Beyer v. Morgan State University

EYLER, DEBORAH S., J. The appellant, Janet Beyer, personal representative of the Estate of Betty Keat, challenges a judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City vacating two orders of the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore City. The appellees are Morgan State University (“MSU”) and the Estate of Betty Keat (“Estate”). The appellant poses the following questions, which we have reworded, for review: I. Did the circuit court lack subject matter jurisdiction in that the orphans’ court’s orders were not appealable final judgments?

II

Did the circuit court err in vacating the orphans’ court’s orders and granting summary judgment to MSU? For the following reasons, we answer “No” to question I, “No” to question II with respect to the order of the orphans’ court approving payment of an attorney’s fee, and “Yes” to question II with respect to the order of the orphans’ court approving payment of expenses. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court in part, reverse it in part, and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS On January 12,1996, several members of the Baltimore City Police Department entered Betty Y. Keat’s house, at 326 Taplow Road, in Baltimore City, and shot her. 1 Ms. Keat was taken to the University of Maryland Shock Trauma Unit where she died later that day. ⁶¹⁴ Ms. Keat (“the decedent”) left a one-page last will and testament (“the Will”), dated January 25, 1982.

The Will provided, inter alia: 1. House: to be sold. Proceeds to Morgan State University for repair of campus clocks. 2. Stocks, mutual funds, deferred compensation, pension.

Converted to cash for litigation costs, if necessary, to enforce precedent provision. Any surplus to be donated towards fund to rectify heating plant of Soper library. 2 The Will included other specific bequests of personalty, among them a gift of books about India to the Soper Library. It purported to leave to the University of Pennsylvania and the Hunter College Scholarship Fund sums that might accrue from the sale of certain real estate in West Virginia. It did not contain a residuary clause, address the payment of debts, or name a personal representative. .

The appellant was the decedent’s sister and, upon the decedent’s death, her sole heir at law. A few days after the decedent’s death, the appellant contacted a lawyer, Anton J.S. Keating, Esquire, and retained him to investigate bringing a civil action against the police officers responsible for the shooting. Subsequently, also in January 1996, the appellant paid Keating a $2,500 retainer for that purpose. 3 Soon afterward, Keating arranged for David Allen, Esquire, to handle the probate case on behalf of the Estate and, as Keating put it in a letter to Allen, to “ensure that [the appellant] is the personal representative thereto.” On February 7, 1996, the appellant paid Keating an additional $2,500 retainer. Soon thereafter, the Will was admitted to probate and the appellant was appointed personal representative of the Estate.

The next month, a claim was filed against the Estate by the Maryland State Department of ⁶¹⁵ Health and Mental Hygiene for $34,921, for medical care rendered to the decedent at the Shock Trauma Unit. On April 6, 1996, Allen wrote to Julie Goodwin, Esquire, General Counsel to MSU, informing MSU of the decedent’s bequest to MSU. Allen’s letter stated that he intended to investigate the circumstances of the decedent’s death and that “funds from the [E]state will be needed for that undertaking, and any legal matters that may grow out of it.” On April 24, 1996, Cecilia M. Assam, a paralegal with the Office of the President for MSU, responded in writing to Allen’s letter, stating that, until MSU’s bequest was distributed, MSU would object to the use of Estate funds for an investigation into the circumstances of the decedent’s death. Assam commented, “[W]e do not understand why costs associated with those efforts take precedence over the Morgan bequest....

Moreover, the testator did not specify that funds from the [E]state be used for that purpose.” On April 29, 1996, the appellant paid Keating an additional $5,000 fee. In June 1996, the appellant filed an inventory in the orphans’ court listing the decedent’s house, valued at $109,000, as the principal asset of the Estate. The inventory valued the Estate’s total assets, including the house, at $111,127. It revealed that the stocks, mutual funds, deferred compensation, and pension referenced in the Will did not exist and that most of the decedent’s personal property had been assessed as having no value, or de minimis value.

