Becker v. Falls Road Comm. Ass'n

Arthur Becker, et al. v. Falls Road Community Association, et al., No. 24, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Getty, C.J. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE — COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL — APPLICABILITY AND RECORD EVIDENCE The Court of Appeals held that the Board of Appeals of Baltimore County erred in reversing an administrative law judge’s conclusion that collateral estoppel did not bar the approval of an updated development plan where the record contained competent, material, and substantial evidence that established material changes existed between the original development plan and the updated development plan. Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. C-03-CV-19-002639 Argued: December 03, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 24 September Term, 2021 ARTHUR BECKER, ET AL. v. FALLS ROAD COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, ET AL. *Getty, C.J. *McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, JJ. Opinion by Getty, C.J. McDonald and Watts, JJ., concur and dissent.

Hotten, J., dissents. Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Filed: August 26, 2022 Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. *Getty, C.J., and McDonald, J., now Senior Judges, 2023-01-18 15:49-05:00 participated in the hearing and conference of this case while active members of this Court. After being recalled pursuant to Md. Const., Art. IV, § 3A, they also participated in the decision and adoption of this Gregory Hilton, Clerk opinion. The case before us involves a family-owned one-hundred-acre tract of land in northern Baltimore County that the property owner, in connection with a Maryland-based development firm, seeks to develop.

The local community association and neighboring residents have opposed the proposed development for multiple reasons, generally based upon traffic safety concerns. The dispute between the property owner and the local community association has spanned the better portion of the last two decades and has endured countless procedural obstacles including a restructuring of Baltimore County’s oversight process for development and zoning matters. The property owner finally received approval to develop the remaining “northern pod” of the property in 2019, which led to the present appeal. This Court is asked to determine whether the Board of Appeals of Baltimore County erred in reversing an administrative law judge’s determination that substantial changes existed between an original development plan and a later proposed development plan, and therefore the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar approval of the later proposed development plan.

For the following reasons, we answer that question in the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. BACKGROUND The present dispute between Arthur Becker, Nancy Miller, and Gaylord Brooks Realty (collectively, “Becker”) and the Falls Road Community Association (“Community Association”) has spanned nearly the entirety of the last two decades. The factual background and procedural history relevant to this appeal are outlined in detail below. A. The 2004 Development Plan For more than 75 years, the Becker family has owned an approximately one-hundred-acre tract of land in northern Baltimore County where they live and operate a commercial fruit orchard.

The land is bisected east to west by Beaverdam Run, which is a tributary that flows into the Loch Raven Reservoir. The tract of land is therefore divided into a “southern pod” and a “northern pod” by Beaverdam Run. Becker initially sought permission from Baltimore County (“County”) to construct twenty single-family dwellings on the one-hundred-acre property (“2004 Development Plan”). The Community Association opposed the 2004 Development Plan, citing concerns about traffic safety, adequacy of well and septic systems, and suitability of storm water management systems.

Deputy Zoning Commissioner John Murphy (“Commissioner Murphy”) held a public hearing on the matter beginning on January 29, 2004, which lasted five days. Multiple witnesses provided testimony, including Becker, County officials, civil engineers, an ecologist, and two traffic engineers: John Seitz, on behalf of the Community Association, and Wesley Guckert, on behalf of Becker. One of the critical issues pertaining to the approval of the 2004 Development Plan involved access onto Falls Road/Maryland Route 25, a State highway. Access is ultimately controlled by the State Highway Administration (“SHA”), which is charged with analyzing safety issues and determining whether access will be permitted for the proposed 2 development, and if so, what improvements are required to obtain access.

See Maryland Code of Regulations 11.04.05.01(A).1 On March 6, 2003—following its review of the concept plan Becker submitted prior to the submission of the 2004 Development Plan to the County—the SHA issued a letter to Becker refusing to permit access to Falls Road for the proposed development, stating: We have reviewed the referenced concept plan and do not recommend approval. The proposed entrance is located on a sub-standard section of MD 25. * * * We would strongly recommend that the developer evaluate alternate access to MD 25, such as, Applecroft Lane due to the existing road conditions. The record before Commissioner Murphy included this letter from the SHA. In addition to this letter from the SHA, Commissioner Murphy also considered the testimony of the two traffic engineers, both of whom relied on the American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials (“AASHTO”) standards for evaluating the impact on the traffic traveling on Falls Road from the northern pod.

The development of the northern pod proposed ten new lots that would be accessible through the frontage on Falls Road, which consisted of a one-hundred-foot strip of land. The 2004 Development Plan called for a public road, proposed as Rose Court, to service these ten lots and the 1 The County also regulates the safety of the proposed development’s road system under Section 34-4-405(a) of the Baltimore County Code, which requires that a proposed development have “safe and convenient vehicular circulation,” but the ultimate determination of permissibility of access onto a State highway is made by the SHA. 3 pre-existing Becker home. Mr. Seitz and Mr. Guckert reached conflicting conclusions as to the impact the development of the northern pod would have on Falls Road. Mr. Seitz testified that drivers coming from Rose Court and attempting to get onto Falls Road would not have the adequate space to reach a safe speed to merge with drivers that were traveling at or above the posted speed limit of forty miles-per-hour on Falls Road.

