Bauer v. Hamill

Grason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: On September 20, 1946, the appellants filed in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, in Equity, a bill of complaint against Richard Hamill, committee of the person and estate of Annie Foster, one of the appellees ⁵⁵⁶ herein, in which they alleged, among other things, the appointment of Hamill by that court, Committee of the person and estate of Annie C. Foster and his qualification as such; that said Committee advertised for sale, on June 8, 1946, property of his ward, and sold the same to William W. Sluss and wife for the sum of $3,700; thereafter the Committee, by petition, requested that the names of the appellants be substituted as purchasers for said property, in the name and stead of Sluss and wife, and an order was passed by the chancellor authorizing the substitution; that the solicitor for the Committee prepared a deed for said property, conveying the same to the appellants, and forwarded it to the Committee for execution, delivery, and acceptance of the purchase price therefor, and on the same day an order was passed by the chancellor allowing the Committee $370 as a fee for his services; that the Committee delivered the deed, prepared as aforesaid, to William W. Sluss and Nellie Sluss, his wife (appellees), but that the deed was changed without legal authority, so as to convey said property to Sluss and wife; and the deed, as changed, was recorded; that on September 20, 1946, the solicitor for the appellants submitted to the Committee a deed conveying the said property to them, which he duly signed, executed and delivered to the solicitor; that the solicitor received a certified check for the sum of $3,700, the full purchase price, and delivered the same to the Committee; that the Committee asked to read the deed, which he signed, and promised appellant’s solicitor to return the same, but that the Committee refused to return the deed to the solicitor, although the check for $3,700 was delivered to the Committee; it is alleged that appellants made full payment for said property to the defendant (the Committee) and are entitled to the return of the deed held by him, and that appellants believe it is the desire of said defendant (Committee), in connivance with others, to force appellants to pay the sum of-$6,500 for said property when, under the proceedings- of this ⁵⁵⁷ case, they are entitled to a deed for said property in accordance with the report of sale and proceedings in said cause. They pray: (1) That an order be passed commanding the Committee to show cause why an order should not be passed commanding him to surrender and deliver to appellants a deed conveying the property of the said Annie C. Foster to them. And (2) for general relief. The chancellor, on said bill, passed a nisi order.

