Beckwitt v. State

Daniel Beckwitt v. State of Maryland, No. 794, September Term 2019. Opinion by Beachley, J. GROSS NEGLIGENCE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER—RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE—LESS CULPABLE FORM OF SECOND- DEGREE DEPRAVED HEART MURDER SECOND-DEPRAVED HEART MURDER—EXTREME DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE—HEIGHTENED FORM OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER—REQUIRES LIKELIHOOD OR CERTAINTY OF DEATH Askia Khafra met Daniel Beckwitt in an internet chatroom where Khafra was seeking investors for his business idea—Equity Shark—a smartphone application that streamlined the process for ordinary people to invest in starter companies. Beckwitt agreed to invest in Equity Shark, and for approximately $10,000 he received a 5% stake in the business. When Equity Shark failed to take off as expected, Khafra needed to repay Beckwitt for the $10,000 investment.

Because Beckwitt feared a nuclear war between the United States and North Korea, he had been digging tunnels and a bunker underneath his home. Beckwitt allowed Khafra to repay the $10,000 debt by digging such tunnels at Beckwitt’s home. On numerous occasions in 2017, Beckwitt would pick up Khafra and drive him back to his house to dig. Concerned with his privacy and in order to conceal his actual address, Beckwitt required Khafra to wear a blindfold during such drives.

Additionally, Beckwitt did not allow Khafra into the first and second floors of the residence; Khafra was free to roam in the basement and the tunnels. Because Beckwitt did not own a cellular phone, he generally communicated with Khafra by using computer programs. On September 10, 2017, in the early morning hours, Khafra sent Beckwitt a text message indicating that the power had gone out in the tunnels, that there was no airflow, and that he believed he smelled smoke. Khafra shortly thereafter clarified that he no longer detected smoke, but asked Beckwitt to fix the issue.

Beckwitt, who was sleeping, did not see the messages until the next morning. When he saw the messages, Beckwitt notified Khafra that there had been a “pretty major electrical failure” and then switched power to the tunnels over to a different circuit. Beckwitt then went back to sleep. Beckwitt awoke in the afternoon at approximately 3:00 p.m. and headed to the kitchen for some food.

At about 4:00 p.m., he heard a beeping sound which he understood to be the carbon monoxide detector indicating a loss of power. After waiting twenty to thirty minutes for the breaker to automatically reset, Beckwitt went to the basement to manually reset the breaker. While in the basement, Beckwitt did not see Khafra. Beckwitt reset the breaker and as he headed upstairs, he heard an explosion and immediately saw smoke rising out of the kitchen floor.

Beckwitt immediately returned to the basement to tell Khafra about the fire. Although Beckwitt did not see Khafra, he heard him yell “yo dude.” Beckwitt was soon overcome by smoke and had to exit the basement. Once outside, Beckwitt yelled for his neighbors to call 9-1-1. Firefighters quickly responded to the scene, but noted unusual challenges in putting out the relatively small fire.

The unusual challenges stemmed from the fact that Beckwitt was a hoarder, and the floor of his basement was completely covered with trash, debris, and other objects that rendered navigation difficult. When the smoke cleared, the firefighters found Khafra’s body in the middle of the basement. The State charged Beckwitt with second-degree depraved heart murder and two theories of involuntary manslaughter: gross negligence and failure to perform a legal duty. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to second-degree depraved heart murder, and guilty as to involuntary manslaughter.

The verdict sheet did not distinguish between the two theories of manslaughter. Beckwitt timely appealed. Held: Conviction for second-degree depraved heart murder reversed. Conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter affirmed.

The evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for depraved heart murder, but is sufficient to support a conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Whereas gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, the “junior varsity” of depraved heart murder, requires a reckless disregard for human life, second-degree depraved heart murder requires an extreme disregard for human life. The evidence in this case shows that Beckwitt demonstrated a reckless disregard for human life by hiring Khafra to dig tunnels underneath his home where Khafra was completely dependent upon Beckwitt for food and supplies, there was a history of electrical failures in the tunnels, the basement was completely cluttered with trash and debris making escape difficult in the event of an emergency, Khafra could not easily call for or receive emergency assistance because Beckwitt had sought to conceal his location, and the door leading from the basement to the outside may have been locked. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter.

Although the case law fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between “reckless disregard” and “extreme disregard,” the cases discussing the sufficiency of evidence for depraved heart murder intimate that the likelihood or certainty of death distinguishes it from mere gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Although the circumstances in this case were dangerous enough to sustain a conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, they were not so egregious as to indicate that death was the likely, if not certain result, so as to satisfy the malice element of depraved heart murder. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for depraved heart murder. As to Beckwitt’s challenges regarding the prosecutor’s closing arguments, Beckwitt generally failed to preserve his arguments for our review because the trial court, for the most part, sustained his objections as to the issues he raises on appeal.

Beckwitt’s challenges as to the jury instructions are unpersuasive. Finally, Beckwitt failed to preserve for our review his argument that the court erred by failing to hold a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) because he failed to indicate what evidence should have been excluded from his trial based on the court’s failure to hold such a hearing. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 133838C REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 794 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ DANIEL BECKWITT v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ *Meredith, Kehoe, Beachley, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Beachley, J. ______________________________________ Filed: January 28, 2021 *Meredith, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of the Court. He participated in the adoption of this opinion after being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act Section 3A.

(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-04-07 11:25-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Following a trial that spanned over two weeks, a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County found appellant, Daniel Beckwitt, guilty of second-degree depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter. The court sentenced appellant to twenty-one years’ imprisonment, suspending all but nine, for depraved heart murder, and merged the conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Appellant timely appealed and presents the following four issues for our review: 1. Was the evidence legally sufficient to sustain [appellant’s] convictions for depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter? 2.