He explained that traffic engineers typically use two different measurements of the distance that a driver would need to avoid a collision. The first measurement is referred to as “stopping sight distance,” which is the safe stopping distance for drivers who unexpectedly encounter something on the roadway. Mr. Seitz provided an example of “a child wandering out into the roadway or a disabled vehicle in the road over the crest of a hill.” The second measurement is referred to as “intersection sight distance,” which refers to the distance a driver needs to merge from a minor road into traffic on a major road. In his explanation, Mr. Seitz emphasized that this calculation “includes the time it takes the vehicle pulling out to accelerate to [a] safe speed.” Mr. Seitz, using the AASHTO calculation tables, calculated the stopping sight distance at 305 feet and the intersection sight distance at 445 feet.

He testified that the intersection sight distance for drivers coming from Rose Court and entering Falls Road created a safety hazard for drivers on Falls Road approaching from the south. Mr. Guckert agreed that 305 feet is the stopping sight distance specified by AASHTO for a forty miles-per-hour road. However, he noted that vehicles traveling northbound on Falls Road climb a six percent grade hill near the intersection with Rose Court, which reduces the stopping sight distance from 305 feet to 278 feet. With this understanding, Mr. Guckert 4 characterized this as an adequate stopping sight distance.

While Mr. Guckert agreed with Mr. Seitz that the intersection sight distance did not satisfy AASHTO’s safety standards, it was his opinion that the proper consideration in this matter is the lesser standard of stopping sight distance. In support of this contention, Mr. Guckert emphasized that the number of drivers coming from Rose Court would be relatively low as the development would only have ten homes. He noted “that had this development been a [300-dwelling] proposal, he may have chosen the higher standard.” Both Mr. Seitz and Mr. Guckert identified additional safety concerns with the development of the northern pod. The first safety concern focused on Hickory Hill Road— a county road on the opposite side of Falls Road from the northern pod—because it did not align with the new intersection of Rose Court.

Put differently, Hickory Hill Road and Rose Court would not directly face one another. Mr. Seitz and Mr. Guckert agreed that it would be best to “align the new road with Hickory Hill Road from a safety standpoint.” The two further agreed that if it became impossible to align these roads that the “next best design” would be to have the new and existing roadways one hundred feet apart. On March 12, 2004, Commissioner Murphy issued a written opinion that approved the development of the southern pod but denied the development of the northern pod.2 2 Following the issuance of Commissioner Murphy’s March 12, 2004 opinion, Becker filed a motion for reconsideration seeking relief only as to the southern pod, which did not require direct access onto Falls Road. On December 11, 2006, Commissioner Murphy approved Becker’s revisions to the southern pod.

However, the Community Association, along with other protestants, expressed concern that granting this motion for reconsideration might be interpreted as vacating Commissioner Murphy’s prior decision regarding the northern pod. If so, this would permit Becker to develop the northern pod without adhering to the conclusions and recommendations Commissioner Murphy set forth 5 Commissioner Murphy observed that Becker “own[ed] only approximately one hundred feet of frontage on the west side of Falls Road[,]” which “severely limited” where any road intersecting Falls Road from the northern pod could be located. Commissioner Murphy credited both Mr. Seitz’s and Mr. Guckert’s testimony in ultimately determining that cars entering Falls Road from the northern pod would not have adequate sight distance. Commissioner Murphy noted a combination of factors that created an unsafe situation at the intersection of Falls Road and Rose Court.

He provided the following illustration to demonstrate these concerns: On a workday morning, drivers are coming out of Applecroft Lane, Rose Court, Hickory Hill Road and the Jones driveway to get onto Falls Road to go to work or school. Traffic is flowing both ways on Falls Road and as shown by the traffic data a significant portion of this traffic exceeds the 40 mph speed limit. The vehicle coming from Applecroft wants to turn right to go toward Rose Court. The vehicle on Rose Court wants to turn left to go north on Falls Road.

The vehicle on Hickory Hill wants to go north on Falls Road. And last, but certainly not least, Mrs. Jones wants to go north on Falls Road. All traffic from these side roads stops waiting for a break in Falls Road traffic. Their attention is riveted on Falls Road traffic.

When a break comes in the flow of traffic, who goes first? Commissioner Murphy continued with this illustration, predicting that drivers would become “frustrated by having to wait for Falls Road traffic coming out of Applecroft, Rose Court, Hickory Hill and the Jones driveway in a mad and dangerous scramble to accelerate onto Falls Road. They are not going to be looking for traffic coming from the other side roads.” Accordingly, Commissioner Murphy, based on the cumulative in his opinion. To avoid this misinterpretation, Commissioner Murphy explicitly established in his 2006 opinion that the granting of the motion for reconsideration had no impact on the 2004 findings regarding the northern pod and the traffic concerns of the access to Falls Road.

