Maryland case law › Baltimore American Insurance v. Ulman

Baltimore American Insurance v. Ulman

165 Md. 630 (1934) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedPakke, J.✓ Good law
HoldingThe Leader Building and Loan Association pledged to Baltimore American Insurance Company, as collateral for a $5,000 note, a first mortgage it held on Conroy property; the assignment was never recorded.

Pakke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Leader Building and Loan Association of Baltimore City, Incorporated, hereafter to be called the association, was a building and homestead association incorporated under the laws of Maryland and engaged in business in Baltimore City, and was on November 11th, 1931, adjudged a bankrupt, and its affairs are in course of administration in bankruptcy by its receivers. The pending appeal grew out of a loan of $5,000 obtained by the association on October 21st, 1926, from the Baltimore American Insurance Company of New York, a body corporate, hereafter to be called the insurance company. For this loan the association gave its note, payable four months after date; and, by a short assignment written on the mortgage, it transferred to the insurance company, as collateral security for the payment of the note, the mortgage deed from Victor Conroy and Marie Conroy, his wife, to the association, conveying a certain tract of land in Baltimore City to secure the payment to the association of a loam of $6,900.

The deed was in the form of a building association mortgage, without a note given to evidence the debt, and was executed on April 12th, 1926, and created a first lien 634 on the fee simple land conveyed. The mortgage deed had been duly recorded, but the assignment to the insurance company is not recorded, although it had been delivered, at the time of its making, to the insurance company. The association paid $2,500 on the principal of its loan from the insurance company, and the amount now due is $2,500, with interest from October 21st, 1930. On account of the bankruptcy of the building association, the insurance company must depend upon the collateral for the payment of the indebtedness.

The mortgagors sustained financial losses and could not meet the weekly payments on account of the principal, interest, and dues of the building association. So, in the spring of 1930, John W. Lohmuller, an attorney at law, counsel for the association, and one of its original.directors, went to see the mortgagors and suggested that the association’s mortgage be reduced, in order that the sum payable weekly to the association be lessened. As a result of this conference, it was agreed that Lohmuller should procure for the mortgagors as large a loan as possible, to be secured by a first mortgage of the common form used by an ordinary borrower and lender, and that the amount so obtained should be applied in reduction of the indebtedness to the association, whose mortgage lien for the residue of its claim should be subordinated to the mortgage lien of the new lender and mortgagee. In fulfillment of this understanding, Lohmuller obtained a promise from the Baltimore Trust Company that it would lend the association’s mortgagors the sum of $3,000, which should be secured by a first mortgage lien on the same property of the mortgagors.

As was its practice, the trust company looked to the borrower to secure an abstract of title, and left to Lohmuller the notification of the Maryland Title Company to furnish the abstract of title. The trust company, however, knew of the existence of the mortgage of the association on the property from the beginning of the negotiations for the loan, and also the financial circumstances and motives of the mortgagors, which caused the application to the trust company. 635 At this stage of the transaction, which was before the abstract of the title had been furnished, Lohmuller drew the mortgage from Conroy and his wife to the trust company to secure the loan of $3,000, but made no reference in the instrument to the subsisting prior mortgage to the association. The new mortgage to' the trust company was dated and executed on May 31st, 1930, and given by the mortgagors to Lohmuller for delivery. The mortgagors both signed an order addressed to the trust company that authorized it to issue a check for the mortgage loan of $3,000 to John W. Lohmuller, attorney.

Lohmuller testified that he left the signed and acknowledged mortgage with the title company, but this is denied by the representative of the title company, and the facts support the conclusion that the document was delivered to the trust company on the day of its signing, as the affidavit by the trust company’s vice-president to the consideration was made on the same day, and on that day the trust company paid out $1,500 of the loan under circumstances now to be stated. There is no denial, however, that Lohmuller presented to the trust company the order of the mortgagors, and that on May 31st, at Lohmuller’s request, the trust company issued a check on account for $1,500 to the Lohmuller Building Company, and delivered it to- Lohmuller, and that on June 4th the trust company made the final payment by the delivery to Lohmuller of a cheek for $1,500 payable to his order as attorney. The Lohmuller Building Company indorsed the first check to Lohmuller, who cashed this check on June 2nd, and the second check on June 5th. Xeither of these amounts was paid to the association, and Lohmuller ultimately appropriated them to his own use.

