Berringer v. Steele

HOLLANDER, Judge. In this legal malpractice case, we must determine whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore County erred in granting summary judgment to Nevett Steele, Jr., Esquire, Michael J. Gentile, Esquire, and the Law Firm of Nevett Steele, Jr., PA. (the “Firm”), appellees, in connection with their post-trial representation of Philip E. Berringer, appellant, who had been convicted of theft and misappropriation of funds by a fiduciary. Berringer presents two general questions for our consideration, which we have rephrased slightly: I. Did the circuit court err in awarding summary judgment? ⁴⁴⁹ II.

Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s post-trial motion to alter or amend judgment? Appellant also raises four issues, which we have rephrased, reordered, and condensed as follows: 1 I. Did appellant’s failure to obtain post conviction relief bar his legal malpractice claim against appellees?

II

Did the circuit court correctly interpret appellant’s complaint in determining that he knew appellees did not intend to file a notice of appeal on appellant’s behalf and conclude that such knowledge barred recovery?

III

In its memorandum and ruling awarding summary judgment, did the circuit court ignore appellant’s allegations of appellees’ negligence and breach of contract with respect to their representation of appellant at sentencing? FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Appellant filed his legal malpractice suit on January 30, 1998, after years of litigation arising from his involvement ⁴⁵⁰ with the National Computer Ribbon Corporation (“NCRC”), a small manufacturing firm. From April 1986 to June 1993, Berringer was the president, chief executive officer, and a director of NCRC. In November 1991, Joanne Hardy resigned her position as NCRC’s production manager.

Shortly thereafter, Berringer indefinitely suspended William Hardy, Joanne’s husband, who was an NCRC salesman, director, and shareholder, pending an investigation into the allegedly unauthorized removal of files and documents from NCRC. Mr. Hardy and another director, Frank Schmidt, asserted that the file and document removal were part of their investigation of fraud and embezzlement purportedly committed by Berringer. In January 1992, Berringer terminated Mr. Hardy for alleged conversion of a company automobile. On May 1,1992, the Hardys initiated a wrongful termination suit against NCRC, Berringer, and Maria Staab.

Staab was a member of the NCRC board, the company’s office manager, and its corporate secretary. The Hardys claimed that Mr. Hardy had been terminated, and Ms. Hardy constructively terminated, because they chose to “blow the whistle” on Berringer’s fraudulent procurement of over $200,000 in NCRC funds through a company called E & L Enterprises (“E & L”). After a three-week trial, the jury rendered a verdict against Berringer and NCRC for nearly $3 million, including $650,000 in punitive damages against appellant. In October 1993, Berringer was charged in Baltimore County with fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary and felony theft.

The case was tried to a jury in the circuit court (Howe, J., presiding) beginning on December 12, 1994. At trial, appellant was represented by Stewart Lyons, Esquire, an Assistant Public Defender. The evidence presented at Berringer’s criminal trial 3 revealed that NCRC used various subcontractors to perform ⁴⁵¹ some of its assembly and processing work. Over a period of time, NCRC paid out more than $227,000 to E & L based on invoices submitted for subcontracting work allegedly performed for NCRC.

The evidence showed, however, that E & L had not performed the services, and that Berringer, who was affiliated with E & L, took the money paid on the invoices and deposited it into his personal bank account. Berringer maintained that he and his associates had performed the work reflected on the invoices at night and on the weekends, when the regular NCRC staff was not present. The jury convicted appellant of both charges. The court then denied Berringer’s request for bail, and he was detained at the Baltimore County Detention Center pending sentencing.

On December 28, 1994, Berringer, through Lyons, moved for a new trial, proffering the following “reasons”: 1. That juror number three, Denise Shipowick, disliked co-defendant Maria Staab.[ 4 ] 2. That Maria Staab and Mrs. Shipowick live in the same neighborhood. A couple of years ago, Mrs. Shipowick’s son assaulted and battered Mrs. Staab’s son.

The Staabs insisted that [Mrs.] Shipowick’s son be charged in juvenile court. Both Maria Staab and her husband Bemie Staab were in juvenile court for Mrs. Shipowick’s son’s case. 3. That both Maria Staab and her husband Bemie Staab believe that Mrs. Shipowick holds a feeling of animosity to them, and that Mrs. Shipowick would have recognized Maria Staab’s name when the names of the potential witnesses were read during voir dire. 4. That one of the grounds for a new trial is the bias and disqualification of jurors. [Citation omitted.] ⁴⁵² 5.

That, as a second ground, the defense presented uncontradicted evidence that the Defendant was owed or entitled to much more money than he allegedly stole from the corporation. In light of this, the jury’s verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence. [Citation omitted.] 6. And for such other and further reasons as may be assigned at a hearing on this motion. A hearing on that motion, and sentencing, were scheduled for January 31,1995.

Dissatisfied with Lyons, Berringer engaged private counsel. On December 28,1994, while incarcerated, Berringer met with Steele and related a number of purported deficiencies in Lyons’s representation, including the failure to gain admission in evidence of fourteen documents that subsequently “disappeared” from the court. Steele advised Berringer that he would file an amended motion for new trial and attempt to secure a bail hearing. According to appellant’s malpractice complaint, Steele agreed with Berringer “that the first and most important thing to do was to get a” transcript of appellant’s criminal trial, and “Steele assured Berringer that Steele would order the Transcript immediately and that Steele should have a copy within a few weeks.” Steele further advised Berringer that he would meet with Judge Howe and the prosecutor to ascertain the location of the fourteen missing exhibits.

Berringer told Steele that Lyons was hostile in response to Berringer’s recommendation that he move for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, Steele advised Berringer that he would note the appeal. Berringer, in turn, assured Steele that his aunt, Ruth Walsh, would furnish any additional money on Berringer’s behalf if needed for the appeal. The following day, December 29, 1994, Gentile brought Berringer an engagement letter, a copy of the motion for new trial filed by Lyons, and a copy of the amended motion for new trial that appellees had filed that day.

The letter, which was signed by Steele, said, in relevant part: ⁴⁵³ Thank you for asking us to represent you in the criminal matter pending before Judge Howe. It is a very interesting case. I think we developed some good ideas in our discussion last night. I have visited Stewart Lyons and left a message with Bruce Penczek[, a certified public accountant,] in order to make arrangements to meet with him to discuss preparation of a financial analysis. ... 1 am operating under the assumption that Ruth [Walsh] will issue a $20,000.00 check to my firm____ I will deposit the $20,000.00 in our escrow account and bill against it at the rate of $180.00 an hour for my time and $135.00 an hour for Mike Gentile.

