Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Stein

³ ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. There are two issues presented in this case: (1) the appealability of an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City requiring the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS), the appellant, to disclose to James Stein, one of the defendants below 1 and the appellee herein, any records it may have on Stephen Ray, the minor plaintiff below, and Annette Hunter and Mickey Ray, his parents, hereinafter, collectively “the plaintiffs,” and (2) the correctness of that ruling. The circuit court’s order prompted the appellant to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued the writ of certiorari prior to argument in that court to consider the important issues raised.

We shall reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. Annette Hunter and Mickey Ray, for themselves, and on behalf of Stephen Ray, their child, sued the appellee, and others, for physical, mental, and emotional injury allegedly caused by lead paint poisoning Stephen suffered, as a result of the appellee’s negligence, while residing in a home owned and managed by the appellee Stein. The plaintiffs did not name the appellant as a defendant, nor did appellee join it as a party. Having filed answers to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint 2 , the appellee engaged in discovery.

He filed and served a Notice To Take Deposition duces tecum on the appellant. That notice set a date for taking the deposition of the appellant’s custodian of records, in this case, its Director, who was requested to produce ⁴ “[t]he entire file regarding Annette Hunter ... Mickey-Ray ... and their child, Steven Ray ... to include all payments made by Social Services to them on their behalf or on behalf of all their dependents (welfare payments, medical assistance payments, W/C payments, etc.) and all records of the Department of Social Services, the Department of Protective Services and/or Division of Daycare.” Resisting the subpoena issued pursuant to the notice, the appellant filed a Motion For Protective Order. 3 It offered several reasons for objection: (1) relying on Maryland Code (1957, 1991 Repl.Vol.) Article 88A, § 6, 4 that the records are ⁵ confidential and may be released only pursuant to court order; (2) that the records are protected by executive or governmental immunity; (3) that executive or governmental privilege exempts the records from disclosure; and (4) that the social worker, and/or psychologist/psychiatrist-patient, privilege “may apply to all or portions of the requested records.” The appellee moved to compel. In his motion, he acknowledged that “the Department is not unjustified in interposing the present objection, and in requiring a court order to produce the requested materials.” He argued, however, that what he sought may be and most likely, will be directly pertinent and vital to the completion of meaningful discovery in this case.

Quite clearly, should these records reveal instances of child abuse or neglect, or matters of psychological or psychiatric problems, all of the information would be directly relevant. Defendants must be permitted to have access to this information in order to have full opportunity for an adequate defense. This is all the more obvious since Plaintiff and/or her family or counsel would have access to much or all of the information contained in these records. Also, the appellee did not entirely reject in camera inspection as an option; rather, he took the position that, while in camera inspection is not absolutely necessary, he would not object if the court were to find it appropriate.

In addition, the appellee did not challenge the need to maintain confidentiality, by redacting identity information with respect to child abuse or neglect informants. Finally, the appellee rejected the appellant’s argument that records relating to Social Services’ intervention, other than through Child Protective Services, are irrelevant. He asserted, on the con ⁶ trary, that because it relates to the social environment, “information as to where the infant Plaintiff resides, who is charged with the responsibility of supervising the infant Plaintiff and commentary as to the adequacy and propriety of the care given to the infant Plaintiff”, is crucial. The appellee concluded: Thus, an investigation into the social environment of the infant Plaintiff is crucial.

The nature of the caregiving environment is clearly a relevant inquiry into the source and factors contributing to the alleged lead intoxication of the minor Plaintiff. Further, the records sought by the Defendants may clearly show evidence of causes contributing to the claimed injuries of the minor Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has put her mental, emotional and social status at issue by filing a lawsuit. The defense of this lawsuit would be severely hampered if the clearly relevant information contained in the records of the Department is categorically denied to the Defendants.

In neither the Notice For Deposition duces tecum nor the Motion To Compel did the appellee proffer precisely what evidence regarding the minor plaintiff and the cause of action it believed the appellant’s files would reveal. He simply asserted that evidence that shows the social circumstances under which the minor plaintiff was raised was relevant. Notwithstanding that both the appellant and the appellee requested a hearing, 5 the trial court decided the issue with ⁷ out one. It denied the appellant’s motion for protective order and granted the appellee’s motion to compel.

