Beretta U.S.A. Corp. v. Santos

HOLLANDER, Judge. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (“Beretta”), appellant, appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirming a decision of the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission (the “Commission”). The Commission found that appellant illegally discharged Peter Santos, appellee, 1 in retaliation for a complaint filed with the Commission by Mr. Santos, in which Mr. Santos claimed that Beretta had discriminated against him. The Commission ordered Beretta to cease and desist from such conduct and awarded appellee $87,690.80 in lost wages and $20,000.00 in damages for embarrassment and humiliation.

Beretta presents the following questions for review, which we have rephrased and reordered: I. Was the Commission’s finding of retaliation supported by substantial evidence?

II

Did the Commission err in awarding damages for humiliation and embarrassment? ¹⁷² III. Did the Commission violate its own rules when the Commission members who awarded back pay and damages did not participate in the hearings at which testimony was offered? At oral argument, we raised, nostra sponte, the additional issue of whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Thereafter, we granted the parties leave to file supplemental memoranda on the jurisdictional issue; appellant filed a supplemental memorandum, but appellee did not.

For the reasons that follow, we shall vacate, in part, the order of the circuit court, and remand for further proceedings. Factual Background Beretta manufactures firearms at a plant in Accokeek, Maryland. The machine factory at the plant has four major lines: the frame line, the barrel line, the small parts line, and the slide line. Operators on each line are supervised by set-up people, who function as the liaisons between the operators and . the managers.

In addition, set-up people are responsible for making adjustments to the machines on each of the lines, changing the cutting tools on the machines, and gauging the parts that are produced by the machines to ensure that they are within acceptable tolerance levels. Mr. Santos was hired in August 1987, and he became a setup person on the frame line in April 1991. 2 On December 11, 1991, appellee filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging discrimination based on race (black) and national origin (Puerto Rican). As a result of conciliation, appellant and appellee signed a settlement agreement, which was ratified by the Commission on February 24, 1992. Approximately two months later, on April 29, 1992, appellant terminated appellee.

The events that prompted appellee’s discharge are hotly disputed. Appellant contends that on April 29, 1992, appellee ¹⁷³ yelled at Cleo Hall, a machine operator on the frame line who had complained to appellee that her machine was producing parts that were not within acceptable tolerance limits. As a result of this confrontation, appellant argues that Hall burst into tears and immediately complained to the operations manager, Tom Valoróse. According to appellant, Mr. Santos had ordered Hall to continue operating the machine even though it was producing nonconforming parts.

Consequently, Valoróse fired appellee that day “for poor job performance,” which Valoróse explained as Santos’s inability to deal with the operators and to “solve, diagnose, and correct problems.” On April 29, 1992, the day Mr. Santos was discharged from appellant’s employ, he filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that his termination was in retaliation for filing the earlier complaint in December 1991. Beretta denied appellee’s allegation and, instead, maintained that Mr. Santos had been terminated for cause. Accordingly, the Commission investigated Mr. Santos’s claim. Thereafter, on January 14, 1994, the Commission found that there was reasonable cause to believe that appellant terminated appellee in retaliation for having filed the December 11, 1991, complaint.

On April 7, 1994, the Commission unsuccessfully attempted to conciliate the dispute. After the reasonable cause determination, Beretta answered appellee’s complaint. Beretta asserted that Prince George’s County Code § 2-195.01, which authorizes the Commission to order damages for humiliation and embarrassment, is unconstitutional on the grounds that (1) it violates Md. Const. Art. XI-A; (2) it violates the Express Powers Act, Md.Code (1957, 1996, Repl.Vol., 1997 Cum.Supp.), Art. 25A; (3) it conflicts with general State law; (4) it is not local law; (5) it is an unlawful delegation of judicial power to an administrative agency; and (6) it violates Beretta’s right to a jury trial.

