Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners v. Koba Institute, Inc.

ZARNOCH, J. In this case, we hold that sovereign immunity bars appellee, the Koba Institute (“Koba”), from bringing an unjust enrichment action against appellant, the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners (“the Board”), an agency of the State. This conclusion is compelled by our recent decision in Board of Education of Worcester County v. BEKA Industries, Inc., 190 Md.App. 668 , 989 A.2d 1181 (2010), cert. granted 415 Md. 38 , 997 A.2d 789 (June 9, 2010) — decided after this case was argued — and by Md.Code (1984, 2009 RepLVol.), State Government (SG) Article, § 12-201. We also reverse for other reasons set forth below and overturn the November 24, 2008 circuit court judgment reflecting the jury verdict of $169,640 in favor of Koba. 1 ⁴⁰⁴ FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Koba is a Maryland corporation that in 2001 operated two nonpublic, licensed secondary special education schools for emotionally and behaviorally disturbed children. Before the two schools merged in August 2002, these facilities were the Focus Point School and the Meadow Brook Education Center in Anne Arundel County.

In 2001-02, twelve Baltimore City public school students, who were temporarily housed in a group home, Bethany House in Talbot County, were referred to Koba for educational services. Seven were referred by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS); three by the Baltimore City Public Schools; one by what is now the State Department of Juvenile Services (DJS); and one by the East Baltimore Mental Health Center. When it received a request to place a child from the Baltimore City Public Schools, Koba would send admission and tuition information to the school system, including a query on how the system wanted to handle transportation. One such letter, dated September 17, 2001, to an employee of the City School System involving one of the twelve city students, stated: If requested Meadow Brook will arrange for the transportation of [the student] to and from our school at the rate of $80.00 per day.

However, you may opt to arrange for separate transportation services from any source. If you elect to have Meadow Brook arrange for transportation, invoices will be sent at the beginning of the month of service and will be submitted separately from invoices for basic educational services. 2 ⁴⁰⁵ Under the apparent belief it would be reimbursed for the service, Koba subsequently arranged with the Facility Operation Center of America (FOCA) to provide transportation services to the twelve children and began to receive billings from the subcontractor. Without a written contract with the Board, Koba, in January 2001, started to submit monthly invoices for each student’s education to the Baltimore City School System. In addition, it sent separate bills for each student’s transportation services primarily to BCDSS, with a copy to the City School System. 3 The School System apparently received the invoices, because, for the next nine months, it paid Koba at the $80/day rate. 4 Then, it began to question whether the Board was obligated to pay for transportation services to students temporarily living in Talbot County.

In September, 2001, Veronica Washington, Coordinator of the City School System’s Office of Nonpublic Services, wrote in a letter to BCDSS that: 1. Talbot County will not transport these students to Anne Arundel County; 5 ⁴⁰⁶ 2. The placement of the special needs students “was done without collaboration with BCDSS;” and 3. In the 2001-02 school year, the City School System “will not pay to transport their students from the Bethany House to Anne Arundel County.” Koba was not sent a copy of this letter. 6 In November 2001, Koba’s contact with the School System, Edie Tress, orally informed the school that as of December 1, 2001, the School System would not pay for the transportation services.

The City School System sent out the last 2001 check in December. 7 Nevertheless, Koba continued to arrange for transportation of the children and to bill for the services. For fleeting brief periods in 2002 and 2003, the School System paid Koba additional amounts. On August 15, 2002, the City School System sent Koba a check for $3,040 covering two November 30, 2001 invoices and, on August 31, 2003, it sent Koba a check that included $1,120 in transportation costs in response to a July 31, 2003 invoice. According to evidence in the record, this last invoice related to transportation for a single student from July 14, 2003 to July 31, 2003.

The last unpaid invoices were dated July 7, 2003, for transportation of five students in June of 2003. No more transportation payments were forthcoming. During this entire period, Koba billed and was paid for providing educational services. On February 9, 2004, Koba’s president made a final written demand to the school system for payment of the transportation costs, a demand that was obviously rejected. ⁴⁰⁷ After failing in attempts to seek the intervention of the Maryland State Department of Education and others 8 and to invoke the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court, 9 Koba filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on July 6, 2006.

