Banashak v. Wittstadt

MOYLAN, J. In this nine-year-old challenge to the administration of Viola M. Uhl’s estate, there are haunting echoes of Jamdyce and Jarndyce. 1 Ironically, what is now before us, even nine years down the track, is not yet an appeal from a decision boasting finality, but only the third attempt to have this Court intervene in a work still painfully in progress. 2 The allusion to Jarndyce and, Jarndyce is no mere literary flourish. This case, as will become clear, could literally end up the same way. A seventy-seven-year old widow left an uncomplicated estate, worth approximately $262,000 according to the Sixth and Final Administration Account of April 22, 2005, to her two sisters-in-law. One of them only outlived the testatrix by seven years and, therefore, collected nothing.

The other, when the dust finally settles and all bills are in, ⁶³⁴ could end up with little more than enough to buy a cup of coffee. Such a shocking result, should it come to pass, could bring down the glare of intense public scrutiny on the question of how such a travesty could be permitted to come about. We will not get to address that issue, however, because of an insurmountable preliminary hurdle. Our focus will be exclusively on the threshold issue of appealability.

A Long, Long Trail Awinding As well befits a case that has lingered long in “chancery,” its procedural trail is, or is rapidly becoming, labyrinthine. Viola M. Uhl died in Baltimore County on September 4, 1996. It has ultimately been established that she left a Last Will and Testament, signed by her on February 26, 1969, that was supplemented by a Codicil, signed by her on June 24, 1995. 3 Dorothy Uhl Banashak and Margaret Uhl Thelen were the sisters-in-law of the testatrix and were initially the exclusive legatees under that Will and Codicil. 4 The estate itself, represented by Gerard William Wittstadt, Sr., as its successor personal representative, is the formal appellee. Complicating matters from the outset was an ostensible subsequent Last Will and Testament, allegedly executed by Viola Uhl on July 1, 1996.

Unfortunately for the procedural history of this case, the ostensible Last Will and Testament of July 1, 1996 won the race to the courthouse door, and thereby hangs the tale. 5 ⁶³⁵ Phase 1: September 20, 1996-April 13, 2000 Tenure of Charles Kresslein, Jr. As Personal Representative/ Special Administrator On September 18, 1996, two weeks after Viola Uhl’s death, Charles H. Kresslein, Jr., Esq., filed a Petition for Probate with the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore County, seeking the administrative probate of the July 1, 1996 Will. An order was signed by the Register of Wills on September 20, admitting the July 1, 1996 Will to probate and appointing Charles Kresslein, Jr. as personal representative of the estate. The provisions of the ostensible Will of July 1,1996, differed dramatically from those that had been made by Viola Uhl in her Will of 1969, supplemented by the Codicil of 1995. Whereas in her earlier Will, Viola Uhl had left her entire estate to her two sisters-in-law, the ostensible Will of July 1, 1996, left her home, along with its contents, “to my friend Opal Bowling.” Of the remainder of the estate, 10% was left to each of the two sisters-in-law.

Fifty percent was left to Marlene E. Higgins and her husband, James W. Higgins. Fifteen percent of the remainder of the estate was left to “my dear friend and attorney Charles H. Kresslein, Jr.” In addition to being a legatee, Mr. Kresslein had 1) prepared the Will, 2) been one of the two witnesses to the Will, and 3) was appointed in the Will as personal representative. The remaining 15% was bequeathed to “my dear friend and financial advisor John R. Cameron,” who was also the other witness to the ostensible signing of the Will. Charles Kresslein, Jr. had, five weeks earlier, also prepared a Will, which Viola Uhl ostensibly signed on May 28, 1996.

The only difference between the two 1996 Wills was that the ⁶³⁶ July 1 version included the devise of the real property to Opal Bowling, which the May 28 version had not. On March 17, 1997, the appellants filed with the Orphans’ Court a Petition to Caveat the Last Will and Testament of July 1; 1996. In the nine-page petition, they alleged, inter alia, 1) the existence of the 1969 Will and 1995 Codicil; 2) that Viola Uhl was not, as of the time of the ostensible July 1, 1996 Will, of sound and disposing mind and lacked the testamentary capacity to execute a valid will; 3) that Viola Uhl had been subjected to undue influence by the new legatees who had been in a relationship of trust and confidence with her, especially Charles Kresslein, Jr.; and 4) that the ostensible July 1, 1996 Will had not actually been signed by Viola Uhl nor by any other person on her behalf and by her direction. The petition also specifically requested that Charles Kres-slein, Jr. be removed as Personal Representative and that an independent special administrator be appointed.

On March 18, an order of the Orphans’ Court directed Mr. Kresslein to answer the Petition to Caveat within 20 days. It also informed him 1) that, pursuant to Maryland Code, Estates and Trusts Article, § 5-207(b) and § 6-307, the administrative probate was now a judicial probate and 2) that his official status vis-a-vis the estate was changed from that of Personal Representative to that of Special Administrator. See Carrick v. Henley, 44 Md.App. 124 , 407 A.2d 765 (1979). On April 4, Mr. Kresslein filed his Answer to the Petition to Caveat.

Charles Kresslein, Jr. hired the law firm of his son, Charles J. Kresslein, Esq., to defend the caveat. On September 18, 1997, Charles Kresslein, Jr. filed with the Orphans’ Court a Petition for Attorneys’ Fees in the amount of $5,355.93. The appellants filed an exception to that petition on September 26 and requested that a hearing be held. A little over six months later, on April 7, 1998, a hearing was held on the pending fee petition.

As a result of that hearing, the Orphans’ Court, on April 9, issued an Order as follows: The Personal Representative failed to establish that he is defending the Caveat in good faith and with just cause. ⁶³⁷ The Court finds that the Personal Representative has a, conflict of interest. He drafted the will, witnessed, the will, named himself Personal Representative and also included a 15% specific bequest to himself. It is therefore Ordered on this 9th day of April, 1998, the Orphans’ Court shall defer all attorney fees requested by Charles H. Kresslein, Jr., Esq. until the conclusion of the Caveat litigation. All attorney fees shall be returned to the estate.

Mr. Charles H. Kresslein, Jr., Esq. shall voluntarily resign until the conclusion of the Caveat proceeding. If the will dated July 1, 1996 prevails, the named Personal Representative shall be reinstated. The Court order dated September 26, 1997 is hereby rescinded. (Emphasis supplied).