On April 25, 1994, the case was certified for public hearing before a three-member panel of the Commission. 3 ¹⁷⁴ Between October 1994 and February 1996, the hearing panel held seven days of public hearings. 4 After the fifth hearing on February 7, 1995, two of the three commissioners on the hearing panel were replaced. In an undated report, the hearing panel, composed of the three commissioners who were in place for the final two hearing dates, issued its findings of fact. In an order dated June 24, 1996, the Commission adopted the hearing panel’s report. The hearing panel’s report, which accompanied the Commission’s order, stated, in pertinent part: Findings Testimony presented to the Commission revealed that a causal link existed between the filing of the discrimination complaint by [Mr. Santos] and [Mr. Santos’s] termination.

The Commission finds that [Mr. Santos’s] charge is valid on the basis of retaliation discrimination. Exhibits and testimony presented at the hearings revealed that employee skills and work performance are reviewed annually at Baretta [sic]. [Mr. Santos’s] performance appraisals from 1987 to 1990 were very good and excellent. The appraisals presented were written while [Mr. Santos] was under the supervision of several people. [Mr. Santos’s] performance appraisals began to change in 1991. The appraisals reflected an overall evaluation of “fair” as opposed to “very good” and excellent.

Testimony and employment records reflected that [Mr. Santos] was assigned to a new supervisor. Once [Mr. Santos] filed a discrimination charge in 1991, he was transferred to a different position and not provided with training. This seemed to be a set-up for failure. The Commission found that retaliation was the reason the complainant was reassigned to a different position without training.

The Com ¹⁷⁵ mission found that this move was intended to create a performance problem for Mr. Santos. [Beretta] alleges that [Mr. Santos] was terminated for poor performance and poor problem solving skills. According to Baretta’s [sic] performance criteria, poor performance involves relationships with other operators and the inability to solve problems. Testimony presented by Baretta’s [sic] operations manager, Tom Vallrose [sic] reveals that [Mr. Santos] was fired because he failed to listen and knowingly ordered an employer [sic] to run bad parts. The Commission found that other employees had run bad parts but had only been reprimanded, not terminated.

Additionally, the Operations Manager questioned [Mr. Santos’s] relationship with other operators based on [Mr. Santos’s] alleged treatment of a specific employee, Cleo Hall. Mr. Vallrose believed that Mr. Santos’ treatment of Ms. Hall caused her to burst into tears.... [Beretta] states that Mr. Santos was terminated because he was unable to gauge Ms. Hall’s machine properly. Whether Mr. Santos could fix the machine was never determined because [Mr. Santos] was never given the chance to repair the machine. Even if [Mr. Santos] had been given a chance to repair the machine, [Mr. Santos] isn’t a machinist and wasn’t trained to repair machines.

Additionally, the machine in question had a repair request lodged by [Mr. Santos] less than a week before the termination. However, at the time of the incident, the machine had not been repaired. This repair request leads the Commission to believe that machine error rather than human error caused bad parts to be produced. Conclusions The Commission finds that [Mr. Santos’s] charge is valid on the basis of retaliation discrimination. [Beretta’s] action in firing [Mr. Santos] was a direct retaliation for the claim of discrimination filed by [Mr. Santos] in December 1991.

It is also apparent that the preponderance of the evidence of record supports the conclusion that [Mr. Santos] sustained ¹⁷⁶ his burden of showing that the firing was the result of retaliation. As a result of the aforementioned, the Commission found for [Mr. Santos], Decision The Commission finds that [Mr. Santos] has suffered embarrassment, humiliation and a loss of wages. The Commission recommends that a partial re-hearing be held to determine damages to [Mr. Santos]. The Commission orders that [Beretta] cease and desist from this type of conduct in the future.