I will delegate the primary responsibility for the financial investigation, organization, and compilation to Bruce Penczek. This should help to keep the hourly rates and costs down and enhance the quality of the work. I will pay Bruce Penczek his retainer out of the money we are holding in our escrow account. My plan is to obtain from Stewart Lyons the various records he has, let Bruce Penczek review those, and have Bruce meet with you.

We will send detailed monthly billing statements with a description of our services and the expenses incurred. Interest will be charged at the annual rate of 12% on unpaid balances over 30 days. You will be responsible for reimbursing us for all advanced expenses that we make such as expert fees, trial transcripts, photocopying, computer research, hand-deliveries, overnight mail, long-distance telephone, and other expenses incurred lip to the date of receipt of your written notice. We reserve the right to withdraw from representation for good cause such as your refusal to cooperate with our office or your failure to maintain an account in good standing.

The firm will not discontinue legal services without giving you notice. ⁴⁵⁴ * $: * Our undertaking is to represent you in regard to the reduction of bail, the motion for new trial, and the sentencing before Judge Howe. This agreement dees not include an appeal of the conviction. If you are in agreement with the above, would you please sign the copy enclosed herein and return it to me. A self- , addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

(Emphasis added). Appellant was dissatisfied with the terms of the agreement, and advised Gentile that Steele should prepare a revised engagement letter to reflect the following: (1) hourly rates of $170 and $125 for Steele and Gentile, respectively, in accordance with discussions during the December 28 meeting; (2) filing a notice of appeal by appellees, with appellees to contact Ruth Walsh if additional funds were required; ánd (8) Berringer did not want Steele to expend funds on retaining Bruce Penczek to conduct a financial analysis. Nevertheless, Berringer signed and dated the engagement letter on December 29, 1994, 5 although none of the requested changes had been made. The amended motion for new trial repeated the first five paragraphs of the original motion, renumbered the sixth paragraph as new paragraph 7, and added the following, in part: 6.

That, as a third ground, the court erred in evidentiary rulings including the exclusion of evidence related to the Defendant’s lack of concealment, the absence of loss on the part of [NCRC], proof that the payments were authorized, that persons other than the Defendant held a majority interest in the corporation, and possible bias on the part of prosecution witness Joanne Hardy and including the denial of Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of $91,042.00 paid to E & L Enterprises in 1991. Error by the ⁴⁵⁵ eourt is a ground for granting a new trial. [Citation omitted.] Steele met with Berringer again on January 6, 1995, and told Berringer that he would revise the engagement letter and submit it to Berringer for his review and signature. Steele also advised appellant that the transcript of the criminal proceeding had been ordered and that it would cost approximately $5,000. Steele also indicated that he was then preparing a notice of appeal, which would be filed shortly.

On the same day, Dr. Ellen McDaniel, a forensic psychiatrist, interviewed appellant, notwithstanding that he never approved the retention of Dr. McDaniel. Moreover, Berringer never received any information concerning the results of Dr. McDaniel’s interview. Steele next met with Berringer on January 19, 1995. Berringer again complained about the use of Penczek, requested a revised engagement letter, and inquired as to the notice of appeal.

Steele indicated that if Gentile had not already done so, the appeal would be noted later the same day. He also said that he would bring a revised engagement letter with him the following day. Although Steele visited Berringer on January 20, 1995, Steele did not bring an amended engagement letter. He also informed appellant that he had not yet received a copy of the trial transcript, but would make certain that appellant received a copy of the notice of appeal.

Steele further suggested that their efforts were best foeused on the motion for new trial because, in Steele’s opinion, Judge Howe would likely impose a substantial sentence. At a meeting on January 26, 1995, Steele told Berringer that Gentile had not filed an appeal because Gentile believed it was a waste of time. Furthermore, Steele indicated that he had met with Judge Howe and the prosecutor, and was waiting to hear about the missing documents. Steele also indicated that his office would deliver the trial transcript to Berringer the following day.

According to the complaint, Steele and Gentile telephoned Berringer’s wife, the attorneys representing NCRC (which ⁴⁵⁶ was then purportedly controlled by the Hardys), and other attorneys who had assisted in the “illegal takeover” of NCRC. These communications were evidenced by an itemized invoice from the Firm to Walsh. Berringer complained that appellees “wastetd] time and money” calling his wife, and expressed his displeasure with appellees’ decision to communicate with counsel retained by “adverse” parties. During a meeting between Steele and Berringer on January 30,1995, Steele advised Berringer, inter alia, that: (1) he had not acted to secure the transcript from the criminal trial; (2) after conversing with “adverse” counsel, he was persuaded of Berringer’s guilt; (3) he was convinced that Berringer would receive a substantial prison sentence unless Berringer could convince Walsh not to pursue stock ownership claims against NCRC, and unless Berringer and Walsh agreed not to sue the attorneys who assisted in the takeover of NCRC by the Hardys and Schmidt; (4) if Walsh and Berringer agreed not to sue “everyone involved with the takeover of NCRC”, then the only hope would be to ask Judge Howe to reduce any sentence in light of appellant’s psychological problems and agreement to house arrest; and (5) he had filed a sentencing memorandum on Berringer’s behalf on January 27, 1995, without first consulting with appellant.

Although the complaint indicates that Berringer never received a copy of the sentencing memorandum, a copy was filed in support of the malpractice action. The memorandum first traced appellant’s personal background and employment history. It also detailed Dr. McDaniel’s recommendation that appellant engage in counseling for at least one year, and indicated that appellant was “willing and able to begin this as soon as he is permitted to attend the counseling sessions at Dr. McDaniel’s offices.” Additionally, appellant was to participate in a community service program for the homeless through a church in Baltimore. Moreover, the memorandum reported that appellant had been offered employment as a sales executive with the Best Ribbon Corporation and that his hours would be 8:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., requiring his absence from home from 7:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

Appellees’ interpreta ⁴⁵⁷ tion of the sentencing guidelines, reflected in the memorandum, revealed that appellant could be sentenced to six months of probation. The memorandum also indicated that appellant was involved in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. A report produced by Penczek was attached to the memorandum, analyzing Berringer’s financial situation in light of the bankruptcy and the judgment rendered in the Hardys’ wrongful discharge action. The memorandum continued: In addition, counsel for the defendant have been informed that NCRC has settled its suit against their former accountants for an amount in excess of $300,000.

As the Complaint in that matter indicates, the bulk of the compensatory relief sought was for $240,000 which defendant Berringer diverted from the company. The remainder of the compensatory relief sought in that case was for the fees paid to the accountants. In addition, counsel for the defendant have been informed that NCRC obtained a settlement in excess of $500,000 in its litigation against its former attorneys. It is suggested that the defendant be required to stay within the State of Maryland during the initial period of his employment and only be permitted to travel outside the State of Maryland with the specific approval of the probation officer.

