Beall v. Holloway-Johnson

GLENN T. HARRELL, JR., J. (Retired, Specially Assigned). This tragic case arose out of a motor vehicle collision between a Baltimore City police cruiser and a privately-owned motorcycle, resulting in the death of the motorcyclist. Respondent Connie Holloway-Johnson, on her own behalf and as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased son, Haines E. Holloway-Lilliston, initiated a wrongful death suit against, among others, Petitioner, Timothy Everett Beall, a Baltimore City police officer.

The complaint, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleged negligence, gross negligence, battery, and a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Compensatory and punitive damages were sought. At trial, Petitioner made a Motion for Judgment at the close of the Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief. The Circuit Court (Hon.

Marcus Z. Shar, presiding) granted the motion in part, allowing to go to the jury only the question of whether Officer Beall was negligent and, if so, what amount of compensatory damages should be awarded. The jury returned a substantial verdict for compensatory damages for Respondent, which amount was reduced subsequently by the trial judge, on Petitioner’s motion, to $200,000 to comply with the damages “cap” of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”), Maryland Code (1974, 2013 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-301 et seq. (“CJP”). Respondent appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgment in a reported opinion and remanded the case for a new trial.

We granted Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to consider multiple questions regarding the partial grant of the Motion for Judgment, the availability for the jury to consider an award of punitive damages, and the applicability of the LGTCA. ⁵⁷ THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED DURING PLAINTIFFS’ CASE-IN-CHIEF On 25 July 2010, Officer Timothy Beall was on duty in a marked police car in Baltimore City working the midnight patrol shift in the Northern District. He overheard a call on his radio from an off-duty officer about a Mercedes convertible and a motorcycle “chasing each other or racing each other” at about 100 miles per hour (m.p.h.) on Interstate 88 North (also known as the Jones Falls Expressway) in Baltimore City. A second transmission related that other officers were able to stop the car 1 , but not the motorcycle. Officer Beall, who was near the 1-83 interchange with Cold Spring Lane at the time of the second transmission, turned onto 1-83 North to see if he could “observe the motorcycle.” As he was merging onto the Interstate, he noticed a motorcycle on 1-83 northbound that was traveling at the time about 35 m.p.h. in a 50 m.p.h. zone.

Unable to determine whether this was the same motorcycle as the one involved in the reported chase/race, Officer Beall followed the motorcycle in an attempt to ascertain license plate information. At approximately 1-83 North’s interchange "with the Northern Parkway, the motorcycle sped-up to about 75 m.p.h., a speed in excess of the posted limit. Officer Beall noted that “[initially I didn’t have much reason to suspect that [the motorcycle] was stolen. But once the motorcyclist fled, that heightened my suspicion based on the extremely high rate of stolen motorcycles in the City of Baltimore that the bike may be stolen.” After the operator of the motorcycle “popped a wheelie,” Officer Beall turned on his siren and lights to pursue the motorcycle. 2 ⁵⁸ The pursuit continued, at speeds of 75 m.p.h., onto the inner loop of Interstate 695 East (the Baltimore Beltway) in the direction of Towson.

At the Charles Street interchange, the speed of the motorcycle reduced to the posted speed limit of 50 m.p.h. 3 As Officer Beall trailed the motorcycle, he received intermittent messages over his car’s police radio. The messages were intermittent due to reception problems along portions of the route. Officer Beall denied hearing an initial direct radio order from his Shift Commander to discontinue pursuit of the motorcycle; he acknowledged, however, that he was advised indirectly thereafter to disengage from the pursuit after he was on 1-695 East into Baltimore County. His Shift Commander stated over the radio “Yeah, have the officer disregard and come back, notify the state police of [the motorcyclist’s] location, the radio is going to die out soon, if there are repeaters out there, so just come on back.” Officer Beall responded to this by stating “10-4” (meaning “acknowledged”), turning off his lights and his siren, and planning to turn back to Baltimore City.

