Barker v. Warden of Maryland House of Correction

Bruñe, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Raymond E. Barker was tried and convicted on October 22, 1954, before Judge Niles in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on the charge of larceny. The amounts of money mentioned in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus make it clear that the offense constituted a felony. (Code (1951), Article 27, Section 405, as amended by Acts of 1952, Chapter 18.) His petition for a writ was filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, and was denied by Chief Judge Prescott.

He applied for leave to appeal from the order denying the writ. The applicant complains: (1) of an alleged illegal search and seizure; (2) that the presiding Judge was prejudiced; (3) that leniency was granted his co-defendant in return for a plea of guilty on the lesser charge against them; (4) that he was denied a severance; and (5) that his counsel would not permit him to testify. 1. Search and Seizure. An allegedly unlawful search and seizure may not be reviewed on habeas corpus.

Barr v. Warden, 200 Md. 657 , 90 A. 2d 216 ; Bowen v. Warden, 200 Md. 661 , 90 A. 2d 174 ; Baker v. Warden, 200 Md. 653 , ⁶⁶⁵ 89 A. 2d 307 ; Presley v. Warden, 201 Md. 660 , 92 A. 2d 754 ; Superintendent v. Calman, 203 Md. 414 , 101 A. 2d 207 . Since the offense in this case was a felony, the Bouse Act (Code (1951), Article 35, Section 5) was not applicable and evidence, even though obtained by an unlawful search, was admissible. Salsburg v. State, 201 Md. 212 , 94 A. 2d 280 , affirmed, sub nom. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 . 2.

Alleged Prejudice. Any matters of alleged prejudice on the part of the trial Judge were likewise available on appeal, but may not be reviewed on habeas corpus. We may add that even the facts alleged do not support the charge. The alleged comment of the court to the effect that each of the parties would undertake to fasten responsibility on the other seems a simple recognition of a strong probability in a case of this type and the Judge’s conclusion based thereon, that it would be fair for each party to be represented by counsel, seems logical and in itself fair.

This is, if anything, emphasized by the fact (which we infer from the applicant’s reference to “Counsel appointed to represent this co-defendant”) that the trial court had appointed counsel for him. The victim of the larceny was the brother of the Governor of the State. The applicant asserts that the Judge who presided at his trial could not have been unprejudiced because, at the time of the trial, the Judge was anticipating an appointment by the Governor as Chief Judge, which appointment was subsequently made. * This contention would attribute to the Governor and to the Judge a desire to achieve the conviction of this defendant, regardless of his guilt. No fact whatever is alleged which could lend color to such a charge, and we find this contention wholly without merit. 3.