Bernadyn v. State

GREENE, J. Appellant, Michael Joseph Bernadyn, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County of possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and maintaining a common nuisance. The two drug possession charges were merged and appellant was sentenced to a ²⁵⁹ term of imprisonment of five years for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and a consecutive one-year term for maintaining a common nuisance. Appellant noted this appeal to raise the following questions for our review: I. Did the circuit court err in admitting into evidence the medical bill addressed to appellant?

II

Did the circuit court err in permitting Deputy Burk-hardt to offer opinion testimony?

III

Did the circuit court err in refusing to pose two of appellant’s requested voir dire questions?

IV

Did the circuit court err in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal? Finding no error and that there was sufficient evidence to convict appellant, we affirm the judgments. FACTS In August 2001, Deputy Mark Burkhardt of the Harford County Sheriffs Office conducted evening and late night surveillance on 2022 and 2024 Morgan Street in Edgewood, Maryland. Deputy Burkhardt observed the residences for approximately one week.

Deputy Burkhardt testified at trial to witnessing numerous individuals entering and exiting the two buildings. Individuals would often exit and walk to adjoining streets to conduct hand-to-hand drug transactions. Deputy Burkhardt further noted that individuals would often return to one of the residences after a transaction had taken place. Deputy Burkhardt testified that he frequently witnessed appellant leaving 2024 Morgan Street and walking up and down the street.

Appellant was also observed looking up and down the street prior to letting people into the residence. Deputy Burkhardt stated that he observed this behavior on approximately ten to fifteen different occasions. Deputy Burkhardt also noted that individuals entering 2024 Morgan Street included known drug dealers. These individuals were ²⁶⁰ viewed answering the door at 2024 Morgan Street and conducting transactions in the area.

On one occasion, two females were viewed exiting 2024 Morgan Street and exchanging what appeared to be a marijuana joint. The females departed and returned to the residence a short time later. Based on the preceding information, Deputy Burkhardt applied for and was granted a search and seizure warrant for 2024 Morgan Street. On August 29, 2001, Deputy Burkhardt, Detective Bray-band, and Sergeant Galbraith of the Harford County Narcotics Task Force executed the search and seizure warrant at 2024 Morgan Street.

Appellant was found alone in the living room of the residence. The police seized five one-ounce bags and twenty small baggies 1 containing marijuana, a coffee can holding marijuana seeds and stems from the master bedroom, a small tin holding marijuana from a desk in the living room, and a marijuana pipe from a curio cabinet in the living room. Deputy Burkhardt testified that the master bedroom contained men’s clothing. Notably, the second bedroom only contained women’s clothing and objects that would belong to an individual in high school or middle school.

The police also seized a medical bill from Johns Hopkins Bayview Physicians addressed to Bernadyn at 2024 Morgan Street. The “Statement Date” listed on the bill was August 16, 2001. Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and maintaining a common nuisance. A two-day jury trial was held on April 15-16, 2002.

During the course of trial the State offered, over appellant’s objection, the medical bill indicating appellant’s address as 2024 Morgan Street. Appellant contended that he did not reside at the subject residence and was not aware of the marijuana or paraphernalia. As a means of bolstering appellant’s position, appellant’s counsel asked Deputy Burk- ²⁶¹ hardt whether he investigated the name on the lease to 2024 Morgan Street. Deputy Burkhardt noted that he had made such an inquiry and discovered that an individual named Nicole Majerowicz was the lessee.

On redirect, the following pertinent exchange occurred: STATE: Deputy, how many search and seizure warrants have you assisted with in your career? DEFENSE: Objection. Relevance. COURT: Overruled.

DEPUTY BURKHARDT: Over 50. STATE: And when you’ve conducted those search and seizure warrants, how common is it for the utilities to be in someone else’s name? DEFENSE: Objection. COURT: If you know.

Overruled. DEPUTY BURKHARDT: Very common. STATE: How common is it for the apartment to be in someone else’s name? DEFENSE: Objection.