Becker developed the southern pod following this approval. 6 weight of the evidence, deemed the proposed intersection unsafe, and denied the development of the northern pod. In his conclusion, Commissioner Murphy stated that he “cannot provide some exact criteria under which [he would] approve the northern pod[,]” but he did provide “some general concepts” to improve the 2004 Development Plan. Commissioner Murphy suggested that Rose Court should not be a public road and that the number of lots should be reduced to allow for the use of a private driveway. Additionally, Commissioner Murphy stated that he would allow the developer to submit revised designs that provide a safe intersection of any driveway, which serves the northern pod and Falls Road, and revised storm water management system.

B. The 2016 Development Plan Approximately ten years later, Becker submitted revisions to the 2004 Development Plan to address the prior denial of developing the northern pod (“2016 Development Plan”). The only relevant change from the 2004 Development Plan to the 2016 Development Plan was a reduction in the number of lots from ten to eight. The proposed access point on Falls Road remained a public road and still did not align with Hickory Hill Road. Significantly, however, contrary to its position on the 2004 Development Plan, the SHA approved the proposed access point onto Falls Road and correspondingly recommended approval of the 2016 Development Plan.

In doing so, the SHA specifically addressed site distance and found that the 2016 Development Plan demonstrated compliance with the applicable regulations governing site distance. 7 Due to restructuring of County government, Administrative Law Judge John Beverungen (“ALJ”) presided over hearings on this matter, instead of a Deputy Zoning Commissioner, on December 17, 2015, May 16, 2016, and June 24, 2016.3 Representatives from the County’s Department of Permits, Approvals and Inspections, the Department of Environmental Protection and Sustainability, and the Department of Planning provided testimony recommending approval of the 2016 Development Plan. Additionally, two traffic engineers, one on Becker’s behalf and one on the Community Association’s behalf, presented expert testimony. On August 5, 2016, the ALJ issued a written opinion that denied approval of the 2016 Development Plan, concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred its approval. The ALJ focused on Commissioner Murphy’s 2004 and 2006 rulings and highlighted that Commissioner Murphy “cited three reasons for his decision: (1) inadequate intersection sight distance; (2) the proposed access road was not aligned with Hickory Hill Road; and (3) the proposed access road was designated as a public road.” The ALJ’s 3 In 2011, the County Council approved two bills that restructured the County’s executive branch of government.

On December 6, 2010, Bills 122-10 and 123-10 were introduced at a County Council meeting, which collectively “propose[d] a few substantive changes to the organizational structure of the County’s executive branch of government[.]” Both bills received favorable votes at the County Council meeting on January 3, 2011, and the restructuring took effect on January 16, 2011. Within this restructuring, the Baltimore County Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) assumed the duties of the Zoning Commissioner and Deputy Zoning Commissioner. The OAH is a quasi-judicial body comprised of administrative law judges who hear cases and issue decisions on a variety of matters, including, zoning, land use, and related topics. The administrative law judges are appointed by the County Executive and then confirmed by the County Council.

See Baltimore County Government, Office of Administrative Hearings https://www.baltimorecountymd.gov/departments/adminhearings/ [https://perma.cc/WD5C-SYQL]. 8 analysis continued to explain that even “[t]hough these findings were initially stricken in response to [Becker’s] Motion for Reconsideration, [Commissioner] Murphy again emphasized in a 2006 Order that the factual findings and legal conclusions set forth in his 2004 Order would be applicable to any future development of the northern pod[.]” The ALJ found that the 2016 Development Plan retained two significant, unchanged features from the 2004 Development Plan: (1) it designated Peachwood Lane, formerly called Rose Court, as a public road; and (2) the proposed access to Falls Road did not align with Hickory Hill Road. Additionally, the ALJ credited the testimony of the two traffic experts that the 2016 Development Plan still did not satisfy the AASHTO intersection sight distance standard. The ALJ underscored that “[t]his was also the case when [Commissioner] Murphy issued his Order in 2006 withholding the approval of the northern pod[.]” Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that these unchanged factors that carried over from the 2004 Development Plan stand “as an obstacle to the approval” of the 2016 Development Plan. The ALJ’s analysis initially focused on the doctrine of res judicata, but aptly observed that “the more appropriate terminology is collateral estoppel[.]” He stated that, for the 2016 Development Plan to evade the applicability of collateral estoppel, substantial changes must be made for the development plan to be considered “distinct” from the 2004 Development Plan.

The ALJ found that the only “salient difference” between the 2004 Development Plan and the 2016 Development Plan “is that the current proposal is for 8 rather than 10 lots.” As such, the ALJ concluded that collateral estoppel barred the approval of the 2016 Development Plan. 9 C. The 2018 Development Plan Becker submitted a modification to the 2016 Development Plan in 2018 (“2018 Development Plan”). The 2018 Development Plan altered the 2016 Development Plan in two principal ways. First, the 2018 Development Plan reduced the number of lots from eight to five. Second, it changed the access road onto Falls Road from a public roadway to a private driveway.