On July 24, 1996, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting, inter alia, that Prince George’s County Code § 2-195.01, which authorizes damages for humiliation and embarrassment, conflicts with Md.Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 11(e), which limits monetary relief for employment discrimination to back pay. On July 31, 1996, the Commission issued a notice to the parties announcing that the partial rehearing on damages would be held on August 26, 1996. The notice stated, in part: “Each party will have 30 minutes to present legal arguement [sic] limited to the evidence and testimony of record only to the full Commission.” The partial rehearing was conducted by six commissioners, none of whom took part in the prior proceedings. At the rehearing, appellant asserted that the Commission “should have held a complete rehearing on the entire matter.” Appellant’s counsel also presented argument on the issue of back pay and damages.

In addition, appellant reiterated its challenges to the validity of Prince George’s County Code § 2-195.01. At some point after the partial rehearing, the Commission issued a “Decision and Order After Partial Re-Hearing” (the “Decision”). Although the Decision is undated, the record contains a date stamped copy indicating that it was “received” on October 16, 1996. The Decision incorporated the hearing panel’s earlier findings and included, in pertinent part, the following additional findings as a result of the August 26, 1996, partial rehearing: ¹⁷⁷ After involuntary termination from Beretta U.S.A. Corporation on April 29, 1992, [Mr. Santos] worked for Kop Flex I, Kaydon Ring and Seal, Stanley Engineering, and BPS where he earned an hourly rate below the $14.80 that he earned at Beretta.

Evidence showed that [Mr. Santos] did not reach his previous salary of $14.80 per hour until September 26, 1994 when his salary at Kop Flex I was raised to $14.81 per hour. Exhibits 1, 2 and 8 (which were accepted into evidence after review by [Beretta’s counsel] who commented that “they clarified the record”) indicated that [Mr. Santos] mitigated his damages when he received unemployment compensation totaling $4,014.00 in 1992 and $669.00 in 1993. Damages were further mitigated by [Mr. Santos] through his employment. Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 indicated that [Mr. Santos] earned $19,094.00 in 1992, $5,730.40 in 1993 and $12,866.40 in 1994.

On September 26, 1994, [Mr. Santos] received a salary increase of $0.43 per hour which brought his income above the $14.80 hourly rate that he received before his involuntary separation from Beretta. Evidence also indicated that [Mr. Santos] experienced embarrassment and humiliation. [Mr. Santos] testified feeling that he was robbed of his dignity and manhood. Additionally, he stated that his inability to pay his bills caused a low self esteem and contributed to tension between [Mr. Santos] and his spouse. The Commission then awarded Mr. Santos $37,690.80 for lost wages and $20,000.00 in damages for embarrassment and humiliation.

The order did not address appellant’s challenge to the validity of Prince George’s County Code § 2-195.01. Subsequently, appellant sought judicial review of the Commission’s order in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. There, Beretta asserted that (1) the Commission’s finding of retaliation was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) appellee failed to meet his burden of proof regarding back pay; (3) the Commission did not follow its own rules in awarding back pay and humiliation and embarrassment damages; (4) the Commission did not explain its calculation of ¹⁷⁸ back pay; (5) the Commission’s finding of humiliation and embarrassment was not supported by substantial evidence; and (6) the County Code provision permitting the award of embarrassment and humiliation damages is unconstitutional. In an order dated May 22, 1997, the circuit court affirmed the Commission’s order.

Regarding appellant’s argument that the Commission’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence, the circuit court stated: The [Commission’s] determination that there existed sufficient evidence to sustain complainant’s allegations of retaliation discrimination was reasonable based upon the facts before it. The [Commission] found a causal link between the filing of [Mr. Santos’s] first complaint and his termination, and [Beretta] was unable to provide a legitimate justification for the dismissal. The record is clear that [the Commission’s] findings were based on substantial evidence. [Beretta] fails to state any areas where the [Commission] failed to correctly apply the law; therefore, no basis exists upon which to overturn the [Commission’s] decision. The [Commission] investigated the facts to determine if a violation of the Prince George’s County Code had occurred, and such a violation was found.