After some initial procedural skirmishing, Koba, on March 26, 2007, filed a First Amended Complaint, advancing two counts: 1) breach of statutory obligation; and 2) unjust enrichment. In response, the Board filed a two-page boilerplate answer, raising twenty-five defenses, including limitations and immunity. After another flurry of motions, the statutory claim fell out and the case went to trial before a jury on the unjust enrichment count. ⁴⁰⁸ Central to Koba’s unjust enrichment claim was an alleged violation by the Board of Md.Code (1978, 2008 Repl.Vol.), Education (ED) Article § 8-410(b)(l), which provides: Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the local school system of the county in which the child with a disability resides shall certify and pay the cost of his daily or other reasonable transportation to school under the rules and regulations adopted by the State Board if: (i) The school is outside this State or the county in which the child resides; and (ii) State aid has provided for the education of the child under this subtitle. 10 Koba contended that because the disabled children “resided”, ie. were domiciled in Baltimore City, the statute obliged the Board to pay transportation costs to a school, like Koba, that was outside the City. The Board countered, in the words of its sole witness, Ms. Washington, that under § 8-410(b)(l), “where ... student[s] [are] in temporary residence[,] where they lay their heads on ... the night before, [that] county is responsible for transportation costs.” Thus, the Board argued that the Talbot County Board, not the City School System, was under a duty to pay transportation costs for the twelve city students. 11 The parties also clashed over how the Board was “enriched” or benefitted by Koba’s services.

Koba asserted that State funds were provided to the Board to pay for transportation for ⁴⁰⁹ disabled students, a total of $15 million for the 2002-03 school year. The Board responded that each year’s State transportation grant was based on a headcount of students transported the year before and that, because the twelve students were not included in any count, the Board received no reimbursement for their transportation and no benefit from Koba’s Services. On November 20, 2008, the jury returned a verdict in Koba’s favor of $169,640, computed on the basis of the $80/per day charges on the invoices. This appeal followed.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Board has asked us to review the following questions: 1. Did the lower court have jurisdiction to decide Koba’s claim of unjust enrichment if Koba failed to exhaust mandated administrative remedies? 2. Did Koba produce any evidence to support its claim that the Board was unjustly enriched by Koba’s services? 3. Was Koba’s claim barred by the statute of limitations? 4.

Did the Board’s immunity require the trial court to reduce the jury’s verdict to $100,000? DISCUSSION Because the legal landscape on the contractual liability of school boards has changed since this case was briefed and argued, we will address the Board’s fourth question at the outset. A. Sovereign Immunity The Board’s position on immunity has shifted a bit since the onset of this litigation. In the circuit court, the Board, pointing to cases involving the sovereign immunity of State agencies and to SG § 12-201 (waiving immunity only for •written contracts), argued that the lack of an executed written agreement doomed Koba’s quasi-contractual unjust enrichment claim.

While not abandoning this argument, appellant ⁴¹⁰ primarily contends here that the immunity conferred by Md. Code (1974, 2006 RepLVol.), § 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP) applies to Koba’s actions. Under that statute, local boards of education may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity to “any claim” of $100,000 or less, CJP § 5-518(c), but may raise the immunity defense to any amount claimed above the limit of its insurance policy or, above $100,000, if self-insured, or a member of an insurance pool, CJP § 5-518(b). In Board of Education of Worcester County v. BEKA Industries, Inc. (“BEKA”), supra, this Court concluded that, despite the apparent breadth of the words “any claim[,]” the context and history of CJP § 5-518 led to the conclusion that the statute covers only tort, not contract actions against local boards. Because this is not a tort action, the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners cannot rely on CJP § 5-518 in this case.

BEKA went on to hold that the contractual liability and immunity of a unit of State government, such as a board of education, was governed by Title 12, subtitle 2 of the SG Article. 12 Specifically, SG § 12-201(a) provides: Except as otherwise expressly provided by a law of the State, the State, its officers, and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract action, in a ⁴¹¹ court of the State, based on a written contract that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units while the official or employee was acting within the scope of the authority of the official or employee. (Emphasis added.) 13 Maryland appellate cases have read this limited waiver strictly to deny liability for State units in the absence of a properly executed written contract. See, e.g., Stern v. Bd. of Regents, 380 Md. 691, 722 , 846 A.2d 996 (2004); Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Constr. Co., 57 Md.App. 766, 781 , 471 A.2d 1121 (1984).