(For example, jewelry bequeathed by the decedent to the appellant was valued at $22.) Two weeks later, on June 28,1996, the decedent’s house was sold. The sale brought $95,045.44 in proceeds. MSU was not notified of the sale. About two months after the decedent’s house was sold, the appellant executed a written retainer agreement with Keating providing, inter alia, that the legal fees [in the civil action against the police officers] shall not exceed $40,000.00, unless the client received an ⁶¹⁶ award, judgment, or settlement in excess of $100,000.00, [appellant and attorney] agree that the attorney shall receive 33.33% of any such award, judgment, or settlement amount, with credit given for accrued attorneys’ fees.

The attorney’s regular hourly rate is $150.00 per hour. The appellant signed the agreement individually and not as the personal representative of the Estate. In October 1996, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Keating, on behalf of the appellant, filed a civil action against the police officers involved in the fatal shooting. Over a nine-month period, beginning September 10, 1996, and ending June 24, 1997, the appellant withdrew a total of $40,000 from the Estate.

She used that money to pay Keat-ing’s fee in the civil action and to reimburse herself for the legal fees she already had paid Keating. 4 Neither the appellant, Allen, nor Keating sought or obtained the orphans’ court’s approval before using or accepting Estate funds for this purpose. In addition, none of them informed MSU or any interested person under the Will about the payments of legal fees to Keating with Estate funds. Leonard Briscoe, Esquire, replaced Allen as the attorney for the Estate on October 15, 1996. The following August, Ms. Assam wrote to Allen (apparently not knowing that he had been replaced), asking whether he was “aware of the disposition of the property located at 326 Taplow Road and the books on India for the Soper Library.” Allen did not respond to this letter.

On September 9,1997, the appellant filed a first administrative account with the Register of Wills. It reflected, inter alia, the sale of the decedent’s house on June 28, 1996, for $95,045.94. Nine days later, the Register of Wills returned the first administrative account, citing numerous deficiencies, ⁶¹⁷ including not distributing Estate property in accordance with the terms of the Will. Expenses Petition On February 4, 1998, the appellant filed in the orphans’ court a “PETITION TO APPROVE EXPENDITURE OF EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATION” (“Expenses Petition”), seeking approval for payment of Estate funds to her, her husband, and other friends and relatives of the decedent as reimbursement for expenses they allegedly had incurred in traveling to Baltimore to clean the decedent’s house and ready it for sale.

The appellant attached invoices from the friends and relatives, and from herself, listing the chores they had performed and the time they had spent traveling, and designating sums for labor, hotel expenses, meals, and other items. The amounts claimed were: the appellant — $3,261.58; Debra Cairns — $2,376; Stephen Cairns — $7,046.95; and William Beyer (the appellant’s husband) — $625. The expenses totaled $13,309.53. The Expenses Petition bore an undated “verification” 5 signed by the appellant as personal representative of the Estate and stating that notice had been given to all interested parties in accordance with Md.Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), section 7-301 of the Estates and Trusts Article (“ET”).

It also bore a certificate of service signed by Briscoe stating that on February 10, 1998, the Expenses Petition had been mailed first class or delivered to, inter alia, “Morgan State University and Soper Library, Morgan State University — Hillen road [sic] & Coldspring [sic] Lane, Baltimore, Maryland 21212.” (In fact, the zip code for MSU is 21234, not 21212.) The certificate of service also set forth a notice, citing Md. Rule 6- ⁶¹⁸ 416(c), that those to whom it was being sent could request a hearing on the petition within 20 days of receiving it. 6 On March 11, 1998, the orphans’ court issued an order continuing the Expenses Petition “pending the submission of verification, the signature of the personal representative, and certificate of service.... ” That order was docketed on March 16,1998. On April 20,1998, apparently without any intervening activity, the orphans’ court issued an order granting the Expenses Petition. On May 6, 1998, MSU filed an exception to the Expenses Petition. The exception was filed by counsel for MSU, and was the first entry of an appearance for MSU in the matter.

The allegations set forth in the exception are written so as to reveal that MSU’s counsel did not know when it was filed that the Expenses Petition already had been granted. Indeed, the allegations also make plain that MSU’s counsel was unaware at that time that the decedent’s house had been sold. On a date that we are unable to ascertain from the record, the Register of Wills issued a “Notice of Hearing,” scheduling MSU’s exception to the Expenses Petition for a hearing on July 7, 1998. On June 3, 1998, however, Briscoe, on behalf of the Estate, filed a motion to strike MSU’s exception, on the ground that it had not been timely filed and contained “inaccurate and false allegations.” 7 The certificate of service for the ⁶¹⁹ Estate’s motion to strike is the first one bearing an address for MSU’s counsel, Mark Davis, Esquire, as opposed to an address for MSU and the Soper Library.

