Baltimore City Passenger Railway Co. v. Sewell

Bowie, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. At the trial of an action, at the suit of Thomas Sewell,' Jr., (the appellee,) against the Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company, (the appellant,) in the Superior Court ⁴⁵¹ of Baltimore City, a verdict was rendered in favor of the appellee, against the appellant, for $18,261.77, on the seventh day of February, 1870. Immediately thereupon the appellant simultaneously moved for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment; which motions were under the then existing organization of the judiciary of Baltimore, to be heard and determined by the Supreme Bench. Both motions were overruled by the Supreme Bench on the third of July, 1871, about sixteen months after they were made.

An appeal was taken from the decisions of the Supreme Bench to this Court, where the same were affirmed at October Term, 1871. By an order of the Supreme Bench passed on the 29th of April, 1872, the cause was remanded to the Superior Court, where the appellee on the 21st of September, 1872, moved for judgment for the amount of the verdict and interest thereon from the date of the verdict. The defendant objected, and insisted that if judgment be rendered it could be only for the amount of the verdict and interest from the date of the judgment. The Superior Court, on the 25th of September, 1872, rendered judgment for the appellee for $13,261.77, the amount of the verdict, with interest from the 7th of February, 1870, (the date of the verdict,) and costs, from which judgment this appeal is taken.

The question presented by the appeal is, whether Courts of Law in this State have power either by virtue of the common law, or the Code, to include in the judgment the interest which accrued on the verdict, (assuming that the verdict bears interest,) between its date and the rendition of the judgment. The learned judge, who rendered the judgment below, in an opinion assigning the reasons of his action, after reviewing the legislation and practice of this State, adopts the conclusion that all verdicts without distinction as to the form of the action, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, ⁴⁵² having liquidated the claim, and given it certainty as to amount and time of payment, should bear interest “ex debito justifies. ’ ’ Regarding .the language of the Code, Art. 29, sec. 15, to be ambiguous, he thinks the terms employed should be so construed as to be most consonant with previous legislation, and the construction adopted by learned Courts, acting under the exposition of a learned bar, and pursued with an unbroken tenor for many years. The question presented by this appeal, in our opinion, is not one of equitable or legal right between the parties, but of jurisdiction, involving the line of distinction between the province of the Court and the jury. A verdict implies that there has been an issue of fact between the parties to the cause, which required a jury to find for the plaintiff or defendant.

Issues of law are decided by the Court; issues of fact by the jury. It would be technically as grave a departure from the functions of a Court for a judge to decide a question of fact, as it would be incongruous lor the jury to settle a question of law. The enquiry then is, to which of these tribunals does the ascertainment pr allowance of interest belong? It must be conceded that interest is not an inseparable and invariable incident of claims for money, or unliquidated accounts. “It is recoverable as of right, upon contracts in writing to pay money upon a day certain ; as upon bills of exchange and promissory notes, or on contracts for the payment of interest, or where the money claimed has been actually used, and upon bonds, etc., but in other cases, it is a question entirely for the jury to be decided according to the equities of-the transaction.’’ Newson vs. Douglass, 7 H. & J., 417 ; Karlhaus vs. Owings, 2 G. & J., 430 .

But it is said whenever the claim is liquidated by ver-diet, however the claim may have arisen, whether ex con ⁴⁵³ tractu or ex delicto, the amount of the verdict should bear interest. This argument attributes to a verdict the quality.of finality, which it does not legally possess. The verdict does not finally establish the claim. It is liable to be set aside for error in law or in fact, and is wholly inoperative, until sanctioned by final judgment.

The leading case cited by the appellee in support of the power of the Court to add interest from the date of the verdict, was an action upon the case upon a bill of exchange, with counts for money lent, and money had and received. The verdict was found for the plaintiffs, subject to a case stated for the opinion of the Court, in the language of Lord Mansfield, “leaving it quite open to the Court to determine whether anything, and what, is recoverable.” There was no question as to the respective powers of the judge and the jury, but it was in the nature of a special verdict. After disposing of the question on the first count adversely to the plaintiff, his lordship subsequently delivered the opinion of the Court as follows in effect: ‘£ The bill of exchange given for the £300 lent by the plaintiff to Sir John Bland, was void in point of law as a security; but the giving of the bill of exchange upon such consideration, is stated in the case as a fact admitted, and showed that, upon the loan, the intention and agreement of the parties was, £ ‘ that the money should carry interest if not repaid within the time limited.” “ The contract remains good, though he gave a void security to perform it. So that it is a liquidated sum which carries interest from the time at which it was agreed to be paid.” “But the question is, whether it is to stop at the commencement of the action ; or to be carried on to the time of liquidating the debt by the verdict or by the judgment. '' ⁴⁵⁴ After congratulating himself upon the opportunity of discussing and settling the point, because the general practice of his associates in taking damages in these cases, as he was informed, was to stop at the commencement of the action, and to allow interest no further down ; which, he conceived, was not founded in law, but in mistake and misapprehension; he argues