Beachem v. State

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. The Circuit Court for Washington County declared valid a detainer lodged by the Commonwealth of Virginia against Neil Edgar Beachem, appellant. Beachem contests this ruling contending: —“[The] detainer should have been dismissed for failure to comply with the time limits set by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.” —“The Court below erred in denying [his] motion to dismiss the Virginia detainer on the basis of undue delay by the State of Maryland in determining the detainer’s validity.” ⁴³ —“The Court below erred in denying [his] request for a continuance.” —“The Judge should have recused himself from [the] case.” I. INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS In order to understand Beachem’s arguments, we first review the relevant portions of the primary statute involved in this appeal. Virginia officials seeking temporary custody of Beachem in order to try him for charges pending in Virginia proceeded under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (I.A.D.), codified at Md.Code Ann. Art. 27, §§ 616A-616R (1957, 1982 RepLVol., 1986 Cum.Supp.).

The I.A.D. provides cooperative procedures among the member states for the transfer of prisoners incarcerated in a penal or correctional institution in one state, which we will refer to as the asylum state, to the temporary custody of a second state, which we will refer to as the demanding state, 1 where criminal charges are pending. See Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303, 307 , 455 A.2d 973 (1983). Initially, officials of the demanding state direct a detainer to prison officials in the asylum state that informs them that there are charges pending in another jurisdiction against one of their prisoners, based on an untried indictment, information or complaint. See Clipper, 295 Md. at 305-08 , 455 A.2d 973 ; State v. Boone, 40 Md.App. 41, 44 , 388 A.2d 150 (1978).

The official having custody of the prisoner must inform him or her of the contents of the detainer and of his or her right as outlined under § 616D to request final disposition of the charges in the demanding state. § 616D(c). The prisoner may send a written request for transfer to the custodial official in the asylum state. § 616D(a), (b). That official forwards the consent notice to the appropriate prosecuting ⁴⁴ official of the demanding state, who must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days from the date the request is received. § 616D(a), (b), (d). Should the prisoner choose not to exercise his or her § 616D right to a final disposition, the demanding state then may request temporary custody pursuant to the procedures outlined in § 616E.

During the 30 days following receipt of the demanding state’s request, the governor of the asylum state may disapprove the request on his or her own motion or upon motion of the prisoner. § 616E(a). Following the expiration of the 30 days, the prisoner may be delivered to the demanding state but retains the right to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the asylum state and challenge the legality of the detainer at a pre-transfer hearing. § 616E(d); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 443-49 , 101 S.Ct. 703, 709-12 , 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Statchuk v. Warden, 53 Md.App. 680, 684-85 , 455 A.2d 1000 , cert. denied, 296 Md. 111 (1983). If the court concludes that delivery is legal, the prisoner may appeal that decision. Statchuk, 53 Md.App. at 683-86 , 455 A.2d 1000 .

After exhausting the right of appeal, trial must commence within 120 days from the date of the prisoner’s arrival in the demanding state. § 616E(c). At the earliest practicable time following trial or dismissal of the charges, the prisoner must be returned to the custody of the asylum state. § 616F(e).

II

CASE SUB JUDICE In August, 1982 Beachem began serving a 10-year sentence in the custody of the Maryland Division of Correction. The prosecuting attorney for the Commonwealth of Virginia lodged a detainer against Beachem in November, 1982 under the I.A.D. Beachem chose in December, 1982 not to request final disposition under § 616D. The record is silent about whether anything relevant to Beachem’s transfer occurred until November, 1983 when Virginia officials filed a request for temporary custody of Beachem pursuant to § 616E. ⁴⁵ We are not told what, if anything, transpired in the ensuing eight months except that on July 23,1984, Beachem filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Circuit Court for Washington County attacking the Virginia detain-er and contesting a Missouri detainer which the court had previously found to be valid in February of 1983. 2 Although the circuit court denied the petition without a hearing by order filed July 31, 1984, the State did not file an answer to Beachem’s petition until September. The State explained that while the court’s order dealt with the Missouri detainer, it failed to address Beachem’s petition contesting the Virginia detainer.