At this time, Officer Beall called the State Police from his cell phone to inform them of his position and that he had followed a motorcycle from Baltimore City onto 1-695 East. Officer Beall followed the motorcycle onto the exit ramp for Dulaney Valley Road. He explained that he chose this exit, rather than the closer Lutherville/Timonium exit, because “[t]he next exit [he] was familiar with was Dulaney Valley Road to go south, which [would take him] right down to Northern Parkway from York Road.” On the exit ramp, the motorcyclist reduced his speed to between 31 and 33 m.p.h. ⁵⁹ Officer Beall was traveling at about 40 m.p.h. The police cruiser made contact with the motorcycle.

The motorcyclist, later identified as Holloway-Lilliston, was ejected from the bike. 4 His body made contact with the hood of Officer Beall’s car. He died upon hitting the pavement. State Police Sergeant Jon McGee, an expert witness in accident reconstruction, offered his opinion about how the collision occurred: So based off all the evidence, it’s my opinion that there was contact between the two vehicles, and at that time Mr. Holloway[-Lilliston], based on that contact, the bike would have went out from Mr. Holloway[-Lilliston]. When he came down, he came down on the hood of the police car.

My initial assessment on the scene was that the speeds of both vehicles were low. I estimated probably the police maybe 40. And I knew the speed differential between the two vehicles, because there was no inward crush damage to the bumper, was significantly low, maybe 5 to 10, 15 mile an hour speed difference, with the police car obviously going slightly faster than the motorcycle. Based off of where the initial tire marks and scratch marks of where the motorcycle went down and the location of where Mr. Holloway[Lilliston] fell to the road and slid to final rest, and the damage associated with the front hood of the police car, it’s my opinion that there was contact.

Mr. Holloway[-Lilliston] fell onto the top of the police car, rolled off the left side. Based on the helmet damage, the circumference of the helmet, there were scratches pretty much the entire circum ⁶⁰ ference of the helmet, landed head first as he rolled off the hood and slid to final rest. Sergeant McGee concluded that “Officer Beall failed to maintain a safe and proper following distance when he collided into the rear of the motorcycle driven by Mr. [Holloway-JLilliston.” On 6 April 2011, Holloway-Lilliston’s mother, Connie Holloway-Johnson, filed a complaint against Officer Timothy Beall and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The complaint alleged counts of negligence, gross negligence, battery, and a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

Ms. Holloway-Johnson sought compensatory and punitive damages in the sum of $20 million. Prior to trial, she dismissed voluntarily her claims against the City and proceeded to a jury trial against Officer Beall. The case was tried between 24 July 2012 and 3 August 2012. At the close of the Plaintiffs’ case, Officer Beall made a Motion for Judgment on the basis that insufficient evidence was presented as to each of the claims.

Judge Shar granted Officer Beall’s motion as to the battery, gross negligence, and Article 24 claims, as well as the prayer for punitive damages. The only claims that were allowed to go to the jury were the negligence claim and the prayer for compensatory damages. On 3 August 2012, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Holloway-Johnson and the estate of her son for $3,505,000. On 20 August 2012, Officer Beall filed a Motion for a New Trial or to Revise the Judgment by reducing the verdict to conform to the damages “cap” in the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA).

The Circuit Court reduced the judgment to $200,000, in accordance with the LGTCA. Ms. Holloway-Johnson appealed timely to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals held, in a reported opinion, that there was sufficient evidence for each of Ms. Holloway-Johnson’s claims to have been submitted to the jury and that it was error for the Circuit Court to have granted Officer Beall’s Motion for Judgment. Additionally, the intermediate appellate court determined that, although the evidence ad ⁶¹ duced would not justify under the gross negligence count an award of punitive damages, the battery and Article 24 counts could qualify as “predicates for punitive damages” under a theory of “malice implicit” in the elements of each cause of action.