According to Davis, after he received the Estate’s motion to strike, he reviewed the orphans’ court’s file and learned that the decedent’s house had been sold two years earlier. The July 7, 1998 hearing on the Expenses Petition never took place. Thereafter, by order of September 11, 1998, the orphans’ court granted the Estate’s motion to strike MSU’s exception to the Expenses Petition. 8 Attorney’s Fee Petition On March 30, 1998, the appellant filed a “Petition for Attorney Fees” (“Attorney’s Fee Petition”), alleging that in her capacity as personal representative of the Estate she had filed a “wrongful death” action against various Baltimore City police officers and, in connection with that litigation, had incurred attorney’s fees totaling $40,000. The petition further stated, “[T]hese attorney fees are to be paid from the Estate of Betty Y. Keat.” 9 Notwithstanding the appellant’s characterization of the nature of the civil action filed in October 1996, the action was not for “wrongful death”; rather, it was a survival action, brought by the appellant as personal representative of the Estate, under ET § 7-401(x).

A survival action is a claim personal to the decedent that the decedent could have brought in his own right if he had lived. Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. P’ship, 351 Md. 460, 474 , 718 A.2d 1161 (1998) (quoting Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., ⁶²⁰ 104 Md. 332, 339-40 , 65 A. 49, 52 (1906)). By contrast, a wrongful death claim is a statutory action on behalf of certain designated beneficiaries for damages for the death of the decedent.

Md.Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 3-901, et seq., of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”); Lopez v. Maryland State Highway Admin., 327 Md. 486, 490 , 610 A.2d 778 (1992) (citing Stewart, 104 Md. at 338-40 , 65 A. 49 ). (In this case, there were no qualifying beneficiaries, so a wrongful death action could not lie.) In her survival action, the appellant alleged that the defendant police officers had illegally entered the decedent’s house without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances and shot her. On April 6, 1998, almost a week after filing her Attorney’s Fee Petition, the appellant filed a certificate of service, dated March 31,1998, stating that the petition had been delivered or mailed to the persons listed, in accordance with ET § 7-302. MSU and Soper Library, “Hillen Rd. & Cold Spring Lane, Baltimore, MD. 21239[,]” were among those listed on the certificate of service.

On April 29, 1998, the orphans’ court issued an order continuing the Attorney’s Fee Petition pending submission of a verification, a certificate of service evidencing notice to all interested people, a detailed list of legal services performed, and a first and final administrative account. Thereafter, on a date that we cannot determine from the record, but necessarily on or after May 18, 1998, the appellant filed a certificate of service representing that on May 18, 1998, the Attorney’s Fee Petition was mailed to a list of individuals and entities, including MSU and the Soper Library. By this time, Davis had filed the exception to the Expenses Petition on behalf of MSU, so his appearance was entered in the case. Nevertheless, the appellant’s Attorney’s Fee Petition was not sent to him.

Also on a date that we cannot discern from the record, the appellant filed a verification of the contents of the Attorney’s Fee Petition stating that notice of the Attorney’s Fee Petition had been given to all interested parties pursuant to Md. Rule 6- ⁶²¹ 416(c). 10 Keating filed a petition for extension of time in which to file an itemization of the legal services he had performed, so as to comply with the orphans’ court’s April 29, 1998 order. 11 His petition stated that he had just learned of that order. Then, on June 8, 1998, Keating filed his own “Petition for Allowance of Counsel Fees” (“Keating’s Petition”). The certificate of service on Keating’s Petition indicates that it was mailed to MSU and the Soper Library, and not to Davis as counsel for MSU. Keating’s Petition has attached to it the appellant’s verification and a May 18,1998 certificate of service.

On June 9,1998, the orphans’ court issued an order extending by an additional twenty days the time for materials to be submitted under its April 29, 1998 order. On June 23, 1998, the orphans’ court again ordered a continuance of the appellant’s Attorney’s Fee Petition, pending submission of her retainer agreement with Keating. It did not send this order to Davis. On July 3, 1998, the appellant submitted the retainer agreement and a verification to the orphans’ court, together with detailed time records from Keating.

