Barksdale v. Wilkowsky

GRAEFF, Judge. This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by appellant, Janay Barksdale, against appellees, G & S Real Estate and its two partners, Stewart Sachs and Ronald Greenwald, in which she alleged that she suffered “severe and permanent brain damage” as a result of exposure to lead-based paint in a rental property owned by appellees. 1 Following a five-day trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the jury returned a verdict in appellees’ favor on all counts. Ms. Barksdale presented eleven issues for our review, which we have consolidated and rephrased as follows: ³⁷² 1. Did the circuit court err in its instructions to the jury by: (a) instructing about the occupant’s duties regarding a dwelling unit; and (b) declining to instruct regarding the portion of the Baltimore City Housing Code that bans the use of lead-based paint? 2.

Did the circuit court err in its evidentiary rulings by: (a) admitting evidence of the average blood lead level in the United States in the 1970s; (b) allowing testimony that there was not any lead paint violations on the Property in 2005; and (c) admitting evidence that Ms. Barksdale’s mother smoked cigarettes and drank alcohol during her pregnancy? 3. Did the circuit court err by allowing appellees’ counsel to tell the jury that he used to be a resident of, and grew up in, Baltimore City? 4. Did the circuit court err in allowing appellees’ counsel to argue that the use of affidavits is unethical? 5. Did the circuit court err in denying Ms. Barksdale’s motion for judgment and her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Ms. Barksdale lived with her grandmother at 2440 West Baltimore Street in Baltimore, Maryland (the “Property”) from her birth in 1988 until her grandmother vacated the Property in 1999. G & S Real Estate owned the Property, and neither G & S Real Estate nor its partners inspected the Property during the time that Ms. Barksdale resided there. In 2005, Eduardo Tarver purchased the Property.

At that time, the house was “boarded up.” Mr. Tarver performed a “[tjotal gut rehab” of the Property, removing all of the interior walls, door jambs, and old window frames. On November 21, 2006, Ms. Barksdale filed a complaint against appellees in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. ³⁷³ Count I alleged that, as a result of appellees’ negligence in failing to maintain and inspect the Property and abate any lead paint hazard, Ms. Barksdale “suffered severe and permanent brain damage” as a result of exposure to lead-based paint. Count II alleged that appellees violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act by marketing and leasing the Property when appellees “knew that the dwelling ... contained flaking, loose or peeling paint or plaster or lead[-]based paint accessible to children.” Ms. Barksdale requested two million dollars in damages on each count. On October 20, 2008, appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

With respect to the negligence claim, appellees argued that there was no “admissible evidence that [the Property] contained any loose, flaking or peeling lead-based paint on the newel post of the stair case,” and therefore, there was no evidence that appellees “breached any duty.” 2 They further argued that Ms. Barksdale had not “provided a report from a medical expert linking the alleged exposure to lead paint at [the Property] with the Plaintiffs alleged injuries.” With respect to the Consumer Protection Act claim, appellees argued that Ms. Barksdale did not have standing to assert a claim under the Consumer Protection Act because “she was not alive at the time [her grandmother] entered into the lease for tenancy at the Property.” On November 12, 2008, Ms. Barksdale filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Barks-dale argued that summary judgment was not proper because “lead[-]based paint was present on interior surfaces of [the Property] besides the newel post when [she] resided there,” and the Property “was a substantial factor in causing the ³⁷⁴ injuries.” With respect to the claim under the Consumer Protection Act, Ms. Barksdale argued that, “[ejven though Janay was not born at the time of the inception of the lease, under the statute Janay was still a ‘consumer,’ because she was a prospective ... recipient of consumer realty.” The circuit court denied appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Trial commenced on January 26, 2009. Ms. Barksdale, age 20, took the stand.

She testified that she lived at the Property until she was 11 years old, and there was “[cjhipped, peeling paint” on the “windowsills in the hallway” and on the walls. Ms. Barksdale stated that the landlord did not do anything about the chipped and peeling paint until two weeks before she moved out. Ms. Barksdale attended school through the sixth grade. After she left school, she worked at a fast-food restaurant for one month.