COURT: Overruled. DEPUTY BURKHARDT: Very common. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found appellant guilty of all charges. Appellant subsequently noted the current appeal.

We shall include more facts in the discussion as necessary. DISCUSSION I. The Medical Bill Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in admitting the medical bill into evidence. He argues that the bill constituted hearsay and that the State did not establish that the bill was produced in the ordinary course of business. We do not agree.

Maryland Rule 5-801 provides the following pertinent definitions: ²⁶² (a) Statement. A “statement” is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. (b) Declarant. A “declarant” is a person who makes a statement.

(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 5-802 provides that hearsay is generally inadmissible. See Stanley v. State, 118 Md.App. 45, 53 , 701 A.2d 1174 (1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 351 Md. 733 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998)(stating “[hjearsay is considered to be generally unreliable because the opponent does not have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant”). Although “the admission of evidence is committed to the considerable and sound discretion of the trial court,” we shall reverse a trial court “if the evidence is plainly inadmissible under a specific rule or principle of law or there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404 , 697 A.2d 432 (1997); see Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 176 , 729 A.2d 910 (1999)(noting the trial court’s determination regarding the admission of evidence “may not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of that discretion”); Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146, 158 , 721 A.2d 231 (1998)(stating “we extend to the trial court great deference in determining the admissibility of evidence and will reverse only if the court abused its discretion”).

The case sub judice raises the question of whether a bill, mailed to an individual at a particular address can be considered hearsay. This is an issue of first impression for the State of Maryland. We shall begin by discussing Rule 5-801. Rule 5-801(a)(l) defines a statement as an oral or written assertion.

Quite certainly, a bill addressed to an individual at a specific address does not assert anything more than that the individual owes the sender money for services. The bill simply did not state “Michael J. Bernadyn lives at 2024 ²⁶³ Morgan Street.” The subject bill, and indeed most correspondence, only includes a name and address. We reject any contention that such information contains an implied assertion 2 that the individual resides at the listed residence. The ²⁶⁴ conduct of addressing a letter is a non assertive action.

United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1147 (8th Cir.1982), rev’d on other grounds en banc, 710 F.2d 431 (8th Cir.1983). Of import, several jurisdictions have directly dealt with the issue before us. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. Singer, supra. In Singer, the appellees were convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and attempted distribution of marijuana.

Id. at 1138. Subsequent to the arrest of an individual attempting to mail large quantities of marijuana, police found documents linking Joseph Sazenski to the drug ring. Id. at 1139. The police consequently obtained a search warrant for Sazenski’s residence at 600 Wilshire, Minnetonka, Minnesota.

Id. During the resulting search, police seized a gram scale, marijuana, an eviction notice addressed to “Carlos Almaden and Joseph Sazenski, 600 Wilshire Drive, Minnetonka, Minnesota,” several other documents, and substantial amounts of money. Id. at 1139-40. On appeal, appellees contended that the envelope addressed to Almadén and Sazenski was hearsay.

Singer, 687 F.2d at 1147 . In rejecting this contention the Court stated: Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) states: “ ‘Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” The Advisory Committee for the proposed Rules of Evidence noted that “the effect of the definition of ‘statement’ is to exclude from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an assertion.... [Some] nonverbal conduct ... may be offered as evidence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the existence of the condition sought to be proved, from which belief the existence of the condition may be inferred.” This observation is consistent with the purpose of the hearsay rule—the exclusion of declarations whose veracity cannot be tested by cross-examination. There is some guarantee that an infer ²⁶⁵ ence drawn from out-of-court behavior is trustworthy, because people base their actions on the correctness of their belief. 4 Weinstein, Evidence § 801—53-56 (1981). If this letter were submitted to assert the implied truth of its written contents—that Carlos Almadén lived at 600 Wil-shire—it would be hearsay and inadmissible.