That fee petition for the payment of $5,355.93 to the former law firm of Charles J. Kresslein is not one of the petitions still before the Orphans’ Court for resolution and forming the basis for this appeal. Although on September 26, 1997, the Orphans’ Court ordered that the requested fee be paid to the law firm, that order was later rescinded as part of the decision on April 9, 1998. The successor firm to that law firm advised the Orphans’ Court on January 28, 2005, that it was making no claim against the estate for legal fees. On October 21, 1997, Mr. Kresslein switched legal representation from his son’s law firm to the law office of Edward B. Rybczynski, Esq.

Mr. Rybczynski was the attorney of record for the estate at the hearing of April 7, 1998. On May 7, Mr. Rybczynski appealed the Orphans’ Court decision of April 9 to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, asking for a trial de novo pursuant to Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-502. On July 27, 1998, the Circuit Court dismissed that de novo appeal for reason that the appeal was premature in that it was not from a final judgment. ⁶³⁸ In the meantime, Mr. Kresslein had disputed the statement made by the Orphans’ Court that he had, apparently in chambers, agreed voluntarily to resign as personal representative/special administrator. 6 When he refused to resign, the appellants, on June 17, petitioned the Orphans’ Court to remove him as Personal Representative (actually as Special Administrator). The appellants followed up, on July 10, with a Motion to Specifically Enforce Agreement Regarding Resignation of Charles H. Kresslein, Jr., as “Personal Representative.” On July 31, the Orphans’ Court, without holding a full evidentiary hearing, ordered Mr. Kresslein to resign. 1.

ORDERED that the Motion to Specifically Enforce the Agreement of Charles H. Kresslein, Jr. to resign as Personal Representative of the Estate of Viola M. Uhl is hereby GRANTED: and 2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Charles H. Kres-slein, Jr., is hereby directed to resign as Personal Representative of the Estate of Viola M. Uhl until the conclusion of the caveat proceedings. (Emphasis supplied). There followed the first appeal to this Court.

Our decision of December 20, 1999, reversed the July 31, 1998 order of the Orphans’ Court because Mr. Kresslein had requested the right to call witnesses and had erroneously been denied the right to “a plenary hearing on the question of his removal as personal representative.” Although this Court remanded the case so that a full evidentiary hearing could be conducted on the question of Mr. Kresslein’s removal, such a hearing never came to pass. On March 22, 2000, Charles Kresslein, Jr., submitted a written letter of resignation as Personal Representative, to be effective 20 days later. 7 ⁶³⁹ One has to wonder why, after spending four years and thousands of dollars to defend his incumbency, Mr. Kresslein ⁶⁴⁰ would suddenly throw in the towel. A gargantuan effort had produced nothing. What, then, was the purpose and what was the motive for conducting such a “scorched-earth” defense in the first place?

Carrick v. Henley, 44 Md.App. 124, 126-31 , 407 A.2d 765 (1979), confirms the legal right of a personal representative acting as a special administrator to defend his incumbency, but it does not answer the question of why he should choose to do so. The appellants petitioned for the appointment of an independent Special Administrator. On April 13, 2000, the Orphans’ Court officially accepted the resignation, as of that date, of Charles H. Kresslein, Jr., as “Personal Representative.” With that termination of the tenure of Charles Kres-slein, Jr. as Personal Representative/Special Administrator, the first distinct phase of this litigation came to an end. That phase had lasted for three and one-half years — from September 18, 1996 through April 13, 2000.

For two and one-half of those years, Mr. Kresslein had retained the legal services for the estate of Edward B. Rybczynski and Kenneth A. Bogan, whose joint Petition for Allowance of Counsel Fees is one of the two petitions that are still in litigation and are the subject matter of this appeal. The great bulk, although not necessarily all, of the legal work done during that period consisted of defending against the appellants’ efforts to have Mr. Kresslein removed as the “Personal Representative” of the estate. The more prominent adjudicative events in the course of that defense were 1) the Orphans’ Court hearing of April 7, 1998; 2) the abortive attempt to appeal the results of that hearing to the circuit court; 3) the hearing before the Orphans’ Court of July 29, 1998, leading to the removal of Mr. Kresslein as “Personal Representative” on July 31, 1998; and 4) the first appeal to this Court resulting in our reversal of that dismissal order on December 20,1999. ⁶⁴¹ Phase II: April 13, 2000-January 5, 2005 Tenure of Thomas Renner as Special Administrator In that same proceeding on April 13, 2000, the Orphans’ Court appointed Thomas James Renner, Esq., as Special Administrator of the estate. The tenure of Thomas Renner in that capacity continued for almost five additional years, from April 13, 2000 through January 5, 2005.

Whereas the first phase of the overall litigation had involved largely the ultimately unsuccessful defense of Charles Kresslein, Jr., against the efforts to have him removed as Personal Representative/Special Administrator, the second phase, during the tenure of Thomas Renner, involved essentially the basic merits of the caveat. On April 21, 2000, Marlene and James Higgins, two of the legatees under the purported Will of July 1, 1996, moved for leave to intervene in the case and to file their own answers to the petition to caveat. Permission was granted and the Higginses participated in all subsequent caveat proceedings. Other than the flurry of petitions for attorneys’ fees, amended petitions for attorneys’ fees, and prompt exceptions to every such petition, the next step forward in the progress of the case took place on October 10, 2001, when the Orphans’ Court, after a petition, an amended petition, a second amended petition, the filing of legal memoranda by both caveators and caveatees, and a hearing, framed seven issues for fact-finding by a circuit court jury pursuant to Maryland Rule 6-434.

See Hill v. Lewis, 21 Md.App. 121, 125-32 , 318 A.2d 850 (1974). Almost three years went by, however, before those jury findings were forthcoming because of yet another appellate interruption. The appellants, aggrieved at the decision of the Orphans’ Court not to frame an additional issue, appealed that decision to this Court. The appellants wanted the jury specifically to determine whether Charles Kresslein, Jr., as both the preparer of the July 1, 1996 Will and a legatee under the Will, was guilty of a violation of Maryland Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(c), which provides: ⁶⁴² A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where: (1) the client is related to the donee; or (2) the client is represented by independent counsel in connection with the gift.

(Emphasis supplied). Ruling that the “same evidence that would be admissible to prove a violation of the Rule would be admissible to establish either fraud or undue influence,” we held that the question was unnecessary and affirmed the decision of the Orphans’ Court not to transmit it. Banashak v. Renner, No.1936, September Term, 2001, 148 Md.App. 714 (filed December 9, 2002). We would like to have been able to ask, could we have been transported back to October 10, 2001, both caveators and caveatees alike, “Even if you win, in terms of one issue more or less will it have been worth three years?” “And thousands of dollars?” The question, of course, cuts both ways. “Is it worth pushing?” “Is it worth opposing?” Perhaps this is good reason why Orphans’ Court judges need to be able to look over the shoulders of special administrators, if not of others.