In rejecting appellant’s argument that Mr. Santos had failed to meet his burden of proof regarding back pay and damages, the court said: [Mr. Santos], to establish a prima facie case, only had to produce enough information to have allowed the [Commission] to infer that discrimination occurred. Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Complainant met this burden by showing that his performance evaluations were very good until 1991, when the problems at issue started; through his testimony about racial slurs and being switched to job tasks for which he was not trained; and through corroborating testimony by Patrick Butler about disparate treatment directed toward African Americans. ¹⁷⁹ (Emphasis added). Further, the court rejected appellant’s challenge to Prince George’s County Code § 2-195.01, stating that it did not conflict with State law.

The court did not address appellant’s argument that the Commission did not follow its own rules in awarding back pay and humiliation and embarrassment damages. We shall include additional facts in our discussion. Discussion I. The Commission’s Order and Decision were the subject of judicial review in the circuit court. As a threshold matter, we must resolve whether we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from an administrative agency of Prince George’s County.

We raised the jurisdictional issue because of our recent decision in Healthcare Strategies, Inc. v. Howard County Human Rights Comm’n, 117 Md.App. 349 , 700 A.2d 278 (1997). In that case, we held that this Court lacked jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s dismissal of a petition for judicial review of a decision of the Howard County Human Rights Commission. The Court of Special Appeals is a court of limited jurisdiction. Therefore, we may not hear every appeal that is brought before us.

Healthcare Strategies, 117 Md.App. at 353 , 700 A.2d 278 . Our jurisdiction in this matter is limited by Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), §§ 12-301 and 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”). C.J. § 12-301 provides: Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil ... case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law....

The pertinent exception is set forth in C.J. § 12-302(a), which states: ¹⁸⁰ Unless a right to appeal is expressly granted by law, § 12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of ... an administrative agency, or a local legislative body. A circuit court never exercises appellate jurisdiction when it directly reviews an administrative decision. Instead, the circuit court’s review of an administrative agency decision constitutes an exercise of that court’s original jurisdiction. See Colao v. County Council, 346 Md. 342 , 359-60 & n. 6, 697 A.2d 96 (1997); Gisriel v. Ocean City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 491-92 , 693 A.2d 757 (1997), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 702 , 139 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998).

Although sometimes called an “appeal” to the circuit court, the technical and accurate term to describe the circuit court’s function in such matters is that of “judicial review.” The Court of Appeals has construed the circuit court’s judicial review of administrative actions to fall within the ambit of C. J. § 12-302(a). See Gisriel, 345 Md. at 496 , 693 A.2d 757 ; Prince George’s County v. American Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 289 Md. 388, 397-400 , 424 A.2d 770 (1981). Prince George’s County Code § 2-197(c) provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by a final decision by the Commission is entitled to file an appeal pursuant to Subtitle B of the Maryland Rules of Procedure.” The B Rules were rescinded effective July 1, 1993.

Those rules, which govern judicial review of administrative actions, now appear, without substantive change, in Title 7, Chapter 200 of the Maryland Rules. See County Council v. Offen, 334 Md. 499 , 504 n. 2, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994). The rules do not provide for further judicial review by this Court. Healthcare Strategies, 117 Md.App. at 355 , 700 A.2d 278 .

Moreover, of particular significance here, Prince George’s County has not conferred a right of appeal to this Court, although it could have done so. See id. at 354 , 700 A.2d 278 (“[A]ny right to appeal to this Court from a circuit court review of its actions must be found in the county law creating the agency and governing its operations.”). In addi ¹⁸¹ tion, the Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize judicial review of the Commission’s decisions, because the Commission does not “operate[ ] in at least two counties” and thus does not satisfy the definition of an “agency.” See Md.Code (1984, 1995 RepLVol., 1997 Cum.Supp.), § 10-202(b)(2)(ii) of the State Government Article. Appellant argues that it is entitled to pursue this appeal because the substance of its action in the circuit court involved an exercise of that court’s original jurisdiction, not statutory judicial review.

