Barroll v. Foreman

Fowler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Hope H. Barroll and A. Randolph Weedon were appointed trustees under a decree of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, to sell the real estate of the late Joseph A. Raisin. The plaintiff in this case purchased several parcels of said real estate, and the sale so made to him was duly ratified. In part settlement of his purchase the plaintiff passed to Weedon, one of the trustees, the promissory note of John B. Brown for the sum of $1,230.53, dated 29th Sept, 1891, payable to the plaintiff’s order thirty-six months after date.

It must be noted that this note was endorsed in blank by the plaintiff, Pere T. Foreman—there being nothing upon the face of it to show that it was intended to be in payment of the land purchased by the plaintiff from the trustees. Sometime in October, 1892, Weedon advised Gov. Reynolds to invest a thousand dollars which Weedon had collected for him, in the note we have just described. This was done, and the difference between the note and the amount Weedon had collected, amounting to $74.54, was remitted to him by Gov.

Reynolds. The note was duly endorsed and delivered by Weedon to Reynolds, who held it until its maturity October 2nd, 1894, when he sued Brown as maker and Foreman as endorser. The latter then filed in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County his bill of interpleader against Gov. Reynolds, Hope H. Barroll, trustee, and John B. Brown, praying that Reynolds and Barroll, trustee, might be required to interplead and set forth their respective claims to said note and the sum represented thereby, and that Reynolds might be enjoined from prosecuting said ⁶⁷⁷ suits against the plaintiff and said Brown, until it could be determined who is legally entitled to the ownership of said note.

All the defendants answered. Gov. Reynolds alleges that he is a bona fide holder for value without notice of any kind, either actual or constructive, of any infirmity in the title of his endorser, and that the note was transferred to him before maturity in the usual course of business. Mr. Barroll, now sole trustee, his co-trustee, Weedon, having been removed, alleges that the settlement made by the plaintiff with said Weedon, was without his (Barroll’s) authority, and that the trust estate cannot be bound by it.

The remaining defendant, J. B. Brown, admits his indebtedness on the note, that it has not been paid by him because he was notified by the trustee, Barroll, not to pay it, and afterwards wrns enjoined from so doing, and that he is willing that the Court shall direct the disposition thereof. A good deal of testimony was taken relating to the question of the ultimate rights of the trust estate on the one side, and the liability of the plaintiff on the other, even assuming the validity of Gov. Reynolds’ title to the note. And whether he has such a title is the only question now properly before us, because that is the sole question finally settled by the decree appealed from.

It may have been the opinion of the Court below that in point of fact the note was intended to be a part of the trust estate, because the plaintiff intended it to be a payment on account of the land purchased from the trustees, but the decree is silent as to the right of the remaining trustee, notwithstanding such payment, to compel the plaintiff to pay again. By the decree it is declared that Gov. Reynolds is the lawful owner of the note; that as such owner he is entitled to judgment against John B. Brown, and also entitled to proceed with the suit against the plaintiff as endorser, unless the plaintiff pay to said Reynolds the amount of said note with interest, &c., on or before 1st June, 1897. It is also decreed that the plaintiff pay to Reynolds the amount of the note with interest and costs.

We have thus recited the whole of the operative part of the decree, ⁶⁷⁸ and it appearing that