The ALJ that denied approval of the 2016 Development Plan also considered the 2018 Development Plan. After receiving evidence and testimony, the ALJ determined that substantial changes existed between the 2004 Development Plan and the 2018 Development Plan, and that therefore, collateral estoppel did not bar consideration of the 2018 Development Plan. The ALJ issued a written opinion on February 6, 2019, this time approving the development of the northern pod set forth in the 2018 Development Plan. In connection with the review of the 2018 Development Plan, County agency representatives from the Department of Permits, Approvals and Inspections, Development Plans Review, and the Office of Zoning Review attended the public hearing before the ALJ.

Each County agency representative indicated that the 2018 Development Plan addressed all comments submitted by their respective agency, and thus each County agency representative recommended approval of the 2018 Development Plan. As to the proposed access point on Falls Road, the County agencies’ “highway comments” stated: Falls Road, Maryland Route 25, is a state road. All improvements, intersections, entrances, draining requirements and construction affecting a state right-of-way are subject to the standards, specifications and approval of 10 the Maryland State Highway Administration in addition to those of Baltimore County. (Emphasis added).

In addition, the County agencies specified certain improvements that the County required Becker to construct at the proposed access point on Falls Road. A letter from the SHA was admitted into evidence that accepted the private driveway access onto Falls Road contingent upon certain conditions being met during the County’s final approval of the 2018 Development Plan. Becker also presented one witness at the hearing, Joshua T. Sharon, a professional engineer with Morris & Richie Associates, Inc. Mr. Sharon provided expert testimony detailing the alterations in the 2018 Development Plan. Mr. Sharon described what he determined to be “significant” changes between the 2004 Development Plan and the 2018 Development Plan.

Notably, the Community Association did not present any witnesses or evidence to rebut the County agencies’ comments, the SHA’s approval of the Falls Road and Peachwood Lane intersection, or Mr. Sharon’s testimony regarding the “significant” changes in the 2018 Development Plan. Members of the community only provided testimony highlighting their various concerns, which focused generally on traffic safety. After considering all the evidence and testimony, the ALJ issued an eight-page opinion approving the 2018 Development Plan. Following a summary of the evidence and testimony in the record, the ALJ first addressed the legal issue of the applicability of the 11 doctrine of collateral estoppel.4 The ALJ emphasized that collateral estoppel does not apply if the “applicant can show there has been a ‘substantial change in fact and circumstances.’” He identified the “50% reduction in density” from the 2004 Development Plan as a substantial change.

In addition, he identified the change in designation of the access roadway from a public roadway to a private driveway as a substantial change. The ALJ explained that Commissioner Murphy “referenced both of these issues in his 2004 order when discussing the circumstances under which the ‘northern pod’ might be approved, and thus he obviously considered these to be material or substantial issues.” In concluding that collateral estoppel did not bar approval of the 2018 Development Plan, the ALJ further maintained that “[t]hese changes are more numerous and substantial than the sole change proposed in the 2016 case; i.e., eight (8) rather than ten (10) lots.” (Emphasis omitted). Finally, the ALJ acknowledged the Community Association’s contention “that to avoid the application of [collateral estoppel] the ‘change in circumstances must be a change in the particular circumstances that induced the prior denial.’” The ALJ concluded that Becker satisfied this standard, as Commissioner Murphy noted that for an updated development plan to be approved “the number of lots should be reduced” and “the access road should be private, so drivers are not [misled].” The ALJ concluded that the 2018 4 While the ALJ concluded that collateral estoppel barred approval of the 2016 Development Plan, his analysis regarding the 2018 Development Plan referenced both res judicata and collateral estoppel. As set forth more fully infra, this case only concerns the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 12 Development Plan “addresse[d] and propose[d] changes in all of these areas, which ‘induced the prior denial.’” After concluding that collateral estoppel did not bar consideration of the 2018 Development Plan, the ALJ proceeded to consider the merits of the 2018 Development Plan and whether it complied with the applicable development regulations.

With respect to the Community Association’s concerns about the safety of the access point at Falls Road, the ALJ made the following findings and conclusions: Protestants contend that the County’s Plan Review Policy Manual requires public or private intersections to be separate by at least 100 feet. In fact, the Manual states that the distance should be 100 feet “where possible.” Here, as recognized by [Commissioner] Murphy, the 100 ft. separation is not possible since the Developer does not own sufficient road frontage on Falls Road. Even so, as recognized by Protestants[,] the centerline of proposed Peachwood [Lane] is approximately 50 feet from the centerline of Hickory Hill Road, which is an increase from the 38 feet of separation shown on the earlier plans. In addition, the [SHA] determined (with regard to the 2016 plan) that the “minimum required site distance can be achieved at the entrance location MD 25 [sic][.]” It is the SHA, not the ALJ or Baltimore County, which determines whether the proposed access is safe and satisfies State requirements, and thus I do not believe the plan can be denied on this basis.

