BD. OF ED. OF CHARLES CTY. v. Ed. Ass'n

Davidson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a question of the limitations Maryland Rule E 2 imposes upon judicial review of an award made in an arbitration to which the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, Md. Code (1974), §§ 3-201 — 3-234 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, is inapplicable. More particularly, the issue here is whether § 3-227 requires a trial court to confirm such an award if the claim that the arbitrator has exceeded his authority by enforcing an illegal contract is not asserted within the time constraints specified in § 3-224. Maryland Rule E 2 provides: “After a final award has been made in writing in an arbitration to which the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act is inapplicable, court proceedings may be had to confirm, vacate, modify, correct, or enter judgment on the award.

In any such case, the provisions of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act concerning such proceedings shall be applicable.” 1 ³⁶⁰ The Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, § 3-227 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: “Confirmation of award by court. “(a) Petition. — A party may petition the court to confirm the award. “(b) Action by court. — The court shall confirm the award, unless the other party has filed an application to vacate, modify, or correct the award within the time provided in §§ 3-222 and 3-223 [and 3-224]. “(c) Proceedings when award not confirmed. — If an application to vacate, modify, or correct the award has been filed, the court shall proceed as provided in §§ 3-223 and 3-224." (Emphasis added.) 2 Section 3-224 provides in pertinent part: “Vacating award. “(a) Petition. — (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a petition to vacate the award shall be filed within 30 days after delivery of a copy of the award to the petitioner. “(2) If a petition alleges corruption, fraud, or other undue means it shall be filed within 30 days after the grounds become known or should have been known to the petitioner. “(b) Grounds. — The court shall vacate an award if: “(1) An award was procured by corruption, fraúd, or other undue means; “(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers----” (Emphasis added.) ³⁶¹ The record here shows that on 21 April 1976, the appellant, the Board of Education of Charles County (Board), and the appellees, the Education Association of Charles County (Association) and Darlene Sale, one of its members, entered into a collective bargaining agreement (agreement). Article II of that agreement established a grievance procedure through which an employee could process a claim that the agreement had been violated, misinterpreted or misapplied. That procedure terminated in final and binding arbitration. 3 The Uniform Arbitration Act was inapplicable to this agreement because it did not, as required by § 3-206(b), expressly provide that that Act should apply. 4 In 1973, Darlene Sale was a licensed, certified and tenured teacher in the Charles County school system. She was then employed as a middle school librarian.

In 1976, the Charles County Superintendent of Schools denied her request for reassignment to a position as an elementary school teacher. She filed a grievance which was processed to arbitration. Before the arbitrator, the Association contended that the ³⁶² Superintendent had violated Articles VI(B) 5 and VII(A) 6 of the agreement. The Board asserted that under Md. Code (1957,1975 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 77, § 62 7 the Superintendent had sole power to transfer teachers and other certified personnel. It maintained that if the agreement were construed to allow the arbitrator to encroach upon the Superintendent’s power, the agreement would violate Art. 77, § 62. Consequently, the Board concluded that if the arbitrator, in enforcing Articles VI(B) and VII(A) of the agreement, could order the assignment of a teacher, his award would also violate Art. 77, § 62. The arbitrator found that the contract was legal because there was no conflict between Articles VI(B) and VII(A) of the agreement and Art. 77, § 62.' In this respect he said: “[Article 77, Section 62] ... is a statutory grant of authority to the Superintendent of Schools to transfer teachers in accordance with the needs of the School system.

The Superintendent, in the exercise of his statutory authority, through the School Board and through free, voluntary and lawful collective bargaining, has agreed in' Article VII that an ³⁶³ employee’s wish for reassignment will be honored as long as the employee is qualified for the vacancy and a vacancy exists. The requisite Contract language dilates upon, rather than conflicts with, the Superintendent’s authority.” He further found that the Superintendent had violated the agreement and in an “Award and Decision,” dated 1 April 1977, ordered Darlene Sale to be transferred to an available elementary school teaching position for the 1977-78 school year. The Board did not file a petition to vacate the arbitrator’s award. Moreover, it did not comply with the award by reassigning Darlene Sale.

On 7 October 1977, in the Circuit Court for Charles County, the Association, pursuant to § 3-227(a), filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award. On 22 November 1977, the Board filed an answer stating that “[t]he particular arbitration award was in direct confrontation with existing statutory law and constituted an aberration that is unenforceable.” Thus the Board asserted, in essence, that the contract, as construed by the arbitrator, was illegal, and that by enforcing such a contract, the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The trial court granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Board’s motion for summary judgment, and confirmed the award on the ground that the Board had not petitioned to vacate the award within the time required by the statute. The Court of Special Appeals held that the language of § 8-227(b) was mandatory and affirmed.

We granted a writ of certiorari and shall affirm. The Board here contends that a court has “inherent” authority to determine the legality of any contract which it is asked to enforce. It maintains that when a court is asked to enforce an award resulting from an arbitration in which the legality of a contract was at issue, the court cannot be bound by the arbitrator’s determination of that issue, but must itself determine the contract’s legality. It concludes that ³⁶⁴ § 3-227 cannot, therefore, be construed so as to deprive the court of its authority. 8 We do not agree.

In Nick-George Limited Partnership v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 279 Md. 385, 386 , 368 A.2d 1001, 1002 (1977), this Court considered the question of the limitations which § 3-224 imposes upon judicial review of an arbitration award. There, an arbitrator entered an award on 18 September 1973 which required Nick-George to pay damages for breach of contract. On 4 December 1973, 77 days later, in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Nick-George filed a bill of complaint seeking, insofar as here relevant, to have the arbitrator’s award “declared null and void and of no effect” on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. This Court, stating that the “declaratory action sought to have the award vacated,” treated the bill of complaint as a petition to vacate the award.

Recognizing that “the General Assembly has restrictively defined the grounds upon which and the condition under which a court may vacate an award,” this Court held that because the bill of complaint had not been filed within the statutory time limit, the action could not be maintained. This case establishes that the time constraint contained in § 3-224 is mandatory. In reaching its conclusion, this Court relied upon Security Construction Co. v. Maietta, 25 Md. App. 303 , 334 A.2d 133 (1975). In that case, the Court of Special Appeals considered the question of the limitations which § 3-224 and § 3-227 impose upon judicial review of an arbitration award.

There, an arbitration panel entered an award on 14 March 1974 which required Security to pay