Barnitz v. Rice

Le Grand, C. J., delivered the opinion of this court. The decision of this appeal must depend upon the construction to be placed on the deed which has given rise to this controversy. It is a deed by a debtor to a trustee, for the benefit of the creditors of the debtor, and exacting of them releases. The conveyance of property is in these words: “All the stock in trade and merchandize, goods, chattels and effects, and promissory notes, securities, evidences of debt, and claims and demands of, or belonging to, or in any wise or manner claimable by me.” To this deed it is objected, that it does not, on its face, convey all of the property of the grantor, and not doing so, that it is not competent, to those insisting on its validity, to show, by extrinsic evidence, that in point of fact it does convey all the property which the grantor had at the time of its execution. •Under the decisions, and particularly those of this court, we ²⁹ think the objection well taken.

In the case of Green vs. Trieber, 3 Md. Rep., 40 , this court said: “We are to look to the character with which the law stamps the deed, without reference to extrinsic facts as to motive. If the law imputes to the grantor a design in making the deed, no evidence of intention can change the presumption. If the law declares the deed to be void, it is no matter how the question of fraud in fact may stand.” This doctrine was fully sanctioned in Malcolm, Trustee of Sprigg, vs. Hodges, 8 Md. Rep., 418 , and re-asserted in Rosenberg & Blondheim vs. Moore, 11 Md. Rep., 380 . The language of these cases, it would seem, is too explicit to admit of doubt as to its meaning.

But it was urged by the able counsel of the appellant, that it should be viewed in connection with that employed in the case of Sangston, Garnishee vs. Gaither, 3 Md. Rep., 40, 48 , and if so considered, the particular deed involved in this controversy would hot be obnoxious to the censure of the law as expounded by this court. We cannot deduce the same conclusion from the collocation and comparison to which we have been invited. In our judgment, the case of Sangston vs. Gaither is in harmony with the subsequent ones to which we have referred. The portions of the opinion relied upon by the appellant’s counsel were intended simply as