Ms. Barksdale testified that she currently was raising her three children, but she was interested in becoming a medical assistant, a security guard, or “work on computers.” Emma Oliver, Ms. Barksdale’s grandmother, testified that she lived at the Property for 15 years. Ms. Barksdale lived with Ms. Oliver from the time she was born until they moved out of the house. When Ms. Oliver first moved into the Property, there was paint “chipping in the windowsills and in the kitchen.” Ms. Oliver testified that the landlord did not do anything about the chipped paint, and the landlord did not advise her of the dangers of lead paint. The landlord never inspected the Property while she lived there, and he did not fix the problem until immediately before she vacated the Property.

Ms. Oliver acknowledged, however, that she did not report any maintenance problems or request that any work be performed on the Property. Ms. Barksdale did not have contact with any other sources of lead, including lead figures, naval paint, bolts, fishing weights, ceramic pottery, or folk medicine. Ms. Oliver acknowledged that Ms. Barksdale’s mother smoked cigarettes and drank alcohol during her pregnancy. ³⁷⁵ Mr. Tarver testified that he purchased the Property in 2005, and he performed a “[t]otal gut rehab” of the Property. This entailed removing all of the interior walls, door jambs, and window frames, except for the upstairs windows, which were new.

Mr. Tarver did not test for lead before undertaking these renovations. There were no outstanding housing or lead paint violations on the Property at the time he purchased it. Ralph Shannon Cavalier, an expert in lead paint testing and assessment, testified that he was the President of an environmental consulting firm that conducts environmental tests, including testing for lead paint. An inspector from his company located lead-based paint on the staircase newel post.

He testified that the “negative readings in a house of this date of construction” could be explained “by the fact that Mr. Tarver did the gut rehab in 2005.” Mr. Cavalier stated that, in his opinion, “there was lead[-]based paint on the interior of the property ... besides the [newel] post during the time period of 1988 to 1994,” explaining that it was “very uncommon” for “a property of this age ... to have one positive component ... unless there’s been a major renovation.” He admitted, however, that he had never visited the Property. He further acknowledged that the positive test for lead paint on the newel post “could come from any layer of paint,” noting that it could be the base layer with 12 to 15 coats of paint on top. Dr. Barry Hurwitz, an expert in neuropsychology, testified regarding his examination and testing of Ms. Barksdale. He determined that her intelligence quotient (“IQ”) was 55, which fell in the “extremely low range,” a range “that we used to refer to as mild mental retardation.” He explained that an IQ score of 90-109 is “average,” and Ms. Barksdale’s IQ score was lower than 99 percent of the population.

Ms. Barksdale’s scores on a “visual attention” test, an “auditory attention” test, and a “tactile sensation” test fell into the “impaired range.” She “showed impairments on a wide variety of abilities compared to people who are of average level functioning.” Dr. Hurwitz further testified that Ms. Barksdale was limited in her ability to read, her verbal language abilities, and her mathematical reasoning. He was not asked to determine, ³⁷⁶ however, whether Ms. Barksdale’s impairments were the result of exposure to lead paint. He acknowledged that “there are lots of reasons why the brain can be impaired.” Dr. Aaron Zuckerberg, a pediatrician and an expert in childhood lead paint poisoning, testified that “the interior painted surfaces of 2440 West Baltimore Street” were “the significant contributing factor in the lead paint exposure and lead paint poisoning that Janay experience^] from birth to 1994.” He reached this conclusion based on the following factors: (1) the age of the property; (2) “there was chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the property when they lived there”; (3) Ms. Barksdale’s documented high blood lead levels; and (4) testing of the Property revealed lead paint. 3 Dr. Zuckerberg testified that children’s blood lead levels typically peak “between a year and a half and three years of age and then continually decline.” He opined that it was “very likely that Janay’s blood lead level peaked in the normal peak time,” suggesting that Ms. Barksdale’s blood level “would have been above 20 during this peak period.” Dr. Zuckerberg concluded that “Janay suffered lead exposure from the time of her birth through 1994,” and that “the neuropsychological impairments that Dr. Horowitz [identified] are the result of Janay’s lead exposure.” He testified that Ms. Barksdale’s injuries were permanent. On cross-examination, Dr. Zuckerberg acknowledged that he had not performed an examination of Ms. Barksdale, nor had he even met her or anyone in her family prior to trial.

