Beattie v. State

GRAEFF, J. Appellant, Bruce Beattie, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of criminally negligent manslaughter, reckless driving, negligent driving, failing to obey the driving rules for laned roadways, and making an illegal U-turn. The court sentenced appellant to one year incarceration for the conviction of criminally negligent manslaughter. 1 On appeal, appellant presents two questions for our review, which we have rephrased slightly: 1. Did the circuit court err in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Md.Code (2011 Supp.) § 2-210 of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”), governing criminally negligent manslaughter, is unconstitutionally vague? 2. Was the evidence sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for criminally negligent manslaughter?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In the early morning hours of October 22, 2011, appellant, a commercial tractor trailer driver, was driving eastbound on I-70, when he realized he was lost. He called Charles Cobb, a driver with the same company, for help with directions. Appellant called Mr. Cobb using a hands-free headset in his truck, and they spoke for approximately twenty minutes.

Appellant told Mr. Cobb that he was on 1-70 east. Mr. Cobb advised that 1-70 “dead ends into a park and ride,” and appellant needed to be driving on 1-70 west. Appellant pulled over and attempted to locate a map, but he could not find one. ⁶⁷¹ He then looked around and saw a “center pull through” area in the median, leading to 1-70 westbound. Appellant was aware that he was not allowed to use the pull through area, which was a break in the grassy median for emergency vehicles. 2 He was wary, however, to get off the highway at an exit that might not take him in the direction he needed to go.

Observing that there was “hardly any traffic on the road,” appellant looked around the bend in the road and saw that “everything was clear” for about a quarter of a mile. He was unable to see anything beyond that point due to the curve in the road behind him. Appellant decided to pull out from the shoulder of the road and cross the three lanes of 1-70 east to turn around using the emergency access in the median. Before pulling out from the shoulder into the travel lanes, appellant looked for oncoming traffic, but after he pulled out, he was looking across the roadway toward the median.

As he pulled onto the highway to attempt to reach the median, appellant told Mr. Cobb that “two vehicles were bearing down on him at a high rate of speed.” He stated that one vehicle appeared to pass him, and then stated: “I think someone ran into me.” He felt the impact when his vehicle was halfway between the shoulder and the median. While still on the line with Mr. Cobb, appellant got out of the truck to inspect the damage, and upon returning stated: “I believe this person has passed. I gotta go. I have, I have to call 911.” The driver of the vehicle that collided with appellant’s truck was Michael Neimus.

Mr. Neimus’ friend, Raymond Bradshaw, testified that he met Mr. Neimus at 10:00 p.m. the evening of October 21, 2011, at Union Jack’s, a restaurant and bar in Columbia. The two men stayed at the bar for several hours, talking and drinking, and they left “a little bit before closing,” just prior to 2:00 a.m. on October 22, 2011. Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Neimus lived ⁶⁷² close to each other in Baltimore County, and after leaving the bar, they planned to go to one of their houses. They drove in their respective cars toward their homes.

Mr. Neimus was driving in front of Mr. Bradshaw in the middle lane of 1-70. As they crossed over an overpass, Mr. Bradshaw saw a truck on the shoulder of the road. Immediately after he saw the truck, the truck “swung out” from the shoulder onto the roadway, leading him to believe the truck was taking a wide turn to get back onto the road. The truck, however, did not get into one of the eastbound lanes, but rather, it “kept on coming,” blocking “the whole highway.” Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Neimus both swerved into the left lane to try to avoid the truck, and then swerved back to the right as the truck blocked the roadway.

Because Mr. Bradshaw was several car lengths behind Mr. Neimus, he had more time to move to the right. Mr. Neimus could not get to the right of the truck fast enough, and he hit the back right side of the truck before driving off the road. Crash reconstruction experts at the scene determined that Mr. Neimus was less than a foot away from avoiding the truck completely. Both Mr. Neimus and Mr. Bradshaw were driving approximately 65 miles per hour at the time they went over the overpass and saw the truck; the speed limit on that portion of 1-70 was 65 miles per hour.

After Mr. Bradshaw successfully swerved around the truck, he pulled over and stopped his car. He approached Mr. Neimus’ vehicle and saw that Mr. Neimus’ truck had fire underneath it, and Mr. Neimus’ body had been pushed into the backseat. Mr. Bradshaw tried to get Mr. Neimus to respond, but he realized “it was done.” Mr. Bradshaw stayed at the scene of the accident and waited for the police and paramedics to arrive. He gave oral and signed written statements to police describing what he observed.