While the defendant’s earnings would likely be higher if he could travel, perhaps he should demonstrate his ability to perform conditions of counseling, community service, and employment specified above before being permitted to travel outside the state. Additionally, the Court may want to restrict the defendant’s mobility by imposing home detention or by using a private monitoring system that would report directly to the probation officer but be paid for by the defendant. CONCLUSION It is submitted that a combination of the conditions suggested above will restrict the defendant’s freedom without eliminating his ability to earn an income and to begin to ⁴⁵⁸ pay significant debts that he owes. It permits the extent of his freedom and income-producing ability to increase as he demonstrates his commitment to the conditions of counseling and community service and to the terms of monitoring and following a precise schedule and itinerary.

A goal of this plan is to make the defendant more aware of the weaknesses and faults and misplaced values that contributed to his undoing. A further objective is to prevent him from engaging in similar conduct in the future. The defendant agrees with this analysis and recommendation and has authorized undersigned counsel to speak for him. He recognizes the wisdom of listening and remaining silent at this time.

On January 31,1995, shortly before the hearing, Berringer and Steele met again. Steele advised Berringer that he had not received the transcript from appellant’s criminal trial and was not prepared to defend the amended motion for new trial. Additionally, Steele indicated that he would not note an appeal of the criminal convictions after the hearing on January 31, 1995, because of insufficient funds. The hearing on appellant’s amended motion for new trial, and sentencing, proceeded as scheduled on January 31, 1995.

The court rejected the “first ground” of error alleged in appellant’s amended motion, concerning the alleged bias of a juror against Ms. Staab. The following discussion is relevant: THE COURT: All right. It’s the Defense Motion for New Trial. MR.

STEELE: Yeah. THE COURT: You may proceed. MR. STEELE: Yes, ma’am.

Your Honor, in regard to the Motion for New Trial, uhm, I, I primarily want to submit on virtually everything except the issue involving the juror; I think we can discuss. And she’s in the courtroom right now. But I don’t want to waive any of the points that we’ve made. I haven’t been able to secure a transcript and I didn’t think it was prudent to spend money on a transcript.

Frankly, your Honor, I thought it was more prudent to, to ⁴⁵⁹ get prepared for sentencing. And, as a consequence, we haven’t, uhm, you know, read over the record. Uhm, in, on the issue regarding the, the juror, we’ve made some inquiries. Today was the first day we were able to talk with her.

And perhaps we can state for the record what— [PROSECUTOR]: I believe we can, your Honor. I can— this is Denise Shipowick, the Juror No. 3 or 4.1 don’t recall. THE COURT: No. 3. [PROSECUTOR]: Specifically, Defense counsel’s made several allegations with regard to Miss Shipowick’s knowledge of Miss Maria Staab. THE COURT: Mm-hmm. [PROSECUTOR]: My understanding, and please correct me if I’m wrong, my understanding is apparently they were neighbors or are neighbors— MS.

SHIPOWICK: Are. [PROSECUTOR]:—or something. Are neighbors. But my understanding from speak[ing] with Miss Shipowick is that she had no knowledge of that, whatsoever. And, as the Court will recall, Miss Staab never testified— MS.

SHIPOWICK: The— THE COURT: Right. [PROSECUTOR]: She had no recollection. No, she did not recognize the name or, obviously, the person of Miss Staab during the course of this trial. Apparently, it was with regard— MS. SHIPOWICK: Juror— [PROSECUTOR]:—when she went after the verdict on that day, Miss Shipowick went home and, for the first time, was obviously able to discuss the case with her family.

At that time, I believe her son mentioned or heard, was hearing the story, her son mentioned, oh, mom, is that the Maria Staab that lives up the street? At first Miss Shipowick thought, oh, I don’t think so. Ultimately, it turns out it was a woman that she knew but, apparently, Miss Shipowick, even in light of that, had no hard feelings or whatever about Miss Staab. ⁴⁶⁰ And, again, because it was all after the trial, I don’t foresee that it had any bearing on the trial, whatsoever. Miss Shipowick can certainly correct any-, anything that I may have said.

MS. SHIPOWICK: That’s, that’s accurate, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Steele?

MR. STEELE: I’m satisfied with that statement, your Honor. And I int-, interviewed the juror, also, prior to the proceedings today. THE COURT: I’ve read carefully the [case of Burkett v. State, 21 Md.App. 438 , 319 A.2d 845 (1974) ].

And the test where a juror would fail to respond to a voir dire inquiry is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge unless, A, actual prejudice to the accused is demonstrated or, B, withheld information in and of itself gives rise to a reasonable belief that prejudice or bias by the juror against the accused is likely. And, so, Mr. Steele, if you want to argue either or both of those points, I will certainly entertain an argument. MR. STEELE: You, your Honor, I don’t believe it would be fruitful to argue the point further.

I, I talked with the witness this morning. The thing I was primarily— THE COURT: That’s not— MR. STEELE: I’m sorry. The juror the juror/witness, the thing I was primarily concerned with was that she had heard the name Staab, didn’t make further inquiry, didn’t raise her hand and didn’t do anything about it.

What she has told us today negates that. THE COURT: Okay. MR. STEELE: So if she were to testify, I don’t think I’d have a factual foundation [to] make the argument your Honor.

I did feel that I had an obligation to pursue the inquiry. It had been raised by prior counsel, and, and we raised it, as well. The “second ground” for new trial concerned appellant’s entitlement to monies in excess of what he allegedly stole from NCRC. The hearing transcript reveals that Steele attempted ⁴⁶¹ to proceed directly to the “third ground,” without addressing the second.

Nevertheless, after reiterating the argument underlying the second ground, the court asked Steele if he had “any additional argument.” When Steele responded in the negative, the court denied the motion on that basis. The third ground alleged that the court erred in excluding certain evidence and in denying appellant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of payments made to E & L in 1991. The following colloquy is pertinent: MR. STEELE: You, your Honor, we raised issues insofar as evidentiary— THE COURT: Right.

MR. STEELE:—objections. Particularly on financial information. THE COURT: Right.

MR. STEELE: Uhm, the Court, you know, denied the admission into evidence of those exhibits during the course of the trial. I, I’ve reviewed them. THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. STEELE: I, I’ve reviewed them. You know, I would continue to say that the Court should have admitted them and that our client was prejudiced because they weren’t admitted. But I think that the Court would really have to recognize or to concede that she was in error at the time that she made those, these rulings.