He acknowledged that Ms. Oliver stated in her deposition that Ms. Barksdale’s mother consumed alcohol during pregnancy, but Dr. Zuckerberg testified that he had “no idea how much or what she drank during her pregnancy.” Moreover, he did not believe anybody could tell what effect, if any, it would have on ³⁷⁷ her pregnancy because “we don’t know how much she smoked, we don’t know how much she drank.” Dr. Zuckerberg testified that Ms. Barksdale could have been exposed to lead paint at other properties, depending on “the activities done at the property” and the duration of time there. Mark Lieberman, an expert in vocational counseling in lead paint cases, testified that he evaluated Ms. Barksdale and determined that she had several “handicaps to success,” including “significant mental retardation,” a “history of issues with attention and concentration,” “very, very low academics,” “[V]ery, very little work experience,” and “no transferable skills ... that she can say she has now that she can take to another job.” Mr. Lieberman testified that he did not believe that Ms. Barksdale could “obtain and maintain competitive employment,” stating that Ms. Barksdale “has a total loss of earning capacity.” Without these severe disabilities, “she would at least [have] been able to maintain the minimum level of competitive gainful employment.” Dr. Thomas Borzilleri, an expert in economics, testified that Ms. Barksdale’s lost earning capacity was presently valued at $449,217. He reached this figure by consulting census data compiled by the federal government and determining “what is the average female with less than nine years of education likely to earn over long periods of time.” At the close of Ms. Barksdale’s case, appellees moved for judgment on both counts. The court denied appellees’ motion.

Appellees called two witnesses. Dr. Marianne Schuelein, an expert in neurology and lead exposure in children, testified that scientific studies indicate that low levels of lead exposure do not necessarily result in damage. With respect to studies discussed by Dr. Zuckerberg regarding possible dangers of “lower levels of lead exposure,” she explained that, because you cannot determine what an individual’s IQ was before he or she was exposed to lead, “you can’t really prove that IQ’s are decreased by lead.” Rather, “[y]ou can only say there’s an association.” ³⁷⁸ Dr. Schuelein further testified regarding the association of lead with decreases in IQ: Now to move a little bit further in trying to explain this very complicated principle, there are a lot of things that can cause problems that may not have been accounted for in these studies and that’s why all you can say is it’s an association. There are things that they try to account for in some of the studies, but you can’t fully account for them.

Such as ... some of the children who have lower IQ’s when they have lead levels in these studies may have had parents who drank too much alcohol and they may not admit that to the people who are studying---- So there are a lot of what we call confounders, things that make this association complicated. Dr. Schuelein testified that “[t]here are other things that are associated with decreased] in IQ such as lack of opportunity, lack of schooling and all of those things are also associated with lead.” She reiterated that exposure to lead creates a risk of damage, “[b]ut it doesn’t necessarily cause these problems.” Dr. Schuelein performed a neurological examination of Ms. Barksdale. During the examination of Ms. Barksdale, she advised Dr. Schuelein of several physical complaints, including: “she feels sometimes as if she were going to black out”; “her eyes get blurry”; “her legs sometimes feel as if they will give out”; “she gets very frustrated for no reason”; memory problems; “she thinks she’s bipolar”; depression; she “doesn’t sleep well”; she’s contemplated suicide, and she has “pains in her heart.” 4 Dr. Francis Thomas, an expert in vocational rehabilitation and assessment, conducted an assessment of Ms. Barksdale and concluded that she was capable of employment. He noted ³⁷⁹ that she reported that she had been working, but she “left that job because of involvement with children.” Ms. Barks-dale indicated to Dr. Thomas that she was interested in geriatrics or nursing.