Perhaps some neutral referee should be able to make the overriding judgment that the dance is sometimes not worth the candle. Following the remand from this Court, the remaining issues were sent to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on May 22, 2003. A six day jury trial commenced on June 16, 2004 (eleven months later), and on June 24 the jury returned the following answers to the following questions: 1. Were the last Will and Testament of Viola M. Uhl dated February 26, 1969 and the First Codicil to said Will dated June 24, 1995 revoked after the making thereof and before July 1, 1996, including by any other paper writing purporting to be her Last Will and Testament?

X Yes No ⁶⁴³ 2. Was the paper writing dated July 1, 1996, purporting to be the Last Will and Testament of Viola M. Uhl, signed by her or by some other person for her in her presence and by her express direction, and attested and subscribed in her presence by two or more credible witnesses? X Yes No 3. Were the contents of the paper writing dated July 1, 1996, purporting to be the Last Will and Testament of Viola M. Uhl, read to or by her, or known to her at or before the time of the alleged execution thereof?

X Yes No 4. Was the paper writing dated July 1, 1996, purporting to be the Last Will and Testament of Viola M. Uhl, executed by her when she was legally competent to make a valid Will? X Yes No 5. Was the paper writing dated July 1, 1996, purporting to be the Last Will and Testament of Viola M. Uhl, procured by undue influence exercised and practiced upon her?

X Yes No 6. Is the paper writing bearing the date of July 1, 1996, the Last Will and Testament [oj] Viola M. Uhl? X Yes No (Emphasis supplied). After those jury findings were reported back to the Orphans’ Court, that court, on October 25, 2004, entered an Order declaring that the purported Will of July 1, 1996 was not the valid Last Will and Testament of Viola M. Uhl, and declared that July 1,1996 document to be “NULL and VOID.” In the meantime, Gerard William Wittstadt, Sr., on October ⁶⁴⁴ 21, 2004, offered for judicial probate the February 26, 1969 Last Will and Testament and June 24, 1995 Codicil of Viola Uhl.

Not yet down for the count, however, both Mr. Renner and the Higginses urged on the Orphans’ Court the proposition that the jury findings of June 24, 2004 had only found the July 1, 1996 document to be null and void and had made no such finding with respect to the purported Will of May 28, 1996. That argument was made notwithstanding the fact that the May 28, 1996 document had been introduced into evidence at the jury trial as a joint exhibit and had been the subject of extensive testimony during the trial. The jury finding, moreover, that the 1969 Will and 1995 Codicil had not been revoked “by any other paper writing purporting to be her Last Will and Testament” would appear to have been equally fatal to both 1996 documents alike. The Orphans’ Court nevertheless conducted yet another plenary hearing on December 8, 2004, at which extensive portions of the circuit court record, including papers contained in the court file, exhibits offered into evidence, and transcripts of much of the testimony before the jury were presented.

Eight and one-half years after it began, the caveat phase of this litigation officially ground to an apparent halt on January 5, 2005, when the Orphans’ Court issued a four-page Memorandum Opinion and Order. That Order ruled that the May 28, 1996 document was invalid, just as the July 1, 1996 document had been invalid. Mr. Renner’s tenure as Special Administrator, which had lasted almost five years, was over. The caveators had won, but had they won anything more than a Pyrrhic victory?

When all the wreckage has been cleared away, will there be anything, other than wounded pride, worth salvaging? Phase III: January 5, 2005-Present Tenure of Gerard Wittstadt as Personal Representative That same Memorandum Opinion and Order admitted to judicial probate Viola Uhl’s February 26, 1969 Last Will and ⁶⁴⁵ Testament along with her June 24, 1995 Codicil. Former Judge Gerard W. Wittstadt, Sr., who had prepared both the 1969 Will before going on the bench and the 1995 Codicil after retiring from the bench, was appointed as the Personal Representative of the estate. That probate, in its own right, would appear to be moving toward a quick and uncontroversial conclusion.

That conclusion, however, must abide the disposition of two still unresolved sequelae of the eight and one-half year caveat proceeding. Two Fee Petitions Although the merits of the caveat had at long last been resolved, the brooding question of fees for legal work done during the course of that caveat had not. This straggler issue promises to be more problematic than the caveat itself. The Order of the Orphans’ Court of April 9, 1998, had deferred all questions of attorney fees “until the conclusion of the caveat litigation.” See National Wildlife Federation v. Foster, 83 Md.App. 484, 495-500 , 575 A.2d 776 (1990).

Two petitions for attorneys’ fees were still before the Orphans’ Court when it scheduled a hearing for February 16, 2005, to consider the Fee Petitions and the Exceptions thereto that had been filed by the appellants. The first of the two petitions was the joint petition filed by. Edward B. Rybczynski and Kenneth A. Bogdan on January 16, 2001. Exceptions were filed by the appellants.

The amount of the fee ultimately requested is $29,886. That fee petition described the essential nature of the legal work done during those years: a. Defense of the Caveat Proceeding instituted by Banas-hak and Thelen; b. Defense and Appeal of the Objection [to] Counsel Fees filed by Banashak and Thelen; c.

Defense and Appeal of the attempts by Banashak and Thelen improperly to remove the Personal Representative; and d. Administration of the estate. ⁶⁴⁶ The series of petitions for fees submitted by Thomas J. Renner, the Special Administrator of the Estate between April 13, 2000, and January 5, 2005, is a bit more blurred, because they combine claims for 1) legal fees and 2) commissions due to Mr. Renner in his capacity as Special Administrator. See Estates and Trusts Article, § 7-602(c). And see Wright v. Nuttle, 267 Md. 698, 700-02 , 298 A.2d 389 (1973); Wolfe v. Turner, 267 Md. 646, 653-54 , 299 A.2d 106 (1973); Stiller and Redden, “Statutory Reform in the Administration of Estates of Maryland Decedents, Minors and Incompetents,” 29 Md.L.Rev. 85 (1969).