It is, however, admissible nonhearsay because its purpose is to imply from the landlord’s behavior—his mailing a letter to “Carlos Almadén,” 600 Wilshire—that “Almadén” lived there. In addition, it is important that the letter was found in the residence at 600 Wilshire. Id. at 1147. Thus, the Court concluded that a letter seized from a residence during a lawful search was not hearsay when offered to show that the sender believed appellees resided at the subject address and the letter was found in the residence to which it was addressed.

It is clear, however, that the content of the letter could not be used to prove the truth of the matters asserted in the letter. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reached a similar result in Shurbaji v. Virginia, 18 Va.App. 415 , 444 S.E.2d 549 (1994). In Shurbaji , a search of a residence revealed eight grams of cocaine, various articles of drug paraphernalia, substantial amounts of money, personal items bearing appellant’s name, and personal papers, including utility bills, addressed to appellant. Id. at 550 .

Notably, the items were all found in the same master bedroom. Id. On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in admitting the utility bills into evidence because it was hearsay and the prosecution was unable to lay a foundation under the business records exception. Id. at 551 .

In concluding that the trial court did not err, the Court held: The challenged documents in this case were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein. The utility bills were used as circumstantial evidence that appellant received or stored his property, including his correspondence, in the master bedroom. It was irrelevant what the utility bills ²⁶⁶ “asserted therein.” Rather, the mere existence of the bills in the master bedroom tended to prove that appellant controlled the room, and that the cocaine and paraphernalia found there belonged to him. See United States v. Hazeltine, 444 F.2d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir.1971) (envelope bearing inmate’s name and address was not hearsay and properly admissible, without authentication, to establish that cell and locker in which heroin was seized were the inmate’s cell and locker); United States v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir.1975) (label bearing accused’s name affixed to gun case was not hearsay and constituted an admissible evidentiary fact); see also McCormick on Evidence § 250 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.1992).

Accordingly, the bills were not hearsay and were properly admitted into evidence. Id. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina addressed the same issue in North Carolina v. Peek, 89 N.C.App. 123 , 365 S.E.2d 320 (1988). In rejecting the contention that mail addressed to appellant was hearsay, the Court stated: On its face, a written or printed name and address on an envelope asserts nothing.

From the sender’s conduct in writing or affixing the name and address and mailing the material so addressed, however, it may be inferred that the sender believes the person named lives at that address. As the Commentary to Rule 801 makes clear, conduct “offered as evidence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the existence of the condition sought to be proved” is not a statement. Although evidence of the sender’s conduct remains untested as to perception, memory, and narration, those “dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent to assert, and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds.” G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, Commentary. See also McCormick on Evidence, section 250 (3d ed.1984).

The sender’s conduct in addressing and mailing the envelope undoubtedly implies that the sender believes the addressee lives at that address. Nevertheless, because no ²⁶⁷ assertion is intended, the evidence is not hearsay and is admissible. Id. at 322. Indeed, other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion regarding the admissibility of mail seized during a search.

Illinois v. Cruz, 111 Ill.App.3d 95 , 66 Ill.Dec. 843 , 443 N.E.2d 769, 774 (1982)(noting “[i]t could be argued that the bill was not hearsay evidence if it were simply offered as circumstantial evidence that [appellee] was receiving mail at that address, from which it might be inferred that he resided there as well”); Missouri v. McCurry, 582 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Mo.Ct.App.1979)(holding that a telephone bill found in the same room as contraband “was not offered to show the truth of the matters asserted on the face of the bill,” but to show a connection between appellee and the contraband). We are persuaded by the logic of these decisions. Consequently, we hold that mail offered to prove that the individual to whom the correspondence is addressed has some connection to the residence, and not the truth of the matter asserted in the body of the correspondence, is admissible nonhearsay. In the case at bar the following excerpt from the State’s closing argument is insightful: Then you go to the officer who testifies, “When we go in, we look for mail.” And I submit if you said to anyone, “Go in this certain house,” and tell them no other information, “and tell me who lives there,” odds are they are going to pick up a piece of mail and look at it, and they’re going to say, probably that person lives here because their mail is here.