Dr. Thomas stated that Ms. Barksdale reads at a sixth grade level. At the close of all the evidence, Ms. Barksdale moved for judgment. She argued that judgment should be granted on the negligence count because the evidence was unrebutted “that there was never any inspection done by the landlord” and “there was chipping, peeling and flaking paint during the tenancy.” Ms. Barksdale asserted that “those facts establish our case.” With respect to the Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) claim, Ms. Barksdale argued that, pursuant to Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507 , 750 A.2d 10 (2000), “if you have chipping, peeling, flaking paint ... then you’ve got the violation of the CPA.” Appellees argued that the motion should be denied because “[tjhere is no legal obligation to inspect,” and “[tjhe jury can interpret that the way they wish.” Moreover, they argued that there were other components of a negligence claim, which were clearly in dispute. With respect to the CPA claim, appellees argued that, “as to whether there was evidence of chipping and flaking paint at the inception of the tenancy is subject to interpretation of that testimony,” and Benik “does not mean that there is a per se violation that takes it out of the realm of the jury’s consideration.” The court denied Ms. Barksdale’s motion for judgment.

The court explained: Well, the court took an opportunity to read both [Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 , 835 A.2d 616 (2003) ] and [Benik].... But there was nothing in the case law that I read with regard to those matters that these issues are not jury issues or that these are per se violations of the Consumer Protection Act. Particularly when I read the [Benik] case on pages 533-34 quoted that the landlord need not inspect the premises before leasing, but because of the implied representation ³⁸⁰ that comes with the making of the lease, he or — if he or she fails to do so they do so at their own peril. And the presence of chipping and flaking paint could be a predicate or evidence for the jury to consider as to whether that’s a violation of the CPA.

So I’m going to send both of these issues to the jury and deny Plaintiffs motion for judgment in the case. The court subsequently instructed the jury, and counsel gave their closing argument. Later that day, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellees on both counts. On February 9, 2009, Ms. Barksdale filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, reasserting the arguments she made in her motion for judgment.

The circuit court denied Ms. Barksdale’s motion. This timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. Housing Code Jury Instructions Ms. Barksdale’s first contention involves the trial court’s instruction to the jury relating to provisions of the Baltimore City Housing Code (the “Housing Code”). She contends that the court erred in two ways.

First, she argues that “the trial court gave an improper jury instruction when it instructed the jury as to the occupant’s duty under the Baltimore City Housing Code.” Second, she argues that “the trial court gave an improper jury instruction by deleting the portion of the Baltimore City Housing Code which bans the use of lead[-]based paint.” Appellees contend that the jury instructions were proper. Initially, appellees argue that, “[i]n the interest of completeness, and in light of the alleged evidence of chipping and flaking paint conditions, the jury was entitled to know that the Housing Code contains obligations for both owner and occupant.” Moreover, appellees argue that “a jury instruction ³⁸¹ suggesting that the Baltimore City Housing Code bans the use of lead-based paint is improper where there is no evidence that any party ‘used’ or applied lead-based paint.” The court’s instruction to the jury regarding the duties of the landlord and tenant pursuant to the Housing Code was as follows: The violation of a statute which is a cause of Plaintiffs injuries or damages is evidence of negligence. The Baltimore City Housing Code states as follows; Section 103; purpose. The purpose of this code is to prevent all conditions in and about dwellings which are now or which may in the future become so unsafe, dangerous, unhygienic or insanitary as to constitute a menace to the health and safety of the people.

Section 702; good repair and safe conditions. Every building and all parts thereof used or occupied as a dwelling shall be kept in good repair in safe condition. Section 703; standards for good repair and safe condition. Good repair and safe condition shall include, but is not limited to the following standards; interior walls and floors shall be maintained free of loose materials.

Section 706; painting. All interior loose or peeling wall covering or paint shall be removed and the exposed surface shall be placed in a smooth and sanitary condition. Section 1001; prohibited occupancies. No owner shall lease or permit the subletting to another for occupancy and vacant or vacated dwelling or dwelling unit which does not comply with the provision of this code.