The State also brought to the court’s attention that Beachem had been transferred to the temporary custody of Missouri on July 24, 1984. The court issued another order on November 2, 1984 denying the petition as to the Virginia detainer because Beachem was not “confined or restrained in his lawful liberty within the State” as required for one to petition the court for a writ of habeas corpus under Rule Z41. Beachem was returned to the custody of Maryland later that month. The State filed a Motion for Reconsideration in March, 1985 indicating to the court that Maryland could not transfer Beachem to Virginia since he requested, but was not granted, a habeas corpus hearing.

The court granted the motion on April 11, 1985 and ordered “that a hearing be set on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by the State’s Attorney’s Office as soon as practicable.” The hearing was scheduled for June 9, 1986. In total, 43 months passed from the time Virginia lodged the detainer until the June 9 hearing. ⁴⁶ At the hearing, Beachem stated he wanted the Virginia detainer dismissed without a hearing on its validity because it had taken Maryland over three years to act on the detainer. He also told the court that he and his attorney were not prepared to contest the validity of the detainer. The court permitted the State to proceed with its case and scheduled a later date for Beachem “to present evidence to the contrary or other evidence that is relevant on the detainer ... [w]hich will give Mr. Beachem a full opportunity to contest the validity of this detainer.” Following the later hearing on July 8, 1986, the court issued a Memorandum and Order denying Beachem’s request to block his delivery to the temporary custody of Virginia.

We will turn to the merits of the issues presented.

III

DISMISSAL OF DETAINER FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EXTRADITION ACT Appellant argues that the lodging of a request for temporary custody under the I.A.D. triggers compliance with certain provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. Appellant alleges that specific time limits of the Extradition Act were not honored in this case and therefore the detainer should be dismissed. We disagree. A. The Extradition Act Maryland’s Extradition Act and the I.A.D. are distinct and separate enactments.

The Extradition Act, codified at Md.Code Ann. Art. 41, §§ 2-201 to -228 (1957, 1986 Repl.Vol.), is a uniform act passed by certain states unilaterally. Unlike the I.A.D., which is codified in Article 27, the Extradition Act is not a compact among the states. Rather, Maryland’s Extradition Act outlines the duties of our Governor regarding the arrest and surrender to the custody of a demanding state persons properly charged there who are presently in, but not necessarily incarcerated in, Maryland. While the Extradition Act, unlike the I.A.D., provides for the arrest and surrender of persons to the demanding state ⁴⁷ who are otherwise at large in Maryland, it overlaps with the I.A.D. in that it also provides for temporary custody to the demanding state of persons incarcerated in Maryland.

Under § 2-205 of the Extradition Act, the Governor may agree with the executive authority of another state for the extradition of a fugitive incarcerated there, with the return of the fugitive at Maryland’s expense. Virginia’s uniform extradition statute contains a provision similar to § 2-205 so that Virginia officials may seek temporary custody of a fugitive incarcerated in another state, including Maryland. See Va.Code Ann. § 19.2-89 (1949, 1983 RepLVol.). See also, e.g., Ray v. Warden, 13 Md.App. 61, 64 , 281 A.2d 125 (1971) (Pennsylvania officials, pursuant to Maryland’s Extradition Act, sought temporary custody to prosecute a fugitive imprisoned in Maryland).

