Barbre v. Pope

BATTAGLIA, J. This case arises under the one year notice provision of the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Section 12-106(b)(1) of the State Government Article, Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.). 1 We have been asked to determine whether the year notice provision is satisfied when a plaintiff timely delivers notice to a County Commissioner. We also have been asked to determine whether the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) notice provision applies to claims against an individual otherwise covered under the Act’s strictures, if the civil complaint, thereafter filed, alleges malice or gross negligence. Two petitions for certiorari, both seeking review of the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, were filed in this case. The first, filed by Deputy Sheriff Mark Barbre, who was one of the defendants below, posed the following questions: 1) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that MTCA’s mandatory notice requirement can be circumvented merely by alleging the existence of “malice or gross negligence” in a pleading filed years after an alleged injury? 2) Does allowing the MTCA’s notice requirement to be circumvented simply by alleging that State personnel acted with malice or gross negligence violate one of the essential ¹⁶² purposes of the Act by depriving the State of the opportunity for a relatively contemporaneous investigation? 3) Did the Legislature intend that the MTCA’s mandatory notice provision should be susceptible to the “pleader’s pen”?

Two questions were posed by Andrew Pope, III, the plaintiff below: 1) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that Pope’s Notice of Claim to Queen Anne’s County did not substantially comply with § 12-106 of the Maryland Tort Claims Act? 2) Is a Trial Court’s granting of a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs timely filed Second Amended Complaint improper when the moving party is not prejudiced by Plaintiffs filing, having previously tendered its written defense to claims of the amended pleadings? 2 We hold that Pope’s notice delivered to the Queen Anne’s County Commissioner did not expressly, nor substantially, comply with the MTCA. We conclude, however, that the allegations of Pope’s complaints were sufficient to allege malice or gross negligence to preclude summary judgment under the MTCA on behalf of Barbre. I. Introduction As alleged in the various complaints filed in the instant matter, on March 17, 2004, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Mark Barbre of the Queen Anne’s County ¹⁶³ Sheriffs Office attempted to stop a truck driven by Andrew Pope, III. When Pope did not stop, Barbre followed him to Pope’s home, whereupon Pope got out of his vehicle and raised his hands in surrender.

At that point, Barbre approached Pope with his gun drawn and fired a single shot, striking Pope in the neck. Five months later, on August 12, 2004, Pope’s attorney sent Benjamin F. Cassell, Jr., a Queen Anne’s County Commissioner, a certified letter, which was to “constitute the requisite 180-day notice under the Local Government Tort Claims Act.” 3 The letter, which was copied to the Queen Anne’s County Attorney, advised that it “will be followed by a law suit against Queen Anne’s County alleging that Deputy Barbre acted with malice when he shot my client.” Pope did file a lawsuit on April 19, 2005 in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, naming Barbre, both in his official capacity and in his individual capacity, 4 and Queen Anne’s County as defendants. In the “Facts” portion of the Complaint, Pope stated in relevant part: 12. On or about March 17, 2004, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Defendant Sheriff Barbre attempted to stop a truck driven by Plaintiff Pope in Grasonville, Queen Anne’s County, Maryland. ¹⁶⁴ 13.

As Plaintiff Pope continued driving his truck vehicle [sic] home, Defendant Sheriff Barbre followed Plaintiff Pope’s vehicle into the driveway of Plaintiffs home. When Plaintiff Pope got out of the vehicle, raising his hands in surrender, Defendant Sheriffs Deputy Barbre approached him with his gun drawn and shot Plaintiff Pope in the neck. 14. At no time during the events described above was Plaintiff Pope intoxicated, incapacitated, a threat to the safety of himself or others, or disorderly. 15. Defendant Barbre had no warrant for the arrest of the Plaintiff and no legal cause or excuse to use excessive force against Plaintiff Pope or shoot Plaintiff in the neck.