Thus, SG § 12-201 would appear to bar appellee’s unjust enrichment claim, which is grounded in an unwritten quasi-contract. Koba makes two arguments why the relief it sought is not precluded by State law. 14 First, it argues that the decision of ⁴¹² this Court in Alternatives Unlimited, Inc. v. New Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners, 155 Md.App. 415 , 843 A.2d 252 (2004), recognizes an unjust enrichment exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine. Second, appellee asserts that ED § 8-410(b)(l) itself waives any Board immunity from paying the transportation costs at issue here. We consider these contentions in order.

The short answer to appellee’s first contention is that Alternatives does not stand for the proposition Koba asserts. Nor would it be possible for the case to be read as it suggests. Alternatives was an unjust enrichment case involving alleged benefits conferred upon the Baltimore County Board of School Commissioners, but was not a decision that changed the law on sovereign immunity. Judge Moylan’s opinion in Alternatives is a thorough explanation of the common law element of enrichmeni/benefit overlayed over the backdrop of the common law nonliability of governmental entities for the unauthorized acts of one of its employees in arranging for a service from a third party.

Noting that this rule of nonliability is grounded in protecting the public treasury from unauthorized expenditures, 155 Md.App. at 465 , 843 A.2d 252 , Alternatives recognized that, for purposes of an unjust enrichment claim, there was a distinction between the provision of a non-cash benefit to government and a cash benefit: When the benefit is in cash, the case for restitution is far less troubling. When the defendant is a governmental entity, there is no threat to the public treasury because the defendant is not being required to buy anything or to pay out any of its own funds. It is simply required to hand over the easily identifiable cash benefits by which it had been unjustly enriched. There is no cost.

The public treasury has not been diminished and the status quo has not been disturbed. Id. at 505-06 , 843 A.2d 252 . As a result of this distinction, this Court allowed an unjust enrichment claim to continue against the Board premised on the conferral of a cash benefit on the governmental entity. ⁴¹³ Fueling Koba’s argument is Alternatives’ comparison of the rationale of protection of the public fisc in an unauthorized expenditure setting with this common justification for sovereign immunity. Id. at 422 , 465-66 and 489, 843 A.2d 252 .

However, the public fisc rationale is not the only justification for the sovereign immunity of a State agency. See Stern v. Bd. of Regents, 380 Md. 691, 701 , 846 A.2d 996 (2004); and Magnetti v. Univ. of Md., 171 Md.App. 279, 287-88 , 909 A.2d 1101 (2006), both noting that sovereign immunity protects the State from excessive interference with governmental functions and preserves control over state funds. In addition, while at present, the elements of an unjust enrichment action are exclusively governed by the common law as interpreted by the courts, State sovereign immunity is no longer the sole province of the common law, but is regulated by statutes enacted by the General Assembly. The defense of sovereign immunity was abrogated in Maryland by Chapter 53, Laws of 1786, but was reinstated in less than 40 years.

Chapter 210, Laws of 1820. This may explain the Court of Appeals’ reluctance to judicially abrogate the sovereign immunity doctrine before the General Assembly addressed the issue in the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm’n., 264 Md. 471 , 287 A.2d 40 (1972). When the Legislature reentered the area in 1976 to enact a limited waiver of State sovereign immunity in contracts, it expressly restricted the waiver to written contracts, leaving little, if any, room for a court to find a common law exception to SG § 12-201 on the basis of theories of quasi-contract or implied contract.

Alternatives acknowledged these vital distinctions between the remnants of sovereign immunity not statutorily waived and the common law elements of unjust enrichment. Taking note of Granite Construction, 57 Md.App. at 780 , 471 A.2d 1121 , the Court said: “However meritorious a claim based on an implied contract may be, if that claim is against the State or any of its agencies, it is barred because it is not based upon a written contract.” 155 Md.App. at 492 , 843 A.2d 252 . Again turning to Granite Construction , we observed that “[ejven if we were persuaded that MTA had been unjustly enriched ... ⁴¹⁴ we would be forced to conclude that sovereign immunity would be a complete bar to recovery.” Id. at 495, 843 A.2d 252 . Moreover, a close look at Granite Construction discloses that rebuffing the appellant’s unjust enrichment claim simply because it was not based on a written contract and thus, was barred by sovereign immunity, was a distinct alternative ground to this Court “also” rejecting an implied contract “as a result of conduct on the part of an employee who was acting outside the scope of his employment.” 57 Md.App. at 780-81 , 471 A.2d 1121 .