Holloway-Johnson v. Beall, 220 Md.App. 195, 227 , 103 A.3d 720, 739 (2014). The Court held that the applicability of the LGTCA (which was not raised until Officer Beall’s post-verdict motion) and its cap on damages was a “furiously contested moot question,” concluding that, under the provisions of the LGTCA, any potential cap on damages could not be waived by Officer Beall as to his local government employer, who would be liable for the judgment (up to the limit of the LGTCA “cap”). On 27 March 2015, we granted a writ of certiorari, Holloway-Johnson v. Beall, 442 Md. 194 , 112 A.3d 373 (2015), to consider five questions (posed by the parties in their respective petitions), which we reorganize and condense as follows 5 : 1) Did the Court of Special Appeals modify improperly established standards to conclude that there was sufficient ⁶² evidence to support the counts for gross negligence, battery, and a violation of Article 24? 2) Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it held that Respondent’s counts could support an award of punitive damages, contrary to the long-established law that actual, not implied, malice was necessary and remanding the case for further proceedings which might result also in the award of duplicative compensatory damages? 3) Did Officer Beall waive the damages cap and judgment avoidance afforded by the Local Government Tort Claims Act, having failed to raise the defense until after trial and entry of judgment? Although we agree with the Court of Special Appeals as to the sufficiency of the evidence as to the counts for which the trial court gave judgment in favor of Officer Beall at the close of Ms. Holloway-Johnson’s case-in-chief and on the LGTCA question, we reverse nonetheless the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals for reasons we shall explain.

DISCUSSION I. Sufficiency of the Evidence a. Contentions Officer Beall contends that the Circuit Court’s grant of his Motion for Judgment as to the Respondent’s claims for battery, gross negligence, violation of Article 24, and punitive damages was correct because there was insufficient evidence admitted during the Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief to support submitting them to the jury. Proceeding from that premise, he asserts further that the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing this judgment and remanding the case for a new trial when the admitted evidence amounted to no more than speculation about his intent at the time of the collision. Ms. Holloway-Johnson responds that she adduced enough evidence at trial to have all of her claims submitted to the jury and that the Court of Special Appeals was correct to reverse the grant of judgment in favor of Officer Beall.

Additionally, she maintains that the Court of Special Appeals applied ⁶³ correctly the malice requirement for consideration of awarding punitive damages to conclude that her battery and Article 24 claims could support implicitly such an award. b. Standard of Appellate Review We “review, without deference, the trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment in a civil case.” District of Columbia v. Singleton, 425 Md. 398, 406 , 41 A.3d 717, 721 (2012) (citing Thomas v. Panco Mgmt. of Md., LLC, 423 Md. 387, 393-94 , 31 A.3d 583, 587-88 (2011)). Because “[w]e conduct the same analysis that a trial court should make when considering the motion for judgment,” we determine whether the evidence presented to the Circuit Court was sufficient to allow permissible inferences of the proof of the elements of the relevant claims. Singleton, 425 Md. at 406-07 , 41 A.3d at 721-22 .

The appellate court considers “the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Thomas, 423 Md. at 393 , 31 A.3d at 587 . c. Analysis As stated earlier, Judge Shar allowed the jury to consider only the negligence count and the compensatory damages claim because he deemed all of Ms. Holloway-Johnson’s other claims to be lacking sufficient evidentiary support. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, finding that there was sufficient evidence for all of Ms. Holloway-Johnson’s counts to reach the jury, as well as her request for punitive damages. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (including reasonable inferences drawable therefrom), we agree in the abstract with the Court of Special Appeals as to the counts, but, as we shall explain, reversal and remand for a new trial to consider those claims and possibly punitive damages is unwarranted in the context of this case.

A motor tort negligence claim presents ordinarily a relatively low bar for a plaintiff to overcome and avoid the grant of a motion for judgment. Negligence is defined as “any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an ⁶⁴ interest of others, which falls below the standard established by law for protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187 , 935 A.2d 699, 717 (2007) (citation omitted). A claim for gross negligence, however, sets the evidentiary hurdle at a higher elevation: [G]ross negligence is an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them. Stated conversely, a wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or acts wantonly and willfully only when he inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly indifferent to the rights of others that he acts as if such rights did not exist.

Id. (citations omitted). The distinction between negligence and gross negligence, however, can be a difficult one to establish in practice, as explained by the Court of Special Appeals in this case — “[a] legally sufficient case of ordinary negligence will frequently be enough to create a jury question of whether such negligence was or was not gross.” Holloway-Johnson, 220 Md.App. at 221 , 103 A.3d at 735 . Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558 , 594 A.2d 121 (1991), involved a state trooper’s high-speed pursuit of a suspected drunk driver, which resulted in the death of other motorists.