In Count I, Pope alleged violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by Barbre: 19. The shooting by Sheriff Barbre was entirely unjustified, was done intentionally, wantonly, recklessly, with gross negligence, malice and with complete indifference for Andrew Pope’s rights and as a result was an unreasonable and excessive use of deadly force. These actions by Defendant Barbre deprived Mr. Pope of his clearly established rights under the Maryland Declaration of Rights to be: (a) free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force; and (b) free from the depravation of life and liberty without due process of law. 20. While acting under color of law and pursuant to his authority in his capacity as a Queen Anne’s County Sheriffs Deputy, Deputy Sheriff Barbre shot Mr. Pope.

Defendant Barbre failed to carry out proper Sheriffs procedures and protocol, failed to promulgate or enact appropriate Sheriffs procedure or protocol, failed to take reasonable actions to protect Mr. Pope and failed to control his actions in violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to be (a) free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force; and (b) from the depravation of life and liberty without due process of law. Defendant Sheriff Barbre had actual knowledge, or in the reasonable and diligent exercise of his duties should have known that he was violating Mr. Pope’s clearly estab ¹⁶⁵ lished constitutional rights to be free from such deprivations. 22. Plaintiff Pope claims damages against Defendant Sheriff Barbre for the injuries set forth above for violation of his constitutional rights under color of law under the Maryland Declaration of Rights, in particular, Articles 24 and 26. In Count II, Pope also alleged battery with respect to Barbre.

Count III alleged violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by Queen Anne’s County. Barbre and the County, collectively, filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. In essence, the County argued that Barbre was covered by the immunity and non-liability provisions of the MTCA rather than the Local Government Tort Claims Act, such that the County should not have been a defendant. Barbre contended that because he was covered by the immunity and non-liability provisions of the MTCA, Pope had to provide written notice under the Act to the State Treasurer or a designee of the State Treasurer within one year of the injury, and because he failed to do so, Pope could not pursue a MTCA claim against him. 5 Pope filed an opposition to the Defendants’ motion, arguing that even assuming that Barbre were considered “state personnel” and therefore covered under the immunity and non-liability provisions of the MTCA, “the notice provisions of the MTCA are not a condition precedent to bringing an action against an individual State employee.” Even if he were required to provide notice under the MTCA in order to recover against the State, Pope also contended that he complied with ¹⁶⁶ the notice provision because the State had had notice of the incident as a result of an investigation undertaken by the State Police and the State’s Attorney for Queen Anne’s County.

Additionally, Pope argued that the notice to a County Commissioner complied with the MTCA because the County was providing defense counsel for Pope under the Local Government Insurance Trust, 6 and because the County would be ultimately responsible for the payment of any claim pursuant to Section 9-108 of the State Finance and Procurement Article. 7 Pope also filed his First Amended Complaint, omitting the County as a defendant and only pursing his claims against Barbre, both in his official capacity and in his individual capacity, stating the same factual averments. In Count I, Pope again alleged violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by Barbre; and in Count II, Pope again alleged battery with respect to Barbre. Barbre then moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, or alternatively, for summary judgment, arguing that because Pope failed to comply with the MTCA notice statute, ¹⁶⁷ the complaint should be dismissed. Subsequently, Pope amended his complaint for a second time, asserting claims not only against Barbre, both in his official capacity and in his individual capacity, but against the County and the State.

In Counts I, IV and V, Pope added that Barbre, Queen Anne’s County, and the State violated Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, in addition to Articles 24 and 26. In Counts II and III, Pope alleged battery with respect to Barbre. Barbre, the County, and the State moved to strike the Second Amended Complaint. Barbre argued that the amended pleading should be stricken because of the prejudice he experienced because of Pope’s “dilatory tactics” in filing another amended complaint “just days away” from the motions hearing regarding the First Amended Complaint.

Barbre also asserted, as did the State, that because Pope failed to notify the State Treasurer of his claim within one year of the date of injury to come within the MTCA, Pope’s Second Amended Complaint should be stricken. The circuit court resolved all outstanding motions by granting the motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint, thereby removing the State and the County as defendants, and by granting summary judgment in favor of Barbre as to all claims asserted in the First Amended Complaint. Pope filed a motion to alter or amend the judgments, essentially asking the court to reverse itself, which it refused to do. Thereafter, Pope noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the circuit court had erred in granting the motion for summary judgment.