And then again that is something you would rely on in your every day decision making in that type of situation. And what you have, the officers said, there’s other mail, but, you know, they don’t back a truck up to the house when they are doing a Search and Seizure Warrant and unload the entire contents of the house. They pick a piece of evidence that shows who lives there, and what you have is a bill from Johns Hopkins Bay view ²⁶⁸ Physicians, a statement date of August 16, 2001. That’s almost two weeks before the warrant, but it’s for services that are provided back in June of 2001.

Now we go back almost two months prior to the warrant being served. So I guess defense counsel and the defendant would have you believe that Johns Hopkins randomly picked an address of 2024 and just happened to send it there, and that’s where the defendant lived. It doesn’t happen, because you also—look, this is a bill, is what it is, and I am sure that any institution is going to make sure they have the right address when they want to get paid. The preceding provides the only indication regarding the purpose for which the State introduced the subject bill.

The State suggests that the police seized an article of mail as evidence that someone lives at an address. The intent of the police in seizing the bill is not at issue. The State thereafter noted that Johns Hopkins believed that appellant resided at the address. The State further bolstered the statement by suggesting that Hopkins’ belief was most likely correct, because it is an institution that wished to be paid and would do background checks.

Consequently, the State properly offered the bill as evidence that Johns Hopkins believed appellant lived at the address. Appellant did not object to the State’s comments. Appellant relies on U.S. v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991 (D.C.Cir.1992), to contend that the bill was improperly admitted into evidence. Patrick is distinguishable from the case at bar.

In Patrick , appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and the use of a firearm in relation to drug trafficking. Id. at 993 . During a search, pursuant to a warrant, of a one bedroom apartment where appellant was residing, police seized a large amount of cocaine, money, a handgun, and a sales receipt for a television set. Id. at 994 .

The receipt indicated appellant purchased a new TV and listed the residence as his address. Id. Appellant objected to the admission of the sales receipt at trial, contending that the document was hearsay. Id. at 999 .

The Court stated: During closing argument, the prosecutor explained: ²⁶⁹ Take, for example, an argument that might be made that that’s not his apartment, that he doesn’t live there, and that’s not his bedroom, that he doesn’t stay in that bedroom. Well, ladies and gentlemen, let’s look at a couple of things that were taken out of that bedroom. Look at government’s exhibit no. 14, the television receipt. You all had a chance to look at this closely before[,] when it was admitted into evidence.

G.A. Patrick, 818 Chesapeake Street, Southeast, Washington, D.C. 20020. The receipt so used constituted a statement, namely Patrick lived at 818 Chesapeake Street, Southeast, and that statement indisputably was hearsay. Unlike the use of the name on the receipt to show that an item belonging to Patrick was found in the bedroom, the prosecutor published Patrick’s address as it appeared on the receipt to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that is, the address of Patrick’s residence. Patrick, 959 F.2d at 1000 (internal citations omitted).

The Court explained further that the receipt was double hearsay because it embodied the assertion of both the Circuit City employee who made out the receipt and the customer who provided the address. In the absence of testimony that Circuit City’s standard practice was to record and verify an address provided by a customer, the Court concluded that the receipt did not fall under the business record exception. Id. at 1000-1001 . The Court in Patrick determined that “the government used the receipt to prove that Patrick resided at the address.” Id at 1000 n. 13.

We agree that such a use would be inadmissa-ble hearsay. In the case sub judice, however, the bill was used as a means to show that Johns Hopkins believed appellant lived at the address and that the belief was likely accurate because Johns Hopkins had an interest in being paid. Such an offering is admissible nonhearsay. Moreover, alternatively, it was immaterial to the State’s case whether or not appellant owed Johns Hopkins money for ²⁷⁰ services rendered.

