Barrell v. Barrell

Melvin, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The primary issue in this case is whether an action pursuant ²⁹⁹ to Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol.) Art. 89C, §§ 1, et seq. (Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act) (URESA) is the exclusive means in this State of enforcing an alimony decree of another state.

We hold that it is not. The appellant, Joanna Lee Barrell, a resident of Maryland, filed a bill of complaint on February 21, 1978 in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, praying that the court adopt and enforce the alimony provisions of a Georgia divorce decree dated April 27, 1972. 1 The appellee, John MacMillian Barrell, a non-resident of Maryland, was served with a summons at Baltimore- Washington International Airport when he arrived to celebrate his daughter’s birthday. In response to the complaint, the appellee filed a motion raising preliminary objections which asserted the following defenses: 1) lack of jurisdiction over the person, 2) insufficiency or illegality of process, 3) insufficiency or illegality of service of process, and 4) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Md. Rule 323 a.

After a brief hearing on the motion on May 9,1978, the trial judge requested that the parties submit memoranda of law on the issues presented. By an order dated September 15, 1978 the appellee’s motion was granted. As a statement of grounds for its decision the court incorporated those grounds set forth in the appellee’s memorandum in support of his motion. The primary thrust of the memorandum was that URESA is the exclusive means of enforcing an alimony decree of another state and that although the appellant had invoked URESA enforcement provisions, she failed to follow those provisions.

Sections 31 through 36 of URESA provide for the “Registration of Foreign Support Orders” which, when confirmed, have the same effect and may be enforced as if originally entered in the courts of this State. The manner in which the orders should be registered is prescribed by Section 34, which states: “The petition for registration shall be verified and shall set forth the amount remaining unpaid and a ³⁰⁰ list of any other states in which the support order is registered and shall have attached to it a certified copy of the support order with all modifications thereof. The foreign support order is registered upon the filing of the petition subject only to subsequent order of confirmation.” Because the complaint was neither verified nor accompanied by a certified copy of the support order, proper service, according to the lower court, could not issue, and the court was, therefore, unable to obtain jurisdiction over the person or subject matter. On appeal, as she did below, the appellant contends that her action is “not a proceeding under the Act [URESA]” but is “a proceeding under the Court’s general equity powers as construed in McCabe v. McCabe [ 210 Md. 308 , 123 A.2d 447 (1956)],” and that URESA does not prescribe the exclusive means of enforcing a foreign alimony order.

At the outset, we agree that there is nothing in the bill of complaint to indicate that appellant sought to invoke the enforcement provisions of URESA. Appellee contends that merely because the bill asked that the court “adopt” the Georgia decree “as its own” and “enroll said Decree of Divorce in the records of this court” the appellant was bound at her peril to follow all the enforcement