Implicit in the discussion in Wolfe v. Turner, 267 Md. at 657-58, 299 A.2d 106 , is the need for the Orphans’ Court to be able to look at a total figure, so that it can assess that total in its relation to value of the estate: [T]he commissions allowed a personal representative and the fee allowed his counsel should be considered together by the orphans’ court. Had he disclosed this in this petition, the revelation that total expenses of administering a $h3,000.00 estate would amount to $9,700.00 could well have been regarded as unreasonable or unfair. (Emphasis supplied). With respect to attorneys’ fees, Mr. Renner is an attorney and he, as Special Administrator, employed his own legal services, as well as those of three other attorneys, all associated with the law firm of Nolan, Plumhoff & Williams, Chartered.

To every succeeding petition for payment, the appellants countered with timely exceptions. The ultimate amount being requested is $89,260.50 in counsel fees and $4,516.86 for the recovery of costs. The most recent statement of the value of the estate (as of April 22, 2005) puts its value at $261,970.58. The combined fee petitions currently pending request legal fees and costs amounting to $123,395.40.

That cost is for the fees incurred by the caveatees. The caveators have yet to be heard from. 8 ⁶⁴⁷ Any fees that may ultimately be owing to Gerard Wittstadt for his less hectic tenure as successor Personal Representative have not yet been factored into the bottom-line figure. Nor have any claims for fees engendered in pursuing or in opposing this present appeal. 9 If truth is not stranger than Dickensian fiction, it is at least as strange. There seems to be a paradox at work.

How cost effective is it to accrue new fees today in order to litigate old fees from yesterday? 10 And what of the fact that as of tomorrow, today will have become tomorrow’s yesterday? When does such a spiraling cycle come to an end? 11 Will it only be when the cupboard is bare? ⁶⁴⁸ In any event, the scheduled hearing of February 16, 2005, on the fee petitions did not reach the ultimate merits. On January 27, 2005, the appellants had sent a letter to the Orphans’ Court, suggesting that “there appears to be a fundamental, threshold issue of law that will need to be heard and decided before the other fee related issues are reached.” The letter posed the legal question: As a matter of Maryland law, does a Personal Representative, acting with only the powers of a Special Administrator, or a Special Administrator appointed by the Court, have the legal authority to engage in litigation involving the Estate and to incur attorneys’ fees and expenses, payable by or from the Estate, without first filing an appropriate petition with the Court under ET § 6-403 and without first obtaining an order of court authorizing those activities? (Emphasis supplied).

The appellants followed up that letter with an oral motion to dismiss the two petitions for counsel fees. At the conclusion of the February 16 hearing, the Orphans’ Court denied that motion to dismiss. The court gave the following opinion from the bench. This court finds that Section 7-603 applies to the situation of a personal representative acting with the powers of a special administrator or a special administrator.

While it is an accepted practice for a personal representative acting with the powers of a special administrator or a special administrator to file a petition with the Orphans’ Court for authority to retain counsel to defend against the caveat, the court holds that it is not a requirement and unnecessary in light of Section 7-603. Ultimately the interests of an interested person in an estate are protected by application of Section 7-602, which requires the filing of a petition for counsel fees with the ⁶⁴⁹ court prior to the payment of any counsel fees out of estate assets. The court has the responsibility of determining whether the personal representative, who in all cases involving a caveat would be limited to the powers of a special administrator, or a special administrator, acted in good faith and with just cause in defending the mil in light of the totality of the circumstances. Furthermore, to the extent that this court signed, the order dated October 10th, 2001, transmitting issues to the Circuit Court, which specifically designated Mr. Renner as special administrator as defendant, this court holds that it implicitly granted Mr. Renner the authority to retain counsel for the defense of the caveat proceedings.

Consequently, this court shall deny the oral motion made by Mr. Barnes on behalf of his clients to dismiss the petitions for counsel fees filed by Mr. Renner and Mr. Rybczynski respectively on the grounds that the personal representatives then acting with the powers of a special administrator failed to file a petition for authority to retain counsel. (Emphasis supplied). The court then scheduled a further hearing on the merits of the fee petitions for March 11, 2005. On March 2, however, the appellants filed a Petition For the Transmission of [12] Issues of Fact to the Circuit Court.

The motion recited the pendency of the “petition for the award and allowance of attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs incurred in connection with or related to the caveat proceedings” and further represented that “certain issues of fact will need to be determined for this Court to enter a proper order under applicable law.” On April 6, 2005, the Orphans’ Court denied that Petition for the Transmission of Issues. On May 3, the appellants filed this appeal from both 1) the April 6, 2005 order, denying the Petition to Transmit Issues; and 2) the February 16, 2005 order, denying the motion to dismiss the fee petitions. ⁶⁵⁰ The Contentions Before Us For convenience in handling, we are reshaping the appellants’ three contentions into two. As reshaped, they are: 1. The Orphans’ Court erroneously, on February 16, 2005, denied the appellants’ motion to dismiss the two fee petitions because the respective special administrators had not obtained authorization from the Orphans’ Court to engage in litigation as required by Estates and Trusts Article, § 6-403. 2.

The Orphans’ Court erroneously, on April 6, 2005, denied the appellants’ request to transmit proposed issues to a circuit court jury for fact-finding. Reluctantly, because of the time and expense involved, we must dismiss the appeal, in both of its aspects, as not properly before us. The appeal from the February 16, 2005 order is not properly before us because it is premature. The appeal from the April 6, 2005, order is not properly before us because it attempts to challenge a non-appealable order.

I. The Appealability of the February 16 Order In assessing threshold appealability, we will look first at the contention based on the February 16, 2005 order in a vacuum. If we find that it is not immediately appealable in its own right, we will then turn to the question of whether it acquires some enhanced eligibility for immediate appeal because of its appellate traveling companion. A. A Plausible Argument, When Ripe Even as we are putting on hold the merits of the February 16 order denying the appellants’ motion to have the two fee petitions dismissed, we are not suggesting for a moment that the appellants have not raised a very plausible argument. It is apparently one of first impression in Maryland and is deserving of serious appellate consideration.

The argument is based on the statutory distinction in the Estates and Trusts Article between a personal representative and a special administrator. Although the linguistic distinction is frequently hon ⁶⁵¹ ored more in the breach than in the observance (and this case is a glaring example of such laxity), it may nonetheless be a distinction of critical importance in terms of the respective powers and authorities of the two functions. Title 6 deals with the position of a personal representative, generally and Title 7 spells out the duties and the authority of a personal representative. Subtitle 4 of Title 6 deals expressly with the closely related, but by no means identical, position of a special administrator. § 6-401(a) provides for the appointment of a special administrator.