II

Anticipating an avenue of attack by the appellee, the appellant argues that the circuit court’s discovery order requiring disclosure of any files it might have on the plaintiffs is appealable. Conceding that the order is not a “final judgment” within the meaning of Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol., 1991 Cumm.Supp.) § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proc. Article, the appellant maintains that it is appealable under the “collateral order doctrine,” a recognized exception to the “final judgment” rule. While acknowledging that the order from which it has appealed is a discovery order, which normally is interlocutory and, consequently, nonappealable, see Public Service Comm’n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200, 207 , 477 A.2d 759, 763 (1984); Sigma Repro.

Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 675 , 467 A.2d 483, 490 (1983), the appellant asserts that the requirements of the collateral order doctrine are all met in this case. Hence, it argues, the order is appealable. The court’s order conclusively determined, i.e., foreclosed its further challenge to the ruling, that the appellant must disclose to the appellee any records it may have on the plaintiffs. 6 The issue decided, i.e., the propriety of disclosing Social Services’ records in a civil case on the basis simply of a subpoena duces tecum, and without the necessity of a proffer, is an important one. While impacting on them, the issue presented is not dispositive of the merits of the underlying action and, indeed, is distinct from them.

As to the final factor, whether the order will be reviewable on appeal from the final judgment resolving the merits, the ⁸ appellant points out that, once disclosure is made pursuant to the court’s order, the harm is done; the confidentiality of the information is lost immediately and forever; it cannot be recaptured, whatever the ruling on appeal may be. The appellee agrees that the correct analysis is under the collateral order doctrine. Unlike the appellant, however, he denies that all of the doctrine’s prerequisites have been met in this case. Specifically, relying on Sigma Repro.

Health Cen., supra, 297 Md. at 670-71 , 467 A.2d at 488 , he argues that the records sought may contain facts material to the defense of the personal injury action and, thus, the collateral issue is intertwined with the merits of the case. The appellee also questions whether the order has the requisite finality since the appellant has not been held in contempt. Moreover, the appellee asserts that, in this case, the federal issue, i.e., whether he had been accorded due process, has not yet been decided; hence, there has been no finality as was the case in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 47 , 107 S.Ct. 989, 996 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 51 (1987). B. Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.) § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article provides that “[A] party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil ... case”, whether entered in the exercise of original, special, limited, or statutory authority, unless “expressly denied by law.” Its purpose is to discourage the piecemeal appeal of issues generated at various stages of the litigation.

Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 614 , 440 A.2d 388, 389 (1982), Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 561 , 386 A.2d 1206, 1208 (1978); Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353, 356 , 384 A.2d 91, 93 (1978). See also Maryland Rule 2-602 which provides: (a) Generally. — Except as provided in Section (b) of this Rule, an order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action (whether raised by original claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim), or that adjudicates less ⁹ than an entire claim, or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action: (1) is not a final judgment; (2) does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or any of the parties; and (3) is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment that adjudicates all of the claims by and against all of the parties. (b) When allowed. — If the court expressly determines in a written order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order the entry of a final judgment: (1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties; or (2) pursuant to Rule 2-501(e)(3), for some but less than all of the amount requested in a claim seeking money relief only. Section 12-101(f) defines “final judgment” as “a judgment ... or other action by a court ..., from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.” This definition, because it does not specify the elements of finality, leaves to this court the ultimate determination of which judgments are final and, therefore, appealable under § 12-301.

Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. at 614 , 440 A.2d at 389 ; Smith v. Taylor, 285 Md. 143, 146 , 400 A.2d 1130, 1133 (1979); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company v. Los Angeles Ram Football Company, 284 Md. 86, 91 , 394 A.2d 801, 804 (1978); Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206 , 477 A.2d at 762 ; Sigma Repro. Health Center, 297 Md. at 664-66 , 467 A.2d at 484-86 . 7 We have interpreted “finality” for appeal purposes as involving settlement, determination, and conclusion of the rights of the parties. Thus, we have said that to be a “final ¹⁰ judgment”, the judgment “must be so far final as to determine and conclude the rights involved in the action, or to deny to the party seeking redress by the appeal the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 427 , 125 A. 177, 178 (1924). See also Sigma Repro.