The Committee answered and, among other matters, alleged: That after the sale of the property to Sluss and wife they expended a large sum of money in the improvement of the property sold, and thereafter agreed to sell the property to the appellants for the sum of $6,500; and that appellants made a down payment of $1,000 on the property to Sluss and wife and were given the following receipt: “July 25, 1946 “Receipt is hereby acknowledged for a check in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1000.00) as part payment and intent to buy the property known as the ‘Foster property on West Mechanic Street.’ “The remaining balance of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) to be paid upon delivery of a clear title to above mentioned property thirty days from this date. “(Signed) William W. Sluss” That the reason for the substitution of the appellants as purchasers of the property was for the convenience of the parties and at their request, and it was never intended by the Committee or Sluss and wife or the appellants that appellants were to pay the Committee the sum of $3,700 and receive a deed from him as Committee of the person and estate of Annie C. Foster conveying the title to this property to them for the sole consideration to Sluss and wife of the sum of $3,700; that the Committee admits he had a deed pre ⁵⁵⁸ pared for delivery to William W. Sluss and that this deed purported to convey the title to the property to the appellants, but the reason it was delivered to Sluss and wife is because they sold the property to appellants and that this transaction was between those parties, and it was understood that appellants were to pay Sluss and wife the balance owed to them upon the delivery of the deed aforesaid; he admits that the chancellor allowed him a fee of $370 for his services, being commission at the rate of 10 per cent, on the purchase price; that he delivered the aforesaid deed to Sluss and wife, and thereafter solicitor for appellants presented to him a deed, which he had prepared, and requested him to sign the same, stating that the deed he had executed to Sluss and wife was not good or sufficient and that the Committee, believing this statement, executed and presented to the solicitor a deed for the property to the appellants; that he thought this action was a mistahe and retrieved the deed from Bauer and wife and placed it in his safe; that the reason he executed a deed for the property to Sluss and wife was that he was informed that the appellants owed them a substantial amount of money on account of the purchase price of this property sold by Sluss and wife to appellants, although this was done after the sale had been ratified to appellants. ' On November 8, 1946, Sluss and wife filed a petition in this causq, asking leave of the chancellor to intervene. The petition makes reference to the answer of the Committee and avers that they have “a real interest in this proceeding, in that their rights, duties and obligations with relation to this transaction are involved, and believe that they should be permitted to intervene for the purpose of protecting their own interest.” The petition prays: (1) For the passage of “an order granting- leave to your petitioners to intervene in these proceedings, and file an Answer. (2) That ⁵⁵⁹ your petitioners may have such other and further relief as the nature of their case may require.” On the same day the chancellor granted leave to Sluss and wife “to intervene in these proceedings, and file an Answer or any other papers, which, in their opinion, are necessary to protect their interest.” On November 9, 1946, Sluss and wife filed a petition' in the cause, in which they alleged: The institution of this case by the appellants and the answer of the Committee to their bill; they admit the matters and things stated in paragraphs one and two of the bill; they admit that Hamill filed a petition “In the matter of the appointment of a committee of the property and person of Annie C. Foster, No. 19,169 Equity,” in which he requested the court to substitute as purchasers of the real property sold in that proceeding, the names of the appellants, in lieu of themselves, and the chancellor so ordered on the 6th day of November, 1946; they deny that anything is said in said petition or order with reference to the appellants’ paying $3,700 as a full consideration to the Committee for the purchase of the property involved in these proceedings; that the Committee sold the real estate involved in this proceeding to them for the sum of $3,700, and before the sale was ratified they expended a large sum of money in improvement of the property; that before ratification of sale they agreed to sell the property to appellants for the sum of $6,500 and that appellants made a down payment of $1,000 and that William W. Sluss gave them the receipt which is set out in full in the answer of the Committee and need not be repeated here; they allege that the only reason for the substitution of the appellants as purchasers of the property sold by the Committee to them was for convenience of the parties, and it was never intended by the petitioners or the appellants that the appellants were to pay the Committee $3,700 and receive a deed from him to the property for the sole consideration of $3,700; they admit a deed was prepared from the Committee to the ⁵⁶⁰ appellants, but that it was understood before the delivery of the same appellants were to pay to petitioners the balance owed on the property upon delivery of the deed; they aver when the deed from the Committee was delivered to them that they made a mistake in asking the court to substitute the appellants as purchasers, and they decided it would be better to have the deed directly from the Committee to themselves and then in turn execute a second deed to the appellants, and that they made the necessary changes in the deed to effect this transfer. They deny that the appellants have made full payment to them for this property; they aver they have spent large sums of money to have the property repaired and improved; that the appellants are in possession of the same and refuse to vacate the property or to pay to them the balance due them under the agreement of purchase; they aver that appellants have delayed and evaded the performance of their agreement to pay the balance due on said property, and that they have been willing to take whatever steps are necessary to give a good and sufficient title to the property to the appellants, upon the payment of the balance due them from the appellants, and that they are able and willing to make a conveyance of a good and unencumbered estate in fee in said premises.

They pray: (1) That the agreement may be specifically enforced, and that the appellants be decreed to pay them the balance of the purchase money agreed to be paid, with all interest accrued thereon, and to accept from your petitioners a conveyance of the aforesaid house and lot,, and (2) for general relief. The appellants demurred to this petition for the following reasons: (1) That the petitioners are not proper parties to the cause. (2) That it does not state such a cause as entitles them to relief. (8) That they have an adequate remedy at law.

(4) That the petition, on its face, shows it is a separate suit by petitioners against appellants, seeking specific performance of an agreement, and does not involve the Committee. ⁵⁶¹ The chancellor reserved the demurrer and heard testimony, and at the conclusion thereof filed his decree. It is in part as follows: (1) That the deed from the Committee to Sluss and wife, dated the 9th day of August, 1946, and duly recorded, is declared to be null and void. (2) That the Committee repay to Sluss and wife the amount of the purchase price he received from them. (3) That the Committee shall execute a good and sufficient deed and convey unto appellants, and their heirs, the land and premises in these proceedings mentioned and described as sold by Richard T. Hamill, Committee, etc., to appellants and conveying all the right, title, interest and estate of the said Committee in and to the same.

(4) That the amount of $3,700 heretofore offered by the solicitor of appellants to the Committee shall be used by the Committee in payment of the Committee’s interest in said property. (5) That at the time of the delivery of the deed from the Committee to appellants the latter shall pay to Sluss and wife the sum of $1,800. (6) That the sum of $1,000 paid by appellants to Sluss and wife as part payment of the land and premises involved in this case shall be retained by Sluss and wife, and (7) that appellants pay unto Sluss and wife an additional sum of $1,800, “which three sums; namely, Thirty-seven Hundred Dollars