Upon the filing of a petition by an interested party, a creditor, or the register, or upon the motion of the court, a special administrator may be appointed by the court whenever it is necessary to protect property prior to the appointment and qualification of a personal representative or upon the termination of appointment of a personal representative and prior to the appointment of a successor personal representative. (Emphasis supplied). Section 6-307 provides that, upon a request for judicial probate, the status and authority of a previously appointed personal representative is scaled back to the more limited one of a special administrator. That section provides, in pertinent part: (a) General. — (1) The appointment of a personal representative who has been appointed by administrative probate is terminated by a timely request for judicial probate.

(2) The validity of an act performed by the person as personal representative is not affected by this termination. (b) Interim powers. — Subject to an order in the proceeding for judicial probate, a personal representative appointed previously has the powers and duties of a special administrator until the appointment of a personal representative in the judicial probate proceeding. (Emphasis supplied). And see Garrick v. Henley, 44 Md.App. 124, 125-26 , 407 A.2d 765 (1979). ⁶⁵² The reason for the diminution of the agent’s authority is self-evident.

In the controversy-free environment of administrative probate, the personal representative and the heirs are presumptively one happy family, working toward a common goal. Governmental (judicial) supervision of the process can be relatively minimal, simply requiring that some basic rules be followed and that appropriate costs be paid. When the process downshifts into the more combatic mode of judicial probate, however, the supervisory reins are pulled far tighter. A caveat may pit one group of expectant beneficiaries against another, and the fear frequently arises that the administrator of the estate may be favoring one group against the other or even favoring his own interests against them both.

In an atmosphere thus rife with confrontation and the possibly hair-trigger outbreak of conflict, the Orphans’ Court understandably circumscribes the administrator’s discretionary authority and intervenes more actively. An erstwhile personal representative will be constrained to act with the more limited authority of a special administrator, or he may simply be replaced by a court-appointed special administrator. Carrick v. Henley, 44 Md.App. 124, 131 , 407 A.2d 765 (1979) (“[T]he request for judicial probate automatically terminated the administrative probate previously granted and no grounds for his removal were necessary.”). The legislative scheme of Titles 6 and 7 in combination makes very clear the difference between the powers of a personal representative and those of a special administrator.

Title 7, as we have mentioned, catalogues the duties and the powers of a personal representative. By contrast, § 6-403 confines the duties and powers of a special administrator to some, but not to all, of those entrusted to a personal representative. That section provides: A special administrator shall collect, manage, and preserve property and account to the personal representative upon his appointment. A special administrator shall assume all duties unperformed by a personal representative imposed under Subtitles 2, 3, and 5 of Title 7, and has all ⁶⁵³ powers necessary to collect, manage, and preserve property.

In addition, a special administrator has the other powers designated from time to time by court order. (Emphasis supplied). Significantly for the argument advanced by the appellants on February 16, the conferring of duties and powers on the special administrator is confined to those spelled out in Subtitles 2, 3, and 5 of Title 7 and does not include those conferred by Subtitle 4. The deliberate legislative omission of Subtitle 4 from the list of duties and powers conferred on a special administrator cannot be blithely ignored.

It is only by virtue of Subtitle 4, specifically by § 7-401(y), that a personal representative is expressly authorized to engage in litigation and implicitly to incur legal fees to that end. (y) Prosecute or defend, litigation. — He may prosecute, defend, or submit to arbitration actions, claims, or proceedings in any appropriate jurisdiction for the protection or benefit of the estate, including the commencement of a personal action which the decedent might have commenced or prosecuted. Not having been granted any such inherent power, a special administrator would presumably have to rely on the granting of “other powers designated from time to time by court order” pursuant to § 6-403. The thrust of the appellants’ argument is that Charles Kresslein, Jr., when he incurred legal fees for the defense of his incumbency as special administrator — at the April 7, 1998 hearing before the Orphans’ Court; in the abortive appeal of May 7, 1998 to the circuit court; and in the first appeal to this Court — was only empowered to act as Special Administrator and not as full-fledged Personal Representative.

The other application of the argument is that Thomas Renner, when he incurred legal fees in defending the ostensible Will of July 1, 1996 against the caveat, was only Special Administrator and not Personal Representative. The argument is that neither Charles Kresslein, Jr. nor Thomas Renner possessed the inherent authority under § 7-401(y) to “prosecute or defend ⁶⁵⁴ litigation” and that neither of them sought such authority from the Orphans’ Court pursuant to § 6-403. 12 B. What Is a Final Judgment From an Orphans’ Court? We are not suggesting that this is not a very cogent argument. Advance review by the Orphans’ Court of the decisions might have prevented the expenditure of excessive time and money on ancillary questions of little merit and with small chance of success.

When, however, the Orphans’ Court on February 16, 2005 denied the motion to dismiss that was based upon this argument, that denial of the motion was quintessential^ in the nature of an interlocutory order and not a final judgment. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-501 (a) squarely provides: A party may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from a final judgment of an orphans’ court. (Emphasis supplied). In Hall v. Coates, 62 Md.App. 252, 255-56 , 489 A.2d 41 (1985), Judge William Adkins thoroughly traced the legislative history of § 12-501 back to the 1973 code revision made by Ch. 2, Acts of 1973 (1st special session). 13 He further pointed out, with respect to the section’s earlier pedigree, that “the only changes [that were] made [were] in style,” and that the ⁶⁵⁵ new section “was not intended to alter prior substantive law in this area.” That language has been interpreted as providing “that the appeals shall be taken only from final orders or decisions [of orphans’ courts], those actually settling the rights of the parties.” 62 Md.App. at 255 , 489 A.2d 41 (emphasis and brackets in original).

In looking at the overall organizational framework of Title 12, dealing with “Appeals, Certiorari, and Certification of Questions,” Subtitle 1, consisting only of § 12-101, provides a list of five not always helpful definitions. 14 Subtitle 3 covers the “Review of Decisions of Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction.” Section 12-301 deals with the right to appeal from final judgments generally, § 12-302 deals with certain exceptions thereto, and § 12-303 permits appeals from a limited list of “certain interlocutory orders.” Subtitle 5 deals distinctly with the “Review of Decisions of Orphans’ Courts.” Section 12-501 covers an “Appeal to Court of Special Appeals” from a “final judgment of an orphans’ court,” and § 12-502 covers an “Appeal to circuit court” from a “final judgment of an orphans’ court.” Subtitle 5 does not even mention the subject of interlocutory orders. Just as Subtitle 3 and Subtitle 5 provide distinct requirements for appealability from decisions of 1) a court of general ⁶⁵⁶ jurisdiction and 2) an orphans’ court, their respective bodies of supporting caselaw provide radically different definitions of what is an appealable “final judgment.” The drawing of any analogy, therefore, between § 12-301 and § 12-501 is treacherous in the extreme, as is the citing of caselaw from the one body of law in the context of the other. In Hegmon v. Novak, 130 Md.App. 703 , 747 A.2d 772 (2000), Judge Sally Adkins referred to what has become § 12-501’s treatment of a final judgment as “this unusual definition of a ‘final judgment,’ ” 130 Md.App. at 709 , 747 A.2d 772 . She there highlighted the critical distinction between radically different definitions.