Pope contended that he expressly complied with the MTCA notice statute when he delivered notice to a Queen Anne’s County Commissioner. Pope also suggested that he substantially complied with the MTCA because he supplemented his notice to the State Treasurer on May 13, 2005, and thus the State was not prejudiced by the delay because the State had had notice of the incident as a result of an investigation undertaken by the State Police and the State’s Attorney for Queen Anne’s County. Addition ¹⁶⁸ ally, Pope contended that the purpose of the notice statute was satisfied because the County was the real party in interest because it was providing defense counsel for Pope under the Local Government Insurance Trust and would be ultimately responsible for the payment of any claim pursuant to Section 9-108 of the State Finance and Procurement Article. Additionally, Pope asserted that the circuit court erred in striking his Second Amended Complaint because neither Barbre, nor the State, nor the County demonstrated that they had suffered any prejudice.

The intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgments entered in favor of the State and Queen Anne’s County and vacated the judgment entered in favor of Barbre. Pope v. Barbre, 172 Md.App. 391 , 915 A.2d 448 (2007). The court rejected Pope’s argument that because he notified a Queen Anne’s County Commissioner, he complied with the MTCA notice requirement: To dispose of Pope’s contention that a county commissioner may serve as the State Treasurer’s “unofficial designee,” we need look no farther than the State Treasurer’s Office itself. By duly promulgated regulation, it has explicitly spelled out who is—and who is not—a “Treasurer’s designee” for purposes of accepting notice of tort claims under the MTCA.

County commissioners are not on the Treasurer’s short list of two designees (i.e., the Chief Deputy Treasurer and the Director of the Insurance Division of the State Treasurer’s Office), both of whom work within the State Treasurer’s Office. See COMAR 25.02.01.02.B(7)(a). 8 To prevent any misunderstanding, the regulation unequivocally states that “ ‘Treasurer’s designee’ does not mean or include any other person[.]” See COMAR 25.02.01.02.B(7)(b). Consequently, county commissioners do not qualify as a Treasurer’s designee for MTCA notice purposes. ¹⁶⁹ Id. at 401-02 , 915 A.2d at 454-55 (alteration in opinion). The court also rejected Pope’s contention that he substantially complied with the MTCA notice requirement, even though Queen Anne’s County was ultimately responsible for paying any judgment entered against the State in the case: The clear language of the MTCA controls our conclusion that such notice does not satisfy the statutory requirement of notice to the State Treasurer or designee.

We recognize that there is equitable appeal to Pope’s contention that this case is unlike any other “substantial compliance” case, in that the County, which was the recipient of the timely notice, is precisely the entity that will bear ultimate financial responsibility for any judgment entered against the State under the MTCA. Thus, the ultimate payor was in a position to do financial planning necessary in connection with the claim. Moreover, although the State might have to “front” the money to pay the County, there is a fool-proof mechanism for State recovery of that money from Queen Anne’s County through the funding withholding provisions of SFP section 9-108(c). Also, the County likely stood in a good position to investigate the claim while memories were fresh, because a County deputy sheriff committed the alleged misconduct.

With a claimant who may have suffered serious injury from wrongful acts of a law enforcement officer, it is somewhat tempting to let him have his day in court. To do so, however, would be to improperly substitute these alternate policy considerations, for the judgment of the legislature enunciated in SG section 12-106(b). See Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 227 , 592 A.2d 1090 (1991) (“ ‘A court is not wholly free to rewrite a statute merely because of some judicial notion of legislative purpose’ ”) (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987)). Id. at 406-08, 915 A.2d at 457-58 .