Health Center, 297 Md. at 665 , 467 A.2d at 485 ; Peat & Co., 284 Md. at 91 , 394 A.2d at 804 ; Boteler & Belt v. State, 7 G. & J. 109, 112-13 (1835). In order for a judgment to be considered final and appealable in Maryland, “[t]he judgment must settle the rights of the parties, thereby concluding the cause of action.” Estep v. Georgetown Leather, 320 Md. 277, 282 , 577 A.2d 78, 80-81 (1990); See also Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 84 , 548 A.2d 837, 839 (1988); Houghton v. County Commissioners, 305 Md. 407, 412 , 504 A.2d 1145, 1148 , on reconsideration, 307 Md. 216 , 513 A.2d 291 (1986); Highfield Water Company v. Washington County Sanitary District, 295 Md. 410, 415 , 456 A.2d 371, 373 (1983); Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 6 , 432 A.2d 1319, 1322 (1981). There are exceptions to the final judgment appealability rule. Section 12-303 permits a party to appeal certain interlocutory orders.

In addition, we have “adopted the so-called ‘collateral order doctrine,’ which treats as final and appealable a limited class of orders which do not terminate litigation in the trial court.” Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206 , 477 A.2d at 762 . In addition to the cases cited in Patuxent Valley, supra, see e.g. County Commissioners v. Schrodel, 320 Md. 202, 209 , 577 A.2d 39, 44 (1990); State v. Jett, 316 Md. 248, 251 , 558 A.2d 385, 386 (1989); Electronic Data v. Westmoreland Association, 311 Md. 555, 555-56 , 536 A.2d 662 -63 (1988); Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 315-16 , 529 A.2d 356, 358-59 (1987). To fall within the collateral order exception, the “ ‘order must [(1)] conclusively determine the disputed question, [ (2) ] resolve an important issue[, (3 be] completely separate from the merits of the action, and [(4)] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’ ” Patux ¹¹ ent Valley, 300 Md. at 206 , 477 A.2d at 762 , quoting Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213 , 406 A.2d 922, 925 (1979), quoting, with approval, Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 , 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26 , 93 L.Ed. 1528, 1536-37 (1949), the seminal case on the collateral order doctrine.

Cases decided under the collateral order doctrine, like those addressed by the Maryland Rules on judgment finality, see e.g. Quartertime Video v. Hanna, 321 Md. 59, 64 , 580 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1990); Estep, 320 Md. at 283-84 , 577 A.2d at 80-81 ; Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989), ordinarily involve an attempt by a party to ongoing litigation to appeal an order entered in the course of that litigation, which does not, however, adjudicate all of the claims or all of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved. But see Sigma Repro. Health Center, supra.

In that case, Sigma, a non-party to the criminal prosecution, moved to quash a subpoena for its records, filed by the defendant. When the trial court denied that motion, it appealed, reasoning that the collateral order doctrine applied to render the trial court’s order final and appealable. Noting that “ordinarily an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum in a pending case is not an appealable final order,” 297 Md. at 675 , 467 A.2d at 490 , we held that the discovery order in that case was not appealable, but only after conducting the analysis required by the collateral order doctrine: First, the order to produce documents pursuant to the subpoena duces tecum is not completely separable from the merits of the criminal proceedings. As noted in [United States v. ] Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 , 94 S.Ct. 3090 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 [(1974)], “[enforcement of a pretrial subpoena duces tecum must necessarily be committed to the sound discretion of the trial court since the necessity for the subpoena most often turns upon a determination of factual issues.” 418 U.S. at 702 , 94 S.Ct. at 3104 [, 41 L.Ed.2d at 1060 ].