Section 902A; every occupant of a dwelling or a dwelling unit shall keep in a clean and sanitary condition that part of the dwelling unit and the premises thereof which he occupies and controls. A clean and sanitary conditiont ] shall include, but is not limited to the following standards; walls and windows. The Baltimore City Code of public local laws provides as follows ... in any written or oral lease or agreement for rental of a dwelling intended for human habitation, the ³⁸² landlord shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that a dwelling is fit for human habitation. The Baltimore City Housing Code places a continuous duty on the landlord to maintain the property and keep it free of chipping, peeling and flaking paint at all times.

It is not a violation of the law for lead paint to be present in a property. You are instructed that as a matter of law there is no evidence that the house where the Plaintiff lived was painted with lead-based paint by the Defendants. (Emphasis added). The court omitted a sentence in § 706 of the Housing Code providing that “[n]o paint shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house or rooming unit unless the paint is free from any lead pigment.” 5 A. Baltimore City Housing Code § 902 Ms. Barksdale contends that the court erred in instructing the jury regarding § 902A, ie., that an occupant of a dwelling shall keep it “in a clean and sanitary condition.” She contends that the instruction was “irrelevant to the present case” because this section of the Housing Code applies only to “dirt and filth.” She further argues that, “[ejven assuming arguendo that Section 902 was relevant, any statutory violation by the grandmother would not release or in any way mitigate the claim against the landlords,” and a “clarifying instruction would be necessary to make it clear that the landlords could still be responsible even if Janay’s grandmother did not comply with Section 902.” Appellees argue that the “trial court did not err when it instructed the jury on an occupant’s duty to maintain the premises in a clean and sanitary condition” because it was a “correct statement of law” and “there was sufficient circum ³⁸³ stantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision to submit it to the jury.” Appellees further argue that the instruction was proper under the doctrine of completeness, noting that § 902A “was one of six sections of the Baltimore City Housing Code that was read to the jury,” and stating that the “jury was presented with balanced instructions as to the concomitant rights and obligations of both owners and occupants.” 6 Moreover, appellees point out that “[t]he jury was not instructed that a tenant’s failure to fulfill his/her obligations somehow relieved a landlord from his/her obligations.” The Court of Appeals has explained that “ ‘[a] litigant is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury, but only if that theory of the case is a correct exposition of the law and there is testimony in the case which supports it.’” Benik, 358 Md. at 519 , 750 A.2d 10 (quoting Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194 , 401 A.2d 651 (1979)).

In other words: “ ‘(1) the instruction must correctly state the law, and (2) that law must be applicable in light of the evidence before the jury.’ ” Id. Thus, a proposed instruction should not be given to the jury unless it is relevant to the issues that are before the jury. The mere fact that a statute imposes a duty on one of the parties does not make the terms of the statute relevant to the case. For example, in Maurer v. Pa.

Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 404 Md. 60, 64-66 , 945 A.2d 629 (2007), a nineteen-year-old pas ³⁸⁴ senger in an automobile accident filed an underinsured motorist action against his insurance company, and the insurance company argued that the passenger, who had a blood alcohol level that exceeded .08, was contributorily negligent and assumed the risk of any injury.

The jury was instructed that “the violation of a statute which is a cause of plaintiffs injuries or damages is evidence of negligence,” and that a statute prohibited an individual from making a “false statement” regarding his age to obtain alcoholic beverages. Id. at 66 , 945 A.2d 629 . The jury found against the passenger, and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court held that, because the insurer failed to show how the passenger’s use of false identification to purchase alcohol was a proximate cause of his injuries, the trial court erred in giving these instructions to the jury.

Id. at 68 , 945 A.2d 629 . This Court similarly has made clear that an instruction, even if a correct statement of law, is appropriate only if it is relevant to the issues before the jury. In Hitch v. Hall, 42 Md.App. 260, 267 , 399 A.2d 953 (1979), we held that the trial court properly declined to instruct on legal principles that, although accurate, involved an issue that was not relevant to the case. See also Brogden v. State, 384 Md. 631, 644 , 866 A.2d 129 (2005) (court erred in giving supplemental instruction when it did not state the “applicable law” relating to the issues before the jury for deliberations).

