Beasley v. State

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, William Beasley (Beasley), was convicted of armed robbery and carrying a concealed deadly weapon by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion. We granted certiorari in order that we might consider whether the trial judge prejudicially restricted the right of Beasley to cross-examine a State’s witness.

Since we conclude that he did, we shall reverse. The facts of the case were succinctly stated in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals: “The victim, Charles Colbert, testified that on July 7, 1972, at 1 a.m., he picked up a girl and three men who were hitchhiking in the City of Baltimore. According to Colbert: ‘When I get to 25th and Calvert I say I’m turning here. One guy in the back seat turned and say this is a stick up.

I turned around and say you got to be crazy. That’s when he slammed me beside the head with this iron pipe. I tried to get out of the car. When I tried to get out the car one jumped out the back seat and took the hammer and busted the front side glass on the driver’s seat side.’ He stated that ‘the young lady tore my pants pocket and the money [$250] ⁵²³ disappeared out of my pocket.’ He identified appellant as the man who wielded the hammer. “The appellant took the stand, denied participating in the robbery stating that he and his wife had attended a movie that evening and later they watched television at the home of a friend, Freddy M. Maddox.

His wife and Maddox testified in support of his alibi.” The State called Julie Grabstein as a rebuttal witness under a grant of immunity from prosecution. Her attorney was present in court. He was initially assigned by the Public Defender to represent Beasley. Thirteen days after that assignment, however, he was replaced because of a conflict of interest.

Miss Grabstein’s story differed somewhat from that of Colbert. She claimed that she met the victim in a bar on Baltimore Street, that they “made an arrangement and [she] took him up to [her] apartment building,” and that they entered an unoccupied apartment located on the same floor as her apartment. She thought this was around midnight. As to what then took place, she testified: “Well, we were in the room and we weren’t there but a few minutes, and the door came in, you know — I don’t remember if it was left unlocked or if it was just pushed in — and three guys came in, and pushed me out of the apartment and they robbed him.

They robbed the dude.” She identified Beasley as one of the three men. She further said: “They didn’t hurt the man or anything. They just went in his pockets. I guess they took his money, you know, but they didn’t physically, you know, hurt him or anything.” Miss Grabstein acknowledged that she left the apartment building with the victim’s three assailants.

She said she drove around with them in what she claimed was Beasley’s car. ⁵²⁴ The record, relative to cross-examination of Miss Grabstein, includes the following: “Q. Now, those three people that you say were there on July 7th, 1972, what are their names, the three males? “A. You all know the names, anyway. Why do you have to ask me? I don’t have to answer that. “MR. COCOROS [counsel for the defendant]: Your Honor, she refuses to answer the question. “THE COURT: I am afraid you must answer the question, Miss Grabstein.

Who were the three males, if you knew their names; who were they? “THE WITNESS: Well, I thought the names were already known, aren’t they, Your Honor? “THE COURT: I don’t know. The question is — you’re asked to say who they were. I am afraid you will have to answer the question. Who were they, if you know? “MR.

EAGAN [Assistant State’s Attorney]: Your Honor, may we approach the Bench? “THE COURT: Come up. Do you want the reporter here? “MR. EAGAN: No [sic], Your Honor. “(Whereupon, there was a discussion at the Bench between the Court and counsel, as follows:) “THE COURT: Now, Mr. Gilbert, you are her counsel and you are the one who raised the objection to her answering this question, as I understand. “MR. GILBERT: Yes, Your Honor. “THE COURT: Yes. “MR.

GILBERT: Yes, Your Honor. The reason why is she has been assaulted. She was assaulted while pending trial in the Baltimore City Jail. She’s been threatened by face to face confrontations and ■ by telephone from what she has told me and I believe her, and I feel that her reservation in ⁵²⁵ testifying at this point, in giving out names, is merely to protect her life. “THE COURT: You really mean that? “MR.

GILBERT: I really mean this, Your Honor. “THE COURT: Mr. Cocoros, do you insist on pressing this question? “MR. COCOROS: I would just like to ask a couple of questions. “MR. COCOROS: . . . May I get these particular names, Your Honor, and bring them up here? “THE COURT: No. If you have any questions, ask — “MR.

GILBERT: I don’t know the names — I don’t know the names. All I know is — I don’t know the names. The only thing I do know is that the little clan that they were involved in — they were all friendly at one time — at that time — anybody that was involved in that particular friendship had, either by themselves or through someone else threatened her. “MR. COCOROS: You don’t know who? “MR.

GILBERT: I am sorry, I don’t know names. I don’t know if it was William Beasley, or — “MR. COCOROS: What I am trying to point out to Your Honor, is that — "THE COURT: Are you pressing the question? “MR. COCOROS: Yes, Your Honor. “THE COURT: I think if something came up, if she were in fact killed, you would be the one responsible for her death by pressing this question.

I will sustain the objection and not require her to answer the question under the circumstances. I wouldn’t want you to have that on your head the rest of your life. ⁵²⁶ “MR. COCOROS: She has mentioned one time Clarence Rogers. “THE COURT: She has mentioned the name Clarence Rogers as being her boyfriend, the man with whom she shared an apartment. “MR. COCOROS: Would the Court permit me to ask her if Clarence Rogers was present in the other apartment? “THE COURT: You may ask her whether Clarence Rogers was present where? “MR.

COCOROS: At the time of the robbery. “MR. EAGAN: It’s irrelevant. “THE COURT: You are asking the same question in another way. That is all you are trying to do. You are just persisting in asking questions that may lead to a tragedy.