Did the trial court err by giving flawed jury instructions on murder and manslaughter? 3. Did the prosecutor’s repeated improper remarks during closing and rebuttal closing arguments result in reversible error? 4. Did the suppression court err in denying [appellant’s] request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware[1]? We hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, but was insufficient to sustain the depraved heart murder conviction.

We reject appellant’s remaining allegations of error. We shall therefore reverse appellant’s conviction for depraved heart murder and remand for sentencing on the previously merged involuntary manslaughter conviction. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case involves the tragic death of Askia Khafra, a twenty-one-year-old who died while trying to escape a fire in appellant’s basement. At the time of the fire, appellant was 1 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). twenty-six years old.

The unfortunate series of events that brought Khafra and appellant together arose from Khafra’s idea to create a smartphone application or “app” called Equity Shark. Khafra envisioned Equity Shark as streamlining the process for average people to invest in “starter companies” or small businesses that had not yet gone public and needed funding. Khafra expended considerable effort in developing the app. In furtherance of that goal, Khafra browsed internet chatrooms looking for investors.

Khafra found his first investor—appellant—in such a chatroom. Khafra pitched his business idea to appellant, and explained that he was looking for approximately $5,000 to go to San Francisco to apply for a Thiel Fellowship.2 According to the parties’ briefs, appellant invested approximately $10,000 for a 5% stake in Equity Shark.3 Khafra and appellant went on to develop a close friendship. Khafra apparently became fascinated with appellant due to appellant’s wealth and financial success. Khafra looked to appellant as someone who could help him grow Equity Shark, not just financially, but by assisting with computer coding and other efforts needed to develop the app into a viable business.

Unfortunately, Equity Shark never took off as planned, and Khafra was not accepted for the Thiel Fellowship. 2 The transcript incorrectly refers to this as the “Peter Field Fellowship.” The specifics of the Fellowship itself, however, such as the age limit, the requirement to drop out of school in order to attend, and the Fellowship’s general purpose, persuade us that Khafra was pursuing a “Thiel Fellowship” rather than a “Field Fellowship.” See Thiel Fellowship, FAQ, https://thielfellowship.org/faq/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2021). 3 There appears to be some discrepancy regarding the total amount of appellant’s investment, but that discrepancy is immaterial to the outcome of this appeal. 2 In order to repay appellant’s $10,000 investment, Khafra agreed to dig tunnels underneath appellant’s house. Appellant had been building tunnels and an underground bunker beneath his home because he apparently feared a nuclear war with North Korea. Khafra was not the first person to dig tunnels for appellant. Douglas Hart, who was approximately twenty years old at the time,4 dug tunnels on several occasions from approximately October 2016 to April 2017.

Logistically, Hart would drive his car to Maryland,5 meet appellant at a McDonald’s, and then appellant would require Hart to wear sunglasses with duct tape on them to obscure Hart’s vision while appellant drove the two to appellant’s home. Despite the fact that appellant actually lived in Maryland, he gave Hart the impression that they were going to Virginia. When Hart visited appellant to dig tunnels, he typically stayed in the tunnels and basement area for approximately a month at a time and understood that he was not allowed into the rest of the house. Hart indicated that he was physically incapable of leaving the basement/tunnel area, and that although there was a door from the basement leading directly to the outside, that door was kept locked and appellant always had the key.

When Hart communicated to appellant that he wanted to go outside for fresh air or to get food, however, appellant would oblige him. Nevertheless, appellant required Hart to wear the duct-taped sunglasses upon going outside to prevent Hart from learning the location of appellant’s house. 4 Hart testified at the April 2019 trial that he was twenty-three years old. From this fact we extrapolate that he was approximately twenty years old when he began working in appellant’s tunnels in October 2016. 5 At trial, Hart indicated that he was living in New York. 3 In early 2017, Khafra began digging tunnels at appellant’s home for $150 a day. Appellant typically picked Khafra up at Khafra’s parents’ house in the early morning hours, around 3:00 a.m., and like Hart, required Khafra to be blindfolded during the trip to appellant’s house.6 Khafra would dig underneath appellant’s home approximately once a month to every two months, and would stay anywhere from a few days to a few weeks at a time.7 During his stays, Khafra mostly remained in the bunker area in the tunnels.

According to appellant’s brief, “Khafra roamed freely in the basement and the tunnels, but he was not permitted to come up to the first or second floors of the residence.” Rather than take showers, Khafra cleaned himself using disposable wipes. To relieve himself, Khafra would urinate and defecate in a bucket he kept in the tunnels. Every few days, Khafra and appellant used a winch system to haul the bucket from the basement to the first floor, where appellant himself would dispose of its contents in the first-floor bathroom. Because appellant did not own a phone, Khafra could only communicate with appellant from the basement and tunnels using Google apps such as Google Voice and V Chat.8 Appellant During a trip to appellant’s home, Khafra learned that appellant actually lived in 6 Bethesda, Maryland. 7 Khafra’s father testified at trial that he recalled Khafra going to appellant’s house in January, February, March, April, and September of 2017. 8 “Google Voice” is a program that “gives you a phone number for calling, text messaging, and voicemail.” https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.android.apps.googlevoice&hl= en_US&gl=US (last visited Jan. 8, 2021). “V Chat” is a private messenger service that allows users to “communicate instantly while avoiding [text messaging] fees[.]” https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.wVChat_9255903 (last visited Jan. 8, 2021). 4 used numerous extension cords and power strips to provide electricity to the tunnels.

In his interviews with police, appellant intimated his familiarity with the failing power cords and having to reset the circuit breaker. On September 3, 2017, Khafra went to appellant’s home to resume work in the tunnels. A week later, while digging in the tunnels on September 10 at 2:32 a.m., Khafra messaged appellant using Google Hangouts, stating “holy [s**t] bro there’s no power down here.” Approximately five minutes later, at 2:37 a.m., Khafra indicated that there was smoke in the basement. At 2:51 a.m., Khafra wrote again, stating that he no longer believed there was smoke in the basement, but that the lights had gone out and it was “pitch black down [there]” with no airflow.