The medical bill was not offered to establish the truth of its contents, but rather for its probative value as circumstantial evidence connecting appellant to the residence wherein he, the bill, and the drugs were all found. Hence, there was no need to inquire into the credibility of the declarant at the time the medical bill was prepared. Similarly, the eviction notice addressed to the defendants in Singer, the personal papers and utility bills addressed to the defendant in Shurbaji , the mail addressed to the defendant in Peek , and the evidence offered here was not intended as an assertion and the jury was free to infer from the sender’s conduct (writing the name and address and mailing the material so addressed) that the addressee lived at the address in question. This inference was bolstered further by the fact that appellant was found inside the residence at that address.

II

Deputy Burkhardt’s Testimony Appellant next contends that the court erred in allowing Deputy Burkhardt to testify regarding his experiences involving background investigations because the testimony was not helpful to the jury and lacked sufficient factual support. Specifically, appellant contends that Deputy Burkhardt is not an expert in leasing and utility practices and, thus, his opinion testimony should not have been admitted. Again, we do not agree. We reaffirm that trial courts have considerable discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and we shall only reverse the court if there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.

Merzbacher, 346 Md. at 404 , 697 A.2d 432 ; See Conyers, 354 Md. at 176 , 729 A.2d 910 ; Hopkins, 352 Md. at 158 , 721 A.2d 231 . Maryland Rule 5-701, limits the opinion testimony that may be accepted from a lay witness. The Rule provides: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’s testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear ²⁷¹ understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. The Court of Appeals has further explained the requirements of Rule 5-701 in Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104 , 702 A.2d 741 (1997).

In Robinson , appellant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine. Id. at 107 , 702 A.2d 741 . Following his arrest, appellant ingested a substance that the police alleged to be cocaine. Id. at 108 , 702 A.2d 741 .

On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in allowing two officers to give lay opinion testimony regarding the swallowed substance. Id. In reversing the conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the Court established a four-pronged test. The Court stated: A trial court should, within the sound exercise of its discretion, admit lay opinion testimony if such testimony is [1] derived from first-hand knowledge; [2] is rationally connected to the underlying facts; [3] is helpful to the trier of fact; [4] and is not barred by any other rule of evidence.

Id. at 118 , 702 A.2d 741 . Thereafter, the Court described two categories of admissible lay opinion testimony. The first category is “lay opinion testimony where it is impossible, difficult, or inefficient to verbalize or communicate the underlying data observed by the witness.” Robinson, 348 Md. at 119 , 702 A.2d 741 . The second category encompasses situations where the jury would be unable to draw the proper inferences from the underlying data due to a lack of knowledge or skill.

Id. at 120 , 702 A.2d 741 . The Court then noted that Maryland courts have recognized a narrow exception lor police officers. Notably, the “specialized training, experience, and professional acumen of law enforcement officials” often justifies a court’s admittance of testimony outside the scope of the officer’s underlying factual observations. Id. at 120 , 702 A.2d 741 .

In applying the requirements of the four-pronged test, the Court concluded that the officers could not visually identify the subject substance as cocaine. Although ²⁷² the record demonstrate^] that the trial court would have been justified in concluding that [the officers] had the training and experience to offer opinion testimony as to the visual appearance of crack cocaine, ... neither trooper limited his testimony to identifying the visual characteristics of the disputed substance. Rather, both [officers] testified to the chemical nature of the alleged contraband. Id. at 122 , 702 A.2d 741 .

Thus, the Court concluded that the testimony fell outside the scope of the officers’ personal knowledge. Similarly, the Court concluded that the visual identification is not rationally connected to the chemical nature of crack cocaine because many substances share the same physical characteristics. Id. at 125 , 702 A.2d 741 . Finally, the Court concluded that the testimony was not helpful to the jury because the conclusions were based upon mere assumptions.

Robinson, 348 Md. at 128 , 702 A.2d 741 . Thus, the Court concluded that the testimonies of both officers should not have been admitted. We have reaffirmed the test set forth in Robinson in various decisions. In Bey v. State, 140 Md.App. 607 , 781 A.2d 952 (2001), cert. denied, 368 Md. 526 , 796 A.2d 695 (2002), we held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a detectives’s “lay opinion regarding whether appellant may have been under the influence of PCP at the time he was arrested.” Id. at 625 , 781 A.2d 952 .