In addition, SG § 12-201 (a) indicates that these are cumulative conditions to a sovereign immunity waiver. The absence of any one of them bars judicial relief. 15 For these reasons, we conclude that Alternatives does not create an unjust enrichment exception to the doctrine of State sovereign immunity preserved by SG § 12-201’s insistence on a written contract. Koba’s second contention — that ED § 8-410(b)(l) itself waives sovereign immunity — also lacks merit. The General Assembly may waive sovereign immunity either directly or by necessary implication.

ARA Health Servs. v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Servs., 344 Md. 85, 92 , 685 A.2d 435 (1996). 16 In Katz v. WSSC, 284 Md. 503, 512 , 397 A.2d 1027 (1979), the Court of Appeals, quoting from earlier authorities, said that waiver should be found only “in cases of positive consent given, or by necessary and compelling implication.” The language of § 8-410(b)(l) does not satisfy this demanding standard. This statute is one of a number of interrelated and overlapping duty-to-pay provisions affecting the disabled school ⁴¹⁵ children at the center of this case. See ED § 4-122(c)(4), 8-406(c)(1) and 8-415(d)(2), discussed infra, at pp. 26-30. 17 These statutory provisions demonstrate no singular or special concern for enforcing the rights of private contractors to receive payment for out-of-county transportation of special education students. 18 Rather, these laws appear more concerned with apportioning or assigning financial responsibility for educational and related services between various governmental units, ie. the State and its subdivisions, and one local board of education or another. In this regard, it is instructive to compare the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in Katz, supra, 284 Md. at 513 - ⁴¹⁶ 15, 397 A.2d 1027 , with the lack of a full waiver found in IDEA Public Charter School v. District of Columbia, 374 F.Supp.2d 158, 165-67 (D.D.C.2005).

In Katz , the Court of Appeals found a. statutory waiver in the enactment of a specific procedure to satisfy judgments against a State agency. 284 Md. at 514-15 , 397 A.2d 1027 . In IDEA Public Charter, a federal district court held that even though Congress had expressly waived the District’s 11th Amendment immunity under the IDEA, it had not waived such immunity with respect to a charter school’s claim for psychological evaluation services of special education students. The 11th Amendment waiver, the Court said, was intended to protect the rights of a parent of a disabled student to sue, “not to create a private right of action for all interested bodies.” 374 F.Supp. at 166. Section 8 — 410(b)(1) lacks the stringent waiver language of either of these statutes, but has more in common with the IDEA in its emphasis on the provision of services to disabled students without parental expense, rather than the Katz statute’s goal of compensating private contractors through facilitating the payment of judgments.

For these reasons, we conclude that § 8-410 does not waive the Board’s sovereign immunity and thus, the unjust enrichment judgment must be reversed. B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Late in the proceedings in the circuit court, the Board argued that Koba’s suit should be dismissed because the school had not exhausted its administrative remedies before the State Board of Education. 19 It seems odd that the Board is raising this issue, after Koba tried to file an administrative complaint with the State Board over the nonpayment of its transportation costs and was rebuffed. See n. 8, supra. However, in any event, this argument is without merit. ⁴¹⁷ Although under ED § 2-205(e) 20 the State Board has broad appellate powers to resolve controversies involving the provisions of the education laws, such authority is not limitless.

In County Board of Education v. Cearfoss, 165 Md. 178 , 166 A. 732 (1933), the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the State Board had exclusive jurisdiction over a contract dispute. Distinguishing earlier precedent, the Court noted: In none of those cases did the question for determination relate to the legal effect of a contract between an agency of the school system and an individual for the performance of a specified service. Such a question, in our judgment, is not within the initial authority of the county superintendent, or the ultimate power of the State Board of Education, to determine. Id. at 187 , 166 A. 732 .