The plaintiffs claimed that the trooper was grossly negligent because he pursued recklessly a suspect “at an excessively high rate of speed through a heavy traffic area.” Boyer, 323 Md. at 579 , 594 A.2d at 132 (quotation marks omitted). We explained that, “[i]n order to charge [the trooper] with gross negligence, the plaintiffs must have pled facts showing that [the trooper] acted with a wanton and reckless disregard for others in pursuing [the suspect].” Boyer, 323 Md. at 579 , 594 A.2d at 132 (emphasis in original). We held that the facts advanced by the plaintiffs were too vague to demonstrate adequately that the trooper acted in a grossly negligent manner because a rational fact-finder could not conclude that the trooper acted with “wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others in ⁶⁵ pursuing [the suspect].” Boyer, 323 Md. at 580-81 , 594 A.2d at 132 . In Barbre , we held that, when a police officer “ordered [the suspect], who was unarmed, to raise his hands, and that after [the suspect] complied with the request, [the police officer] approached with his gun drawn and shot him in the neck, [those facts] could support an inference that [the police officer] acted grossly negligent.” Barbre, 402 Md. at 190 , 935 A.2d at 719 .

Comparing and contrasting Boyer and Barbre , it is apparent that determining if a plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence of gross negligence to get to a jury can be a complex question due to the sometimes close relationship between ordinary negligence and gross negligence. See Barbre, 402 Md. at 187 , 935 A.2d at 717 (“Issues involving gross negligence are often more troublesome than those involving malice because a fine line exists between allegations of negligence and gross negligence.”). Here, Officer Beall argues that the evidence (viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs) did not show he was grossly negligent (or permit a reasonable inference of such) in acting “wantonly and willfully [by inflicting the] injury intentionally.” Barbre, 402 Md. at 187 , 935 A.2d at 717 . To be sure, the evidence presented at trial by the Plaintiffs revealed contradictory accounts by Officer Beall about how the incident unfolded.

With only one surviving eyewitness, other direct evidence of what occurred was minimal. Although Ms. Holloway-Johnson’s complaint alleged that Officer Beall “intended to harm Haines,” Officer Beall notes that Sergeant McGee “did not offer any testimony that this accident was the result of intentional conduct by Officer Beall.” The evidence presented by Ms. Holloway-Johnson strikes us as stronger than the conclusory record in Boyer . In Boyer , the plaintiff offered general allegations that the behavior of the trooper was reckless and in violation of police procedures. Ms. Holloway-Johnson relied specifically, however, on the actions of Officer Beall prior to the collision to show that he was acting recklessly.

Officer Beall commenced trailing the ⁶⁶ motorcycle surreptitiously and started active pursuit only after Holloway-Lilliston “popped a wheelie” and sped away. Officer Beall’s conduct concededly was in violation of BCPD General Order 11-90 (see discussion supra fn. 2) as he was acting without exigent circumstances in his pursuit of Holloway-Lilliston, who committed only traffic offenses and posed no articulated immediate harm to others. Additionally, evidence was presented to show that Holloway-Lilliston reduced his speed upon entering the construction zone on 1-695 East; yet, Officer Beall continued to follow him in contravention of a directive from his Shift Commander to discontinue pursuit and allow the State Police to handle the “traffic incident.” Because “we have viewed gross negligence, rather, ‘as something more than simple negligence, and likely more akin to reckless conduct,’ ” there was a factual dispute that should have been presented ordinarily to the jury. Barbre, 402 Md. at 187 , 935 A.2d at 717 (citing Taylor v. Harford County Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 384 Md. 213, 229 , 862 A.2d 1026, 1035 (2004) (emphasis in original)). Here, based on the accident reconstruction that surmised the over-taking speed of the police cruiser on the ramp, the lack of exigent circumstances justifying Officer Beall’s pursuit, and Officer Beall’s testimony (as an adverse witness called by Ms. Holloway-Johnson) that he saw Holloway-Lilliston apply his brakes on the exit ramp, a jury could have inferred reasonably that Officer Beall knew or should have known a collision between the vehicles was likely. Ms. Holloway-Johnson relied on the same evidence for her battery claim, which required proof that “one intends a harmful or offensive contact with another without that person’s consent.” Nelson v. Carroll, 355 Md. 593, 600 , 735 A.2d 1096, 1099 (1999) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 & cmt. d (1965)). The contact may be direct or indirect, but it must be intended.