Additionally, the court concluded that the circuit court did not err in striking Pope’s Second Amended Complaint, there ¹⁷⁰ by removing the State and the County from the case. As to the claims against the State and the County, the court stated that “Pope concede[d] that he ha[d] no claim against the County,” and “[a]ny error in striking that complaint [with regard to the claims against the State] was harmless given that lack of compliance with the notice requirements of the MTCA was apparent on the face of the complaint.” Id. at 410 , 915 A.2d at 460 . For the claims asserted against Barbre, the court noted that they were “substantially similar to those Pope asserted against Barbre in his first amended complaint,” and thus, he was not prejudiced by the decision to strike the Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 410-11 , 915 A.2d at 460 .

The intermediate appellate court, in Pope’s favor, however, determined that the MTCA statute did not apply to the claims asserted against Barbre individually because Pope had alleged that Barbre acted with “malice or gross negligence,” and in doing so, permitted the claims against Barbre to proceed: In sum, when the claimant alleges simple negligence ..., section 12-105 immunity bars suit against the individual deputy sheriff. The claimant’s sole remedy in that case would be against the State, but any such relief is precluded by the claimant’s failure to give the State notice under SG section 12-106(b). When, as in this case, the claimant pursues tort remedies against an individual classified as State personnel, based on acts allegedly committed with malice or gross negligence, a requirement of notice to the State would not serve the investigation and settlement purposes underlying section 12—106(b). Nor would notice to individual State personnel serve such purposes.

Thus, the State Treasurer does not require early notice of a claim against an individual officer alleging a malicious or grossly negligent tort. Id. at 414 , 172 Md.App. 415 , 915 A.2d 462 . Barbre and Pope both filed petitions for writs of certiorari, which we granted. Barbre v. Pope, 399 Md. 32 , 922 A.2d 573 (2007).

Barbre challenges the Court of Special Appeals’ holding that Pope could pursue his claims against him individually ¹⁷¹ without complying with the MTCA notice statute; Pope challenges the Court of Special Appeals’ decisions that he did not comply with the MTCA notice statute in order to proceed against the State and that the circuit court correctly struck his Second Amended Complaint. We shall hold that Pope’s notice to a Queen Anne’s County Commissioner did not expressly or substantially comply with the MTCA notice statute. We also hold, however, that the allegations of Pope’s complaints were sufficient to allege malice or gross negligence to preclude summary judgment under the MTCA on behalf of Barbre individually.

II

Discussion The entry of summary judgment is governed by Maryland Rule 2-501(e), which provides in pertinent part: Entry of judgment. The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We explicated the standard of review for the entry of summary judgment in Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373 , 863 A.2d 952 (2004), stating: This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 110 , 854 A.2d 1191, 1196 (2004); Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 154 , 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 359 , 800 A.2d 707, 721 (2002); Schmerling v. Injured Workers’ Ins.

Fund, 368 Md. 434, 443 , 795 A.2d 715, 720 (2002); see Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 210 , 783 A.2d 194, 199 (2001). In so doing, we must determine, initially, whether a dispute of material fact exists. Md. Rule 2-501(e) (2002); see O’Connor, 382 Md. at 110-11 , 854 A.2d at 1196 ; Todd, 373 Md. at 154 , 816 A.2d at 933 ; Beyer, 369 Md. at 359-60 , 800 A.2d at 721 ; Schmerling, 368 Md. at 443 , 795 A.2d at 720 ; Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227 , 783 A.2d 206, 209 (2001). “ ‘A material fact is ¹⁷² a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.’ ” Todd, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d at 933 (quoting Matthews v. Howell, 359 Md. 152, 161 , 753 A.2d 69, 73 (2000)).

The facts properly before the court as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. O’Connor, 382 Md. at 111 , 854 A.2d at 1196 ; Todd, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d at 933 ; Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 178 , 757 A.2d 118, 127 (2000). If the record reveals that a material fact is in dispute, summary judgment is not appropriate. O’Connor, 382 Md. at 111 , 854 A.2d at 1196 ; Todd, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d at 933 ; Okwa, 360 Md. at 178 , 757 A.2d at 127 .