Relying on Gisriel, 345 Md. at 477 , 693 A.2d 757 , appellant argues that, in essence, its action before the circuit court was either an action for declaratory judgment or mandamus, involving the circuit court’s exercise of original jurisdiction, not statutory judicial review. Thus, Beretta claims that this Court has jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s judgment. We turn to consider both Gisriel and Healthcare Strategies . In Healthcare Strategies , we distinguished Levitz Furniture Corp. v. Prince George’s County, 72 Md.App. 103 , 527 A.2d 813 , cert. denied, 311 Md. 286 , 533 A.2d 1308 (1987).

Levitz involved the consolidation of two actions: Levitz’s action seeking judicial review of the Commission’s findings and an enforcement action brought by the Commission. On appeal, the Levitz Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review Levitz’s appeal because it was part of a “unitary judgment.” Id. at 108, 527 A.2d 813 . We then considered the appeal on the merits and concluded that the Commission’s factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 115 , 527 A.2d 813 .

In Healthcare Strategies , we noted the difference between the posture of that case and Levitz, explaining: [I]f in addition to exercising its appellate jurisdiction the circuit court exercised original jurisdiction, we would have jurisdiction to review that portion of the circuit court’s final judgment. Healthcare Strategies, 117 Md.App. at 355 , 700 A.2d 278 (emphasis added) (citing Levitz, 72 Md.App. at 108 , 527 A.2d 813 ). Because the circuit court’s dismissal did not constitute an act of original jurisdiction, however, we concluded in ¹⁸² Healthcare Strategies that we did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The controversy in Gisriel involved whether the Board of Supervisors of Elections was required to remove the names of unqualified voters before determining the percentage of voters who had signed a petition for a referendum.

The case was brought to the circuit court as an action seeking judicial review of the Board’s action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals looked beyond the form of the action and focused on the substance of the complaint. In doing so, the Court of Appeals concluded that this Court had appellate jurisdiction because “the nature of [the] action [before the circuit court] was not a statutory judicial review” but instead “in substance was a traditional common law mandamus action.” Id. at 496-97 , 693 A.2d 757 . Accordingly, the Court of Appeals determined that the circuit court was not exercising “appellate” jurisdiction, but instead was exercising original jurisdiction.

Therefore, C. J. § 12-302(a) did not preclude appellate review. Applying these principles to the case sub judice, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider Beretta’s constitutional challenge to the Prince George’s County Code, which authorizes damages for embarrassment and humiliation. Because the nature of Beretta’s claim was, in substance, a declaratory action, the circuit court exercised original jurisdiction and not “appellate” jurisdiction. Similarly, we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to consider appellant’s claim that the Commission failed to follow its own rules when it awarded back pay and damages without any commissioner being “present and participating” at the hearing.

Our conclusion in this regard is grounded on our view of this issue as substantively analogous to a mandamus action or a declaratory action for violation of Beretta’s due process rights. Because the substance of appellant’s claims before the circuit court invoked the court’s original jurisdiction, it is immaterial that the form of appellant’s claim was in the nature of an action for judicial review. Gisriel, 345 Md. at 496-97 , 693 A.2d 757 . By raising the constitutional issues at the administrative level, we are equally satisfied that appellant’s claims are preserved and it ¹⁸³ has exhausted its administrative remedies.

See generally Holiday Point Marina Partners v. Anne Arundel County, 349 Md. 190, 199-204 , 707 A.2d 829 (1998). The remaining issue involves Beretta’s argument that the Commission’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. As this issue relates to the circuit court’s exercise of judicial review, we do not have jurisdiction to consider it on appeal. Healthcare Strategies, 117 Md.App. at 355 , 700 A.2d 278 .

