Barton v. Bridges

Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the 28th of October, 1912, the appellees executed a deed of trust for the benefit of creditors of F. Wilbur Bridges and J. Augustine Mason, of Washington County, to sell and dispose of the grantor’s property and to apply the money and proceeds to the payment of the debts, claims and demands whatsoever for which the grantor, J. Taliaferro ⁶⁷⁷ Bridges, should be liable, according to their priority and standing in law. The appellant is a holder of a judgment against the appellee for $941.22, with interest from March 12th, 1911, with certain credits thereon, as will appear from the record thereof, obtained at the February Term, 1911, of the Circuit Court for Washington County, and which was filed with the Auditor of the Circuit Court for that county, as a judgment- claim and lien, to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of tire property, sold by the trustees. This judgment was disallowed by the Auditor, in the distribution of the proceeds of sale of the appellees’ property, and this appeal is from certain orders passed by the Circuit Court for Washington County, overruling the appellant’s exceptions to Auditor’s Accounts Nr. 1 and No. 2, and the order of Court, dated the 8th day of February, 1915, finally ratifying and confirming Auditor’s Account No. 2, directing the trustee to pay out the funds, in accordance with the distribution made therein, and disallowing the appellant’s judgment claim.

The single question in the case is whether the Court below was right in its determination, that the appellant was not. entitled to distribution from the proceeds of sale on the alleged judgment claim, held by him against the appellee, under the facts of the case. The appellee contends and the proof shows that sometime prior to the audit, on the 25th of January, 1913, the appellant signed and delivered to the appellee an order, directing the judgment here in question to be released and satisfied. The order is as follows : Wason Barton vs. J. Taliaferro Bridges. “Mr. Oswald, Clerk— “Will please enter the judgment in the above entitled cause satisfied. “Test: C. E. Carter. (Signed) Wason Barton. “January 25th, 1918.” ⁶⁷⁸ Air.

Oswald, the Clerk of the Court, testified that this order was left with him to he filed, and the paper had been in his possession since that date, but was not filed, because the costs were not paid. It is conceded that this order was signed by the appellant, but it is contended that his signature thereto was procured by fraud and misrepresentation, and the judgment is a valid and prior lien and should be paid out of the proceeds of sale of the appellees’ property in the hands of the trustees for distribution among his creditors. Upon the part of the appellees it is denied that any fraud • was committed or practiced upon the appellant in obtaining his signature to the order, and it is earnestly insisted upon their part, that the signing of the order was. in accordance with a settlement, previously had between the parties “in November, 1911,” and that it was so understood by the appellant when he signed it as a release and satisfaction of the judgment in question. It is clear that as the execution and signing of the order to the Clerk by the appellant, is admitted and conceded, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish the claim of fraud, set up and urged to avoid the legal effect of the release and satisfaction of the judgment here in question.

It is well settled that while a Court of Equity will at all times lend its aid to defeat a fraudulent transaction, fraud like any other fact must be established by satisfactory proof, and it will not be presumed. Ranstead v. Allen, 85 Md. 482 ; Willson v. Williams, 106 Md. 663 ; Paper Bag Co. v. Carr, 116 Md. 550 ; Riggin v. Robinson, 117 Md. 84 . The proof of fraud, in the obtention of the appellant’s signature to the order directing the Clerk of the Court to enter the judgment satisfied, does not measure up to the legal