(Internal references to exhibits omitted). Further, the ALJ stated the following regarding the 2018 Development Plan generally: The [Baltimore County Code] provides that the “Hearing Officer shall grant approval of a development plan that complies with these development regulations and applicable policies, rules and regulations.” [Baltimore County Code] § 32-4-229. After considering the testimony and evidence presented by the Developer, the exhibits offered at the hearing, and confirmation from the various County agencies that the Plan satisfies those agencies’ requirements, I find that the Developer satisfied its burden of proof and, therefore, is entitled to approval of the Development Plan. 13 Accordingly, the ALJ approved the 2018 Development Plan, deferring to the SHA’s approval of the Falls Road and Peachwood Lane intersection and concluding that the 2018 Development Plan complied with the applicable development regulations. D. Community Association Appeal to the Board of Appeals of Baltimore County The Community Association appealed the ALJ’s approval of the 2018 Development Plan to the Board of Appeals of Baltimore County (“Board”).

Following a hearing on the record, the Board issued a written opinion on July 8, 2019, concluding that “[the ALJ] erred as a matter of law in ruling that the recent development plan modification was not barred by collateral estoppel.” The Board observed, in a footnote, that the ALJ’s analysis regarding the 2016 Development Plan began with citations to res judicata, but “ultimately concluded, probably correctly, that the real doctrine that controls is that of collateral estoppel.” In doing so, the Board highlighted that “[i]t is sometimes difficult to distinguish between” the two doctrines. Accordingly, the Board’s analysis focused on whether the ALJ erred in the application of collateral estoppel, and not the doctrine of res judicata, to the 2018 Development Plan. The sole issue the Board examined was “whether there [had] been a substantial change in circumstances between Deputy Zoning Commissioner Murphy’s findings in 2004 that the proposed intersection was unsafe and [the ALJ’]s decision in 2019 that it was safe.” The Board outlined Commissioner Murphy’s findings and conclusions from 2004 and 2006, as well as the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the 2016 Development Plan and the 14 2018 Development Plan. The Board described Commissioner Murphy’s “primary safety concern as the ability of the drivers entering Falls Road to see the oncoming traffic, particularly the traffic entering from the proposed Rose Court.” The Board summarized that Commissioner Murphy’s determination of the proposed intersection as unsafe was based on the failure to meet the [intersection sight distance] standard, the sheer number of roads and driveways for traffic seeking to enter Falls Road, all within several hundred feet of each other, the misalignment of Hickory Hill and Rose Court, and the fact that Rose Court, as a public road, potentially created confusion in the minds of the Rose Court vehicles, all of whose drivers expecting the normal safety features of an intersection between two public roads.

The Board determined that safety concerns for drivers on these roadways and intersections substantially influenced Commissioner Murphy’s overall decision. In reviewing the ALJ’s approval of the 2018 Development Plan, the Board noted that the ALJ determined that “Commissioner Murphy’s safety findings no longer had preclusive effect because the reduction of houses to five and making Peachwood Lane private constituted ‘material changes[.]’” The Board ultimately disagreed with the ALJ’s conclusion that these two alterations constituted substantial changes from the prior development plans. The Board observed that Becker did not present any “expert testimony from any traffic expert or otherwise as to why the reduction to five houses made an unsafe intersection safe.” (Emphasis in original). Additionally, the Board emphasized that Becker did not present any testimony, expert or otherwise, explaining why changing Peachwood Lane from a public roadway to a private driveway “materially enhanced the safety of the intersection.” The Board determined that Becker insufficiently attempted to bring the 2018 Development Plan within the parameters of Commissioner Murphy’s “2004 musings,” as 15 “[t]he question of material change in circumstances is an objective question to be decided based on the present facts and circumstances.” (Emphasis in original).

Accordingly, the Board concluded that the record contained no such evidence to render Commissioner Murphy’s factual findings regarding the 2004 Development Plan immaterial. Further, the Board expressed its view that the SHA letters in the record go “from being unable to recommend the intersection in 2004 to having no particular recommendation though accepting the developer’s representation that Peachwood Lane could be installed with adequate sight parameters.” The Board also emphasized that no witness from the SHA provided testimony at any of the hearings taking place from 2004 through 2018 and that the letters contain various “ambiguities and uncertainties that cannot be blithely overlooked.” As such, the Board determined that the position of the SHA could not “represent a material change in the objective safety circumstances as found by Deputy Zoning Commissioner Murphy.” Ultimately, two of the three members of the Board determined that Becker did not present a substantial change “in the circumstances such that the otherwise desirable principal of litigation finality can be over-ridden.” The Board concluded that the changes made in the 2018 Development Plan simply harkened “back to Deputy Zoning Commissioner Murphy’s fifteen-year-old ‘general comments.’” In a written opinion, the dissenting member of the Board disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that “collateral estoppel precludes Developer from moving forward to develop the northern pod of this property in the manner proposed.” Although the dissent determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply, the dissent would have 16 “remand[ed] this case to amplify the underlying factual basis for the ALJ’s approval, particularly as to the safety issues, and if determined to be necessary, to supplement the evidentiary record on those issues.” In sum, the Board voted two-to-one to reject the approval of the 2018 Development Plan, thus reversing the ALJ’s decision. E. Becker’s Appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County Becker sought judicial review of the Board’s decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Following a hearing on the matter, the circuit court issued an opinion from the bench reversing the Board’s decision on June 30, 2020.