Khafra’s message asked appellant to “please try to fix when you see this.” Appellant did not see Khafra’s messages until he woke up at approximately 9 a.m. At 9:27 a.m., appellant wrote to Khafra that there had been a “pretty major electrical failure” and that appellant was switching the power over to a different circuit. Appellant then went back to sleep, and awoke at approximately 3 p.m. Appellant went downstairs from his second-floor bedroom to get something to eat, and at around 4 p.m., he heard a beeping sound coming from the carbon monoxide detector in the dining room.

Appellant understood the beep to signify a loss of power, which he confirmed when he could no longer hear the refrigerator running. Appellant waited approximately twenty to thirty minutes, believing that the circuit breaker would reset itself. When the power failed to return, appellant went to the basement to manually reset the breaker. Appellant did not see Khafra while in the basement resetting the breaker. 5 On his way up the stairs from the basement to the first floor, appellant heard an explosion, which he believed to be either the refrigerator’s compressor or the air conditioner.

Appellant went to the kitchen to see if the refrigerator’s compressor was working, and immediately saw smoke rising out of the kitchen floor. Appellant promptly headed back to the basement to tell Khafra that there was a fire, and that Khafra needed to get out. Appellant heard Khafra yell “yo dude,” but he could not see him through all of the smoke. Fearing that he would not be able to take the basement stairs to the first floor, appellant exited the basement by unlocking the basement door that led directly to the outside.9 Because he did not have a cellular phone, and because it would have been dangerous to return to his second-floor bedroom to call 9-1-1 from his computer, appellant began to yell for help.

Appellant’s neighbors called 9-1-1. Firefighters from Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service responded to appellant’s home at approximately 4:23 p.m. The firefighters struggled to navigate through appellant’s home to extinguish the fire, however, because, as appellant concedes, “[t]he home by all accounts was a hoarder’s home.” Put simply, appellant’s home was filled with an extreme amount of debris, trash, and other objects that made navigation difficult. In fact, it took firefighters approximately a minute and a half to two minutes to traverse the short distance from the basement’s side entrance to the fire.

Firefighters extinguished the fire with two or three sprays of water lasting approximately fifteen to thirty seconds each. 9 Although he could not remember for certain, appellant indicated that he “[thought he] had to” unlock the basement door to exit. Appellant could not recall whether the key was already in the door or whether he had it at the time, but told police it was “common” to keep the key in the door. 6 When the steam finally cleared, firefighters found Khafra’s lifeless body in the middle of the basement. DISCUSSION I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter because his conduct was not, as a matter of law, sufficient to meet the elements of those crimes. When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, [w]e will consider the evidence adduced at trial sufficient if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Coleman, 423 Md. 666, 672 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Facon v. State, 375 Md. 435, 454 (2003)). Our task, then, is to determine whether any rational trier of fact, after viewing the entire record in a light most favorable to the State, could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential elements for depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter. A. A Primer on Depraved Heart Murder and Gross Negligence Involuntary Manslaughter We begin with an examination of the rather murky legal landscape of depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter. Depraved heart murder has been described as “one of the ‘unintentional murders’ . . . that is punishable as murder because another element of blameworthiness fills the place of intent to kill.” Alston v. State, 101 Md. App. 47, 56 (1994) (quoting Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738, 744 (1986)). “The critical feature of 7 ‘depraved heart’ murder is that the act in question be committed ‘under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.’” Id.

(quoting Robinson, 307 Md. at 745 ). As to involuntary manslaughter, the Court of Appeals has recognized three varieties: (1) unlawful act manslaughter, which is “doing some unlawful act endangering life but which does not amount to a felony”; (2) gross negligence manslaughter, which is “negligently doing some act lawful in itself”; and (3) “the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.” State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 152 (2019) (first quoting State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 499 (1994); and then quoting Mills v. State, 13 Md. App. 196, 200 (1971)). It is well-settled that the “gross negligence” theory of involuntary manslaughter is a less culpable form of depraved heart murder. Id. at 173 n.20 (citing Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Criminal Homicide Law § 12.1, at 223 (2002)); Dishman v. State, 352 Md. 279, 299 (1998) (stating that the difference between depraved heart murder and gross negligence involuntary manslaughter “is one of the degree of culpability”); see also Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Criminal Homicide Law § 12.1, at 223 (2002) (stating that “gross negligence manslaughter is the junior varsity manifestation of depraved-heart murder”).10 To understand the elements of the crimes of depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter, we look to Judge Moylan for guidance.

In Pagotto v. State, Judge Moylan explained, 10 Although depraved heart murder is often described in terms of being a more culpable manifestation of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, we are aware of no authority that depraved heart murder may only arise from the grossly negligent modality of involuntary manslaughter. In other words, it seems possible that the negligent omission of a lawful duty variety of manslaughter could, in a proper case, be elevated to the more culpable crime of depraved heart murder. 8 On the matrix of blameworthy states of mind that will support a verdict of either civil liability or criminal guilt on the part of an unquestioned homicidal agent, one of those mental states is that in which the homicidal agent causes an unintended death by carelessly or negligently doing some act lawful in itself. 127 Md. App. 271, 276 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dishman, 352 Md. at 291 ), aff’d 361 Md. 528 (2000). The bottom of the negligence “matrix” represents the least culpable form of homicide—civil negligence. Id.

Civil negligence may give rise to “heavy civil liability,” but such negligence is “still something less than criminality.” Id. Moving up the scale of blameworthy negligence, the next culpable level “are those more ‘gross deviations’ from the standard of care used by an ordinary person where the negligent conduct can reasonably be said to manifest ‘a wanton or reckless disregard of human life.’” Id. at 277 (quoting Dishman, 352 Md. at 291 ). Such conduct constitutes gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Id.