I mean, I don’t, as I said, we do not have the transcript, so I am not in a position to argue in any great detail those points. I have reviewed those exhibits, and I’ve reviewed the exhibits that were admitted and I think I understand the nature of why the Defendant wanted them in and why the Court ruled the way the Court did, your Honor. THE COURT: ... [Ajnything further on that other than what you’ve said todayt?] ⁴⁶² * * * MR. STEELE: ...

I don’t have anything further to, to add than what, what we’ve said in the motion. The court rejected the third argument. After Steele indicated that appellant had no other grounds, the court denied the new trial motion in its entirety. During the sentencing phase of the hearing, Steele elaborated upon the points addressed in the sentencing memorandum.

With respect to the proposed counseling, Steele said: We have come to agreement among ourselves as things, as to the various things that he would be willing to do and that we think would be constructive for him to do in the next year or two years. First of all is counseling. I, I asked Dr. McDaniel [to] see the Defendant and evaluate him.- She is willing to continue to work with him as far as the counseling is concerned. I think that the Defendant has suffered from too much optimism, too much salesmanship, a, you know, lack of a hold on, on reality.

And I, and I do have some concerns that, without examining himself, and getting professional examination, evaluation and counseling that a psychiatrist could give ... him, that he could get himself again in, you know, financial difficulties similar to what, you know, brought about this case. In the malpractice complaint, Berringer alleged that he advised Steele that he wanted to address the Court at sentencing. Nevertheless, the record at sentencing reflects that appellant declined to allocute. The following exchange is relevant: THE COURT: ...

Does Mr. Berringer wish to address the Court today by way of allocution? MR. STEELE: Your Honor, we’ve spoken about this and, very frankly—and I trusted in our memo I think some, one of the things that has gotten him into difficulty is he’s, talks too much. And I’ve ... advised him that I think it’s in his best interests not to, to speak today, but to . -.. accept what we have said on his behalf.

Uhm, do you agree with that? ⁴⁶³ [BERRINGER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: So you—he waives his right of allocution; is that correct? MR. STEELE: That’s correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. MR. STEELE: You understand that? [BERRINGER]: Yes. Thereafter, the court merged appellant’s fraudulent misappropriation conviction with the theft conviction and sentenced Berringer to fifteen years of imprisonment, with all but three years suspended, and credit for forty-three days of time served.

Appellant was to be incarcerated for the first year of his sentence and, in accordance with Steele’s proposal, he was then to be placed in home detention for two years. During that period, appellant would be permitted to work, attend weekly religious services, and participate in counseling. Additionally, the court ordered appellant to pay restitution of $227,191.25 to NCRC “during [appellant’s] seven-year period of probation.” 6 On May 1, 1995, Steele filed a motion for modification and reduction of sentence, as well as another motion for new trial, pursuant to Md. Rule 4-331(b), (c). Both motions were denied.

No appeal was filed as to the conviction or post-trial motions. By letter dated August 18, 1995, Steele notified Berringer that appellees intended to withdraw their appearance. The letter stated: “I remain interested in assisting you, but at the present time we are approximately $15,000.00 in the hole.” Judge Howe granted appellees’ motion. ⁴⁶⁴ On November 15, 1995, appellant appeared before Judge Howe on a charge of violation of probation. Although somewhat unclear from the record, it appears that the alleged violation included a series of threatening telephone calls to the Hardys.

Notwithstanding Berringer’s steadfast denial of any wrongdoing, the court found appellant in violation, revoked his probation, and imposed the entire fifteen-year sentence. Appellant’s subsequent appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, on December 6,1995, Berringer applied for review of his sentence by a three-judge panel. On May 22, 1996, the panel upheld the sentence.

Appellant filed a petition for post conviction relief on November 5, 1996, which was heard and decided by Judge Brennan. The petition was premised on the alleged ineffective assistance of appellant’s trial counsel. In his opinion and order of August 25, 1997, 7 Judge Brennan found that Lyons’s representation of Berringer “was below objectively reasonable standards as measured against prevailing professional norms” and resulted in “actual prejudice.” Accordingly, the court granted the petition and awarded a new trial. On September 24, 1997, the State responded by applying to this Court for leave to appeal the order.

While the State’s application was pending in this Court, appellant instituted the legal malpractice action against appellees at issue here. On January 30,1998, through Nathaniel E. Jones, Jr., Esquire and Jones’s firm (collectively, “Jones”), 8 appellant filed a five-count complaint. The first three counts, directed at Steele, Gentile, and the Firm, alleged breach of contract (Count I); negligent representation (Count II); and breach of fiduciary duty (Count III). An additional count, ⁴⁶⁵ lodged against the Firm, asserted negligent supervision (Count IV).

Count V alleged intentional misrepresentation by Steele and Gentile. Although segmented into separate counts, the complaint was premised principally on the following failings: (1) appellees did not adequately prepare to argue appellant’s motion for new trial and presented a defective argument at the hearing on that motion; (2) appellees presented positions to the court regarding sentencing of which appellant had not been previously advised and which were contrary to appellant’s instructions; (3) appellees did not file a petition for bail or arrange a bail hearing; and (4) appellees failed to note an appeal of Berringer’s criminal conviction. Count V also included sixteen alleged false representations made by either Steele or Gentile in the course of representation. In addition, the alleged damages Berringer sustained as a result of each count were identical, and included: (1) the loss of $20,000.00 paid to [the Firm]; (2) the loss of [Berringer’s] employment and loss of income due to his incarceration for twenty eight months and continuing; (3) being wrongfully incarcerated in Maryland prisons and having lost his liberty for 28 months and continuing and; (4) the loss of his wife and child after 7 years of marriage due to his being incarcerated for over 28 months; (5) mental and physical pain and anguish, and (6) professional and personal ruin. .

Appellees responded by filing a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, stating, in pertinent part: 1. Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against Defendants based on their alleged failure to file an appeal because Defendants specifically declined to undertake the representation of Plaintiff with respect to an appeal of his criminal conviction. The Plaintiff, by contract concurred. 2. Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against Defendants based on alleged inadequate representation at the January 31, 1995 hearing on the motion for a new trial and the ⁴⁶⁶ sentencing as any such claim necessarily constitutes an impermissible attack on Defendant’s trial strategy. 3.

Plaintiff cannot maintain any of the claims set forth in the Complaint because he cannot demonstrate that any act or omission on the part of Defendants proximately caused him any damage. 4. Plaintiff cannot maintain any of the claims set forth in the Complaint because he failed to obtain post conviction relief against of [sic] the Defendants. Appellant filed an opposition to appellees’ motion, to which appellees replied. Thereafter, on October 26, 1998, appellant filed: (1) a “Surreply to Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment” (the “Surreply”), and (2) a “Supplemental Surreply to Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment” (the “First Supplemental Surreply”).