I will sustain the objection. “(Whereupon the conference at the Bench was concluded.)” The Court of Special Appeals said, in its opinion: “It is contended that the refusal of the trial judge to compel the witness to give the names of the other two assailants prevented the appellant from showing the bias of the witness and that her testimony was fabricated as well as showing that her motive was to protect those individuals from prosecution and to avenge ‘an old score with the appellant.’ While it may or may not have been helpful to appellant’s case to have the jury know the names of the other assailants, we do not think that the action of the trial judge, under the circumstances here, was so harmful or damaging to the appellant’s defense as to amount to reversible error. It is perfectly evident from the other testimony elicited from the witness that she was in the business of prostitution, had recently been convicted of ‘soliciting’ and that she was a participant in a scheme ‘to roll the victim.’ All of ⁵²⁷ this went to her credibility and was before the jury. It is, of course, well established that the latitude or scope of questions propounded on cross examination lie within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Long v. State, 7 Md. App. 256 .

In this instance, we do not think that discretion was abused.” The facts in Long v. State, 7 Md. App. 256 , 254 A. 2d 707 (1969), differed substantially from those in this case. Judge Thompson there said for the Court of Special Appeals: “On direct-examination, one of the police officers stated that he knew the deceased by ‘reputation.’ On cross-examination, it developed that the witness knew the deceased by reputation within the police department but did not know his reputation in the community. The trial court sustained an objection by the State to a question by the appellant’s counsel as to what that reputation was. Long contends that this ruling was reversible error.

Questions allowed on cross-examination are largely in the discretion of the trial judge, Holt v. State, 3 Md. App. 544 , 240 A. 2d 355 and Barger v. State, 2 Md. App. 565 , 235 A. 2d 751 . We see no abuse of discretion. By his statement that he did not know the general reputation of the deceased, the witness disqualified himself from giving testimony as to that reputation.” Id. at 261-62. The allowance or disallowance of certain questions on cross-examination normally is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.

Shields v. State, 257 Md. 384, 392 , 263 A. 2d 565 (1970); Ridgeway, Inc. v. Seidman, 243 Md. 358, 364 , 221 A. 2d 393 (1966); Shupe v. State, 238 Md. 307, 310 , 208 A. 2d 590 (1965), and cases there cited. Speaking on the subject of cross-examination in Ridgeway, Chief Judge Prescott said for the Court: “[C]ross-examination plays a most important part in the administration of justice in this country. It ⁵²⁸ has been stated that it is one of the most efficacious tests for the discovery of the truth. Regester v. Regester, 104 Md. 1 .

And, when it relates to the facts in issue or to the issues themselves, it may, within reasonable limits, be pursued as a matter of. right. 98 C.J.S., Witnesses, § 368. However, its scope, range, and extent are left largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. Mezzanotte Const. Co. v. Gibons, 219 Md. 178 .” Id. at 364.

This Court, reversing in Shupe , held that the questions propounded were relevant to the issues of whether there had been a theft and whether the appellant was the thief. Judge Sybert there said for the Court: “The prevailing American rule relating to the scope of cross-examination, which is applicable in Maryland, was stated as follows in Williams v. Graff, 194 Md. 516, 522 , 71 A. 2d 450 (1950): ‘* * * where a witness is called to testify on a particular point, the adverse party in the cross-examination of the witness is restricted to the point on which he testified and cannot question him in regard to other issues in the case. Of course, a party may ask questions on cross-examination to show bias or prejudice in the witness, or to lay a foundation to admit evidence of prior contradictory statements.* * * ‘However, our rule does not go to the extent of restricting the cross-examination of the witness to the specific details inquired into on direct examination, but permits full inquiry into the subject matter entered into. Where a general subject has been entered upon in the examination .in chief, the cross-examining counsel may ask any relevant question on the general subject.* * * ’ “The extension of the rule, mentioned in the second paragraph just quoted, was applied in Plank v. Summers, [ 205 Md. 598, 607-08 , 109 A. 2d 914 ⁵²⁹ (1954)].

We think the questions posed in the instant case were permissible under it. The testimony of the State’s witnesses, Jenkins, Mosby and the station owner, showed a loose, slipshod method of handling and protecting station receipts. Therefore, a question on cross-examination exploring the possible consequences of such methods was properly within the scope of the direct, and relevant to the case. Although defense counsel apparently did not know what the answers to the questions would be, ‘exploratory’ type questions are well recognized, McCormick, Evidence, sec. 29, p. 55, and to prohibit their use under certain circumstances may be prejudicial, see Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687 (1931).” Id. at 311.

In Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687 , 51 S. Ct. 218 , 75 L. Ed. 624 (1931), an individual was convicted of using the mails to defraud. A former employee of the defendant was called by the Government as a witness at the trial. He gave what the Supreme Court described as “damaging testimony with respect to various transactions of accused.” Upon cross-examination there was an attempt to ascertain the place of residence of the witness. Objection was sustained on the ground that the questions were immaterial and not proper cross-examination.

Mr. Justice Stone said for the Court: “Cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right. The Ottawa, 3 Wall. 268, 271 . Its permissible purposes, among others, are that the witness may be identified with his community so that independent testimony may be sought and offered of his reputation for veracity in his own neighborhood, cf. Khan v. Zemansky, 59 Cal. App. 324 , 327ff.; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.) § 1368 I.

(1) (b); that the jury may interpret his testimony in the