Admittedly, this conclusion seems at odds with our earlier decision in Levitz , in which we considered the merits of Levitz’s “appeal” challenging the agency’s factual findings. Nevertheless, the Gisriel Court appears to have foreclosed our review of this issue. The Court reasoned: Any issues requiring the resolution of disputed facts would not arise until the Board begins to perform [its] duty. A subsequent judicial review of the manner in which the Board and Council performed the duty, involving the substantiality of the evidence supporting factual findings, the reasonableness of inferences and conclusions, etc., would constitute a judicial review action authorized by [the applicable provision] of the Ocean City Charter.

Section 12-302(a) presumably would be applicable to such an action. But a court action to determine in the first instance whether the Board must perform the duty is, by its very nature, a traditional common law mandamus action. Gisriel, 345 Md. at 498 , 693 A.2d 757 (emphasis added); see also Healthcare Strategies, 117 Md.App. at 355 , 700 A.2d 278 . The decision to limit our review to those matters involving the circuit court’s original jurisdiction is a practical one.

Were we to permit an appeal from all issues decided by the agency merely because one or two issues involved original jurisdiction, we would be inviting mischief. As long as a party attempting to challenge an agency’s factual findings includes an issue invoking the circuit court’s exercise of original jurisdiction, that party would be assured of obtaining appellate review in this Court over the entire action. In essence, we would be creating an exception to C.J. § 12-302(a) that would swallow the rule. We decline to do so, especially in a case ¹⁸⁴ such as this, in which we can easily separate the issues involving the lower court’s exercise of judicial review and original jurisdiction.

Accordingly, we hold that we have jurisdiction to consider Beretta’s appeal regarding (1) the constitutionality of the provision of Prince George’s County Code authorizing damage awards of up to $100,000 for humiliation and embarrassment and (2) whether the Commission violated its own rules when it made its back pay and damage awards. In contrast, the issue with respect to the adequacy of the evidence to support the Commission’s findings concerns the circuit court’s exercise of judicial review. 5 Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to consider this particular issue on appeal. C.J. § 12-302(a); Gisriel, 345 Md. at 498 , 693 A.2d 757 ; Healthcare Strategies, 117 Md.App. at 355 , 700 A.2d 278 ; cf. Levitz, 72 Md.App. at 108 , 527 A.2d 813 .

II

Appellant contends that Prince George’s County Code § 2-195.01(a)(3) is unconstitutional because (1) it conflicts with State law; (2) it is a general law and not a local law; (3) it is an impermissible delegation of judicial power; and (4) it violates Beretta’s due process rights. Section 2-195.01(a) of the County Code provides: In addition to the other awards and relief which are hereinafter provided, the Commission panel may, in accor ¹⁸⁵ dance with the standards of proof set forth in Section 2-195, also make the following monetary orders determined by the Commission panel from the evidence of record as the actual damages, costs, or losses involved, or in such amounts as may be specified below: (3) Damages may also be awarded to compensate complainant for humiliation and embarrassment suffered in an amount determined by the Commission panel to be appropriately and reasonably warranted considering all of the circumstances, but in no event shall the amount be in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). Section 2-195 provides: (a) If, upon all the evidence, the Commission by a majority vote of the full Commission finds that the respondent has engaged in any discriminatory action or wrongful practice within the scope of this Division, it shall so state its findings. The Commission shall issue and cause to be served upon the respondent an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the unlawful discriminatory action or prohibited practice and to take such affirmative action as equity and justice may require and prospective relief as is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Division.

(b) Such order must be reasonably related to the violation, and may include a requirement of reimbursement of actual expenses to the complainant arising out of the wrongful conduct of the respondent, and in employment cases may include the awarding of back pay and reimbursement of actual expenses caused by wrongful conduct of the respondent to a complainant employee. Prince George’s County is a charter home rule county, having adopted a charter form of government in accordance with Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, known as the Home Rule Amendment. 6 Prince George’s County is thus ¹⁸⁶ subject to the Express Powers Act. See Holiday Point, 849 Md. at 198, 707 A.2d 829 . Although Article XI-A does not confer legislative powers directly upon charter counties, Section 2 of Article XI-A requires the Legislature to “delegate those powers exercisable by [charter] counties.... ” Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 283 Md. 48, 57 , 388 A.2d 523 (1978).