On July 8, 1998, MSU filed a Petition to Order Distribution of Property. It alleged, inter alia, that it had learned about the sale of the decedent’s house six days earlier. 12 It further alleged that the proceeds of that sale had not been distributed to it in accordance with the terms of the Will and that its interest in the Estate could be diluted by payments of Estate funds to various persons without reasonable basis. Specifically, MSU stated that the appellant “propose[d] to pay an ⁶²² attorney the sum of $40,000 for a -wrongful death action for services which could have been secured on a contingent fee basis.” It requested, inter alia, that the orphans’ court stay any further expenditures pending court review and order distribution of the Estate property in accordance -with the terms of the Will. Neither the appellant’s Attorney’s Fee Petition nor Keat-ing’s Petition revealed that the appellant already had taken funds from the Estate and used them to pay Keating (directly and indirectly).

Furthermore, it is evident from MSU’s Petition to Order Distribution of Property that MSU did not know that the appellant already had used Estate funds to pay Keating’s legal fee. On September 9, 1998, the orphans’ court entered an order granting the appellant’s Attorney’s Fee Petition and authorizing her to use Estate funds to pay “a counsel fee in the amount of $30,000 unto [Keating] for legal services rendered to the [E]state, subject to the notice requirements of Section 7-502 of the Estates and Trusts Article and Maryland Rule 6-416(c)[,] with leave to request additional payment after the case had been heard by the Circuit Court.” Further Proceedings in the Orphans’ Court On September 29, 1998, the orphans’ court held a hearing on MSU’s “Petition to Order Distribution of Property.” Davis attended the hearing on behalf of MSU. As he later told the circuit court, he learned that day of the filing and subsequent granting of appellant’s Attorney’s Fees Petition. The orphans’ court did not rule on MSU’s petition.

Proceedings in Circuit Court On October 1, 1998, MSU filed an appeal in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City from the September 9 and 11, 1998 orders of the orphans’ court. In its memorandum in support of its appeal, MSU asked the circuit court to vacate the orders because the appellant “ha[d] violated her statutory duty pursuant to [ET] § 7-101(a) to settle the [E]state ‘as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under ⁶²³ the circumstances.’ ” At some point, which we cannot determine from the record, it had become known to MSU that the appellant already had used Estate funds to pay Keating’s legal fee. In its circuit court appeal, MSU further alleged that the decedent’s bequest to it had been improperly diluted by expenditures made by the Estate. On January 4, 1999, Keating filed a motion in the circuit court asking, inter alia, that the court permit appellant to reimburse herself from Estate funds the full amount of his legal fee in the survival action.

Keating acknowledged that, although he already had received full payment of his legal fee from the appellant, he had petitioned the orphans’ court to allow his fee to be paid from the Estate so that the appellant could reimburse herself with Estate funds. (In fact, she already had done so.) According to Keating’s motion, the appellant had made the following payments to him on the following dates: Retainer: $ 2,500 2/10/96 $ 2,500 4/29/96 $ 5,000 9/19/96 $20,000 6/24/97 $10,000 Total: $40,000 Two days later, on January 6, 1999, Keating moved the court to consolidate MSU’s appeal from the orphans’ court’s orders with the survival action, captioned Beyer v. Eldridge, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case No. 96277005/ CL218165, which was set for trial the following month, “so that the de novo appeal is heard immediately after the resolution of the civil litigation by the same Court.” The motion to consolidate was granted the same day. On January 15, 1999, the circuit court, sua sponte, appointed Arthur Drager, Esquire, to represent the interests of the Estate. The survival action was tried before a jury and resulted in a defense verdict, on February 23, 1999.

The next day, the circuit court held a hearing on MSU’s de novo appeal from the ⁶²⁴ orphans’ court’s orders. At that time, the Estate contained approximately $50,000 in cash, and the claim by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene remained unpaid and had not been disallowed by the appellant. Notwithstanding MSU’s Petition to Order Distribution of Property, the appellant had not made any distribution to MSU. At the outset of the hearing, Drager filed a memorandum of law on behalf of the Estate, setting forth its position.