Finally, the most culpable conduct on the negligence scale are “those acts of a life- endangering nature so reckless that they manifest a wanton indifference to human life.” Id. Such conduct constitutes second-degree depraved heart murder. Id. Regardless of the degree of reprehensible negligence, however, the standard is an objective one: the conduct must “[manifest] such a gross departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under the same circumstances so as to furnish evidence of an indifference to consequences.” Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500 .

Additionally, the State must prove a causal connection between the negligence and the death. Id. at 499 (quoting Mills, 13 Md. App. at 200 ); see also Thomas, 464 Md. at 152 . “This includes actual, but-for causation and legal causation.” Thomas, 464 Md. at 152 . 9 Regarding the line of demarcation between depraved heart murder and gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, Judge Moylan has noted that, Definitionally, the Maryland case law has yet provided no meaningful distinction between those last two levels of culpability. “[O]ur cases have not drawn a precise line between depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter.” Dishman v. State, 352 Md. at 299 , 721 A.2d 699 . As an abstract matter, however, we know that there is—somewhere—such a line. There must be or else there is no legally cognizable distinction between murder and manslaughter.

Pagotto, 127 Md. App. at 277 . We agree with and shall explore Judge Moylan’s astute observation on this subject. In In re Eric F., this Court defined the indispensable component of depraved heart murder, stating, “The essential element of depraved heart murder is that the act in question be committed ‘under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.’” 116 Md. App. 509, 519 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Robinson, 307 Md. at 745 ). We explained, The question is whether the defendant engaged in conduct that created a very high risk of death or serious bodily injury to others.

The murder may be perpetrated without the slightest trace of personal ill-will. Instead, the willful doing of a dangerous and reckless act with wanton indifference to the consequences and perils involved, is just as blameworthy, and just as worthy of punishment, when the harmful result ensues, as is the express intent to kill itself. Id. at 519-20 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As to gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, the Court of Appeals has stated, In determining whether a defendant’s actions constituted gross negligence, we must ask whether the accused’s conduct, under the circumstances, amounted to a disregard of the consequences which might ensue and indifference to the rights of others, and so was a wanton and reckless disregard for human life.

Stated otherwise, the accused must have 10 committed acts so heedless and incautious as necessarily to be deemed unlawful and wanton, manifesting such a gross departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under the same circumstances so as to furnish evidence of an indifference to consequences. It is only conduct which rises to this degree of gross negligence upon which a conviction of involuntary manslaughter can be predicated. Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The line between depraved heart murder and gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, then, appears to be as follows: depraved heart murder requires an “extreme indifference to the value of human life,” In re Eric F., 116 Md. App. at 519 (quoting Robinson, 307 Md. at 738 ), whereas gross negligence involuntary manslaughter requires only “a wanton and reckless disregard for human life,” Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500 (quoting Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 590 (1954)).

In his book Criminal Homicide Law, Judge Moylan suggests that part of the reason Maryland courts have struggled to distinguish between these two degrees of criminal negligence is because when appellate courts first recognized gross negligence involuntary manslaughter in the 1950s, judges did not anticipate that Maryland would proceed to recognize the more reprehensible crime of depraved heart murder thirty years later. Judge Charles E. Moylan, Criminal Homicide Law § 12.4, at 226-27 (2002). “When the time came to describe the mens rea of depraved-heart murder, the opinion writers discovered to their chagrin that the store of ‘juicy’ and lurid adjectives had been profligately exhausted by the rhetorical excesses of earlier opinion writers in the manslaughter cases.” Id. at 227. 11 As we shall explain, despite the cloudy line of demarcation between the two criminally culpable levels of negligence, we conclude that appellant’s conduct satisfies the criteria for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, but falls short of what is required for depraved heart murder. B. Appellant’s Conduct Demonstrated Wanton and Reckless Disregard for Khafra’s Life (Involuntary Manslaughter) Gross negligence involuntary manslaughter generally occurs in four contexts: automobiles, police officers, failure to perform a duty, and weapons. Thomas, 464 Md. at 154 .

In Thomas, however, the Court of Appeals posed a unique question: “[U]nder what circumstances the dangers of heroin would justify holding a dealer liable for involuntary manslaughter for supplying the means by which his customer fatally overdoses.” Id. at 139 . In an effort to resolve that question, the Thomas Court considered cases involving automobiles, police officers, and weapons to “create a helpful tableau” to guide its analysis. Id. at 154 . Thomas began by discussing automobile cases.

An easily identified form of gross negligence occurs where a driver operates a vehicle in a reckless manner, such as by gratuitously speeding in a heavily congested residential area, and strikes and kills a pedestrian.11 Id. at 154-55 (citing Duren, 203 Md. at 588-89 ). In Duren, the State produced evidence that the defendant was driving in a “heavily congested residential and business 11 The Thomas Court recognized that a criminal statute for “manslaughter by vehicle” preempts prosecution for common law gross negligence manslaughter, but noted that the cases concerning that statutory offense were still relevant in analyzing “gross negligence” in this context. Thomas, 464 Md. at 154 . 12 area” of Baltimore City at 7:00 p.m. at a speed of at least 60 miles per hour—approximately 30 miles per hour above the speed limit. 203 Md. at 588-89 . Notably, after Duren’s vehicle skidded approximately 72 to 89 feet, it struck the victim with such force as to hurl him into the air and onto “the trunk of a car a number of feet away.” Id. at 589 .

The evidence there sufficiently manifested “a wanton and reckless disregard for human life.” Id. at 590 . Likewise, in State v. Kramer, 318 Md. 576 (1990), the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for gross negligence manslaughter by vehicle. There, on a rural two- lane road, Kramer attempted to pass another vehicle in a no-pass zone, striking an oncoming vehicle while driving at least 75 miles per hour. Id. at 586-89 .