We would agree with appellant’s argument if the entena for a final judgment in the context of an appeal from an order transmitting issues from an orphans’ court were the same as that for other orders. The Court of Appeals has made clear, however, that it is not. “Finality” for purposes of an appeal from an orphans’ court transmittal of issues assumes a different meaning than any other final judgement. 130 Md.App. at 708-09 , 747 A.2d 772 (emphasis supplied). On the one hand, the definitive statement as to what is a “final judgment” in a court of general jurisdiction is that articulated by Judge Wilner (specially assigned) in Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767 (1989): If a ruling of the court is to constitute a final judgment it must have at least three attributes: (1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy, (2) unless the court properly acts pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b), it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties, and (3) the clerk must make a proper record of it in accordance with Md. Rule 2-601. With exceptions not relevant here, a ruling of a circuit court is not appealable unless it constitutes a final judgment.

To have the attribute of finality, the ruling must be so final as either to detennine and conclude the rights ⁶⁵⁷ involved or to deny the appellant the means of further prosecuting or defending his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied). By contrast, the standard definition of what is a “final judgment” from an orphans’ court is taken from Schlossberg v. Schlossberg, 275 Md. 600, 612 , 343 A.2d 234 (1975): [T]he “final judgment” of an Orphans’ Court are those judgments, orders, decisions, etc. which, in caveat proceedings, finally determine the proper parties, the issues to be tried and the sending of those issues to a court of law. [15] An earlier definition from Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Hanna, 159 Md. 452, 455 , 150 A. 870 (1930), had been: The order here appealed from determined the proper parties to the caveat proceeding, determined the issues to be tried, and directed that they be sent to a court of law. See also Hegmon v. Novak, 130 Md.App. at 709-10 , 747 A.2d 772 .

A representative list of “final judgments” within the contemplation of probate law, each example footnoted by its supporting caselaw, can be found at 1 Philip L. Sykes, Probate Law and Practice (1956), 16 § 243, pp. 251-52. ⁶⁵⁸ In general an appeal will lie from any decision of the Orphans’ Court which transcends its restricted powers and from its act done in contravention of a statute. It has been held that an appeal may be taken from an order appointing an administrator ad litem, from an order revoking the probate of a will, from an order revoking letters, from an order refusing to revoke letters, from an order dismissing a petition asking that the Court refuse to grant letters testamentary or of administration on the ground of the decedent’s non residence, from an order granting or refusing to grant issues, from the ratification of a separate administration account on an appeal by a co-executor and a distributee, from an order relating to the allowance of counsel fees, and from an order directing the mode of distribution of a decedent’s estate among his creditors. As is apparent at a glance, the two definitions of “final judgment” are not even in the same ballpark, and the careful practitioner should scrupulously confine each to its own unique arena. Upon reflection, moreover, the distinction between the two makes eminently good sense.

The litigation that produces a judgment in a court of general jurisdiction is, in its deepest ontological essence, adjudicative by its very nature. The final judgment of a court is the thing being sought from the outset of the action. It is the purpose of the litigants that the suit proceed to final judgment, and it is appropriate to let the appeal abide the final outcome of that litigation, so that all loose ends can be tied up in a single omnibus appeal. The administration of an estate, by contrast, is a very different phenomenon.

Ideally, as in administrative probate, there may be nothing that a judge need ever adjudicate. Even when the endeavor turns to judicial probate, moreover, the need for judicial adjudicative intervention is frequently intermittent and only on a very ad hoc basis. For much of its course, the process is allowed to go its own way outside the courtroom. Adjudication is sometimes an incident of the process, but it is by no means its generative purpose. ⁶⁵⁹ Because adjudicative decisions as to bits and pieces of the larger enterprise may be the only court judgments ever rendered, however, there is not the same expectation of an apocalyptic last judgment.

Appeals from some, though not from all, of the adjudicative decisions taken along the way may be necessary in this fundamentally different legal environment. The two arenas are simply not the same. Even by the more latitudinarian definition in the lexicon of probate law, however, it is clear that the Orphans’ Court’s decision to deny the appellants’ motion to dismiss the fee petitions was not a final judgment. Its effect was quintessentially interlocutory.

But for this appeal, the Orphans’ Court would have proceeded forthwith to conduct a hearing on the merits of the fee petitions. Once awards are made, or denied, those awards will, in the fullness of time, be appealed to us as proper final judgments. The argument the appellants now make on the merits of the fee petitions may be made at that time and will not in any way be compromised by intervening events. C. There Are Still Other Arrows in the Appellants’ Quiver The Orphans’ Court decision of February 16, 2005, moreover, was not fatal to the appellants’ challenge to the fee petitions.

That decision warded off only a single arrow in the enfilade of arguments the appellants will certainly be aiming at the fee petitions. Above and beyond any claim that the decisions of two successive special administrators to hire attorneys, without prior Orphans’ Court approval, were ultra vires, an attack on a fee petition is routinely two-tiered in two other respects. One may, of course, challenge a requested fee purely by the norms and standards of the legal workplace — the charge per billable hour, the number of billable hours, the quality of the work produced. This is the standard charge that the fee is excessive in amount.

The attack in such a case is focused more on the lawyer than on the client. ⁶⁶⁰ On the other hand, or in addition, there may be a challenge of a very different nature. It is a challenge that focuses on the client rather than on the lawyer. It may challenge both the judgment of the client and the motive of the client — particularly when the client is a personal representative or special administrator — in engaging a lawyer in the first place for certain litigational purposes. It is settled law that, although the decision to award a fee and the amount of the fee are in the discretion of the Orphans’ Court, an appeal may be taken from an abuse of that discretion.