Drager argued that, by entering into an agreement with Keating to use Estate funds to pay Keating’s attorney’s fee in the survival action, the appellant had violated her fiduciary duty to “fairly consider the interests of interested persons and creditors.” Drager pointed out that any award in the survival action would go to the Estate and, ultimately, because the Will did not contain a residuary clause, to the appellant, as the decedent’s sole heir at law. He emphasized that because the Estate’s assets consisted of the proceeds from the sale of the decedent’s house, which were specifically bequeathed to MSU, and a few articles of nominal value, any money taken from the Estate and applied to Keating’s fee necessarily would come from money intended for MSU. Thus, the appellant was using Estate funds earmarked as a bequest to MSU to finance litigation that might or might not produce a benefit and, if it did, would benefit only herself. By doing so, she was placing MSU’s bequest at risk, thereby violating her fiduciary duty to fairly consider MSU’s interests.

Drager also argued that the appellant had violated her fiduciary duty by paying Keating out of Estate funds before receiving or even seeking the approval of the orphans’ court. Drager’s memorandum also challenged the propriety of the orphans’ court’s order granting the Expenses Petition. He noted that there was nothing to indicate that the repairs and maintenance work for which the Expenses Petition sought reimbursement had been performed in the most cost effective manner and alleged that a number of the expenses and services for which payment had been sought were not extraordinary at all, but were of the type normally incurred in the administration of an estate and compensated through the ⁶²⁵ commission allowed to the personal representative by statute. According to Drager, the most the appellant could have received in commissions for administering the Estate was approximately $6,300, which is less than half of the amount requested in the Expenses Petition.

Drager, Briscoe, Keating, Davis, and the appellant attended the circuit court hearing. At one point, the court asked Davis what course of action MSU would take if the court were to vacate the orphans’ court’s orders. Davis replied: I believe we would be permitted to access the bond which has been filed on behalf of the personal representative in this case. We would have a cause of action against the bond.

If your honor permits us, ... to access the bond, we would proceed to recover the money on behalf of [MSU]. 13 When the court asked Drager his position on that issue, Drager stated that he had no objection to the relief that’s been sought by the attorney general’s office, because on behalf of the Estate, with that relief granted and the bonding company then being bound, in effect, winding up[,] coming into this matter with the direction that they have to repay the sums that had been vacated, then the bonding company would then have the burden of deciding whether to proceed against the personal ⁶²⁶ representative and/or other to recover on that surety bond based upon how that contract is spelled out. Thereafter, the court observed, I don’t think there is a factual dispute concerning what was done by this personal representative. I don’t think it’s disputed at all that these disbursements were made. I don’t think that there is a dispute that these disbursements were made prior to the approval of the orphans’ court ...

I am concerned about [MSU] not even being put on notice after they filed an objection through the original attorney representing the [E]state.... In fact, forty thousand dollars was disbursed before approval was ever obtained, and even over objection, this disbursement was made without having a hearing. Mr. Davis, motions for summary judgment can be made at any time in a proceeding, and it can even be done orally. Davis took the cue and moved for summary judgment on behalf of MSU.

The court allowed Briscoe to respond, but asked him to identify any factual disputes about the timing and amounts of the disbursements, and the amount of commission appellant would have been entitled to be paid. Briscoe responded that he could not “see any factual disputes.” Drag-er then gave Briscoe a copy of the memorandum he had prepared and the court allowed Briscoe to read it. After doing so, Briscoe reaffirmed his original statement that he could not “see that there is any issue of fact as far as stated.” Briscoe argued, however, that there was a factual dispute about whether MSU’s clocks were in need of repair, which was the purpose for which the Will directed the bequest be made. The court rejected this argument, concluding that even if MSU’s clocks currently were in good repair, MSU still could use the bequest for future clock repairs.

Briscoe then argued that the amount of Keating’s fee was reasonable. The court responded that the reasonableness of the fee was not relevant to the issue before it. The court then determined that there was no dispute of material fact and stated it was granting MSU’s motion for summary judgment. ⁶²⁷ Two days later, on February 25, 1999, the court issued a written order vacating the September 9 and 11,1998 orders of the orphans’ court and granting summary judgment in favor of MSU. The court found that the appellant had “wrongfully expended [Ejstate funds in the amount of $40,000 for legal services to [Keating] in violation of her fiduciary duty under [ET] § 7 — 101(a) and without prior court approval” and had “wrongfully expended [E]state funds in the amount of $13,309.53 for extraordinary expenses.” The appellant noted a timely appeal to this Court.