If no material facts are disputed, however, then we must determine whether the Circuit Court correctly granted summary judgment as a matter of law. See Md. Rule 2-501 (e); O’Connor, 382 Md. at 111 , 854 A.2d at 1197 ; Todd, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d at 933 ; Beyer, 369 Md. at 360 , 800 A.2d at 721 ; Schmerling, 368 Md. at 443 , 795 A.2d at 720 . Serio, 384 Md. at 388-89 , 863 A.2d at 961 . In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always “to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.” Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419-20 , 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007); Gen.

Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352 , 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that “ ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ” Kelly, 397 Md. at 420 , 918 A.2d at 482 ; Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s County, 390 Md. 145, 167 , 887 A.2d 1060, 1073 (2005). Further, whenever possible, an interpretation should be given to the statutory provisions which does not lead to absurd consequences. See Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 53 , 912 A.2d 658, 673 (2006); So.

Easton Neighborhood Assoc. v. Town of Easton, 387 Md. 468, 495 , 876 A.2d 58, 74 (2005); ¹⁷³ Smack v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305 , 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003) (“[T]he statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, ‘not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense.’ ”). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. Kelly, 397 Md. at 419 , 918 A.2d at 482 ; City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427 , 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604-05 , 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004). If however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose.

Kelly, 397 Md. at 419-20 , 918 A.2d at 482 ; Mayor & Town Council of Oakland v. Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316 , 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006); Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Division Phase III, 391 Md. 374, 403 , 893 A.2d 1067, 1084 (2006). A. The Maryland Tort Claims Act—Barbre and the State Under the MTCA, Barbre, as a Deputy Sheriff of Queen Anne’s County, is classified as “state personnel.” Section 12-101(a)(6) of the MTCA specifically provides that “State personnel” means ... a sheriff or deputy sheriff of a county or Baltimore City.... Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Section 12-101(a)(6) of the State Government Article. 9 The MTCA was enacted in 1981 as a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity for tortious acts or omissions committed within the scope of the public duties of “state personnel,” and committed without malice or gross negligence. See Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 448 , 545 A.2d 1312, 1314 (1988).

Under the immunity and non-liability provisions of the MTCA, “state personnel” are immune from suit and from liability in tort for acts or omissions committed within the scope of their public duties and ¹⁷⁴ without malice or gross negligence, and when the State waives its immunity pursuant to the MTCA. Section 12-105 of the State Government Article, Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.), 10 governing the liability of state personnel, states in relevant part: State personnel shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), 11 provides in part: State personnel, as defined in § 12-101 of the State Government Article, are immune from suit in courts of the State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the State or its units have waived immunity under Title 12, Subtitle 1 of the State Government Article, even if the damages exceed the limits of that waiver.

Section 12-104(a)-(b) of the State Government Article, Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.), 12 governs the State’s waiver of immunity as to a tort action: (a) (1) Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State____ (b) Immunity is not waived under this section as described under § 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. ¹⁷⁵ Section 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 2002 RepLVol.), 13 provides in part: (а) Immunity of the State is not waived under § 12-104 of the State Government Article for: (4) Any tortious act or omission of State personnel that: (i) Is not within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel; or (ii) Is made with malice or gross negligence.... As a result, the State does not waive its sovereign immunity for any tortious acts outside the scope of employment or when a “state personnel” acts with malice or gross negligence. See e.g., Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 267-70 , 863 A.2d 297, 310-12 (2004), and cases cited therein, including Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247 , 587 A.2d 467 (1991). See also Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285, 296 , 587 A.2d 485, 491 (1991) (holding that under the Local Government Tort Claims Act, local government employees are not shielded from liability for tortious acts committed outside the scope of employment).

Notice under the MTCA plays an integral part, however, in the invocation of waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity. As originally enacted, the MTCA required claimants, prior to filing suit, to submit a claim to the State Treasurer; no specific time period was provided. Maryland Code (1974,1980 RepLVol., 1983 Supp.), Section 5-406 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In 1985, see 1985 Maryland Laws, Chapter 538, the General Assembly amended the notice requirement, and provided that, in any case a claimant must submit a “written claim to the Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within 180 days after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim.” Maryland Code (1984, 1985 Supp.), Section 12-106(b)(l) of the State Govern ¹⁷⁶ ment Article.