The First Supplemental Surreply was evidently intended to update the circuit court on the status of the State’s application for leave to appeal the order of August 26, 1997, granting a new trial. In an unreported opinion, a panel of this Court granted the State’s application. State v. Berringer, No. 212, Sept. Term 1997 (filed Sept. 29,1998) (“Berringer I ”). There, we said that “[t]o demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: ‘(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’ ” Id., slip op. at 1 (quoting Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685, 696 , 496 A.2d 1074 (1985)).

Because we concluded that the prejudice prong had not been established, slip op. at 8, we granted the State’s application and vacated the order granting a new trial. Id. Appended to the First Supplemental Surreply was a draft copy of the motion for reconsideration that appellant intended to file in this Court. The circuit court (Daniels, J.) held a hearing on appellees’ motion for summary judgment on October 26, 1998.

It reserved ruling and, by letter dated November 23, 1998, informed counsel: ⁴⁶⁷ The Plaintiffs [sic] argue that the favorable judicial ruling on Mr. Berringer’s Complaint For Post Conviction Relief, at the very least, generates a material dispute as to the facts in this case. That argument has some allure. Accordingly, I propose that I hold Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment sub curia pending the outcome of the State’s appeal of Judge Brennan’s grant of post conviction relief. Appellant file a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s decision in Berringer I on October 29, 1998, and a copy was attached to a “Second Supplemental Surreply,” filed in the circuit court on October 30, 1998.

In a “Third Supplemental Surreply to Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment” (the “Third Supplemental Surreply”), filed on December 30, 1998, appellant advised the circuit court that this Court had denied reconsideration and that a petition for certiorari was pending in the Court of Appeals. By letter of January 28, 1999, appellant’s attorney advised the court that certiorari was denied on January 14,1999. In addition, appellant’s counsel said: [Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ denial of Berringer’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Berringer still has the right to, and fully intends to, file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, asserting as the bases for relief essentially the same bases asserted in support of his State Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Accordingly, given the availability of this federal remedy to Berringer, Defendants’ position that Berringer has not been granted post-conviction relief has not been fully resolved, and thus, the purported absence of such relief cannot serve as a basis for granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

The record does not reflect that appellant thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. But, appellant advised us in his brief that the habeas petition was filed after the circuit court issued its ruling on April 14, 1999, and that the matter was still pending when the briefs were filed with this Court. ⁴⁶⁸ In its ruling of April 14, 1999, the court treated appellees’ motion as one for summary judgment, see Md. Rule 2-322(c), and relied on our opinion in Berringer I. The court found several facts as undisputed: 1. The Amended Motion For A New Trial, filed by the Defendants on behalf of the Plaintiff, was heard and disposed of on the date of the Plaintiffs sentencing by Judge Howe, January 31,1995. 2. The Plaintiff was aware that the Defendants “had decided not to file for an appeal ‘after today’s hearing’ ‘because he was out of money;’ ”.

Complaint ..., Paragraph 46(c), page 22. 3. Plaintiff contends that his trial counsel committed numerous delicti which resulted in an unjustified verdict of guilty in the underlying criminal ease. Complaint ..., paragraphs 11 through 22, pages 8 through 12. 4.. In its opinion vacating the grant of post conviction relief, the Court of Special Appeals found, Nothing that the hearing judge said or that Mr. Berringer has said in his reply application has shown that defense counsel’s actions caused any prejudice to Mr. Berringer’s defense.

Because no showing has been made that defense counsel’s representation prejudiced the defense, no basis exists to rule that the defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. [Berringer I, slip op. at] 8. The court then turned to its conclusions of law, stating, in part: 1. Plaintiff argues that a genuine dispute exists as to whether or not the Defendants had undertaken the responsibility of noting an appeal in Plaintiffs criminal case. Assuming arguendo that such a dispute does exist, there is no dispute that the Plaintiff knew of the Defendants’ decision not to note an appeal as early as January 26, 1995.

Because the Plaintiff knew of the Defendants’ decision not to note an appeal as of that date, it was then incumbent upon the [Plaintiff] to take whatever means were necessary to file the Notice of Appeal on his own behalf. By rule, he ⁴⁶⁹ had thirty days from the date of the sentencing, January 31, 1995, within which to note his appeal. The Court concludes that the failure of the Plaintiff to cause a Notice of Appeal to be filed, after having been so apprised, amounts to contributory negligence and a failure to mitigate contract damages as a matter of law. 2. Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants were negligent in failing to raise all instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial before Judge Howe. [Berringer /] eviscerates this argument.

Because the Court of Special Appeals ruled that Plaintiff failed to prove that trial counsel had prejudiced his case in any way, the Court concludes as a matter of law that had the Defendants, in this ease, raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel before Judge Howe, she would have, and should have, denied Plaintiffs Motion For New Trial. In essence, [.Berringer I ] precludes a finding that the Defendants in this case were negligent in not raising the deficiencies of trial counsel because trial counsel did nothing to prejudice the Plaintiffs criminal defense. ... The Plaintiff ... argued the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel before the Court of Special Appeals without success. That ruling should bar him from attempting to obtain the opposite result in his civil case. * * * A significant number of states have held that a successful ruling in a post conviction proceeding is a precondition for bringing an attorney malpractice case.

Likewise, a number of courts have precluded the prosecution of legal malpractice claims against a trial attorney by a convicted defendant who has been unsuccessful in obtaining post conviction relief. ⁴⁷⁰ * * * This Court fully anticipates the Plaintiff will question the applicability of a rule of law barring him from bringing an action for malpractice against the Defendants in this case when the Court of Special Appeals passed judgment only on his claims of ineffective assistance on the part of trial counsel in the criminal case. The Court responds by pointing out that Plaintiffs only allegation of negligence, aside from the failure to note an appeal, was Defendant’s failure to argue the deficiencies of trial counsel before Judge Howe. Because the Court of Special Appeals has found Plaintiffs claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to be groundless, ipso facto, there can be no negligence for failing to argue those deficiencies before Judge Howe. (Citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).

Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. Berringer’s subsequent motion to alter or amend judgment was denied. We shall include additional facts in our discussion. STANDARDS OF REVIEW “Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” King v. Board of Educ., 354 Md. 369, 376, 731 A.2d 460 (1999); see Md. Rule 2-501(e); Philadelphia Indem.