DISCUSSION I The appellant first contends that the judgment of the circuit court must be vacated because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. She uses as the basis for her contention a point raised by MSU in the circuit court: that MSU was not given proper notice, under ET § 7-502(a) and Md. Rule 6-416, of the Attorney’s Fee Petition or the Expenses Petition. Specifically, the appellant cites the language of ET § 7-502(a) to argue that if MSU did not receive proper notice of the petitions then the September 9 and 11, 1998 orphans’ court’s orders granting them never became final judgments from which an appeal to the circuit court could lie. She also argues that the order granting the Attorney’s Fee Petition was not final because, by its terms, it permitted Keating to seek recovery of an additional $10,000 in the future.

MSU and the Estate respond that, irrespective of whether MSU was afforded proper notice of the petitions, the orphans’ court’s orders were final and appealable and, therefore, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. We do not find any merit in the appellant’s contention. It will help in explaining why, and in addressing her second contention, to review certain pertinent provisions of subtitle 7 of the Estates and Trusts Article. ⁶²⁸ ET § 7-101 (a) establishes that the personal representative is a fiduciary, and sets forth his duties. The personal representative is “under a general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estates of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances.” Id.

He also has a number of specific duties, among which is to “file written accounts of his management and distribution of property at the times and in the manner prescribed [by law], with a certification that he has mailed or delivered a notice of the filing to all interested persons .” Id. § 7-301. The personal representative has general and specific powers that are set forth by statute as well. Id. § 7-401. A personal representative who improperly exercises a power concerning the estate “is liable for breach of his fiduciary duty to interested persons for resulting damage or loss to the same extent as a trustee of an express trust.” Id. § 7-403.

One of the specific powers of the personal representative is to “prosecute ... actions, claims, or proceedings in any appropriate jurisdiction for the protection or benefit of the estate, including the commencement of a personal action which the decedent might have commenced or prosecuted[,]” i.e., a survival action. Id. § 7-401(y). See discussion, supra. Under ET § 7-603, entitled “Expenses of estate litigation,” a personal representative who prosecutes or defends a proceeding on behalf of the es'tate “in good faith and with just cause ... shall be entitled to receive his necessary expenses and disbursements from the estate regardless of the outcome of the proceeding.” ET § 7-602(a) provides that “[a]n attorney is entitled to reasonable compensation for legal services rendered by him to the estate and/or the personal representative.” When an attorney has rendered services on behalf of the estate or the personal representative, either the personal representative or the attorney himself may file a petition in the orphans’ court seeking allowance of payment of the legal ⁶²⁹ fee from the estate.

The fee “shall be fair and reasonable in light of all the circumstances to be considered in fixing the fee of an attorney.” Id. § 7-602(b). The decision to allow the payment of the attorney’s fee is an exercise of discretion on the part of the orphans’ court. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Foster, 83 Md.App. 484, 496 , 575 A.2d 776 (1990) (quoting Wolfe v. Turner, 267 Md. 646, 653 , 299 A.2d 106 (1973)). ET § 7-502 and Md. Rule 6-416 govern the notice that must be given of a claim or other request that could result, directly or indirectly, in the payment, inter alia, of a “fee, or other compensation to or for the benefit of the personal representative or the attorney for the estate.” ET § 7-502(a).

The notice must be given to all interested persons, which includes a “legatee in being, not fully paid, whether his interest is vested or contingent,” ET § l-101(i)(3), and “shall state the amount requested ... [and] shall also state that a request for a hearing may be made within 20 days after the notice is sent.” ET § 7-502(a); Md. Rule 6-416(c). ET § 7-502(b) also contains language addressing the finality of an order allowing payment of a fee to the personal representative or attorney for the estate. This language is the focal point of the appellant’s argument. The language states: “Unless there was fraud, material mistake, or substantial irregularity in the proceeding, or a request for a hearing is filed within 20 days of the sending of the notice, any action taken by the court on the petition is final and binding on all persons to whom the notice was given.” Md. Rule 6 — 416(f) also addresses the finality of