The Legislature amended the notice provision again in 1995, see 1995 Maryland Laws, Chapter 437, to require a plaintiff to file notice of a claim with the State Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within one year after the injury: (b) Claim and denial required.—A claimant may not institute an action under this subtitle unless: (1) the claimant submits a written claim to the Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within 1 year after the injury to person or property that is the basis for the claim.... Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Section 12-106(b)(l) of the State Government Article (emphasis added). 14 In order to comply with the MTCA, a plaintiff must serve written notice upon the State Treasurer, or a designee of the State Treasurer, within one year following the injury. Pursuant to Section 12—106(b)(1) of the MTCA, which states that written notice must be submitted to the State Treasurer “or a designee of the Treasurer,” Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl. Vol), Section 12-106(b)(l) of the State Government Article, the Office of the State Treasurer has promulgated interpretive regulations defining those designees.

COMAR 25.02.01.02B(7) states: (7) Treasurer’s Designee. (a) “Treasurer’s designee” means only the: (i) Chief Deputy Treasurer; or (ii) Director of the Insurance Division of the State Treasurer’s Office. (b) “Treasurer’s designee” does not mean or include any other person, including, but not limited to: (i) An officer or employee of State government other than those persons identified in (§ ) B(7)(a), above; ¹⁷⁷ (ii) The Comptroller of the Treasury, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of State; or (iii) A commercial insurer, adjuster, claims administrator, or similar person who provides services to the Treasurer as an independent contractor. Clearly, under the regulation, notice to a designee of the State Treasurer only embraces that given to the Chief Deputy Treasurer or the Director of the Insurance Division of the State Treasurer’s Office.

Pope expressly failed to meet the notice requirements of the MTCA when he only provided written notice to the State Treasurer on May 13, 2005, fourteen months after the injury, not within the one year time period prescribed by the MTCA. See also Sawyer, 322 Md. at 257-58 , 587 A.2d at 471-72 (plaintiff failed to give any notice to the State under the MTCA, which precluded suit against both the State and the State Police). 15 Pope argues that his notice to a County Commissioner within the one year period substantially complied with the MTCA because he supplemented his notice to the State Treasurer on May 13, 2005, 16 and the State was not prejudiced by the delay because the State had had notice of the incident as a result of an investigation undertaken by the State Police and the State’s Attorney for Queen Anne’s County, citing Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284 , 808 A.2d 1262 (2002); Moore v. Norouzi, ¹⁷⁸ 371 Md. 154 , 807 A.2d 632 (2002); and Conaway v. State, 90 Md.App. 234 , 600 A.2d 1133 (1992). Pope’s relies upon Faulk, 371 Md. at 284 , 808 A.2d at 1262 , and Moore, 371 Md. at 154 , 807 A.2d at 632 , both Local Government Tort Claim Act cases, to support his proposition that a claimant can substantially comply with the MTCA. The Local Government Tort Claims Act, however, by its express terms, permits judicial consideration of a claim about which the required notice was not given, when the plaintiff can show good cause, unless the defendant can affirmatively show prejudice: [A]n action for unliquidated damages may not be brought against a local government or its employees unless the notice of the claim required by this section is given within 180 days after the injury. $ % ❖ sK (d) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, unless the defendant can affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced by lack of required notice, upon motion and for good cause shown the court may entertain the suit even though the required notice was not given.

Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Section 5-304(b), (d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 17 See Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 140-45 , 872 A.2d 1, 22-25 (2005). Pope’s one MTCA case, Conaway, 90 Md.App. at 234 , 600 A.2d at 1133 , was decided by the Court of Special Appeals before our decision in Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285 , 628 A.2d 162 (1993). In Johnson , on facts remarkably similar to this case, the plaintiffs failed to provide notice, but asserted that the State was not prejudiced and had ¹⁷⁹ created several reports about the accident. In language equally applicable here, we said: The facts relied on by the plaintiffs might show that the State suffered no prejudice as a result of the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the administrative claim requirement.

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs’ argument confuses “substantial compliance” with “lack of prejudice.”