Ins. Co. v. Maryland Yacht Club,. Inc., 129 Md.App. 455, 465 , 742 A.2d 79 (1999); Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 115 Md.App. 381, 386, 693 A.2d 370 (1997). In reviewing the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, we evaluate “the same material from the record and deeide[ ] the same legal issues as the circuit court.” Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76, 83 , 712 A.2d 24 , cert. denied, 351 Md. 286, 718 A.2d 234 (1998).

In order to proceed to trial, the non-moving party must first produce evidence of a disputed material fact. See Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 691 , 645 A.2d 1160 (1994); ⁴⁷¹ Wankel v. A&B Contractors, Inc., 127 Md.App. 128, 156 , 732 A.2d 333 , cert. denied, 356 Md. 496 , 740 A.2d 614 (1999). A material fact is one that will alter the outcome of the case, depending upon how the fact-finder resolves the dispute. King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985); Faith v. Keefer, 127 Md.App. 706, 734 , 736 A.2d 422 , cert. denied, 357 Md. 191 , 742 A.2d 521 (1999).

In opposing the motion, the non-moving party must present more than “mere general allegations which do not show facts in detail and with precision.” Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 738 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993). Moreover, the court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn from the facts, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 338 Md. 341, 345 , 658 A.2d 675 (1995); Electronics Store, Inc. v. Cellco Partnership, 127 Md.App. 385, 395 , 732 A.2d 980 , cert. denied, 356 Md. 495 , 740 A.2d 613 (1999). When there are no disputes of material fact, the court may resolve the case as a matter of law.

See Md. Rule 2-501(e). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we determine whether the . court reached the correct legal result. Beatty, 330 Md. at 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 . Generally, we review an award of summary judgment “only on the grounds relied upon by the trial court.” Blades v. Woods, 338 Md. 475, 478 , 659 A.2d 872 (1995).

But, “[i]f the alternative ground is one upon which the circuit court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment, summary judgment may be granted for a reason not relied upon by the trial court.” Davis v. Goodman, 117 Md.App. 378 , 395 n. 3, 700 A.2d 798 (1997) (citing Blades, 338 Md. at 478 , 659 A.2d 872 ); accord Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Comm’n, 125 Md.App. 579 , 587 n. 1, 726 A.2d 807 , cert. granted, 354 Md. 570 , 731 A.2d 969 (1999). When a motion is based solely “upon a pure issue of law that could not properly be submitted to a trier of fact,” then “we will affirm on an alternative ground.” Davis, 117 Md.App. at 395 n. 3, 700 A.2d 798 . ⁴⁷² We review a circuit court’s denial of a motion to alter or amend judgment on an abuse of discretion standard. Friends of the Ridge v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 120 Md.App. 444, 490 , 707 A.2d 866 (1998), vacated on other grounds, 352 Md. 645 , 724 A.2d 34 (1999). ‘We will find an abuse of discretion only if ‘the ruling either does not logically follow from the findings upon which it supposedly rests or has no reasonable relationship to its announced objective.’ ” Scamardella v. Illiano, 126 Md.App. 76, 91 , 727 A.2d 421 (quoting.

North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 14 , 648 A.2d 1025 (1994)), cert. denied, 354 Md. 115 , 729 A.2d 406 (1999); cf. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997) (“Questions within the discretion of the trial court are ‘much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts____’ ” (citation omitted)). DISCUSSION I. Appellant complains that, in awarding summary judgment, the circuit court incorrectly relied on his failure to obtain post conviction relief of his criminal conviction. 9 Referring to our decision in Fischer v. Longest, 99 Md.App. 368 , 637 A.2d 517 , cert. denied, 335 Md. 454 , 644 A.2d 488 (1994), appellant avers that Maryland jurisprudence does not require a criminal defendant to obtain post conviction relief prior to initiating a legal malpractice action against a former defense attorney. 10 Appellees counter that post conviction relief is a necessary ⁴⁷³ predicate to the maintenance of a legal malpractice suit by a criminal defendant. Alternatively, appellees suggest that Berringer’s failure to obtain such relief precludes him from establishing proximate causation, a necessary element to a legal malpractice claim. The elements of a legal malpractice action in a civil case include: (1) the employment of the lawyer, (2) the lawyer’s neglect of a duty, and (3) loss to the client proximately caused by the neglect of duty.

Thomas v. Bethea, 351 Md. 513, 528-29 , 718 A.2d 1187 (1998); Cavacos v. Sarwar, 313 Md. 248, 253 , 545 A.2d 46 (1988); Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 611 , 31 A.2d 312 (1943). Focusing on the third element in Fishow v. Simpson, 55 Md.App. 312, 323 , 462 A.2d 540 (1983), we said that unless the client “has a good cause of action against the party proposed to be sued, the first party loses nothing by the conduct of his attorney even though the latter were guilty of gross negligence.” In support of this statement, we cited the case of Niosi v. Aiello, 69 A.2d 57, 60 (D.C.1949). There, the court explained: The rule to be applied in a case where an attorney is accused of negligence in the conduct of litigation is that such attorney is not liable for negligence if, notwithstanding the negligence, the client had no cause of action or meritorious defense as the ease may be; or that if conduct of an attorney with respect to litigation results in no damage to his client the attorney is not liable. See 7A C. J.S. Attorney & Client § 258 (1980).

Thus, in order to recover, the client must establish that he or she probably would have prevailed in the underlying action, but for the lawyer’s negligence, and that the litigant was harmed by the lawyer’s conduct. Cf. Riordan v. Jones, 793 F.Supp. 650, 651 (D.Md.1992) (“[T]he matter for which the attorney was engaged must have had sufficient merit that any malpractice actually caused damages to the plaintiff. This requires that the malpractice plaintiff demonstrate merit in the underlying claim____” (citing Fishow, 55 Md.App. at 323 , 462 A.2d 540 )), aff'd, 989 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.1993); Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., 72 F.R.D. 198 , 200 ⁴⁷⁴ (D.Md.1976) (stating that, to recover under a malpractice theory against their attorney, the plaintiffs need “prove that they had a proper claim and are entitled to damages, and further allege and show that their failure to recover on their claim was due to the negligence of their attorney”).

But, we are not presented here with a “civil malpractice” claim. Instead, appellant has charged “criminal malpractice,” i.e., legal malpractice arising from a criminal prosecution. See Otto M. Kaus & Ronald E. Mailen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel—Reflections on “Criminal Malpractice,” 21 UCLA L.Rev. 1191, 1191 n. 2 (1974) (using the term “criminal malpractice” to describe a situation involving “legal malpractice in the course of defending a client accused of a crime” and referring to “civil malpractice” as its counterpart). 11 Until recently, few so called criminal malpractice cases were found among the reported opinions of any jurisdiction. See Kaus & Mailen, supra, at 1192-93.