Thus, in the instant case, since appellant was incarcerated at the time Virginia lodged a detainer against him, Virginia officials could have sought temporary custody of appellant under either the Extradition Act or the I.A.D. Virginia officials chose to seek custody through the I.A.D. Had they proceeded pursuant to the Extradition Act, Maryland would have had to follow a set of procedures different from those required under the I.A.D. Once arrested in Maryland for charges pending in another state, the Extradition Act would require that Maryland’s Governor decide whether to comply with the extradition request within 30 days, or 90 days if a full extension is granted. §§ 2-207, -215, -217. If the Governor decides to grant the extradition request, he or she issues a governor’s warrant. § 2-207. Certain rights enunciated in § 2-210 attach to a person arrested under that warrant: the person is brought before a judge and informed of the charge(s) and his or her right to procure legal counsel; for a prisoner who desires to contest the legality of his or her arrest, the judge fixes a reasonable time in which the prisoner may apply for a writ of habeas corpus, and once the prisoner petitions for the writ, the judge sets a hearing date; and where, following a hearing, the court denies the petition, the prisoner may ⁴⁸ appeal to this Court. If no governor’s warrant is issued within the permissible 30 to 90 days from the time of arrest, a judge or District Court commissioner may discharge the accused. § 2-217.

B. Application of the Extradition Act to the I.A.D. There is no provision under the I.A.D. that specifically limits the amount of time that may pass from the filing of a detainer until the habeas corpus hearing when a defendant chooses to challenge the detainer’s validity. Appellant argues that we should apply the 30- to 90-day time limit that would have been applicable had Virginia sought custody of him under the Extradition Act rather than under the I.A.D. Citing § 616B of the I.A.D., Clipper v. State, and Cuyler v. Adams, appellant explains his argument as follows. The member states to the I.A.D. expressed in § 616B their recognition that without cooperative procedures for the orderly disposition of outstanding detainers, the extradition process is lengthy and cumbersome, and an outstanding detainer can block a prisoner’s eligibility for certain rehabilitative programs. The Court of Appeals has concluded from this that lodging a detainer against a prisoner under the I.A.D. imposes additional restraints on the prisoner’s liberty similar to those emanating from the arrest of a person under the Extradition Act.

See Clipper, 295 Md. at 307 , 455 A.2d 973 . The 30- to 90-day rule insures that fugitives sought under the Extradition Act will have a timely determination of any invalid restraint. The I.A.D., however, contains no corresponding protection for prisoners serving sentences but who, absent the detainer, would be eligible for work-release programs, treatment and rehabilitation. In reliance on Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 448 , 101 S.Ct. at 711 , appellant concludes that we must apply the 30- to 90-day rule because a prisoner fighting transfer to a demanding state under the I.A.D. retains all rights and remedies he would have under the Extradition Act.

Appellant misapplies Cuyler to this case. ⁴⁹ In Cuyler , the Supreme Court interpreted subsection (d) of § 616E of the I.A.D. As stated, § 616E sets out the procedures to be followed by the demanding state when requesting temporary custody of a prisoner from the asylum state. Subsection (d) provides that “[njothing contained in [§ 616E] shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery ... but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.” The Supreme Court held, based on § 616E(d), that since an inmate sought under the Extradition Act would be entitled to a habeas corpus hearing, the asylum state could not deny that same right to a prisoner requested for temporary custody pursuant to the I.A.D. 449 U.S. at 449 , 101 S.Ct. at 712 . In Statchuk, 53 Md.App. at 685 , 455 A.2d 1000 , this Court relied on Cuyler to provide the right of appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, so that a prisoner sought under the I.A.D. would enjoy the same right of appeal to this Court as § 2-210 guarantees to inmates sought under the Extradition Act. In both Cuyler and Statchuk , rights originally available only to fugitives sought under the Extradition Act were applied to prisoners sought under the I.A.D. Without a hearing as required by Cuyler , and an appeal therefrom as required by Statchuk , the prisoner would necessarily be deprived of “any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery” in direct contravention of § 616E(d) of the I.A.D. Unlike the right to a hearing on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or the right of appeal from a denial of the petition, the non-application of the Extradition Act’s 30- to 90-day rule does not impede a prisoner’s challenge to his or her transfer.

That time period has no bearing on the prisoner’s right to contest delivery but is germane only to the issuance of a governor’s warrant. As we made clear in Statchuk, 53 Md.App. at 685 , 455 A.2d 1000 , the right to