Wright v. Nuttle, 267 Md. 698, 700-01 , 298 A.2d 389 (1973); Wolfe v. Turner, 267 Md. at 653, 299 A.2d 106 ; Lusby v. Nethken, 262 Md. 584, 586 , 278 A.2d 552 (1971). 2 Sykes, Probate Law and Practice, § 895, p. 54, makes mention of the two-tiered nature of the inquiry. The action of the Orphans’ Court in allowing fees may be reviewed on appeal; first, as to the authority to make such allowance in the particular case; second, as to the reasonableness of the fee allowed. (Emphasis supplied). The list of factors to be considered set out in Wolfe v. Turner, 267 Md. 646, 653 , 299 A.2d 106 (1973), seems to embrace both 1) the work of the attorney per se and also 2) the decision of the client to engage an attorney for certain tasks.

The principal elements to be considered in determining reasonableness are the amount involved, the character and extent of the services, the time employed, the importance of the question, the benefit to the estate and the customary charges made for similar services. (Emphasis supplied). See also Riddleberger v. Goeller, 263 Md. 44, 52-58 , 282 A.2d 101 (1971); American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee v. Eisenberg, 194 Md. 193, 200 , 70 A.2d 40 (1949). ⁶⁶¹ D. The Question Is Not So Much What Shall Be Paid, But Who Shall Pay? The consistent and unmistakable thrust of the appellants’ challenges to fees in this case has not been aimed primarily at the work product, quantitative or qualitative, produced by the respective law offices.

The attack, at times vigorous, has been upon 1) the decision of Special Administrator Charles Kres-slein, Jr., to engage counsel to defend his incumbency in that position; and 2) the decision of Special Administrator Thomas Renner to engage counsel to defend the purported Will of July 1, 1996 against caveat. On the other hand, the appellants do take serious exception to the legal bill of $81,000 for the defense against the caveat. That fee petition asked for an amount that represented almost one-third of the total value of the estate for the unsuccessful defense against caveat of the purported Will of July 1, 1996, that was ultimately declared to be “null and void.” As was stated by Wolfe v. Turner, 267 Md. at 658-59, 299 A.2d 106 , “[Tlhe appropriateness of a counsel fee cannot be determined by simple arithmetic. This is an area where adherence to standards, and not reliance on mere numbers, must be the controlling factor.” The primary thrust of the appellants’ argument, however, is not that the two law firms are not entitled to be paid, but that they are not entitled to be paid by the estate.

This question of who shall pay was the issue raised in Wright v. Nuttle, 267 Md. 698, 699 , 298 A.2d 389 (1973): [N]either the reasonableness of the hourly rate nor the amount of the charge is directly questioned. Rather, the question is, shall the charge be paid entirely by the estate or partly or wholly by the residuary legatee? (Emphasis supplied). In Riddleberger v. Goeller, 263 Md. at 58 , 282 A.2d 101 , the Court of Appeals explained that the appellee in that case confuses the difference between the fee which may be allowable from an estate with the total compensation which may well be due counsel for his services rendered, since the ⁶⁶² allowance of a fee in an estate in no way precludes counsel from charging a fee to the personal representative.

(Emphasis supplied). See also Wolfe v. Turner, 267 Md. at 658, 299 A.2d 106 ; American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee v. Eisenberg, 194 Md. at 202 , 70 A.2d 40 . When this question of the fee petitions is finally before the Orphans’ Court for consideration, that court will be facing a multi-layered bundle of intertwined and overlapping issues. There are two distinct petitions for the payment of legal fees to two different law firms.

The first petition was submitted by the lawyers themselves, pursuant to Estates and Trusts Article, § 7-602. The second petition was submitted by the Special Administrator of the estate, also pursuant to § 7-602. The first petition is for legal services that were engaged by Charles Kresslein Jr., who was also a legatee under the Will that he had prepared and submitted for probate. The second petition is for legal services that were engaged by Thomas Renner, who was an independent appointee of the Orphans’ Court.

The first petition is for legal services, rendered in defending the incumbency of Mr. Kresslein as Special Administrator. The second petition is significantly, but not entirely, for legal services rendered in defending the purported July 1, 1996 Will against caveat. Mr. Renner had been directed to defend against the caveat by the Orphans’ Court. The sets of circumstances are both sufficiently distinct and sufficiently complex to preclude any simplistic resolution of the exceptions to the petitions.

Because the attack in both cases will, inter alia, be upon the judgments and/or the motives of the Special Administrators in engaging counsel 1) to defend the Kresslein incumbency and 2) to defend the purported Will of July 1, 1996 against caveat, § 7-603 may become involved. It provides: When a personal representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes a proceeding in good faith and with just cause, he shall be entitled to ⁶⁶³ receive his necessary expenses and disbursements from the estate regardless of the outcome of the proceedings. (Emphasis supplied). Battle may be joined, of course, over both 1) good faith and 2) just cause.

At such hearing, all interested parties will be permitted the full opportunity to argue and to offer evidence on the reasonableness of the fee petitions. Geesey v. Geesey, 94 Md. 371, 374 , 51 A. 36 (1902); Miller v. Gehr, 91 Md. 709, 715 , 47 A. 1032 (1900). Heavily involved in any resolution on the merits will be a close examination of Piper Rudnick LLP v. Hartz, 386 Md. 201 , 872 A.2d 58 (2005); Fields v. Mersack, 83 Md.App. 649 , 577 A.2d 376 (1990); and National Wildlife Federation v. Foster, 83 Md.App. 484 , 575 A.2d 776 (1990). In National Wildlife Federation v. Foster, this Court was, to be sure, considering the reasonableness of a personal representative’s request for interim attorney’s fees, a subject slightly different, at least in terms of tense, from that now before us.

The opinion nonetheless offers guidance as to how to measure the “good faith” and “just cause” required of a personal representative by § 7-603. When it comes to the question of whether the representative of an estate acted with “good faith” and “just cause” in undertaking to prosecute or defend a particular action, the likelihood of success will have a significant bearing on that issue. Whether actually looking forward[ as in the National Wildlife case, or hypothetically looking forward, as in the case at hand, the Orphans’ Court must attempt to assess the likelihood that a legal action will succeed, because that tactical assessment is strong evidence of the representative’s good faith and just cause in pursuing the action. The first, and most important, factor is whether there is prima facie evidence that the personal representative will succeed on the merits and thus is defending or prosecuting the underlying action in good faith and with just cause.