The facts also showed that Kramer was distracted while performing this maneuver. Id. at 589 . Under such circumstances, “the evidence was legally sufficient for the jury to find on Kramer’s part a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and lives of others and so a state of mind amounting to criminal indifference to consequences.” Id. at 593 . In Johnson v. State, however, the Court found that the circumstances were insufficient to support a conviction for gross negligence vehicular manslaughter. 213 Md. 527, 533-34 (1957).

The evidence showed that Johnson was driving on a one-way, four lane highway in a non-residential area with “very light” traffic. Id. at 533 . Additionally, there was contradictory evidence of Johnson’s speed. Id. at 530 .

Relying on Duren, the Court focused on “whether, by reason of the speed in the environment, there was a lessening of the control of the vehicle to the point where such lack of effective control [was] likely at any moment to bring harm to another.” Id. at 532-33 . The Court concluded 13 that Johnson’s conduct did not amount “to a wanton or reckless disregard of the rights and lives of others.” Id. at 534 . The Thomas Court then turned to gross negligence involuntary manslaughter cases involving police officers. 464 Md. at 157 . Notably, where a police officer is involved in negligent conduct resulting in death, the officer is held to a “heightened ‘reasonable police officer under the circumstances’ standard, rather than a reasonably prudent person standard.” Id. at 157 (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 487 ).

In Albrecht, Officer Albrecht was one of two officers responding to a reported stabbing. 336 Md. at 479 . The suspect apparently left the scene in a vehicle driven by Rebecca Garnett. Id. The two officers eventually arrived at a townhouse complex where they spotted the suspect’s vehicle, with the suspect and Garnett standing near the vehicle in the parking lot.

Id. at 479-80 . Officer Albrecht removed his shotgun from his cruiser and yelled at the suspect and Garnett because he believed they were going to attempt to escape. Id. at 480-81 . Officer Albrecht then “‘racked’ the shotgun into its final stage of firing capability[,]” and aimed it directly at Garnett.

Id. at 481 . With his finger on the trigger, Officer Albrecht intended to turn and aim his gun at the suspect, but the weapon discharged, killing Garnett. Id. at 481-82 . According to Albrecht’s own testimony, at the time he fired, “he did not believe that [Garnett] posed any danger to him or to any other person[.]” Id. at 504 .

A fellow officer testified that “Garnett had ‘done nothing’ to warrant having a shotgun racked and aimed at her.” Id. In upholding Officer Albrecht’s conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, the Court of Appeals stated that Officer Albrecht manifested a wanton and reckless disregard for human life in “drawing and 14 racking a shotgun fitted with a bandolier and bringing it to bear, with his finger on the trigger, on an unarmed individual who did not present a threat to the officer or to any third parties, in a situation where nearby bystanders were exposed to danger.” Id. at 505 . Lastly, the Thomas Court looked to Mills v. State, 13 Md. App. 196 (1971), a weapons case, to help map the contours of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. 464 Md. at 159 . In Mills, a sixteen-year-old boy took his father’s pistol to a dance, then went into a bathroom with some friends to drink liquor. 13 Md. App. at 197 .

Mills, aware that there was a bullet in the chamber, pointed it at another boy, who slapped the gun out of Mills’s hand, causing it to discharge and kill another boy. Id. at 198-99 . In sustaining Mills’s conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, this Court stated that “the introduction of the loaded weapon into a small room among five youths drinking liquor from a bottle, and the handling of the weapon by a person unfamiliar with its operation, including its loading and unloading, is plainly a grossly negligent act dangerous to life . . . .” Id. at 202 . With this “tableau” of cases in mind, the Thomas Court then considered whether the unique facts present there—the dangers of a specific heroin sale—constituted the wanton and reckless disregard for human life necessary to sustain Thomas’s conviction.

In Thomas, the agreed findings of fact showed that the victim, twenty-three-year- old Colton Matrey, died of a heroin overdose.12 464 Md. at 147 . Thomas, a heroin dealer Thomas entered a “hybrid plea,” wherein Thomas agreed to the ultimate facts of 12 the case, but maintained the ability to argue legal issues and evidentiary sufficiency on appeal. Thomas, 464 Md. at 140 . 15 and user himself, would typically consume twelve bags of heroin a day, using four bags for a single shot. Id. at 148 .

Prior to Matrey’s death, Thomas had sold heroin to Matrey “[a] few times.” Id. at 149 . Just hours before he was found dead in the early morning of June 26, 2015, Matrey called Thomas approximately twenty-seven times in a twenty-two- minute span. Id. at 145 . This was unusual because Matrey typically called Thomas earlier in the day to purchase heroin.

Id. at 149 . Thomas sold Matrey four bags of heroin. Id. Thomas later told police that he believed Matrey was nineteen years old.

Id. at 150 . After discussing numerous gross negligence involuntary manslaughter cases, including those mentioned above, the Court of Appeals provided the following guidance for determining the sufficiency of evidence for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter: there is no scientific test or quantifiable probability of death that converts ordinary negligence to criminal gross negligence. Rather, the inherent dangerousness of the act engaged in, as judged by a reasonable person . . . is combined with environmental risk factors, which, together, make the particular activity more or less “likely at any moment to bring harm to another.” Id. at 159 (quoting Johnson, 213 Md. at 533 ). The Court echoed the standard established in earlier cases: In sum, when determining whether an individual has acted with the requisite grossly negligent mens rea to be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, the State must demonstrate wanton and reckless disregard for human life.

This requires a gross departure from the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person and a disregard or indifference to the rights of others. It also involves an assessment of whether an activity is more or less likely at any moment to bring harm to another, as determined by weighing the inherent dangerousness of the act and environmental risk factors. Id. at 160-61 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 16 In examining the inherent dangerousness of distributing heroin and its attendant environmental risk factors, the Court of Appeals noted that Thomas knowingly engaged in selling heroin, a drug with the propensity to harm or possibly kill those who ingest it. Id. at 167.

