT: I understand. I did not attend the one—the one I attended was 1992 and 1991, whatever it was, 1993, 1992, I believe, which I understand they have changed considerably since then because I did not have a video tape.” (Emphasis added). Judge Casula could not have been influenced by video tapes that he had not seen.

There was no error, therefore, in denying Appellant’s request for access to these tapes. In fact, there would be no error in the denial of Appellant’s request even if Judge Casula had seen the subject video tapes. The discovery of Judicial Institute training tapes is neither permitted under the Maryland rules, nor “mandated by constitutional guarantees.” See Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112, 122 , 651 A.2d 866, 871 (1995) (stating that “the right to pre-trial discovery is strictly limited to that which is permitted by statute or court rule or mandated by constitutional guarantees”). Maryland Rule 4-264 provides: “On motion of a party, the circuit court may order the issuance of a subpoena commanding a person to produce for inspection and copying at a specified time and place before trial designated documents, recordings, photographs, or other tangible things, not privileged, which may constitute or contain evidence relevant to the action.” (Emphasis added).

A general training video on the conduct of capital cases does not “constitute or contain evidence relevant to the action.” The circuit court, therefore, has no authority to order the third-party custodian of these video tapes to turn them over to ¹⁸⁴ the accused in a criminal action. Furthermore, to the extent that there exists a constitutional right to pre-trial discovery of certain information, recognition of that right generally has been based on the notion that the accused in a criminal proceeding is entitled to access to exculpatory information, see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 , 107 S.Ct. 989, 1002 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 58 (1987), or to information about the accused upon which the judge or jury relies in imposing a particular sentence, see Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 31-32 , 92 A.2d 570, 573 (1952) (Chief Medical Officer’s report about accused). The Judicial Institute video tapes provide no such information and do not give rise to due process concerns. For these reasons, discovery of the video tapes need not be allowed.

To conclude otherwise would be to authorize, in effect, discovery of all materials associated with any continuing legal education course, seminar, or training program that a judge has ever attended. C. The Conviction of Robbery with a Deadly Weapon and Robbery as an Aggravating Circumstance of Murder The next issue concerns the validity of the jury’s conclusion at trial, and the judge’s conclusion at sentencing, that Appellant committed the offense of robbery. Robbery has been defined by this Court as “the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, by violence or putting in fear, or, more succinctly, as larceny from the person, accompanied by violence or putting in fear.” West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 202 , 539 A.2d 231, 233 (1988) (citations omitted). Invoking this common law definition, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of robbery in that: (1) the asportation of the property occurred before [Appellant] used force against the victim; and (2) “the property was not taken from the person or in the presence of [Debra] Goodwich.” We find no merit in these contentions.

We begin with Appellant’s assertion that the element of force necessary to support a robbery conviction is only force ¹⁸⁵ that precedes, or is precisely contemporaneous with, the physical “taking” of the property. Appellant contends that he did not commit a robbery because he murdered Debra Goodwich after he had already seized the jewelry and other items from the master bedroom; that is to say, he did not use force to accomplish the initial “taking.” Under Appellant’s theory, guilt must be assessed as of the exact point in time at which asportation of the property occurs, without regard to any events thereafter. If force is used during the thief s escape from the scene of the taking or in an effort to retain possession of property already taken, Appellant contends that there has been no robbery. Historically, there has been some disagreement among the various jurisdictions as to whether the use of force to retain property or to effectuate an escape supplies the requisite element of robbery, as the offense is defined at common law.

See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Use of Force or Intimidation in Retaining Property or in Attempting to Escape, Rather Than in Taking Property, as Element of Robbery, 93 A.L.R.3d 643 (1979). Some courts, adhering to the approach suggested by Appellant, have refused to uphold robbery convictions where force was applied subsequent to the physical act of “taking.” See, e.g., Royal v. State, 490 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla.1986) (holding that robbery convictions were improper where force was not used “prior to or while taking” the property) 3 ; State v. Aldershof 220 Kan. 798 , 556 P.2d 371, 375 (1976) (stating that “robbery is not committed where the thief has gained peaceable possession of the property and uses no violence except to resist arrest or to effect his escape”). Other courts, in contrast, have interpreted robbery as a continuous transaction that is not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety. ¹⁸⁶ See, e.g., People v. Estes, 147 Cal.App.3d 23 , 194 Cal.Rptr. 909, 912 (1983); People v. Turner, 120 Mich.App. 23 , 328 N.W.2d 5, 7 (1982). Under this latter theory, the offense of robbery occurs whenever force is used in furtherance of the “taking,” regardless of whether force is used to gain original possession of the property, or to retain possession in the face of subsequent resistance from the victim.

In Estes, supra, for example, the court held that a robbery had occurred where the defendant used force to prevent a security guard from retaking property that the defendant had stolen from a department store. The security guard had witnessed the defendant steal the items and confronted him in the store parking lot. In resisting the guard’s attempt to detain him, the defendant threatened the guard with a knife, and the guard retreated. Estes, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 910 .

The court held that evidence of these facts was sufficient to support a robbery conviction in that: “[t]he crime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety. It is sufficient to support the conviction that appellant used force to prevent the guard from retaking the property and to facilitate his escape. The crime is not divisible into a series of separate acts. Defendant’s guilt is not to be weighed at each step of the robbery as it unfolds.

The events constituting the crime of robbery, although they may extend over large distances and take some time to complete, are linked by a single-mindedness of purpose.” Estes, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 912 . The Court of Appeals of Michigan reached a similar conclusion in People v. Tinsley, 176 Mich.App. 119 , 439 N.W.2d 313 (1989), where the robbery conviction was predicated on a threat of force during the defendant’s flight from the scene of the “taking.” In this case, the taking occurred when the accused snatched money from a store counter and fled. The customer, who had placed the money upon the counter, and his son gave chase. The pursuit continued until the victim’s ¹⁸⁷ son came within approximately nine feet of the accused, at which point the accused drew a gun.

The victim and his son abandoned their pursuit upon this show of force. Tinsley, 439 N.W.2d at 314 . In upholding a conviction of armed robbery on these facts, the court referred to robbery as a “continuous offense, which is not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety,” and explained that “the use of force or intimidation in retaining the property taken or in attempting to escape rather than in taking the property itself is sufficient to supply the element of force or coercion essential to the offense of robbery.” Tinsley, 439 N.W.2d at 314 (citations omitted). The Court of Special Appeals expressed approval of the “continuous offense” approach in upholding a robbery conviction in Burko v. State, 19 Md.App. 645, 657-58 , 313 A.2d 864, 871 (1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 1003 , 95 S.Ct. 2624 , 45 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975).

The appellant in Burko appealed his conviction for armed robbery of a shoe store on the ground that he did not draw his gun until after the taking of the money had been accomplished. Although the court primarily relied upon witness testimony that the gun was in plain view prior to the taking, its rejection of the appellant’s claim was also based, in part, on precedent to the effect that “when one commits a larceny and then displays a weapon so as to overcome the resistance of the witness, the crime is then elevated to robbery. See Clark and Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes, § 12.09 (6th ed. Wingersky rev. 1958).” Id.

The Burko decision has been interpreted as implicitly overruling earlier case law