Second, the order to produce does not finally and conclusively determine Sigma’s claim. Rath ¹² er, if Sigma had failed to comply with the order and had been cited for contempt, then there would have been a final order____ The denial of a motion to quash itself was not a final disposition. Third, although the order involved an important right — the privacy rights of Sigma and its patients — the right would not have been lost on appeal if Sigma had been cited for contempt. 297 Md. at 670-71 , 467 A.2d at 488 . Patuxent Valley, supra, also decided upon a collateral order doctrine rationale, stands in stark contrast to Sigma Repro.

Health Center. 8 In that case, subpoenas, which required them to appear for pretrial depositions, were issued to the individual Public Service Commissioners. The State of Maryland and the Public Service Commission, both parties to the ongoing action, moved to quash and, when that was unsuccessful, appealed. We pointed out, 300 Md. at 205 n. 2, 477 A.2d at 762 n. 2, that, but for a Maryland Rule, see Rule 2-403(a), 9 the appeal by the Commission and the State would have presented a standing issue; however, since the rule provided standing for a party who seeks protection from an order directed at a non-party, the issue in that case was appropriately one of finality. C. The collateral order doctrine does not apply to the facts sub judice.

See United States v. Harrod, 428 A.2d 30, 31-32 (D.C.App.1981) (“[A]n examination of the Cohen rationale confirms the implicit inference that Cohen was never intended to apply to court orders requiring production of ¹³ information from non-party witnesses (footnote omitted).”) The appellant is not a party to the ongoing litigation in this case; it was brought into this case solely because of the appellee’s perceived need to review records, pertaining to the plaintiffs, which he believes the appellant may have and maintain. And the appellant has brought this appeal solely because of its stake in preserving the confidentiality of its records, the order signed by the trial court requires it to disclose information pursuant to a statute whose purpose is to ensure the confidentiality of certain information the appellant is required to maintain. See discussion, infra. See also Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 76 , 602 A.2d 1247, 1258 (1992); State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 620 , 566 A.2d 88, 91 (1989); Freed v. Worcester County, 69 Md.App. 447, 454 , 518 A.2d 159, 162 , cert. denied, 309 Md. 47 , 522 A.2d 392 (1987), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 804 , 108 S.Ct. 49 , 98 L.Ed.2d 14 (1987).

The appellant simply has no stake or interest, as a legal matter, in the merits of the tort action. Nor have the plaintiffs sought and been denied a protective order. See note 9, supra. With regard to the appellant and the appellee, the ruling has all of the attributes of finality recognized by this Court: it settles the rights of the appellant and appellee in the records sought to be discovered, thereby, concluding that phase of the action, and it has been entered on the docket.

Estep, 320 Md. at 282, 283 , 577 A.2d at 80 . See also Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41 , 566 A.2d at 773 ; In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. at 427 , 125 A. at 178 . This is so even though the words, “final judgment,” or the word, “judgment,” has never been used. See Houghton, 305 Md. at 412-13 , 504 A.2d at 1148 .

The discovery order in this case determined and concluded the appellant’s rights and interests in the discovery issue and denied it the means of further prosecuting or defending them. Rohrbeck, supra; Houghton, 305 Md. at 412 , 504 A.2d at 1148 . D. Notwithstanding the conclusive effect of the order as between the appellant and the appellee, the order is one ¹⁴ entered in the context of ongoing litigation, and, as to the appellee, may have significance during the progress of that litigation. Moreover, the order is one entered in a discovery matter.

It is well settled in Maryland that discovery orders usually are not immediately appealable. Sigma Repro. Health Center, 297 Md. at 664-665 , 467 A.2d at 485 . The rationale for that rule was stated in Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 208 , 477 A.2d at 763 : ... “[o]rdinarily, an order granting or denying discovery does not finally determine the rights of any party . . .” Alford v. Commissioner, supra, 227 Md. [45,] 47, 175 A.2d 23 [, 24 (1961)].

Also, in the usual case, the party or individual opposing the discovery order does not suffer sufficient immediate harm to warrant an appeal prior to the final termination of the litigation. Moreover, a party is generally able to seek effective review of the order upon an appeal from an adverse final judgment terminating the case. See also Price v. Orrison, 261 Md. 8, 9 , 273 A.2d 183, 184 (1971); Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 534 , 207 A.2d 83, 88 (1965); Montgomery County Council v. Kaslow, 235 Md. 45, 50 , 200 A.2d 184, 186 (1964). The Supreme Court has held that the finality, hence, appealability, of a discovery order is not determined by the status of the party against whom discovery is sought.

In Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 , 26 S.Ct. 356 , 50 L.Ed. 686 (1906), officers of corporations sued by the United States government under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, on whom, in both their professional and individual capacities, subpoenas duces tecum had been served, refused to produce the documents sought even after a special examiner appointed to hear and take testimony had ordered them to do so. Their appeal of the order to testify was improper, they argued, because “the orders of the circuit court constituted practically independent proceedings and amounted to a final judgment.” 201 U.S. at 121 , 26 S.Ct. at 358 , 50 L.Ed. at 688 . Rejecting that argument and finding the orders to be nonappealable, the Court reasoned: ¹⁵ In a certain sense finality can be asserted of the orders under review, so, in a certain sense, finality can be asserted of any order of a court. And such an order may coerce a witness, leaving to him no alternative but to obey or be punished.

It may have the effect and the same characteristic of finality as the orders under review, but from such a ruling it will not be contended there is an appeal. Let the court go further and punish the witness for contempt of its order, then arrives a right of review, and this is adequate for his protection without unduly impeding the progress of the case. Why should greater rights be given a witness to justify his contumacy when summoned before an examiner than when summoned before a court? Testimony, at times, must be taken out of court.

In instances like those in the case at bar the officer who takes the testimony, having no power to issue process, is given the aid of the clerk of a court of the United States; having no power to enforce obedience to the process or to command testimony, he is given the aid of the judge of the court whose clerk issued the process, and if there be disobedience of the process, or refusal to testify or to produce documents, such judge may “proceed to enforce obedience ... or punish the disobedience in like manner as any court of the United States may proceed in case of disobedience to like process issued by such court____” This power to punish being exercised the matter becomes personal to the witness and a judgment as to him. Prior to that the proceedings are interlocutory in the original suit, (citations omitted) 201 U.S. at 121-22 , 26 S.Ct. at 358 , 50 L.Ed. at 688 . See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-92 , 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3098 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1053-54 (1974); United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 531 , 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582 , 29 L.Ed.2d 85, 88-89 (1971). Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12-13 , 38 S.Ct. 417, 419 , 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918).

The rationales underlying this rule — that, unless the subject of the order subjects him or herself to contempt, a denial of an order ¹⁶ granting or denying discovery in an ordinary civil or criminal action is not a final, appealable order — are: [t]o allow immediate review on the denial of a motion to quash a subpoena may produce an appeal that otherwise would not occur, since the case may be settled, or the party proposing to call the witness or the witness himself may have second thoughts. Also, ... postponing the appeal until the witness has placed himself in contempt would normally provide the appellate court with a record of just what questions the witness had been asked and refused to answer which is generally unavailable on the denial of a motion to quash. Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 , 814-15 n. 3 (2d Cir.1976). E. We have declined to follow the Alexander rule, at least when, in the procedural posture of the case, the only matter before the trial court is the discovery order, i.e. the motion to quash.

Thus, in In re Special Investigation No. 244, 296 Md. 80, 85 , 459 A.2d 1111, 1113 (1983), (citing In re Special Investigation No. 231, 295 Md. 366, 370 , 455 A.2d 442, 444 (1983)), noting that the proceedings consisted only of a petition to quash the subpoena duces tecum, we observed that “our consistent holding has been that a final judgment from which an appeal will rise is one which settles the rights of the parties or concludes the cause.” 10 See also In re Special Investigation No. 185, 293 Md. 652 , 655-56 n. 2, 446 A.2d 1151 , 1154 n. 2 (1982), and cases therein cited. The rule has also been stated in Unnamed Attorney ¹⁷ v. Attorney Grievance Commission, 303 Md. 473, 480 , 494 A.2d 940, 944 (1985): It has consistently been held in this State that where a court proceeding is commenced to quash or to enforce an administrative subpoena, summons, search warrant, or similar process issued by an administrative agency or official, where the court refuses to quash or orders enforcement, and where the court’s order terminates the court proceeding, the order is final and appealable. The fact that the administrative proceedings may not be terminated does not render the court order interlocutory if nothing remains to be done in the trial court. We have rejected the argument that, in this situation, one must be adjudged in contempt of the court order in order to obtain appellate review.