Here, the requested instruction regarding the occupant’s duties to maintain the Property in a clean and sanitary condition, the obligation pursuant to § 902A, was not relevant to the issues before the jury, ie., whether the landlord was negligent or engaged in deceptive trade practices in renting the Property. Whether Ms. Barksdale’s grandmother kept the Property clean had no bearing on the jury’s assessment of those issues. In Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.App. 34, 66 , 651 A.2d 908 (1994), cert. denied, 338 Md. 557 , 659 A.2d 1293 (1995), a lead paint case, this Court stated that it “would have been error for the trial court to instruct the jury to find in favor of [the ³⁸⁵ defendants] based on the parents’ actions.” The Court explained that “[t]he law in Maryland is clear that the negligent acts of a parent cannot be imputed to the minor child, and that negligent acts of the parent that merely contribute to the injury do not necessarily rise to the level of superseding causation.” Id. n. 16 (citing Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125 , 304 A.2d 831 (1973)). There was no argument here that the grandmother’s actions or inactions were a superseding cause of Mr. Barksdale’s injuries.

Accordingly, the instruction regarding § 902 was irrelevant under the facts of this case, and the court erred in instructing the jury on § 902 of the Housing Code. That, however, is not the end of the inquiry. “To justify [ ] reversal, an error below must have been ‘... both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious.’ ” Flores v. Bell, 398 Md. 27, 34 , 919 A.2d 716 (2007) (citation omitted). “Prejudice can be demonstrated by showing that the error was likely to have affected the verdict below; an error that does not affect the outcome of the case is harmless error.” Id. at 33 , 919 A.2d 716 . Ms. Barksdale has not met her burden of showing prejudice. The court’s instructions made clear that the relevant issue for the jury was the conduct of appellees, not anything done by the occupants.

The court instructed that a “minor cannot be held responsible for the negligence of the minor’s parent, guardian or custodian.” It also instructed that it was appellees who had the duty to “maintain the property and keep it free of chipping, peeling and flaking paint at all times.” Thus, the jury clearly was advised that appellees had a duty to keep the Property free of chipping paint and that Ms. Barksdale could not be held responsible for any negligence on the part of her grandmother. Moreover, there was no suggestion during closing argument that appellees were relieved in any way of their statutory obligations to keep the premises free of chipped or flaking paint or that Ms. Oliver was contributorily negligent for failing to clean up any chipped ³⁸⁶ paint. Thus, although the court erred in giving the instruction, it was harmless error that does not require a new trial. B. Lead Paint Ban Ms. Barksdale also contends that the court erred in denying her request to instruct the jury that “[n]o paint shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling ... unless the paint is free from any lead pigment.” As indicated, a proposed jury instruction “‘must be applicable in light of the evidence before the jury.’ ” Benik, 358 Md. at 519 , 750 A.2d 10 (citation omitted).

As appellees note, there was no evidence that appellees ever painted the interior of the Property, “much less paint[ed] it with lead-based paint.” Given the absence of such evidence, the court instructed the jury, without objection, that “as a matter of law there is no evidence that the house where the Plaintiff lived was painted with lead-based paint by the Defendants. Thus, the Defendants did not create the condition of lead-based paint at this property.” Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that “[n]o paint shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling ... unless the paint is free from any lead pigment.” II. Evidentiary Rulings Ms. Barksdale argues next that the trial court erred in several of its evidentiary rulings. Specifically, she argues that the court improperly allowed testimony regarding the following: (1) the average blood lead level in the United States in 1976; (2) that Baltimore City had not issued any lead paint violations for the Property; and (3) that Ms. Barksdale’s mother smoked cigarettes and drank alcohol during her pregnancy.

