Bayliss v. Federal Mutual Insurance

Anderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by the appellant, Delsworth Lloyd Bayliss, Jr., from a jury verdict against him in a negligence action. The jury found in favor of the appellees, Federal Mutual Insurance Company and Mrs. Lillian May Scott, in the amount of $446.52. On appeal the appellant claims that Mrs. Scott was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and that the trial court erred in not granting either his motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment N.O.V. On October 5, 1969, the appellant was operating his vehicle in a westerly direction on Tilghman Neck Road, Queen Anne’s County, Maryland, a public highway, when at 5:30 p.m. his vehicle collided with the vehicle operated by Mrs. Scott.

The question of whether Mrs. Scott was contributorily negligent as a matter of law hinges upon whether she violated Article 661/2, Sec. 11-404 of the Maryland Code, 1 commonly known as the “Boulevard Rule.” Section 11-404 states: “The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall stop and yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway.” Mrs. Scott was coming from a private driveway known as Gouldtown Church Road at the time of the accident. The important question is whether she had left the driveway and entered the boulevard at the time of the accident. If she had entered the boulevard, it is clear that she did not yield the right-of-way to Mr. Bayliss and was ¹⁶⁸ contributorily negligent as a matter of law. If this was the case, appellant’s motion for a directed verdict was improperly denied.

Oddis v. Greene, 11 Md. App. 153, 157 . In Mazer v. Stedding, 10 Md. App. 505 , Judge Orth discussed in detail the propriety of directing verdicts when the question involved is primary or contributory negligence. The Court stated at pages 506-507: “The established general rule is that questions of primary and contributory negligence are for the jury. But there is a qualification as well known as the general rule.

Particular facts may establish that a defendant has been guilty of negligence or a plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative Inc. v. Blanchard, 239 Md. 481, 485 . The burden of proving negligence is upon the plaintiff and the burden of proving contributory negligence is upon the defendant. Before it can be determined as a matter of law that one has not been guilty of negligence, the truth of all the credible evidence tending to sustain the claim of negligence must be assumed and all favorable inferences of fact fairly deducible therefrom tending to establish negligence drawn. ‘And Maryland has gone almost as far as any jurisdiction that we know of in holding that meager evidence of negligence is sufficient to carry the case to the jury.

The rule has been stated as requiring submission if there be any evidence, however slight, legally sufficient as tending to prove negligence, and the weight and value of such evidence will be left to the jury. * * * However, the rule as above stated does not mean, as is illustrated by the adjudicated cases, that all cases where questions of alleged negligence are involved must be submitted to a jury. The words ‘legally sufficient’ have significance. They mean that a party ¹⁶⁹ who has the burden of proving another party guilty of negligence, cannot sustain this burden by offering a mere scintilla of evidence, amounting to no more than surmise, possibility, or conjecture that such other party has been guilty of negligence,