Investigators at the crash scene recovered one gram of marijuana from Mr. Neimus; Mr. Bradshaw was unaware that Mr. Neimus had marijuana on him. Mr. Nei ⁶⁷³ mus’ blood alcohol level later was determined to be .14. 3 Trooper Boyce, a member of the Maryland State Police, received a call at 2:57 a.m. regarding a collision on 1-70 eastbound. When he arrived at the scene, he saw a Silver Chevy Tahoe on the right shoulder with “heavy front end damage” and a white tractor trailer in the emergency vehicle crossover. The fire department had all lanes on 1-70 blocked due to the collision.

Trooper Boyce approached the Chevy Tahoe and saw that the driver, Mr. Neimus, was deceased. Thereafter, he spoke to appellant. Appellant initially told Trooper Boyce that he had pulled his truck onto the right shoulder in order to look at a map, and he was struck from the rear by another vehicle. Trooper Boyce asked appellant to memorialize his account on a Driver Witness Statement form, and appellant recounted the same version of events that he told Trooper Boyce.

Trooper Bedell, the Collision Investigator for the Maryland State Police Crash Team and an expert in the field of accident reconstruction, responded to the scene at approximately 4:30 a.m. He read the witness statements provided by appellant and Mr. Bradshaw. He then approached appellant, who was still at the scene, and they walked the area of the collision together. Appellant gave Trooper Bedell an account of the accident that matched his written statement, asserting that he had been on the right shoulder looking at a map with his hazard lights on, and as he began to pull out into traffic, a vehicle struck the rear of his trailer.

After the impact, appellant pulled into the emergency vehicle crossover area. Trooper Bedell asked appellant why he had pulled into the crossover after the accident, rather than stopping in the right ⁶⁷⁴ lane where he was struck, or pulling back onto the shoulder. Upon this line of questioning, appellant became nervous. Trooper Bedell and appellant continued to walk the collision site, and when the area was cleared of emergency vehicles, Trooper Bedell was able to see various scrapes and other markings on the roadway.

Based on the markings and other indications of where the impact had occurred, Trooper Bedell asked appellant whether he was intending to use the emergency vehicle crossover by driving from the right shoulder across the highway, requiring the two vehicles driven by Mr. Neimus and Mr. Bradshaw to swerve left and then right to avoid him. At that point, appellant stated that he wanted to revise his written statement. Appellant’s revised witness statement provided that, after he determined he was going east rather than west on 1-70, he pulled onto the shoulder. He then pulled onto the roadway and began to make a U-turn.

Prior to pulling out onto the road, appellant looked both ways and did not see any oncoming traffic. As he was turning, he did not see a car approach, but he felt an impact when the vehicle collided with the back of his truck. In response to a question on the form asking if the accident could have been avoided, appellant answered in the affirmative, stating that he “shouldn’t have made the U-turn.” At the accident scene, Trooper Bedell asked appellant whether he was on a cell phone at the time of the collision, and appellant replied that he was not. Trooper Bedell also asked appellant whether he was in possession of any hands-free devices, and appellant stated that he did not have a hands-free device inside his vehicle.

Trooper Bedell subsequently searched appellant’s truck pursuant to a warrant, and he did not locate a hands-free device. 4 Later in his investigation of the collision, Trooper Bedell obtained appellant’s cell phone records. He learned that appellant had made a cell phone call ⁶⁷⁵ to Mr. Cobb prior to the collision that lasted approximately 20 minutes, continuing past the time of the collision. At appellant’s trial, Trooper Bedell described the accident scene. The portion of 1-70 where the collision occurred was three lanes wide, with two shoulders.

Each lane was 12 feet wide, and the shoulders were 9 to 10 feet wide; the roadway was 56 feet from edge to edge. Appellant’s tractor trailer was approximately 70 feet long. Appellant’s attempt to make a U-turn on the emergency vehicle crossover, which was a break in the grassy median between 1-70 east and west, left tire marks on the roadway, which Trooper Bedell used to verify the path of the vehicle. As part of his investigation, Trooper Bedell obtained the “black boxes” from both the tractor trailer and the Chevy Tahoe, which contained computer information from both vehicles.