Meanwhile the abstract had been completed by the title company on June 2nd, and it was presented to Lohmuller. The abstract confirmed the information which the trust company had before either of the checks was given to Lohmuller, and reported the lien of the mortgage given to the association; and Lohmuller stated to the title company that he would obtain a waiver of this 636 existing mortgage lien, as the title company had refused to issue its policy assuring the title until this lien was removed. The building association executed on June 10th, 1930, a waiver of its prior mortgage lien in favor of the Baltimore Trust Company mortgage. The waiver was effective in form, and the association’s corporate name was subscribed by its president, its corporate seal affixed, and the acknowledgment was made by its president in his representative capacity, and the instrument was duly recorded on June 12th, 1930.

By the recitals of the waiver, the trust company is represented as having made the loan to the mortgagors on June 10th, and the mortgage to the trust company as having been recorded on that day. The statement of the time of recording is correct, but the recital of the mortgage deed is that the loan was made on May 31st, and it was with reference to this loan of that date that the oath to the consideration was taken. The testimony is that transactions which involve the examination, transmission, and guaranty of title are, as a general rule, concluded by a settlement in the office of the title company, but, in this instance, there was no participation by the title company in the details of the settlement, beyond furnishing an abstract of title, receiving the waiver for record, making the final examination to see if the record were clear, and then, on June 20th, delivering the policy guaranteeing the title. The insurance company had received the collateral mortgage on October 21st, 1926, and had kept it continuously .in its possession until June 23rd, 1931, when Lohmuller called at its office in Baltimore and stated that the mortgagors were in default and that he wanted to foreclose the mortgage.

Lohmuller was the attorney named in the mortgage for the purpose of foreclosure, and the mortgage, with the unrecorded assignment indorsed upon the instrument, was delivered to him to foreclose for the account of the insurance company. Lohmuller gave a receipt for the mortgage, and left with it in his possession. Without the knowledge or consent of the assignee, Lohmuller struck out the assignment, 637 and instituted foreclosure proceedings in the name of the association on July 3rd, 1931. The insurance company was without any actual information or knowledge with respect to the second mortgage or the waiver, or any of the circumstances in relation to either of these documents, until about a mouth later, when Lohmuller’s conduct in financial matters became notorious, and the insurance company, by reason of these reports, directed its attorney to make an investigation, and his actions in connection with the foreclosure and the associated matters became known to the insurance company, which began a proceeding to set aside the foreclsonre suit, and shortly after-wards instituted the cause now before the court.

John W. Lohmuller was one of the incorporators and first directors of the associatkm in 1911, and was, at the time of all the transactions mentioned, its regular attorney, who was an officer provided for hy the constitution and by-laws of the association and expressly given “general charge of the legal business of the Association.” Whether he continued as a director does not appear on the record, but he customarily acted for the association not only in his professional capacity, but in the carrying on of its business affairs, whatever may have been his other official connection. There is no contradiction to his testimony that he had most of the “free share” money of the association, and that almost all of the money, in the numerous transactions of the association, was paid to him and deposited by him in his personal account, and that periodically he would account to the association for these funds. Ho change in these methods occurred until the midyear of 1931, when the crisis came in Lohmuller’s affairs and put an end to his career. The court has not undertaken an analysis of the testimony in order to disclose the process by which a fact is determined, but has set forth the facts according to the uncontroverted testimony, and its conclusion, according to the weight of the evidence, on those few conflicts in the testimony offered.