This case does not involve an administrative subpoena and, moreover, the proceedings out of which it arose are still pending before the trial court. Consequently, this case is more akin to Alexander and Sigma Repro. Health Center , both supra, than to the special investigation cases out of which the rule just quoted arose. Moreover, the facts of this case are not consistent with those upon which the Supreme Court formulated an exception to the Alexander rule.

The subpoenaed material is not in the hands of a third party who could not be expected to subject him or herself to contempt in order that the owner of the material may take an immediate appeal. See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12-13 , 38 S.Ct. 417, 419 , 62 L.Ed. 950, 955 (1918). See also In re Search Warrant (sealed) 810 F.2d 67, 70 (3rd Cir.1987); State of Illinois v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533, 536-37 (7th Cir.1984). Nor, even though the Director of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services is undoubtedly, or at least arguably, a “high-level government decision maker”, does the official to whom the subpoena is directed occupy a position so lofty as that of the President of the United States.

In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691-92 , 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3099 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1054 (1974), the Supreme Court made clear that “[t]o require a ¹⁸ President of the United States to place himself in the posture of disobeying an order of a court merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review of the ruling would be unseemly____” F. Although, as we have seen, it was decided on the basis of the collateral order doctrine, our analysis in Patuxent Valley is nevertheless instructive as to the issues sub judice. We made clear, in that case, that “we continue to adhere to the general rule that discovery orders are interlocutory and ordinarily cannot be appealed prior to a final judgment terminating the case.” 300 Md. at 207 , 477 A.2d at 763 . Then, having stated the reasons for the general rule, we contrasted the facts in Patuxent Valley and, focusing on the last of the collateral order doctrine factors, observed: [T]he harm that will result from deposing Commission members prior to trial, should they be immune from this type of scrutiny, will occur from the instant they are subjected to a probing of their decision making processes. Furthermore, the harm to the State and its agencies, and consequently to the public, because of the disruption of the governmental process which could result from orders such as this, is potentially much greater than the harm to private individuals and entities. 300 Md. at 208 , 477 A.2d at 762 .

We concluded that “discovery orders, directed at other than high level government decision makers, are ordinarily not appealable in accordance with the general rule.” 300 Md. at 210 , 477 A.2d at 764 . In holding that exceptional circumstances existed making an immediate appeal appropriate in that case, we distinguished the immediate appealability of the order in that case from that in an “ordinary” discovery case, analogizing the former to that of a governmental official, who, in defense of a civil action, claims immunity. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 209 , 477 A.2d at 764 , citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742-43 , 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2697-98 , 73 L.Ed.2d 349, 358-59 (1982); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 700 ¹⁹ F.2d 104, 105 (3rd Cir.1983); McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 315-16 (D.C.Cir.1982). See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-17 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411, 424-27 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 806 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 2732 n. 11, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 , 403 n. 11 (1986); Andreu v. Sapp, 919 F.2d 637, 638-39 (11th Cir.1990); P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (2nd Cir.1990); Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400, 402 (5th Cir.1990); Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1231 (8th Cir. 1990); McDaniel v. Woodard, 886 F.2d 311, 313 (11th Cir.1989); Compania Mexicana De Aviacion v. U.S. Dist.

Court, 859 F.2d 1354 , 1358 (9th Cir.1988). Unless that official were permitted to have his claim of immunity reviewed prior to being required to obey a court order rejecting it, we opined, the claim of immunity would be forever lost. Id. To have held otherwise would have made useless the purpose of immunity — protecting the official from the burden of an unnecessary trial, id., and “to shield government officials from ‘the risks of trial — distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service should be.’ ” McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d at 316 .

G. A similar rationale is applicable to the confidentiality claim asserted by the appellant in this case. A governmental agency charged, by statute, with ensuring the confidentiality of the records it is required to maintain, — their disclosure being determined by