Nevertheless, courts have been increasingly confronted with these kinds of cases and have, for reasons of public policy, expanded the requirements of a criminal malpractice action beyond those of one sounding in civil malpractice. See 3 Ronald E. Mailen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 25.3 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp.1999) 12 Robert J. Hoffman, Legal Malpractice in the Criminal Context: Is Postconviction Relief Required?, Fla. B.J., Jan. 2000, at 66. Many courts hold that successfill post conviction relief is a predicate to maintenance of a criminal malpractice action.

See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Alaska 1991) (“Shaw I”); Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla.1999); Johnson v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Mo.Ct.App.1986); Morgano v. Smith, 110 Nev. 1025 , 879 P.2d 735, 737-38 (1994); Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169 , 518 N.Y.S.2d 605 , 511 ⁴⁷⁵ N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (1987); Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221 , 851 P.2d 556, 561 (Or.1993); Bailey v. Tucker, 533 Pa. 237 , 621 A.2d 108, 113 (1993); Gibson v. Trant, No. M1999-00390-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 320666 , at ² (Tenn.Ct.App. March 29, 2000) (unreported); Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 497-98 (Tex.1995) (“Peeler II ”); Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 868 S.W.2d 823, 831-32 (Tex.App.1993) (“Peeler I”), aff'd, 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.1995); Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275 , 482 S.E.2d 797, 801 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 937, 118 S.Ct. 348 , 139 L.Ed.2d 270 (1997); cf. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 , 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (holding that “to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal ..., or called into question by federal court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus” (footnote omitted)). Several of the same jurisdictions, as well as others, require some showing that the criminal plaintiff was innocent of the criminal charges. See, e.g., Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57, 470 S.E.2d 692, 695-96 (1996); Kramer v. Dirksen, 296 Ill.App.3d 819 , 231 Ill.Dec. 169 , 695 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 , appeal denied, 179 Ill.2d 585 , 235 Ill.Dec. 565 , 705 N.E.2d 438 (1998); Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (1991); Morgano, 879 P.2d at 738 ; Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A., 143 N.H. 491 , 727 A.2d 996, 998-99 (1999); Carmel, 518 N.Y.S.2d 605 , 511 N.E.2d at 1128 ; Bailey, 621 A.2d at 113 ; Peeler II, 909 S.W.2d at 497 ; Peeler I, 868 S.W.2d at 831-32 ; see also Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269 , 923 P.2d 976, 979 (1996) (setting forth elements of civil malpractice and noting that criminal plaintiff did not dispute that, in a criminal malpractice action, criminal plaintiff “must estabHsh the additional element of actual innocence of the underlying criminal charges”); cf. Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566 (Alaska 1993) (“Shaw II”) (con- ⁴⁷⁶ eluding that innocence was relevant, but holding that lawyer/defendant may raise issue of the criminal plaintiff’s guilt as an affirmative defense). Many of the cases that have made post conviction relief an element of a criminal malpractice suit rely on public policy considerations.

First, absent relief from a conviction or sentence, the criminal plaintiff’s own actions are presumably the proximate cause of injury. See Shaw I, 816 P.2d at 1361 ; Steele, 747 So.2d at 933 ; Carmel, 518 N.Y.S.2d 605 , 511 N.E.2d at 1128 ; Gibson , 2000 WL 320666 , at ⁶; Peeler II, 909 S.W.2d at 497-98 ; Peeler I, 868 S.W.2d at 831-32 ; Adkins, 482 S.E.2d at 801-02 . Second, requiring relief promotes judicial economy by avoiding the duplication of litigation in a criminal malpractice case that was previously litigated and resolved in a post conviction or appellate proceeding. See Shaw I, 816 P.2d at 1361 ; Steele, 747 So.2d at 933 ; Stevens, 851 P.2d at 562 ; cf. Johnson, 719 S.W.2d at 826 (“If appellant is not successful in his pursuit of post-conviction relief, then he is barred by collateral estoppel form pursuing his alleged legal malpractice claim.”).

Third, “appellate, post conviction, and habeas corpus remedies are available to address ineffective assistance of counsel.” Steele, 747 So.2d at 933 ; see Morgano, 879 P.2d at 737 n. 3. Fourth, “there is a concern about the litigious persons who occupy the time of their incarceration by pursuing civil actions against their former attorneys.” 3 Mallen & Smith, supra, § 25.3, at 240; accord Shaw I, 816 P.2d at 1361 ; see Stevens, 851 P.2d at 562-63 . Not all jurisdictions require a criminal plaintiff to obtain appellate or post conviction relief as a predicate to a criminal malpractice action, however. In Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989), the Ohio Supreme Court refused to require reversal of the criminal plaintiff’s conviction as an additional element to a criminal malpractice action, treating criminal and civil malpractice claims alike.

Id. at 1060-61. Nevertheless, the court recognized “that in most cases the failure to secure a reversal of the underlying criminal conviction may bear upon and even destroy the plaintiffs ability to establish the element of proximate cause.” Id. at ⁴⁷⁷ 1062. Moreover, the Krahn court acknowledged that collateral estoppel could preclude litigation concerning “[wjhether a conviction resulted from a defense attorney’s incompetence” if the issue was raised in and determined by a prior post conviction proceeding premised on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

The decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court in Shaw I, 816 P.2d 1358 , and Shaw II, 861 P.2d 566 , illustrate the thorny issues that these cases present. The facts underlying both appeals are identical. John Shaw and a co-defendant were charged with burglary and larceny. David Backstrom, a public defender, represented both defendants.

Despite Backstrom’s statement to the trial court of a conflict that arose during his dual representation of the defendants, new counsel was not provided. Both men were subsequently convicted in March 1973. Although Backstrom had told Shaw that he would later contact him and file an appeal, he did neither. Prior to sentencing, Shaw left the jurisdiction.

More than six years later, during a routine traffic stop, an outstanding warrant was discovered and Shaw was charged with failure to appear. At a subsequent sentencing hearing on the burglary and larceny convictions, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Shaw on probation. Thereafter, at his trial for failure to appear, Shaw was convicted and sentenced to three years of incarceration, of which two years were suspended. While appeal of that conviction was pending, Shaw was arrested for receiving a stolen handgun and being a felon in possession of a handgun.

The larceny charge was later dropped and Shaw pleaded nolo contendré to the possession charge. In 1986, Shaw successfully moved to set aside the 1973 convictions on constitutional grounds. Then, in January 1988, Shaw filed a criminal malpractice action against Backstrom. The trial court granted Backstrom’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.