In 1918, in response to the constitutional directive, the Legislature enacted the Express Powers Act, now codified in Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Cum.Supp.), Art. 25A. It recognizes the power of a county council in a home rule county to enact local ordinances to maintain “the peace, good government, health and welfare of the county,” Code, Art. 25A, § 5(S), and gives charter counties and Baltimore City “a wide array of legislative and administrative powers over local affairs.” Ritchmount, 283 Md. at 57 , 388 A.2d 523 ; see Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 610-11 , 415 A.2d 255 (1980). The scope of a charter county’s general welfare power is considered as broad at the local level as that of the General Assembly at the State level. See, e.g., Prince George’s County v. Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 275 Md. 374, 382 , 340 A.2d 265 (1975).

By permitting charter counties to enact many kinds of public local laws for the welfare of the county, the Express Powers Act affords charter counties “a significant degree of political self-determination.” McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 16 , 570 A.2d 834 (1990); see, e.g., Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 162 , 252 A.2d 242 (1969) (explaining that county’s authority to enact housing ordinance that prohibited discrimination based upon race was a valid exercise of police power under Art. 25A, § 5(S)); Holiday Universal Club of Rockville, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 67 Md.App. 568, 575 , 508 A.2d 991 (same, regarding discrimination in public accommodations), cert. denied, 307 Md. 260 , 513 A.2d 314 (1986), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1049 , 107 S.Ct. 920 , 93 L.Ed.2d 973 (1987); see also Snowden v. Anne Arundel County, 295 Md. 429, 432-33 , 456 A.2d 380 (1983); Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 298-99 , 396 A.2d 255 (1979); Steimel v. Board of Election ¹⁸⁷ Supervisors, 278 Md. 1, 6-8 , 357 A.2d 386 (1976); County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 415 , 312 A.2d 225 (1973). Nevertheless, such powers may be exercised only “to the extent that the same are not provided for by public general law....” Md.Code, Art. 25A, § 5(S). Indeed, Article XI-A provides that it “does not constitute a grant of absolute autonomy to local governments.” Ritchmount, 283 Md. at 56 , 388 A.2d 523 . Rather, as the Court observed in McCrory, 319 Md. at 16-17 , 570 A.2d 834 , Article XI-A was designed to provide a certain amount of self-autonomy to charter counties and Baltimore City in matters of purely local concern.

There are, however, occasions when a local law is invalid or of no effect as a result of State law. Article XI-A does not attempt to define the distinction between a local law and a general law. Instead, that question is left to the “ ‘application of settled legal principles to the facts of particular cases in which the distinction may be involved.’ ” McCrory, 319 Md. at 17 , 570 A.2d 834 (quoting Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 260 , 183 A. 534 (1936)); see Steimel, 278 Md. at 5-6 , 357 A.2d 386 . It is clear, however, that State law may preempt local law “ ‘in one of three ways: (1) preemption by conflict, (2) express preemption, or (3) implied preemption.’ ” Holiday Point, 349 Md. at 209 , 707 A.2d 829 (quoting Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 487-88 , 620 A.2d 880 (1993) (footnotes omitted)); see Perdue Farms Inc. v. Hadder, 109 Md.App. 582, 588 , 675 A.2d 577 (1996); May Dep’t Stores v. Montgomery County, 118 Md.App. 441, 462 , 702 A.2d 988 (1997), cert. granted, 349 Md. 237 , 707 A.2d 1330 (1998).