Appellees argue that the evidence was relevant and the trial court properly admitted this evidence. First, appellees argue ³⁸⁷ that “evidence of average blood-lead levels in the United States in the 1970s was relevant to testimony offered by appellant’s own medical expert on trends in blood-lead levels and the safety of certain blood-lead levels.” Moreover, appellees argue that, even if the testimony was improperly admitted, any error was harmless. Second, appellees argue that the circuit court properly allowed testimony regarding the lack of a lead paint violation notice on the Property because “the existence, or lack thereof, of a lead paint violation notice on a property is directly relevant to a core issue in the case — the condition of the property.” Third, with respect to Ms. Barks-dale’s mother’s use of alcohol and cigarettes during pregnancy, appellees argue that “appellant’s own medical expert addressed the issues of cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption during pregnancy and, in doing so, validated those issues as evidentiary considerations in the case.” “The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557, 579 , 919 A.2d 49 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs “ ‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,’ or when the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding rules or principles.’ ” King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697 , 967 A.2d 790 (2009) (citation omitted).

As the Court of Appeals has made clear, [A] ruling reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling. The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable. Brown v. Daniel Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 601 , 976 A.2d 300 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted). A. Average Blood Lead Level in the U.S. Ms. Barksdale contends that the court erred in admitting Dr. Zuckerberg’s testimony that, in 1976, the aver ³⁸⁸ age blood lead level in the United States was 14.6.

She argues that the testimony was irrelevant because she was not born until 1988, twelve years later. Additionally, she argues that any probative value in this evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and therefore, it was inadmissible under Md. Rule 5-403. We note that Ms. Barksdale’s argument in this regard is less than one page in length, and she cites no case law supporting her contention. Appellees argue that the testimony was properly admitted because Ms. Barksdale “opened the door to this evidence” when she elicited testimony from Dr. Zuckerberg, her expert, regarding the “threshold safety lead levels” set by the Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) and the U.S. Surgeon General.

In any event, appellees argue that, even if the admission of this evidence was error, it was harmless because the evidence “did not have any impact on the ultimate jury verdict.” On direct examination, Dr. Zuckerberg testified that “[tjhere is no safe level for lead.” Dr. Zuckerberg also testified that, in 1971, the CDC and U.S. Surgeon General “became involved in lead paint poisoning,” and they “said that 40 was the lowest blood lead level that they would consider to be high.” These agencies continued to lower the threshold safety level, and in 1991, “10 was the lowest level that they would consider high.” Dr. Zuckerberg testified “that there was no safe level. But they said that the action level would be 10.” 7 On cross-examination, counsel for appellees questioned Dr. Zuckerberg regarding whether exposure to lead paint necessarily resulted in damage: “Can you tell us what the average blood lead level was in Baltimore City in the seventies? I was a resident of Baltimore City and grew up in Baltimore City, ³⁸⁹ I’d like to know what the environment was.” Dr. Zuckerberg stated that he had information for the United States, and he testified that “[i]n 1976 the average blood lead level in the United States was 14.6.” Cross-examination continued as follows: [COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: You do hold the opinion that any lead exposure necessarily means damage, don’t you sir? [DR. ZUCKERBERG]: My opinion is that any exposure puts one at risk for damage. [COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: Oh, okay.

So it puts on[e] at risk. So exposure doesn’t necessarily mean damage? [DR. ZUCKERBERG]: Exposure doesn’t mean damage. But damage done is damage permanent.

We find no error in the admission of the evidence that the average blood lead level in the United States was 14.6. Ms. Barksdale argued that her blood lead levels, ranging from 15-18, caused her mental impairments. Appellees’ defense was, among other things, that Ms. Barksdale could not prove that lead caused her impairments, arguing that Ms. Barksdale’s blood lead levels were not high levels. Evidence that the average blood lead level in the United States was 14.6 was relevant to appellees’ defense.

We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to admit this testimony at trial. We turn next to Ms. Barksdale’s argument that this testimony was inadmissible under Md. Rule 5-403 because any probative value was “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury....” Ms. Barksdale cites no case law in support of this contention, and, other than the statement quoted above, she makes no argument