The Court next noted that Worcester County, where Matrey died, “ha[d] been consumed with heroin overdoses, some resulting in deaths, and that these overdoses [had] resulted in an acute awareness of the dangers of heroin.” Id. at 168. Additionally, the Court found it “fair to infer that Thomas subjectively knew an overdose was possible based on his statement that [Matrey] ‘couldn’t have overdosed off [the amount] I sold him.’” Id. The Court also noted the increased risk based on the unusualness of the transaction. Id. at 169.

Namely, Thomas knew that Matrey was young, had been in prison, and called Thomas either 27 or 28 times in a twenty-two-minute span in addition to sending multiple text messages, and that the transaction occurred unusually late in the evening. Id. Additionally, because of Thomas’s familiarity with heroin—his experience as a seasoned dealer coupled with his own personal use—the Court of Appeals inferred that Thomas was aware of the risks posed by heroin abuse yet “continued to sell the drug notwithstanding its danger.” Id. at 170. In concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support Thomas’s conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, the Court held that Thomas sold heroin to a desperate young man, knowing that the consumption of heroin could be deadly.

He had extensive experience with heroin— distributing it widely, in a manner sure to net a profit, and with such frequency that he travelled across state lines two to three times a week to procure it—and was knowledgeable of its dangers. Yet, he either willfully 17 failed to obtain the necessary information to help reduce the risks of his behavior, or he was indifferent to mitigating these risks. Either way, his conduct posed a high degree of risk to those with whom he interacted. Id. at 171-72.

Recently, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion discussing the sufficiency of the evidence for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter where a mother accidentally suffocated her infant child while co-sleeping.13 State v. Morrison, 470 Md. 86 (2020). In reversing the mother’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter, the Court held that the mother did not engage in inherently dangerous conduct, id. 115 , and that, although the evidence showed that the mother had consumed alcohol, she was not intoxicated or impaired at the time she smothered the infant, id. at 121-22 .14 Against this legal backdrop, we return to the instant case. In analyzing the sufficiency of evidence for appellant’s gross negligence involuntary manslaughter conviction, we shall consider “the inherent dangerousness of the act engaged in, as judged by a reasonable person . . . combined with environmental risk factors, which, together, 13 “The term ‘co-sleeping’ is most commonly used to describe a situation where a caregiver sleeps on the ‘same sleep surface as an infant[.]’” Morrison, 470 Md. at 95 n.2. 14 On two occasions, the Court noted that the mother was not actually aware that co- sleeping could be deadly. Morrison, 460 Md. at 104, 115 (stating that “there was no suggestion that she was aware that co-sleeping could be deadly, even if risky[,]” and “the State did not introduce evidence that Ms. Morrison was aware of the risks of co-sleeping, or that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have appreciated those risks”).

This seems to signal that, where factually applicable, a subjective standard could inform, if not supplant, the objective one. In other words, where the evidence shows that the person actually understood the danger of her conduct, the State may not need to show that an ordinarily prudent person would have appreciated the danger. In the instant case, because there is no evidence that appellant actually appreciated the dangerousness of his conduct, we rely on the objective test defined in the caselaw. 18 make the particular activity more or less ‘likely at any moment to bring harm to another.’” Thomas, 464 Md. at 159 (quoting Johnson, 213 Md. at 533 ). Employing that standard, we conclude that appellant’s conduct, under the totality of circumstances, was sufficient to establish gross negligence involuntary manslaughter.

Appellant placed Khafra, who was not an experienced construction worker, in a dangerous situation by paying Khafra $150 a day to dig tunnels underneath his home. The only way Khafra could contact appellant in case of an emergency was to send appellant messages through Google apps and hope appellant received them. Electricity to the tunnels was provided by various extension cords and power strips with an apparent history of failing, and in response to power outages, appellant would switch breakers and replace extension cords. When the power first went out on September 10, 2017, and Khafra believed he smelled smoke, his early morning messages went unnoticed for more than six hours until appellant finally woke up.

Compounding Khafra’s helplessness while in the tunnels was the fact that appellant actively sought to conceal his home’s location. The State produced evidence that appellant went to great lengths to conceal his address from both Khafra and Hart, requiring them to wear goggles or sunglasses that obstructed their vision while appellant drove them to his home. Although Khafra eventually learned that appellant’s home was in Bethesda, appellant actively sought to hide this fact. This secrecy elevated the danger in that, although Khafra apparently had internet and phone service, not knowing his exact location 19 created an additional obstacle to him calling for and receiving emergency assistance.15 Contributing to the environmental risk factors here was the amount of debris and detritus in appellant’s basement.

These conditions elevated the danger by hampering Khafra’s ability to escape in the event of an emergency. According to the State’s Fire Cause investigator, escape from this particular fire would have been very difficult due to the debris in the basement. The investigator opined that individuals attempting to escape a fire instinctively get low to the ground to avoid the layer of hot air and gases caused by the fire. Doing so in appellant’s basement, however, would have been “very, very difficult” “[b]ecause [Khafra would] have to crawl over all the debris, all the buckets and the bags of cement and all the other [debris in the basement].” Moreover, even if Khafra were able to navigate through the debris, Mr. Hart testified that the basement doors were typically locked, a situation that, if believed by the jury, would have further hampered Khafra’s escape efforts.

Finally, appellant’s conduct on the day of the fire, when coupled with the dangerous environmental factors listed above, demonstrated his wanton and reckless disregard for Khafra’s life. When appellant saw Khafra’s messages at approximately 9 a.m. regarding a power outage and the possible odor of smoke, appellant’s only response was to tell Khafra that there had been a “pretty major electrical failure,” and to manually switch power over to another breaker. When the carbon monoxide alarm began to beep that afternoon, 15 Appellant used a virtual private network so that, had Khafra attempted to use his phone’s location services while connected to appellant’s network, it would have appeared to Khafra that he was in Virginia. 20 indicating another loss of power, appellant waited approximately twenty to thirty minutes before finally resetting the circuit breaker despite the fact that the previous electrical failure had left Khafra in “pitch black” darkness with no airflow. Despite the electrical failures, and Khafra’s helplessness under the circumstances, at no point in time did appellant ask Khafra to leave the basement for precautionary reasons.