Citing public policy considerations, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Shaw I, 816 P.2d at 1360-61, 1363 . The court held “that a convicted criminal defendant must obtain post- ⁴⁷⁸ conviction relief before pursuing an action for legal malpractice against his or her attorney,” id. at 1360 , and concluded that the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action does not begin to run until after the grant of post conviction relief. Id.

On remand, Shaw was required to establish that Shaw’s injuries were proximately caused by Backstrom’s negligent legal representation at trial, and damages. Moreover, Backstrom had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the affirmative defense that Shaw was guilty of the 1973 burglary and larceny charges. In the parties’ second appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court, the court was asked to consider the relevance of a criminal defendant’s innocence in a criminal malpractice claim against a former defense lawyer. Shaw II, 861 P.2d at 569-70 .

The court observed that, in the “cases that have addressed the issue of a criminal defendant’s guilt, the vast majority of courts have held that innocence or the actual guilt[ 13 ] of the criminal defendant is relevant.” Id. at 570 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that guilt was relevant but, unlike other courts, it declined to place the burden of proving actual innocence on the criminal plaintiff. Id. at 572 . It said: “Rather than require the plaintiff to prove his actual innocence in order to succeed, we hold that the defendant may raise the issue of the plaintiff’s actual guilt as an affirmative defense.” Id.

With this background in mind, we turn to consider our decision in Fischer v. Longest, 99 Md.App. 368 , 637 A.2d 517 . Relying on Fischer , appellant argues here, as he did below, that post conviction relief is not a precondition to pursuit of a criminal malpractice action. Fischer did not resolve, in cases of criminal malpractice arising out of an alleged wrongful conviction or sentence, whether (1) post conviction relief is a ⁴⁷⁹ precondition to the initiation or pursuit of a malpractice action, or (2) a showing of actual innocence is required for recovery. Rather, Fischer’s significance stems from its declaration that a criminal plaintiff may be entitled to recover damages for ineffective representation resulting in harm short of a wrongful conviction or sentence.

We explain further. In Fischer; the criminal plaintiff, Ray Fischer, had engaged the appellees to represent him in connection with federal criminal charges, and with regard to his interests in certain real and personal property. Although the appellees filed various motions, Fischer was dissatisfied with their work and discharged them approximately four months after they were retained. Fischer was in pre-trial detention for several months before being released on bond.

Through new counsel, Fischer negotiated a plea agreement with the government and was convicted of two crimes, for which he was sentenced to two consecutive, suspended five year terms. Thereafter, Fischer initiated a civil suit against the appellees, charging his former attorneys with malpractice, fraud, conversion, and conspiracy. As to the malpractice count, Fischer alleged ten failings: (1) failure to take any measures to seek his release on bond, (2) failure to investigate the charges against him, (3) disclosure of confidential information to the Government, (4) failure to “adequately protect [Fischer’s] rights,” including the failure to file “appropriate” motions and to properly research and draft the motions they did file, (5) failure to obtain information concerning the expungement of appellant’s prior conviction in California, (6) failure to discuss with him his right to a preliminary hearing and the recommendation that he waive such a hearing, (7) failure to communicate with him, explain his options, and assess his chance of conviction, (8) failure to obtain his consent to the entry of a plea of insanity, (9) failure to preserve and protect his real and personal property, and (10) failure to provide an accounting of the time spent on his case. Id. at 374 , 637 A.2d 517 .

Fischer also listed the damages that were proximately caused by these negligent acts: “(1) incar ⁴⁸⁰ ceration for ten months, (2) loss of real and personal property, (3) payment for services with little or no value and no benefit, (4) loss of credit and eligibility for refinancing of his real property, (5) physical injury suffered while incarcerated, and (6) psychological and emotional distress.” Id. at 379 , 637 A.2d 517 . After answering Fischer’s complaint, the appellees moved to dismiss the malpractice claim on the ground that Fischer failed to plead cognizable harm. The appellees maintained that Fischer had never attacked his criminal conviction or his sentence and, because Fischer received credit for his pre-trial detention, he was not harmed. Id. at 375 , 637 A.2d 517 .

The court granted the motion. Id. In connection with the malpractice claim, Fischer asked this Court to determine “[wjhether it is a prerequisite in a legal malpractice action arising from a criminal case, where a wrongful criminal conviction is not one of the damages for which compensation is sought, that the plaintiff first establish ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding in the criminal ease.” Id. at 376 , 637 A.2d 517 . Although we acknowledged that the issue, as framed by Fischer, was one of first impression, id., we concluded that the case was an inappropriate vehicle to resolve the question, because Fischer “never asserted that his conviction or sentence were the product of [the] alleged failings, or were otherwise unjust or unlawful.” Id. at 378 , 637 A.2d 517 .

Additionally, we noted that Fischer was satisfied with the ultimate outcome of the criminal proceeding, and did not argue that the appellees’ alleged malpractice contributed to his conviction or sentence. Instead, Fischer’s complaint focused on the claim that the appellees’ malpractice resulted in a lengthier pre-trial detention than was necessary and a loss of property. As we stated: “No direct or collateral attack on his conviction could possibly have resolved those complaints.” Id. at 378 , 637 A.2d 517 . We continued: [The a]ppellees contend, however, that, for reasons of public policy, the law should not permit a malpractice claim ⁴⁸¹ against an attorney based on ineffective representation in a criminal case unless the plaintiff can show that the end product of that malpractice was an unjust conviction or sentence.

They urge that the law not recognize any prejudice short of wrongful conviction or sentence and thus, in particular, that it give no regard to a claim of unnecessary pre-trial detention which, they contend, can never be prejudicial because, as a matter of law, the plaintiff/criminal defendant must receive credit for it when the ultimate sentence is imposed. We reject that argument. For one thing, it overlooks the case in which the plaintiff was ultimately acquitted, placed on probation without entry of judgment, had imposition of sentence suspended, or had execution of sentence suspended. In those situations, the plaintiff would not have received credit for pretrial detention, for there would be nothing against which to apply the credit, and, if that detention was indeed the result of attorney malpractice, the plaintiff would certainly have suffered harm.

Nor can we discern any public policy reason for refusing, as a matter of law, to recognize harm short of an unjust and unsatisfactory end result. Such harm can accrue from malpractice, in both civil and criminal proceedings, and, if sufficiently distinct from the ultimate judgment, there is no reason why, if the other elements of the tort are shown, the law should not allow compensation for it. We do not suggest, and certainly do not hold, that every alleged misstep along the way suffices to support a malpractice claim, simply because some additional cost, delay, expense, deprivation, or annoyance may result, where no complaint is made about the ultimate judgment. It is only where the malpractice