In delivering its ruling, the circuit court recounted the relevant factual background and procedural history. The circuit court explained that its role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of the law. The circuit court ultimately concluded that the Board “misapplied the law and misconstrued the facts” in reversing the decision of the ALJ. In support of this conclusion, the circuit court stated that “[c]ollateral estoppel cannot apply in this case where prior rulings arise from an entirely different development than the one more recently proposed in 2018.” The circuit court continued to explain that the 2018 Development Plan contained material differences, and “there was evidence, substantial evidence, from which the ALJ could have and, in fact, did reach that conclusion[.]” In support of its conclusion the circuit court highlighted that the ALJ appropriately credited Mr. Sharon’s “uncontradicted” testimony that the 2018 Development Plan contained material differences compared to the 17 2004 Development Plan.

The circuit court issued an order consistent with its holding on July 6, 2020, which reversed the Board’s decision, and therefore approved the 2018 Development Plan. F. Community Association Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals The Community Association filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, reversed the decision of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. See Falls Rd.

Cmty. Ass’n, et al. v. Arthur Becker, et al., No. 436, slip op. at 29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 22, 2021). The intermediate appellate court determined that the Board correctly “recognized that the safety of the intersection was Commissioner Murphy’s overriding concern[,]” and that this concern “could not be resolved simply by addressing two of [Commissioner Murphy’s] ‘general concepts[.]’” Id. at 29.

The Court of Special Appeals determined that Becker needed to provide substantial evidence “of the impact that the intersection will have on Falls Road based on empirical data” to establish the safety of the Falls Road and Peachwood Lane intersection. Id. Because the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Becker did not satisfy this burden, it reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, effectively reinstating the Board’s decision that collateral estoppel barred the approval of the 2018 Development Plan. Id.

G. Petition for Writ of Certiorari Becker petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on August 25, 2021. Arthur Becker, et al. v. Falls Road Cmty. Ass’n, et al., 475 Md. 699 (2021). 18 Becker presented the Court with the following question—“[w]hether, in order for collateral estoppel to bar a subsequently filed development plan, it must be found that the two plans are identical.” We rephrase the question as whether the Board erred in reversing the ALJ’s determination that substantial changes existed between the 2004 Development Plan and the 2018 Development Plan, and therefore the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar approval of the 2018 Development Plan. For the following reasons, we answer that question in the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review In reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, this Court does not review the decisions of the circuit court or of the Court of Special Appeals. Broadway Servs., Inc. v. Comptroller, 478 Md. 200, 214 (2022). Instead, this Court determines whether the administrative agency itself erred. Id.

In doing so, this Court reviews an agency’s decision “solely on the grounds relied upon by the agency.” Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 123 (2001). This Court “is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s [factual] findings . . . and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Couns. for Balt. Cty., 336 Md. 569, 577 (1994). “Substantial evidence exists if ‘a reasonable mind might accept [the evidence] as adequate to support a conclusion.’” 19 Broadway Servs., Inc., 478 Md. at 214 (quoting Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., Inc. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 834 (1985)). In this case, we must determine whether the Board erred in reversing the ALJ’s determination that substantial changes existed between the 2004 Development Plan and the 2018 Development Plan, and therefore the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the ALJ from considering the merits of the 2018 Development Plan.

Although the Board’s decision is the final administrative decision for purposes of our review, we must consider whether the Board correctly applied the applicable provisions of the Baltimore County Code (“BCC”) when undertaking its review of the ALJ’s decision.5 Accordingly, it is 5 Becker argued in its opening brief to the Court and at oral argument that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that the Board’s decision, and not the ALJ’s decision was the final administrative decision for purposes of judicial review. Becker highlights that, under the BCC, the Board is the body to which an aggrieved person may appeal an administrative law judge’s final decision regarding a development plan. In connection with its review of an administrative law judge’s decision, the Board is required to apply a deferential standard of review to determine whether the administrative law judge’s decision was outside the scope of his or her statutory authority, contrary to the law, or not supported by substantial evidence. See BCC § 32-4-281(e).