Like the judge in an interlocutory injunction hearing, the ⁶⁶⁴ orphans’ court must attempt to predict the outcome of the trial on the merits. 88 Md.App. at 497, 575 A.2d 776 (emphasis supplied). Judge Alpert’s opinion went on to explain why pursuing litigation with little chance of success is evidence, albeit not per se conclusive evidence, of bad faith and the absence of just cause. [W]e are mindful of the harm that could result if a personal representative is permitted to use the estate’s assets to defend or prosecute a claim in bad faith and without just cause. Not only might the estate be dissipated and the legatees unable to recover the money paid in attorneys’ fees from the personal representative at the conclusion of the underlying litigation, but such meritless litigation also causes an unnecessary drain on the judicial system. 83 Md.App. at 498, 575 A.2d 776 (emphasis supplied). There are echoes of the present case in Fields v. Mersack, supra, 83 Md.App. 649 , 577 A.2d 376 , a case that considered whether a personal representative who hired an attorney to defend a caveat had acted, pursuant to § 7-603, in good faith and with just cause.

The wife of the deceased in that case was both the personal representative and the sole beneficiary under a will. The will was successfully caveated by the personal representative’s step-daughter. A jury found that the will had been procured by undue influence. The personal representative subsequently filed a petition for counsel fees incurred in defending against the caveat.

The step-daughter successfully excepted to the payment of such a fee, and the personal representative appealed. Writing for this Court, Judge Bell (now chief Judge of the Court of Appeals) quoted § 7-603 and then set out the opinion’s major premise. The plain language of the statute makes clear, and the parties agree, that a personal representative may not receive “necessary expenses and disbursements from the es ⁶⁶⁵ tate” unless he or she “defends or prosecutes a proceeding in good faith and with just cause.” 83 Md.App. at 654, 577 A.2d 376 (emphasis supplied). After concluding that the personal representative had, indeed, been the wielder of the undue influence, this Court had to consider the impact of the undue influence finding on the issue of good faith and just cause.

Implicit in appellant’s position is that a jury finding of undue influence does not preclude, as a matter of law, payment of a personal representative’s expenses out of the estate. Appellee’s position is explicit in its assertion that such a finding does preclude, as a matter of law, payment of such expenses from the estate. No Maryland court has had an occasion to address this point. 83 Md.App. at 656, 577 A.2d 376 . Surveying the caselaw from around the country, Judge Bell found that two basic approaches are employed.

The discretionary approach permits an orphans’ court to find such a connection on a case-by-case basis. The per se approach concludes that such a connection exists as a matter of law. We opted for the discretionary rule. The fundamental difference between these lines of cases is that, in the latter, a per se rule is enunciated, while in the former a discretionary rule is explicated.

We are persuaded that the discretionary rule is the better ruis. 83 Md.App. at 658, 577 A.2d 376 (emphasis supplied). Although the present case is not on all fours with Fields v. Mersack, the import of that opinion is that the Orphans’ Court, when determining whether Mr. Kresslein acted in good faith and with just cause in engaging counsel to defend his incumbency as special administrator, may consider, as part of “the totality of circumstances,” such things as its own findings of April 9, 1998, and the findings of the circuit court jury of June 24, 2004. [A] trial judge presented with a petition for costs and attorney’s fees filed by a personal representative, whom a ⁶⁶⁶ jury has found has exerted undue influence on the decedent, must determine, nevertheless, whether the personal representative acted in good faith and with just cause in defending the will. That determination must be made in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the jury’s finding, and by weighing all the evidence. The trial judge may not import bad faith from the jury’s finding alone. 83 Md.App. at 659-60, 577 A.2d 376 (emphasis supplied).

E. Section 7-602 and § 7-603 Distinguished The scholarly and painstakingly thorough opinion of Judge Raker in Piper Rudnick v. Hartz draws a careful line between § 7-602 and § 7-603. Section 7-602 requires that the legal services, to be reimbursable from the estate, shall have been rendered “for the protection or benefit of the estate,” 17 whereas § 7-603 “requires only that the personal representative acted ‘in good faith and with just cause.’ ” 18 386 Md. at 217 , 872 A.2d 58 . In tracing at length the legislative histories of the two sections, the opinion makes it clear that § 7-602 focuses primarily on the attorney and the legal fees, whereas § 7-603 “covers a personal representative’s expenses in defending or prosecuting a proceeding.” 386 Md. at 223 , 872 A.2d 58 . There is a decided overlap, but the respective centers of gravity are not the same.

The two fee petitions in this case were submitted pursuant to § 7-602. Judge Raker’s opinion then carefully pointed out that its analysis was only with respect to § 7-603 and not with respect to § 7-602. As the courts below ruled based on § 7-603, we first consider whether Goldman met the requirements of § 7- ⁶⁶⁷ 603. Since we conclude that Goldman is entitled to receive his expenses and disbursements from the estate, we need not consider whether Piper Rudnick should have been reimbursed under § 7-602. 386 Md. at 217 n. 7, 872 A.2d 58 (emphasis supplied).

In Piper Rudnick, a personal representative who successfully defended against an attempt to have him removed from that office was entitled, under § 7-603, to be reimbursed for legal fees expended in that successful effort. 19 Although doing so only in the context of distinguishing § 7-603 from § 7-602, Judge Raker, 386 Md. at 224-28, 872 A.2d 58, thoroughly traced the history, beginning in the early 1900’s, of the “benefit to the estates” requirement. Although not a part of § 7-603, the “benefit to the estate” requirement is firmly embedded in § 7-602. This conception that a “benefit to the estate” was required from the statutory use of “legal services rendered” endured through the 1969 revision of Article 93 in § 7-602 — but not in § 7-603. ... Contrary to § 7-602, § 7-603 does not contain a “legal service rendered ... to an estate” clause, and no decision of this Court has held that the “benefit to the estate” rule was carried over to § 7-603. 386 Md. at 227-28 , 872 A.2d 58 (emphasis supplied).

The Piper Rudnick opinion also spelled out several procedural and evidentiary incidents that, we conclude, would apply to the consideration of the “benefit to the estate” requirement under § 7-602 as surely as Piper Rudnick held them to apply to the “good faith and just cause” requirement under § 7-603. One of them allocates the burden of proof. ⁶⁶⁸ It is the personal representative’s burden to establish good faith and just cause. 386 Md. at 229 , 872 A.2d 58 . Another points out that these are factual questions affecting the award of attorneys’ fees that are to be determined by the Orphans’ Court. The existence of good faith and just cause is a question of fact to be determined by the orphans’ court based upon all of the evidence. 386 Md. at 229-30 , 872 A.2d 58 (emphasis supplied).

The third is that the legal outcome of the proceeding that led to the incurring of the legal fees is not per se dispositive of