In our view, the “environmental risk factors” and appellant’s conduct related to those risk factors, taken together, sufficiently demonstrate the requisite wanton and reckless disregard for Khafra’s life necessary to support a conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Although none of the Maryland cases cited above neatly align with the unique facts present here, our conclusion is bolstered by two out-of-state decisions: Noakes v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 284 (Va. 2010), and People v. Luo, 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).

In Noakes, the Supreme Court of Virginia was tasked with determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support Noakes’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter. 669 S.E.3d at 286. There, Noakes, an in-home child-care provider, had been caring for Noah Colassaco for approximately three weeks. Id. For those three weeks, Noakes “had experienced difficulty in getting Noah to lie down and sleep during ‘nap time.’” Id. “Around noon on the day in question, Noakes put Noah and another toddler she was caring for in their cribs for an afternoon nap.

The cribs were located in an upstairs, ‘loft’ bedroom that was only partially visible from Noakes’ bedroom.” Id. (footnote omitted). The cribs themselves, however, were not visible from Noakes’s bedroom. Id.

When Noakes left him, Noah was standing in his crib and crying. Id. 21 Approximately a half an hour later, when Noakes returned to check on Noah, he was still standing in his crib and crying. Id. We refer to the court’s description of Noakes’s efforts to get Noah to sleep: Knowing that when Noah stood in his crib, his chin was above the crib’s sides, and also that Noah would fall asleep if he were lying or sitting in the crib instead of standing, Noakes decided to place a make-shift covering over the crib to prevent Noah from standing.

After removing Noah from his crib, Noakes placed a thirty-three and one-quarter pound, collapsed “dog crate,” which ran the length of the crib but was substantially narrower, on top of the crib. Noakes reasoned that the crate’s weight would prevent Noah from standing up in the crib. Noakes tested the stability of her contraption by shaking the crib with the crate on top to determine if the crate could fall into the crib and injure Noah. Satisfied that the crate could not fall into the crib, Noakes removed the crate, put Noah back into the crib, and placed a fabric-covered piece of approximately one-inch thick cardboard on top of the crib.

The cardboard was added, in part, to cushion the force of any impact between Noah’s head and the crate if Noah attempted to stand. Although the cardboard would cover the entirety of the crib’s top, Noakes positioned it so the cardboard extended out over the front of the crib, where Noah often stood, thus leaving a small “gap” in the rear between the crib’s side and the cardboard. Noakes then placed the dog crate on top of the cardboard, toward the front side of the crib, where it covered a little more than one-half of the crib’s width. Noakes examined the covering to ensure that Noah would not be able to reach into the dog crate and injure his fingers.

Id. at 286-87. After observing Noah and detecting no problems, Noakes left the loft area. Id. at 287. Sometime before 1:00 p.m., however, Noakes returned when she heard a noise from the loft and observed Noah sitting in his crib with his face pressed against the crib’s front mesh.

Id. Noakes then placed a toy in front of the crib to obstruct Noah’s view, believing that he would eventually get bored and finally go to sleep. Id. Noakes returned again at approximately 3:15 p.m. to wake another toddler from his nap, but did not check on Noah. 22 Id.

About forty-five minutes later, Noakes returned to wake Noah but found him unconscious. Id. He was standing with his chin resting on the side of the crib, one or both of his hands gripping the crib’s side, and his head and neck wedged between the cardboard and the crib. His lips were blue and his skin was cold to Noakes’ touch.

Noakes surmised that Noah had attempted to stand, had pushed up against the cardboard causing the dog crate to slide a few inches thereby creating a space between the covering on the top of the crib and the crib’s wall. Id. Despite Noakes’s efforts and those of emergency personnel, Noah was pronounced dead. Id.

Noah died as a result of “[a]sphyxia due to mechanical compression of neck.” Id. Following a bench trial, Noakes was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Id. On appeal to Virginia’s Supreme Court, Noakes argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction as a matter of law because her actions did not constitute criminal negligence, and because she could not have anticipated Noah’s unforeseeable acts.

Id. at 288. At the outset, we note the similarities between Maryland’s and Virginia’s standards for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Virginia law requires that “the lawful act must have been done in a way so grossly negligent and culpable as to indicate an indifference to consequences or an absence of decent regard for human life.” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 409, 413 (Va. 1947)).

Applying this standard, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld Noakes’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter, concluding that her conduct demonstrated a reckless disregard for Noah’s life: 23 Upon review of the evidence, we conclude that Noakes’ conduct in placing cardboard and a thirty-three and one-quarter pound, collapsed dog crate atop Noah’s crib and failing to visually check on him for about three hours was wanton and willful, “showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of [Noah’s rights], under circumstances [that made] it not improbable that injury [would] be occasioned, and [Noakes] is charged with the knowledge of[] the probable result of [her] acts.” Noakes knew that Noah would attempt to stand in his crib and also that when doing so, Noah’s head and chin rose above the height of the crib’s sides. While she obviously took steps to prevent the crate’s falling upon Noah and his reaching into the crate, Noakes should have known that a toddler, used to standing but constrained against his will, might attempt to free himself, thereby dislodging the makeshift covering and sustaining serious injury. The measures that Noakes undertook to prevent the crate from falling upon Noah demonstrate her actual knowledge of the inherent danger of the contraption she placed atop the crib. And, because Noakes knew that she had placed Noah in an inherently dangerous situation that could cause serious injury, she certainly should not have left Noah unattended for approximately three hours.

