Maryland case law › Baugh v. Moore

Baugh v. Moore

122 Md. 149 (1913) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedStockbridge✓ Good law
HoldingIn the latter part of 1910, the appellee, Moore, was employed by the appellant, Baugh, as manager of Baugh's farm in Anne Arundel County.

Stockbridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit, as originally instituted, contained two counts, the first in slander, and the second in libel. By the ruling' of the Court below the count in libel was withdrawn from the consideration of the jury, and is not involved in this appeal. The present suit, therefore, is simply an action for slander, based upon the first count of the declaration, and arises out of the following circumstances: 152 In the latter part of 1910 the appellee was employed by the appellant as manager of the latter’s farm in Anne Arundel County, and continued as such during the ensuing winter, but in May, 1911, was discharged by the appellant.

About a month after the termination of this employment, Mr. Baugh, the appellant, being at an hotel in Baltimore, dictated to a public stenographer in the hotel a letter, which he mailed Moore, the appellee, and some of the language in which constitutes the alleged slander, the alleged slanderous words being: “There are scarcely any small tools on the place. I don’t know what you did with them; bút I gave you the money for them. Rubber boots, coats, etc., have all disappeared — after costing me in the neighborhood of $5,000.00, giving the'place a bad name through your gross incompetency and neglect — to walk off with my property, even if it is a sheet of paper, I won’t stand; and I want everything belonging to me instantly returned. You are the first person I have ever had in my employ that has not brought the Inventory and his accounts to go over with me to prove they were right before leaving.

You did not do this. The Inventory is not of what is on the place, but rather of what should be on the place. I now understand why you did not bring your accounts, etc., to me.” Following the language quoted in the narr. is the innuendo, “meaning thereby that the said plaintiff had been guilty of embezzlement”. A general demurrer was filed to- the declaration, which was overruled.

The demurrer of course admits that the words were written by the defendant, and that they were false and malicious, but it does not admit that the words in themselves are actionable per se, nor does it admit that they are, when read by themselves, or in connection with the colloquium capable of the meaning ascribed to them in the innuendo. If it be conceded that the words as interpreted by the innuendo are actionable, the question whether 153 the innuendo is good, that is to say, whether it is fairly warranted by the letter when read in connection with the inducement and colloquium still remains as a matter of law for the Court. It is the office of the innuendo to explain the words of the alleged slander and to give them their true meaning. It can not, however, introduce new matter or enlarge or add to the sense of the words declared on, or properly impute to them a meaning not justified, either when taken alone or in connection with the inducement and colloquium.

Lewis v. News Co., 81 Md. 466 ; Dorsey v. Whipps, 8 Gill, 462 ; Haines v. Campbell, 74 Md. 158 ; Avirett v. State, 76 Md. 510 ; Barnes v. State, 88 Md. 347 ; Goldsborough v. Orem, 103 Md. 681 ; Weeks v. News Pub. Co., 117 Md. 126 . Taking the language as used in the declaration, together with the admissions necessarily made by the demurrer, and the allegation that the plaintiff had been injured thereby, the demurrer was properly overruled. The case then proceeded to trial.

The sole exception reserved was the exception of the defendant to the ruling of the Court on the prayers, and the important ruling was the refusal of the defendant’s first prayer, by which the Court was asked to instruct the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. As a part of the proof of the plaintiff’s case, he had offered in evidence the letter, a portion of which had been selected and declared on in the narr as constituting the alleged slander. From that it appears that immediately following the language declared on, is this sentence: “Your immediate attention to returning my property will oblige, yours truly. Kindly answer instantly or I will put the case in my attorney’s hands.” By the language which was quoted in the narr. as explained by the inuendo, it was averred that the appellee

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