From the black box, as well as from vehicle marks at the scene and other data, Trooper Bedell determined that Mr. Neimus was traveling 62 miles per hour at the time he first swerved to attempt to avoid appellant’s vehicle, which occurred 112 feet from impact. Using the black box from appellant’s vehicle, he determined that appellant pulled onto the highway from the shoulder and accelerated to 10.5 miles per hour within 7 seconds before impact, when he slowed to a stop. Trooper Bedell calculated that, based on the speed of the vehicles and when appellant’s truck began to pull out, Mr. Neimus had a little more than a second and a half to perceive and respond to the hazard. In his professional opinion, the cause of the accident was as follows: [T]he cause of the collision was that the commercial vehicle had made [its] ... turning maneuver, it had positioned [its] vehicle directly in front of the Chevrolet Tahoe in such a way that the, the available time and the available distance for a driver to respond was not enough to be able to ... safely avoid the collision.

Prior to announcing its verdict, the court commented on the criminal negligence statute, CL § 2-210, as follows: “It’s a new Statute, but it’s not an overly cumbersome Statute. I don’t believe that this is a difficult Statute to apply under the ⁶⁷⁶ circumstances of this case. Maybe under another, maybe one of those other cases hypothetically referred to it may be. [B]ut not ... in this one.” The court then stated: This is a situation where a driver of a seventy foot tractor trailer was approximately a quarter of a mile from a curve in the road, where the speed limit is sixty-five miles per hour, in the dark, with and I note exhibit[s] show, no street lights in that area of 1-70, moves from the ... right shoulder to the far left median in one move. By his own testimony, he looked in his rear view mirror before he moved from the shoulder into the lane of travel, but didn’t do so again as he crossed ... from the middle lane to the far left lane.

And that maneuver was completely unexpected for good reason. Doing so while he was on the phone hands free or not, frankly only elevates the level of negligence, but in my view the maneuver itself meets the definition of a gross deviation from the standard of care. I want to address the, the issue that was raised with regard to the victim in this case and his blood alcohol level. While it is true that level of alcohol can certainly impair one’s ability to react quickly to unanticipated circumstances[,] I think the evidence is clear that, in this case at least, there was no negligence on the part of the victim in the way that he handled his vehicle....

And I do find that the conduct on the part of this Defendant, while not intentional, does meet the requirements of criminal negligence was is defined in [CL § 2-210]. So, I find him guilty of count one [criminally negligent manslaughter]. The court found appellant guilty of all other charges. After merging the lesser convictions with the conviction for criminally negligent manslaughter, the court sentenced appellant to one year imprisonment.

This appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. Void for Vagueness Appellant’s first contention is a challenge to the constitutionality of CL § 2-210, entitled “Causing death of another ⁶⁷⁷ by operation of vehicle or vessel in criminally negligent manner.” He asserts that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore, the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. CL § 2-210, which became effective on October 1, 2011, provides as follows: (a) In this section, “vehicle” includes a motor vehicle, streetcar, locomotive, engine, and train. (b) A person may not cause the death of another as the result of the person’s driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle or vessel in a criminally negligent manner.

(c) For purposes of this section, a person acts in a criminally negligent manner with respect to a result or a circumstance when: (1) the person should be aware, but fails to perceive, that the person’s conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such a result will occur; and (2) the failure to perceive constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that would be exercised by a reasonable person. (d) It is not a violation of this section for a person to cause the death of another as the result of the person’s driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle or vessel in a negligent manner. (e) A violation of this section is criminally negligent manslaughter by vehicle or vessel. (f) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both.

Appellant contends that the elements of criminally negligent manslaughter are “vague and ambiguous” because they “fail to provide [a defendant] with adequate notice of the conduct prohibited.” He further argues that, as written, the statute is so broad that it could be subject to irrational or selective enforcement. ⁶⁷⁸ The State argues that CL § 2-210 is not unconstitutionally vague. It contends that “[t]he meaning of the term ‘criminal negligence’ as expressly defined” in the statute “is clear on its face,” and the meaning of this term “becomes no less clear when placed in the larger context of Maryland jurisprudence governing” the concept of gross negligence. The State asserts that, “[bjecause no person of ordinary intelligence would necessarily have to guess at the statute’s meaning, and because the statute provides enforcement standards narrow enough to forfend irrational and selective patterns of enforcement, the circuit court was correct to rule that [CL] 2-210 is not unconstitutionally vague.” In addressing a claim involving the constitutionality of a statute, we begin “with a