Baltimore Belt Railroad v. Lee

Bryan J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Mrs. Eliza Lee filed a hill in equity, against the Baltimore Belt Railroad Company and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The hill alleged that the complainant was the owner in fee of a, lot of ground in the City of Baltimore, and that the Belt Railroad Company had taken possession of it, and was using it for purposes connected with the tunnel which it was constructing, and that it had assumed to grant to the Mayor and City Council a license to use the lot, or a portion of it, for purposes connected with the building of a bridge over Jones’ Falls, and that the Mayor and. City Council had entered upon a portion of the lot and were occupying and using it.

The prayer was for an injunction to prohibit the defendants from occupying the lot, and from doin'g any work of any description upon it, and also for a mandatory injunction requiring them to remove from it all their personal property and effects. The Court ordered an injunction to restrain them from occupying the lot and from carrying on any work upon it. The railroad company answered the bill of complaint and denied the title of the complainant as alleged, and set up a title to the lot in the Baltimore and Lehigh Railroad Company; and further stated that it had agreed with the Mayor and City Council to provide approaches for a bridge over Jones’ Falls, and that the occupation of the lot by the rail road company and the Mayor and City Council was by virtue of a license from the Baltimore and Lehigh Rail Road Company. The Mayor and City Council do not appear to have answered the bill of complaint.

A motion to dissolve the injunction was made by the railroad company; and after testimony and hearing it was overruled. The railroad company has appealed.. If the complainant has the title which she claims, there does not seem to he any well groumled objection to ⁶⁰⁰ the injunction. The railroad company certainly could have no right to take possession of land and use it against the consent of the owner without making compensation.

In any aspect of the case it would be an abuse of its corporate power. There is no mode of acquiring the right to this use and occupation of the land of another against his will, except by condemnation under the authority given by statute. The acts charged in the bill cannot be regarded as amounting merely to a fugitive and temporary trespass. According to both bill and answer the lot is used for the purpose of accomplishing the object for which the railroad company was incorporated.

But even a trespass will be enjoined under some circumstances. In White vs. Flannigain, 1 Md., 525 , it was decided that where a party held a right of way over a street, equity would grant an injunction to prevent the obstruction of it. The reason given was that obstruction of it destroyed it as a street, and the party was entitled to the enjoyment of it as a street. The principle was recognized on a review of the authorities that where the mischief reached to the very substance and value of the estate, and went to the destruction of it in the character, in which it was enjoyed, equity would give relief against the trespass by injunction.

This case has been frequently approved, and its principle often applied in other cases where the facts were of a different character. In Gilbert vs. Arnold, 30 Md., 29 , the controversy involved the right to use a building which had been erected and set apart for religious worship. A bill in equity was filed in which it was alleged that Messrs. Arnold and Hobbs were “the ministers and preachers duly appointed to have pastoral charge of said ‘meeting-house;’ and that shortly after they had entered upon the discharge of their duties, the defendants and. others in concert with them, not members of said religious society, commenced an unauthorized and unjustifiable use and occu ⁶⁰¹ pancy of said meeting-house whereby they have hindered, obstructed, interrupted, and interferred with said ministers in the due progress and prosecution of their duties.” This Court held that the complainants were entitled to an injunction and among other reasons for their opinion, they relied on the fact that the trespass went to the destruction of the property in the character in which it had been held and enjoyed, citing White vs. Flannigain.

In Mayor, &c. of Frederick vs. Groshen, 30 Md., 436 , the complainant alleged that the Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council of Frederick without lawful authority had entered upon and taken possession of certain land belonging to him, and were engaged in excavating, digging up, and removing the soil, and that his business as a coal dealer, having a coal yard on the premises, would be seriously impaired, if not destroyed by such acts. This Court held that the defendant’s acts were not authorized by its charter of incorporation, and that the complainant’s injury ought to be remedied by injunction, and cited from White vs. Flannigain, that a trespass will be enjoined where it is of such a character as to work destruction of the property as it had been held and enjoyed. The Court also say: “But there is another ground upon which the appellee is entitled to the injunction, and that is, that corporations will be