Nelson, 355 Md. at 600-01 , 735 A.2d at 1099-100 . It is clear that “[a] person can use an automobile or other vehicle to intentionally hit another person,” but, in order for that to constitute civil battery, the element of intent must be present. Hendrix v. Burns, 205 Md.App. 1, 22 , 43 ⁶⁷ A.3d 415, 428 (2012). This intent “requires not a specific desire to bring about a certain result, but rather a general intent to unlawfully invade another’s physical well-being through a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension of such a contact.” Nelson, 355 Md. at 602-03 , 735 A.2d at 1101 .

Accordingly, accidental conduct that “inadvertently results in a harmful or offensive contact with another will not give rise to liability, but one will be liable for such contact if it comes about as a result of the actor’s volitional conduct where there is an intent to invade the other person’s legally protected interests.” Nelson, 355 Md. at 603 , 735 A.2d at 1101 (emphasis supplied). Although a plaintiff is required to adduce admissible facts as to each element of a claim in order to reach the jury, it is well-established that “intent is a subjective element usually left for the jury’s determination [and] there are circumstances under which the law will imply the intent element of an intentional tort or a crime.” Id. Following the accident, Officer Beall made conflicting statements to investigators that the motorcycle darted in front of him on the ramp, that Holloway-Lilliston crashed his motorcycle, and his body bounced off a tree, among other claims. 6 Notwithstanding Officer Beall’s differing after-the-fact accounts, his violation of the BCPD General Order and disregarding his Shift Commander’s verbal directive were clearly intentional acts. It is clear further that contact was made between the two vehicles by Officer Beall’s vehicle overtaking the motorcycle.

Thus, Ms. Holloway-Johnson presented legally sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude ⁶⁸ that a battery occurred on the exit ramp, which led to the collision, and was intentional. By the same token, the evidence could have been viewed by a reasonable fact-finder as supporting a claim for a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Article 24 7 is Maryland’s equivalent due process provision, determined to “have the same meaning and effect in reference to an exaction of property, and that the decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct authorities.” Bureau of Mines of Maryland v. George’s Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 156 , 321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974). The analysis for an Article 24 violation follows the analysis used for claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, as a result, “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, ... should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment[’s] ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 204 , 757 A.2d 118, 141 (2000) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 , 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)).

Officer Beall relies on County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 839 , 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1713 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), in which the United States Supreme Court was asked to “resolve a conflict among the Circuits over the standard of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating substantive due process in a pursuit case.” The Supreme Court determined that “a police officer [does not violate] the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender.” County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 836 , 118 S.Ct. at 1711 . Only “a purpose to cause harm unrelated to ⁶⁹ the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process violation.” County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 836 , 118 S.Ct. at 1711-12 . Although this case might support Officer Beall’s argument to the jury (had he been called upon to address the jury on this count) that he did not violate Article 24, it bears on the burden of persuasion once the claim is presented to the fact-finder, who would evaluate the evidence to determine if the standard was met. It does not aid his argument regarding the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs’ evidence via a vis his motion for judgment at the close of the Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief.

As held by this Court, “if there is any evidence adduced, however slight, from which reasonable jurors [applying the appropriate standard of proof] could find in favor of the plaintiff on the claims presented, the trial court should deny the defendant’s motion for judgment at the close of the evidence and submit the claims to the jury for decision.” Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 16 , 867 A.2d 276, 285 (2005). After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Ms. Holloway-Johnson, we arrive at the same technical conclusion as the Court Special Appeals: the defense’s motion for judgment based on the alleged insufficiency of the Plaintiffs’ evidence should not have been granted on that ground. Our decision does not address whether a jury would find for Ms. Holloway-Johnson on these claims. We are