Despite the detective’s testimony that he had contact with many people under the influence of PCP, the testimony revealed that such individuals “could exhibit a wide range of behavior and emotion,” the detective only had contact with appellant for a short period of time, and the detective noted nothing unusual about appellant’s conduct during this period of time. Id. In Bell v. State, 114 Md.App. 480 , 691 A.2d 233 (1997), we concluded that lay opinion testimony regarding the mental state of an assailant was erroneously admitted. Appellant was convicted of manslaughter, attempted first degree murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of both of the preceding crimes.

Id. at 483 , 691 A.2d 233 . At trial, appel ²⁷³ lant claimed that he had shot his two victims in self-defense. Id. at 487 , 691 A.2d 233 . During trial, two independent witnesses testified that there was no appearance of an imminent threat to appellant.

Id. at 506-07 , 691 A.2d 233 . On appeal appellant claimed, in part, that the circuit court erred in admitting the subject testimony. Id. at 505-06 , 691 A.2d 238 . We initially noted that, although the questions were not couched in the form of opinion testimony, the answers required the witnesses to opine as to the appellant’s state of mind.

Bell, 114 Md.App. at 507 , 691 A.2d 233 . We further acknowledged that, despite the rule that “opinion generally is ‘not objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact,’ ” the testimony in the instant matter should not have been admitted. Id. at 508 , 691 A.2d 233 (quoting Rule 5-704(a)). Specifically we noted that the witnesses lacked any first-hand knowledge regarding appellant’s state of mind and the testimony was not helpful to determining a fact in issue to the jury.

Id. at 509 , 691 A.2d 233 . In Rosenberg v. State, 129 Md.App. 221 , 741 A.2d 538 (1999), cert. denied 358 Md. 382 , 749 A.2d 173 (2000), we used the test set forth in Robinson to conclude that the admission of a detective’s lay opinion testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Rosenberg involved the arrest of appellant for the alleged theft of tools. Initially, police officers observed him tampering with a telephone equipment box.

Id. at 231 , 741 A.2d 533 . The officers believed that appellant was using special tools to make free phone calls due to the state of several wires that appeared to be crimped and pulled from the box. Id. at 233-34 , 741 A.2d 533 . The police did not immediately arrest appellant but seized a canvas bag of tools under the belief that the tools had been stolen.

Id. Thereafter, officers obtained a search warrant for appellant’s vehicle and residence. Rosenberg, 129 Md.App. at 234-35 , 741 A.2d 533 . The resulting search uncovered over a hundred items of telephone equipment that were not generally available to the public.

Id. at 236 , 741 A.2d 533 . Appellant was thereafter ²⁷⁴ convicted by a jury of “two counts of theft of property valued at more than $300.” Id. at 229 , 741 A.2d 533 . On appeal appellant, in part, contended that the circuit court erred in allowing a detective to give lay opinion testimony regarding: (1) the significance of crimp marks on the telephone wires in the telephone box; (2) what appellant was doing with the wires in the telephone box; (3) whether certain equipment seized from appellant’s canvas bag and home belonged to Bell Atlantic; and (4) whether the blue material found on the barbed wire at a Bell Atlantic storage facility was consistent with the blue blanket found in appellant’s truck. Id. at 254 , 741 A.2d 533 .

We held that the detective’s testimony fell within the category of permissible testimony under Robinson . We first noted that the detective had twenty-five years of experience as a police officer, experience conducting electronic surveillance, and experience dealing with phone boxes. Id. at 256, 741 A.2d 533 . We then concluded: According to [the detective], the crimp marks on the wires in the telephone box were consistent with the type of marks made by “alligator clips connected to a butt-in set.” This remark was derived from the detective’s first-hand knowledge, was rationally connected to the underlying facts, and was helpful to the trier of fact, because it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to convey the type of marks on the wires. [The detective] also testified