Although Becker accurately outlines the scope of the Board’s review under the applicable provisions of the BCC, the fact that the Board is undertaking an on the record deferential review does not alter its characterization as the County’s final administrative decision for purposes of judicial review under Maryland Rule 7-201, et seq. This Court has frequently had the occasion to review the decisions of county boards of appeals, which affirmed or reversed the decision of an earlier decision maker, such as an administrative law judge or hearing officer. See, e.g., People’s Couns. of Balt. Cty. v. Surina, 400 Md. 662, 681 (2007) (reviewing the decision of the Baltimore County Board of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the hearing officer); White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 35 (1999) (reviewing for substantial evidence the decision of the Board of Appeals of Anne Arundel County, which reversed the decision of the hearing officer); Sembly v. Cty.

Bd. of Appeals of Balt. Cty., 269 Md. 177 , 182–83 (1973) (reviewing the decision of the Baltimore County Board of Appeals, which reviewed on appeal the decision of the zoning commissioner). 20 instructive to set forth the County’s review process for approving or denying development plans, and the Board’s scope of review when an aggrieved party files an appeal from the decision of an administrative law judge. B. Development Plan Review Under the Baltimore County Code 1. Proceedings Before an Administrative Law Judge BCC § 32-4-227 sets forth that a “final action on a Development Plan may not be taken until after a public quasi-judicial hearing before a Hearing Officer.” BCC § 32-4-227(a).

Subsection (c) establishes that the Department of Permits, Approvals and Inspections is responsible for compiling and maintaining the following “with respect to all hearing proceedings over which the Hearing Officer presides”: (i) The Development Plan; (ii) Reports or comments or proposed or requested conditions relating to the plan from county agencies, the community input meeting, community groups, or any person; (iii) Exhibits introduced in evidence at the hearing; (iv) The final decision rendered by the Hearing Officer; and (v) Papers, records, and dockets required under §§ 32-3-106 and 32-3-109 of this article. BCC § 32-4-227(c). Additionally, “[t]he Hearing Officer shall consider any comments and conditions submitted by a county agency[.]” BCC § 32-4-227(e)(1). And, “[i]f no comments or conditions are received by the Hearing Officer, the Development Plan shall be considered to be in compliance with county regulations.” BCC § 32-4-227(e)(2).

BCC § 32-4-227 The final administrative decision related to the approval of the 2018 Development Plan is the Board’s decision, not the ALJ’s decision. 21 establishes that an administrative law judge, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, has the authority to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding a development plan following a public hearing on the matter. 2. Appeals of an Administrative Law Judge’s Decision to the Board of Appeals BCC § 32-4-281(b)(1) states that “[a] person aggrieved or feeling aggrieved by final action on a Development Plan may file a notice of appeal with the Board of Appeals . . . within 30 days after the date of the final decision of the Hearing Officer.” BCC § 32-4-281(d) establishes that in reviewing an administrative law judge’s final decision on a development plan, the Board shall hear oral argument of the parties and receive written briefs, if requested by either party. Additionally, “[a]t the Board’s discretion, additional evidence and testimony may be allowed.” BCC § 32-4-281(d). BCC § 32-4-281(e) authorizes the Board to either remand the case to the Hearing Officer, affirm the decision of the Hearing Officer, or reverse/modify the decision of the Hearing Officer.

The Board may reverse or modify the decision of the Hearing Officer where the Board determines that the decision: 1. Exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer; 2. Results from an unlawful procedure; 3. Is affected by any other error of law; 4.

Is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or 5. Is arbitrary or capricious. BCC § 32-4-281(e) (Emphasis added). Here, in the introductory language of its opinion, the Board identified that it was conducting an “on the record review,” noting that “[t]he Protestants appealed only the 22 approval of the development plan; no appeal was taken from any of the zoning issues.

As a result, the appeal hearing before the [Board] was on the record and not de novo.” With the scope of the Board’s review in mind, we turn to the issue of whether the Board correctly determined that the ALJ erred in concluding that substantial changes existed between the 2004 Development Plan and the 2018 Development Plan, and therefore the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the ALJ’s consideration and approval of the 2018 Development Plan. C. Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel We begin our analysis of the Board’s opinion with a review of this Court’s precedent on collateral estoppel. In general, the law “precludes the relitigation of matters that have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided between parties, by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction.” Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 (1989) (“Murray Int’l”). This avoids “the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibilities of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147 , 153–54 (1979).

Accordingly, rules have been developed and adopted to preserve the conclusive effect of judgments. Murray Int’l, 315 Md. at 547 . The two leading doctrines that serve to preserve this conclusive effect are res judicata and collateral estoppel.6 6 The doctrine of res judicata, also referred to as claim preclusion, provides that a claim may not be relitigated once it has come to a final judgment. This Court has previously explained the doctrine of res judicata as a judgment between the same parties and their privies is a final bar to any other suit upon the same cause of action, and is conclusive, not only as to all 23 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also referred to as issue preclusion, establishes that factual issues resolved in the adjudication of one claim are binding for purposes of subsequent adjudication of another claim.

Welsh v. Gerber Prod., Inc., 315 Md. 510, 516 (1989). This Court has established a four-part test that must be satisfied for collateral estoppel to apply: 1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? 2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 3.

Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? 4. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue? Burruss v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Frederick Cty., 427 Md. 231 , 249–50 (2012) (citing Wash.

Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. TKU Assocs., 281 Md. 1 , 18–19 (1977)). matters that have been decided in the original suit, but as to all matters which with propriety could have been litigated in the first suit[.] Alvey v. Alvey, 225 Md. 386, 390 (1961). Res judicata presents itself as an affirmative defense that will preclude the relitigation of a suit if: (1) the parties in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier action; (2) the claim in the current action is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication; and (3) there was a final judgment on the merits in the previous action. Bank of New York Mellon v. Georg, 456 Md. 616, 667 (2017) (quoting Powell v. Breslin, 430 Md. 52 , 63–64 (2013)). The doctrine bars relitigation of “‘all matters actually litigated or that could have been litigated[.]’” Id. at 667–68 (quoting Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty.

Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 388 (2000)). 24 The Court sanctioned the conclusive effect of collateral estoppel for an administrative agency’s findings in Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684 (1992). In doing so, the Court adopted the “Exxon test” used by the Ninth Circuit with respect to administrative agency findings and collateral estoppel. Batson, 325 Md. at 701–03. Under this test, administrative agency findings are afforded the preclusive effect from collateral estoppel if: (1) the agency was operating in a judicial capacity; (2) the issue presented to the court was actually litigated by the agency; and (3) resolution of the issue was necessary to the agency’s action.

Id. at 701 . In development and zoning matters specifically, this Court has established that the threshold issue in determining if a prior adjudication regarding the same property should bear a preclusive effect on the present development plan or zoning application is whether significant or substantial changes exist between the prior development plan or zoning application and the present development plan or zoning application. See Woodlawn Area Citizens Ass’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Prince George’s Cty., 241 Md. 187 , 195– 98 (1966) (“Woodlawn Area”).

Woodlawn Area involved property owners attempting to rezone a forty-seven-acre tract of land in Prince George’s County from its zoning status for detached single-family houses to garden apartments that would permit approximately eight hundred families to occupy the land. Id. at 189 . The property owners attempted to rezone the land three times over a ten-year period. Id. at 189–90.

The property owners’ request was finally approved in 1964, which the protestants appealed, arguing that the prior denials of the rezoning request barred the approval because no substantial changes had been made to the rezoning application. Id. at 190 . 25 The Court ultimately concluded that “[n]o substantial or significant change in fact or law was shown to have occurred between” the property owners’ initial rezoning application and the approved application in 1964. Woodlawn Area, 241 Md. at 197 . The property owners identified four changes in support of their argument that the rezoning application had been properly approved: (1) a proposed highway that would run along one side of the property if developed as garden apartments; (2) the land’s suitability for single- family homes and garden apartment houses; (3) the local community’s need for apartment houses; and (4) the eight zoning reclassifications of the land surrounding the property.

Id. at 197–200. The Court discounted each of these alleged changes as considered in the initial disposition of the rezoning application. Id. Accordingly, the Court held that the original disposition barred the approval of the rezoning application.

Id. at 201 . D. Analysis of the Board’s Opinion Reversing the ALJ’s Approval of the 2018 Development Plan 1. Parties’ Contentions Becker argues that the Board erred in determining that collateral estoppel precluded the ALJ from approving the 2018 Development Plan. Becker contends that the ALJ was presented with substantial evidence that significant and material changes existed between the 2004 Development Plan and the 2018 Development Plan, and therefore the ALJ properly determined that collateral estoppel did not preclude approving the 2018 Development Plan.

Specifically, Becker identifies the following differences between the 2004 Development Plan and the 2018 Development Plan, which were presented to the ALJ: (1) the SHA’s determination that the site distance requirements were satisfied for the Falls 26 Road intersection; (2) the change in the access road to a private driveway; and (3) the reduction of houses from ten to five. Additionally, Becker highlights that the same ALJ also presided over the hearing regarding the 2016 Development Plan, which he ultimately denied under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, demonstrating the extensive care and thought given to the issues. The Community Association responds that the Board correctly concluded that collateral estoppel bars approving the 2018 Development Plan. The Community Association argues that collateral estoppel applies because the changes between the 2004 Development Plan and the 2018 Development Plan—reducing the number of lots from ten to five and changing the access road to a private driveway—are not substantial, and that Becker presented no evidence to demonstrate what the overall impact would be from these two changes.

Further, separate from these changes, the Community Association contends that collateral estoppel still bars approval of the 2018 Development Plan due to other, critical elements of the development plan that have not changed. The Community Association relies on three aspects of the 2018 Development Plan in support of this contention, which are that: (1) the access road to the development is still not aligned with Hickory Hill Road; (2) the intersection sight distance standard is still not satisfied; and (3) the confluence of other roads and driveways entering Falls Road remains. Finally, the Community Association highlights that Commissioner Murphy did not set forth a specific checklist requiring approval of an updated development plan and asserts that simply addressing two 27 of Commissioner Murphy’s concerns regarding the