Beale v. State

Horney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The defendant (Rosalie L- Beale) was tried by the Criminal Court of Baltimore sitting without a jury on a six-count indictment, charging violations of the narcotic drug laws, and a general verdict of guilty was entered on all counts. On the motion for a new trial, the Supreme Bench granted the motion as to the first, second, fourth and fifth counts (charging unlawful possession and control of narcotics and with being a second offender with respect to both of these charges), but denied the motion as to the third and sixth counts (charging unlawful possession of equipment for administering narcotics and with being a second offender with respect to this charge). On appeal, the only claim of the defendant is that the narcotics equipment taken by the police from the back yard of the house in which she resided was inadmissible as evidence against her because it was obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure.

The State, on the other hand, contends that there was no search and seizure as a matter of law; that the taking of the evidence was reasonable and therefore legal ¹⁸⁴ though made without a warrant; and that the taking was legal as incident to a lawful arrest. In the early morning (3:00 a.m.) of a day in May of 1961, three members of the narcotics squad (Officers Robinson, Davis and Griffin) went to the residence of the defendant. They planned, the police claimed, to talk to the defendant with regard to an arrest that had been previously made. When they arrived, Officer Robinson went up the front steps and rang the bell to the second floor apartment occupied by the defendant and demanded that he be admitted.

And, as had been prearranged, Officer Davis went to the rear of the premises. When the defendant looked out of a second story window and recognized Officer Robinson, whom she knew, she refused to admit him and left the window. But she went out on the roof of a back porch and threw several objects (subsequently identified as narcotics equipment) to the ground. Officer Davis, who was standing in the hedge-enclosed backyard of the premises, picked up one of the objects, examined it, and, after determining that it was a hypodermic needle, yelled that he had a needle to Officer Robinson, who was still standing at the front door.

It was not until then and after a further demand to enter was refused, according to Officer Robinson, that he kicked the door open, and went up to the apartment of the defendant where he found her with a marijuana cigarette. Officer Davis followed, bringing with him the narcotics equipment he had taken from the back yard. A search was then made of the apartment and the defendant was arrested. At the trial the narcotics equipment taken by the police was admitted as evidence over the objection of the defendant.

If there was a search and seizure as a matter of law, and the seizure of the narcotics equipment by the police was unlawful under the facts and circumstances in this case, then the remaining questions posed by the State as to whether the taking of the equipment was reasonable or was incident to a lawful arrest will require little consideration. As we read the record, it is apparent to us that the police were trespassers at the time the narcotics equipment was picked up in the back yard. Officer Davis became a trespasser ¹⁸⁵ the moment he entered the enclosed back yard. And Officer Robinson was a trespasser, if not ab initio, then certainly from the time of his forced entry into the dwelling because the information given him by Officer Davis that a misdemeanor had been or was being committed in his presence was acquired while Officer Davis was himself a trespasser.

In Gorman v. State, 161 Md. 700 , 158 Atl. 903 (1932), where the facts and circumstances were similar to those in the case at bar, a police officer, having seen a number of persons entering and leaving the house of the defendant, suspected a violation of the lottery laws and entered the house through an open door, without either a warrant to search the premises or to arrest the defendant, and took possession of the gambling paraphernalia he found there. In holding that such evidence was procured by an illegal search and seizure, even though the officer had not found it necessary to break open the door, it was said (at p. 704) that “the bursting open of the door was not the essence of the offense; it was the invasion of the privacy of the defendant's home, [for] under the facts and circumstances stated, the officer was * * * a