Id. at 289 (internal citation omitted). Noakes’s actions, though well-meaning, were inherently dangerous. She created a make-shift apparatus designed to prevent Noah from standing up, but with the capacity to apply over thirty pounds of weight against any part of his body that managed to lift the cardboard. Additionally, Noakes left Noah, who was essentially helpless, unattended for three hours.

Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that Noakes demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard for Noah’s life. The other out-of-state case that provides useful guidance is Luo, 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526 . There, “[a]fter an unsupported excavation at a construction site caved in and killed a worker, a jury convicted defendant Dan Luo of involuntary manslaughter” and other related crimes.

Id. at 531 . Luo, who was neither a licensed realtor nor a licensed general 24 contractor, worked as an assistant for Richard Liu, who was both a real estate agent and licensed general contractor. Id. In April 2010, Liu sold a real estate parcel, and agreed to construct a home on the property.

Id. Luo was tasked with overseeing construction and dealing with the property owner and contractors. Id. at 532 . In January 2012, because Liu had failed to pay his contractor for work on the property, the workers walked off the jobsite.

Id. at 532 . “At that time, the hallway excavation [a deep cut made into a hill on the property] still had the 12-foot high, unsupported dirt wall with an overhanging ledge, and there were numerous unresolved issues with the construction.” Id. Unable to find a licensed contractor to replace the one who had walked off the job, Luo instead hired a union carpenter. Id. The carpenter never considered himself responsible for the safety of the jobsite, and Luo “did not put in place any job safety plan nor did he meet with the workers to discuss safety.” Id.

In late January 2012, a city inspector came to the jobsite and handed Luo a “Stop Work Notice” which explicitly stated: “DO NOT PROCEED[¶] with this job until the above has been approved for correction by the building and safety department.” Id. Luo “did not tell any of the workers about the notice and he did not direct anyone to stop work. Instead, he told the workers that the city wanted benching cut into the hill above the wall. . . . [Luo] never sought approval from the city to continue the construction.” Id. at 532- 33. Two days after issuance of the Stop Work Notice, Luo “specifically instructed the workers to work in the excavation area.” Id. at 533 .

The next morning, “the excavation wall collapsed,” killing a worker. Id. Following his conviction for involuntary 25 manslaughter and other related charges, Luo appealed to the California Court of Appeal. Id.

On appeal, Luo argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Id. In rejecting Luo’s argument, the California appellate court first identified its standard for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter: Criminal negligence is defined as conduct that is such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an indifference to [the] consequences. Id. at 533-34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926 (Cal. 1955)).16 Applying this standard, the California Court of Appeal readily concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Luo’s conviction: The prosecution presented evidence that defendant was in a supervisory position at the construction site, took no action to enhance the safety of the workplace, violated several applicable safety regulations, did not inform the workers that he had been ordered by the city to stop work due to a dangerous condition, and directed the victim to work in the dangerous area even after receiving the Stop Work Notice.

The evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that defendant committed involuntary manslaughter by performing a lawful act that might produce death, without due caution or circumspection. Id. at 535. We recognize that sufficiency of evidence cases in the gross negligence involuntary manslaughter arena are inherently fact-specific, and, to that extent, their persuasiveness is 16 We note that this standard resembles Maryland’s standard for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. 26 limited. Nevertheless, both Noakes and Luo provide examples of analogous conduct that appellate courts found sufficiently demonstrated a reckless disregard for human life to support an involuntary manslaughter conviction.

Although not an infant, Khafra, like Noah, was essentially trapped in an unsafe situation of the defendant’s making—appellant created the tunnels just as Noakes created the crib apparatus. Similarly, both Noakes and appellant were solely responsible for their respective victims’ safety—Noakes was the only adult close enough to respond to any emergency concerning Noah, and appellant was the only person who even knew where Khafra was while Khafra was underground digging in the tunnels. In short, both Noakes and appellant created unsafe conditions for their respective victims: Noakes created an apparatus designed to be heavier than anything Noah could lift, and placed it above his head; appellant invited Khafra to dig tunnels in a secret location beneath appellant’s home where there were power outages, and where mounds of garbage and debris, and possibly locked doors, impeded escape in the event of an emergency. Turning to Luo, we note that appellant, like Luo, was in a supervisory position at a “construction” site and disregarded the safety implications despite obvious danger warnings.

Although we acknowledge that Luo disregarded a government-issued Stop Work Notice that instructed him to cease operations, appellant disregarded the significance of Khafra’s precarious and dependent position in the tunnels, the occurrence of two electrical failures within a twenty-four-hour period, and the obstacles Khafra faced in the event of an emergency. In summary, although we recognize the fact-specific nature of Noakes and Luo, they support our conclusion that appellant’s conduct was sufficient for a 27 jury to find him guilty of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. C. The State Produced Sufficient Evidence to Establish Causation In addition to challenging whether his conduct demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard for human life, appellant also challenges whether the evidence was sufficient to support the causation element of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Appellant correctly notes that “A causal connection between . . . gross negligence and death must exist to support a conviction[.]” Thomas, 464 Md. at 173 (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499 ).

Specifically, “the defendant’s gross negligence must be the proximate cause of the victim’s death—meaning the (1) actual, but-for cause and (2) legal cause.” Id. (citing Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 442-43 (1979)). Regarding actual causation, Maryland gross negligence manslaughter cases have evaluated the actual, or but-for, cause of a given result on only a few occasions. In one such case, the Court of Special Appeals determined that a mutual agreement to engage in grossly negligent conduct can be sufficient to find causation, even where the victim was, himself, engaged in the grossly negligent act.

Id. at 174-75. The Court of Appeals has stated that a defendant does not ‘cease to be responsible for his otherwise criminal conduct because there were other conditions which contributed to the same result.’ In [Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 353 (1960)], we held a mother liable for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter when she failed to prevent her husband’s savage beatings of her daughter. Significantly, the Court concluded that it was not necessary that the mother’s grossly negligent conduct be the sole reason for her