In AD + Soil, Inc. v. County Commissioners of Queen Anne’s County, 307 Md. 307, 324 , 513 A.2d 893 (1986), the Court explained: The doctrine of pre-emption is grounded upon the authority of the General Assembly to reserve for itself exclusive dominion over an entire field of legislative concern. When properly invoked, the doctrine precludes local legislative bodies from enacting any legislation whatsoever in the preempted field. ¹⁸⁸ Although “[ajbusive employment practices constitute a statewide problem which has been addressed by the General Assembly....” McCrory, 319 Md. at 20 , 570 A.2d 834 , we are satisfied that the Legislature has not preempted the entire field of employment discrimination law. To the contrary, the McCrory Court recognized that “the field [of employment discrimination] has not been preempted by the State, and ... home rule counties have concurrent authority to provide administrative remedies not in conflict with state law.” Id. Notwithstanding that the General Assembly has conferred upon charter counties the power to enact and enforce laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, see National Asphalt Pavement Assn’, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 292 Md. 75, 80-81 , 437 A.2d 651 (1981), the question for our determination is whether the County’s compensatory provisions conflict with State law.

Assuming, arguendo, that the County law in issue constitutes a local law, it would be invalid if it conflicts with a public general law enacted by the General Assembly. See Coalition for Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No. 622, 333 Md. 359, 379 , 635 A.2d 412 (1994); Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. at 419-20 , 312 A.2d 225 ; Mayor of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 312-17 , 255 A.2d 376 (1969); County Comm’rs v. Soaring Vista Properties, Inc., 121 Md.App. 140, 155 , 708 A.2d 1066 (1998). “Preemption by conflict exists if a local ordinance ‘prohibits an activity which is intended to be permitted by state law, or permits an activity which is intended to be prohibited by state law.’ ” May Dep’t Stores, 118 Md.App. at 462 , 702 A.2d 988 (quoting Perdue Farms, 109 Md.App. at 588 , 675 A.2d 577 (footnote omitted)). Accord, Holiday Point, 349 Md. at 210 , 707 A.2d 829 ; Skipper, 329 Md. at 487 n. 4, 620 A.2d 880 . Indeed, Article XI-A provides that, in the event of a conflict between a local law enacted by a charter county and a Public General Law of the State, “the Public General Law shall control.” Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3.

Nevertheless, when a local ordinance and a State law “employ wholly different means” to further the same objective or policy, and ¹⁸⁹ they “regulate entirely separate and distinct activities,” a conflict may not exist. Holiday Point, 349 Md. at 211 , 707 A.2d 829 . Moreover, “[w]hen state law simply regulates a matter to a limited extent, our cases have not ordinarily attributed to the General Assembly an intent to preempt local law regulating the matter to a greater extent.” Id. at 211 n. 6, 707 A.2d 829 . Under State law, the relief available to a complainant for employment discrimination is governed by Md.Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 11(e), and common law.

See Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 636-37 , 672 A.2d 608 (1996) (holding that common law action for wrongful discharge is available if statutory remedy is not otherwise applicable). Md.Code, Art. 49B, § 11(e) currently states, in pertinent part: If the respondent is found to have engaged in or to be engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the remedy may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief that is deemed appropriate. The award of monetary relief shall be limited to a 36-month period. The complainant may not be awarded monetary relief for losses incurred between the time of the Commission’s final determination and the final determination by the circuit court or higher appellate court, as the case may be.

Interim earning or amounts eaimable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the monetary relief otherwise allowable. (Emphasis added). The Court of Appeals explained in Makovi v. SherwinWilliams Co., 316 Md. 603 , 561 A.2d 179 (1989), that when the General Assembly added remedies to Art. 49B, they were limited to equitable relief, including back pay. Id. at 623 , 561 A.2d 179 .

The Legislature expressly rejected amendments that would have permitted awards for compensatory and ¹⁹⁰ punitive damages, including damages for “pain of mental anguish and humiliation.” Id. at 625, 561 A.2d 179 .