In addition, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that “the State Board does not have the power to decide purely legal issues.” Resetar v. State Board of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 556 , 399 A.2d 225 (1979) (collecting authorities). These well-recognized limitations on the State Board’s authority apply here. Koba has filed a common law action seeking to impose liability on the basis of a quasi-contract. At the bottom of the dispute is an application of the elements of unjust enrichment and an interpretation of ED § 8-410.

These are purely legal issues capable of judicial resolution. 21 The circuit court did not err in rejecting the Board’s exhaustion argument. ⁴¹⁸ C. Statute of Limitations The Board argues that Koba’s unjust enrichment claim is untimely and foreclosed by limitations. It argues that this cause of action is barred either by 1) the one-year limitation period of the “most analogous” statute, Art. 25A, § 1A; or 2) the 3-year limitation period for civil actions set forth in CJP § 5-101. We believe the Board is partly correct. As we noted earlier, n. 13, supra, Art. 25A, § 1A does not apply to Baltimore City or boards of education.

If this case involved a written contract, the one-year limitation period specified in SG § 12-202 would apply. However, because state sovereign immunity has not been waived for quasi-contracts and implied contracts, § 12-202 would hardly be the “most analogous” limitation period. If sovereign immunity were not in the picture, we believe that the three-year period set forth in CJP § 5-101 would control an unjust enrichment claim. In City of Baltimore v. Household Finance Co., 168 Md. 13 , 176 A. 480 (1935), the ⁴¹⁹ Court of Appeals indicated that a claim based on an implied contract was subject to the general three-year statute of limitations, even if the implied contract action were premised on a statutory violation. 22 Similarly, Koba’s action is one in quasi-contract for unjust enrichment based on the Board’s alleged violation of State law.

Thus, it would be subject to the general limitation period contained in CJP § 5-101. The Board also argues that Koba has failed to file its suit within the three-year limitations period. It asserts that Koba knew the Board would not pay for the transportation costs of the twelve students as early as December 1, 2001, but did not file its complaint until July 6, 2006. The Board also now argues that all but one invoice ($1,120) involved services performed before July, 2003 and that recovery of these costs is barred by § 5-101. 23 Koba responds that it was still receiving payments in 2002 and 2003.

The payments were a single month’s services for one student in 2003 and two in ⁴²⁰ 2002. And the school notes that the last invoice paid was dated July 31, 2003 for services provided from July 14 to July 31, 2003 and for which it received payment on August 31, 2003. Koba also points out that it made a final demand for payment in February, 2004. The key issue here is from what point does the statute of limitations run.

In Dempsey v. McNabb, 73 Md. 433, 438 , 21 A. 378 (1891), the Court of Appeals said that a claim for services on the basis of an implied obligation runs from the time the services are performed. This “last rendition of service” test appears to be the law in most other jurisdictions. See Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 622-23 (3rd Cir.2004) (collecting cases), and GSGSB, Inc. v. New York Yankees, 862 F.Supp. 1160, 1171 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (“[A] cause of action for quantum merit begins to run when the final service has been performed.”) However, caselaw generally appears divided over whether a period of demand and refusal is tacked on to the point when services were last rendered. In News World Communications, Inc. v. Thompsen, 878 A.2d 1218, 1225 (D.C.2003), the District of Columbia’s highest court held that “[a] claim for unjust enrichment only accrues ... when the enrichment becomes unjust.” Quoting from Zic v. Italian Gov’t.

Travel Office, 149 F.Supp.2d 473, 476 (N.D.Ill. 2001), the D.C. court emphasized that “the essence of a quantum merit claim ... is not the plaintiffs expectancy of payment, but the unjust enrichment of the defendant and ... the defendant was unjustly enriched when the services were rendered and when payment was refused.” 878 A.2d at 1223 . However, in Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.App.3d 860 , 186 Ill.Dec. 807 , 617 N.E.2d 46 (1993), an Illinois court rejected as untimely a tax accountant’s quantum merit claims when he waited more than 5 years to file suit after the rendering of his services. Specifically, the court concluded that limitations began to run “as soon as the services were rendered,” not “upon presentment and subsequent rejection of a bill for services,” because the accountant “could have billed defendants as soon as he rendered his services to them.” Id., 186 Ill.Dec.807, 617 N.E.2d at 52 . ⁴²¹ Apparently echoing a similar refrain is Henry’s Drive-in, Inc. v. Pappas, 264 Md. 422 , 287 A.2d 35 (1972), where the Court of Appeals of Maryland said, id. at 428 , 287 A.2d 35 : The modern view is that when the maturity of the cause of action is dependent upon the performance of an act within the control of the plaintiff, limitations will run from the time the plaintiff could have acted, without a demand being made. If this were not so, the plaintiff could indefinitely postpone the statutory bar.