On the facts here presented, Tjohmuller had, during a long course of management of the affairs of the corporation and of the 638 exercise of its corporate powers, been presented to the public as its authorized possessor of extensive powers and functions. His frequent and continuous employment in similar acts or transactions as those here described, and his customary receipt of the money of the association, and thereafter depositing it to his own account, where it remained until a periodic settlement with the association was made, show a course of dealing of which the various acts done in the particular instance would be a consistent part, and in which the principal corporation had so long acquiesced, participated, and' benefited, as reasonably to lead to no other conclusion than that of a general and. continuous agency for the doing of the acts of a similar nature. 1 Mechem on Agency (2nd Ed.), sec. 244; Martin v. Webb, 110 U. S. 7 , 3 S. Ct. 428 , 28 L. Ed. 49 . In all the matters, therefore, that developed throughout the entire transaction, and that were done for the benefit of the association, in which Lohmuller participated, his acts were for the association, his principal, as its general agent. The knowledge of the agent acquired in the course of his agency is’, consequently, imputed to the association as his principal.

In addition, Lohmuller was the special agent of the mortgagors to' procure the new mortgage loan and to receive the payment of the loan and to see that it was applied in partial discharge of the original mortgage indebtedness to the association. The mortgagors knew of his general agency for the association, and there was no inherent nor actual conflict in Lohmuller so representing the association and the mortgagors, since they had a common purpose and interest in the successful issue of the undertaking. All that the agent of the two principals did in pursuance of his general and special agency would bind the principals according to their several principalships. Every act of the double agency was done while the agent was engaged in the business either of one or the other of the principals, with the single exception of his request that $1,500 of the new mortgage loan would be paid to the Lohmuller Building Company and his taking of the check so drawn by the new mortgagees.

In this excep 639 tional instance, the agent, in order to subserve his own interests, violated his duty to both principals in this conversion of funds to his own use, since the mortgagors had expressly limited in writing his agency in this payment to- the acceptance of a cheek from the new mortgagee for the full sum of the loan of $3,000 and made payable to the order of the agent as attorney, so that it might be applied by the agent in partial liquidation of the first mortgage- debt; and, similarly, the association was to receive the full amount of the new mortgage debt as a credit upon the former mortgage to the association. The trust company had in hand the explicit written limitation of the mortgagors on their agent’s power to receive the sum loaned, and it was solely because of the trust company’s deliberate violation of its only authority to pay out the loan that the fraudulent conversion of one-half of the sum loaned was effected. The payment thus made in disregard of the mortgagors’ plain order to a third person, at the instance and request of Lohmuller, is not a payment to the mortgagors on account of the new mortgage loan. Since this sum of $1,500 was never received by the mortgagors nor applied to their use or benefit, and there is no evidence on the record that they ever adopted or ratified this wrongful payment, the mortgage to the trust company fails of consideration to the extent of $1,500 as of the date of the mortgage, and the trust company mortgage debt can only stand and he made effective in the sum of $1,500, with interest from the date of the mortgage.

Hunter v. Chase, 144 Md. 13 , 123 A. 393 ; Riley v. Woodall, 145 Md. 125 , 125 A. 503 ; Whistler v. Hanna, 152 Md. 597 , 137 A. 276 . It follows from this conclusion that, as against the association, the mortgagors would be entitled to a credit in the amount- of $1,500 on the association’s first mortgage, since this sum was paid to the general agent of the association for its benefit in the due course of his employment and in behalf of his principal. This credit would also have prevailed against the assignee of the association, so far as the mortgagors a,re concerned, because of the statutory effect given to the assignee’s failure 640 to record its assignment prior to the execution of the second mortgage (Code, art. 66, sec. 25), hut for the fact, that, at the time that the sum of $1,500 was paid to Lohmuller, he was the special agent of the mortgagors to take and pay this fund to the association as a credit on the mortgagors’ mortgage to the association, and then, the circumstances show, had present in his mind the knowledge that the association had pledged the mortgage as collateral. Mechem on

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