In any event, the facts of this case make it unnecessary to resolve this issue. Except for the transportation of one student in July 2003 at a billed and paid cost of $1,120, all of the services were rendered more than three years before suit was filed on July 6, 2006. In addition, except for July 7, 2003 invoices for $4,720, the City School System was billed for the transportation costs and clearly refused payment more than three years before Koba went to court. To counter the limitations defense, Koba seems to be arguing that partial payments made by the City School System in 2003 and 2003 were an acknowledgment of the entire debt, thus tolling the statute of limitations.

This contention is undercut by both the facts and applicable caselaw. First, it is important to note that Koba’s provision of transportation services involved multiple debts, not a single debt. Separate invoices were sent for each student for each month. The August 2002 payment of $3,040 reflected November 30, 2001 invoices for just two students.

The August 31, 2003 payment of $1,120 involved just a single student and it was linked to a July 31, 2003 invoice. 24 Clearly, these were not general, undirected and undesignated payments suggestive of a greater obligation to pay. See Himelfarb v. American Express Co., 301 Md. 698, 707 , 484 A.2d 1013 (1984) (“ ‘If within three years before the bringing of the suit, the defendant had admitted a single item of the plaintiffs account to be ⁴²² due, the plea of limitations would have been defeated as to that item, while it would have been a good bar to all the other items in the account.’ ”) (Citation omitted). Second, at most, the August 2002 payment would have started a new period running. Id. at 705 , 484 A.2d 1013 .

However, because Koba sued in July 2006, nearly four years later, the claim still would have been barred by the 3-year statute of limitations. Third, Himelfarb noted that, “ ‘[i]n order to make a money payment a part payment within the statute, it must be shown to be a payment of a portion of an admitted debt, and paid to and accepted by the creditor as such, accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unquestionable acknowledgment of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder.’ ” Id. at 707 , 484 A.2d 1013 . (citations omitted.) It would be blinking reality to read such a commitment in the unexplained, isolated and single-item payments by the City School System in 2002 and 2003. For these reasons, we reject Koba’s partial payment argument.

This does not end the matter, however. The Board’s lawyer admitted in open court that claims based on $10,720 in unpaid invoices were not time-barred by § 5-101. 25 See n. 23, supra. Although not conceding these items in this Court, this admission in the circuit court is clearly a waiver of limitations as to the June-July invoiced amounts. For these reasons, if Koba’s claim were not precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the lion’s share of any award would be barred by limitations, but not the sum of $10,720.

D. Unjust Enrichment The Board has proffered numerous arguments why the court and jury were incorrect in finding the elements of unjust enrichment. However, we need not consider all of them. Unjust enrichment consists of three elements: ⁴²³ 1. A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 2.

An appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and 3. The acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value. Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, 402 Md. 281, 295 , 936 A.2d 343 (2007). Integral to Koba’s attempt to demonstrate these elements is its assertion that the Board violated its statutory duty under ED § 8-410(b)(l) to pay transportation costs for the twelve disabled City students housed in a group home in Talbot County and transported to Koba’s school in Anne Arundel County. 26 If the Board had such a statutory duty, it could plausibly be found that the City School System had knowledge of the benefit it was receiving when Koba arranged for transportation services and that Koba was not acting as an officious intervenor or volunteer in performing the Board’s duty. 27 In our view, a proper understanding of § 8-410, ⁴²⁴ particularly, how it interacts with other key provisions of law relating to transportation of disabled students, will shed light not only on whether the Board has a duty to pay, but also whether it has received a “benefit” for purposes of an unjust enrichment claim.

Education Article § 8-403 provides: (a) The State and each local school system shall make a free appropriate public education available to each child with a disability, as provided by this subtitle. (b)