Blades v. Woods

MURPHY, Judge. Randy W. Blades, Sr., appellant, is a white Baltimore City police officer who, at the conclusion of a police department ¹⁸⁰ trial board hearing, was transferred and demoted by Police Commissioner Edward V. Woods, appellee. In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, appellant filed a complaint in which he combined a § 1988 action with a petition for judicial review. That pleading alleged in pertinent part: The sole reason for the disparate treatment of Sergeant Blades is his race, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In order to support his “disparate treatment” claim, appellant sought to compel discovery of what discipline had been imposed on other officers in similar cases. Appellant’s motion to compel was overruled, appellee’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and we affirmed that judgment. 1 Our decision has been reversed. Blades v. Woods, 338 Md. 475 , 659 A.2d 872 (1995). The Court of Appeals has concluded that appellant’s § 1983 claim is not barred by res judicata and has mandated that we resolve “the issue of whether Blades’s motion to compel was properly overruled.” Appellee contends that appellant’s motion to compel was properly denied because (1) appellee is an agent of the State of Maryland who therefore enjoys absolute immunity from a § 1983 action, and (2) appellant’s discovery request was properly denied because it (a) was overbroad and oppressive and (b) sought discovery of privileged information.

There is no merit in either of these contentions. Appellant is entitled to additional discovery in support of his § 1983 claim. I Immunity Appellee contends that, as an agent of the State of Maryland, he is immune from any actions brought under 42 ¹⁸¹ U.S.C. § 1983 . According to appellee, the Baltimore City Police Department is an arm of the State; therefore, he is a State official and not a “person” under § 1983.

It is true that a § 1983 suit against the State is barred because a State is not a “person.” See Will v. Michigan Dept of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). In Will , the United States Supreme Court ruled that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983” and, consequently, cannot be held liable for claims under § 1983. Id. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312 . The holding in Will , however, applies only to State or government entities that are considered “ ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes.” Id. at 70 , 109 S.Ct. at 2312 (citations omitted).

We must determine whether the Baltimore City Police Commissioner is a State agent. In Clea v. Baltimore, 312 Md. 662 , 541 A.2d 1303 (1988), the Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of respondeat superi- or tort liability, the Baltimore City Police Department is a state agency. Id. at 669 , 541 A.2d 1303 . Appellee contends that this conclusion should also apply to actions brought under § 1983.

We disagree. In Clea the Court of Appeals, looking to current federal law, anticipated the issue that is now before us: We are aware, of course, that the General Assembly’s designation of the Baltimore City Police Department as a state agency would not be controlling for all purposes. For example, with regard to federal law liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , the state law classification of the Baltimore City Police Department would not be decisive, and the Baltimore City Police Department might well be regarded as a local government agency. Id. at 670 n. 5, 541 A.2d 1303 (citations omitted).

Whether officials of the Baltimore City Police Department can be held liable under § 1983 is an issue that arises frequently in federal court. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore recently argued that it cannot be held liable for policies of the Baltimore City Police Department because the ¹⁸² department is an agency of the State of Maryland. Wiley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 48 F.3d 773 (4th Cir.1995). Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided that it did not need to address the merits of that argument, it did indicate its approval of cases decided in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, including Hector v. Weglein, 558 F.Supp. 194 (D.Md.1982), in which Chief Judge Kaufman held ... that the Commissioner and the City cannot escape liability under § 1983 on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

The Commissioner and the Department are sufficiently city-connected so as not to be entitled to the claimed Eleventh Amendment protection. Id. at 199 (emphasis added). We agree with Chief Judge Kaufman’s analysis and hold that appellee is not entitled to absolute immunity from appellant’s § 1983 action. II Discovery A. Answers to Interrogatories Appellee objected to and refused to answer appellant’s interrogatories nos. 1, 2, 3, and 7.

Interrogatory No. 1 requested identification of any internal department investigations alleging sexual harassment, abuse, or misconduct by any department employee. Interrogatory No. 2 requested identification of any alleged improper action between a male and female employee. Interrogatory No. 3 requested the facts and circumstances relating to any internal investigation or allegation of sexual abuse, misconduct, or harassment by certain named officers. Interrogatory No. 7 requested an explanation of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances the department relied on in disciplining any officers identified in the preceding interrogatories.

Generally, “a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged ... if the matter sought is relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” Maryland Rule ¹⁸³ 2-402(a). The discovery rules are broad and comprehensive, and should be liberally construed. Androutsos v. Fairfax Hospital, 323 Md. 634, 638 , 594 A.2d 574 (1991); Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 287 Md. 223, 229 , 411 A.2d 449 (1980); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 13 , 174 A.2d 768 (1961). Liberal discovery is encouraged.

Barnes v. Lednum, 197 Md. 398, 406-407 , 79 A.2d 520 (1951); Shenk v. Berger, 86 Md.App. 498, 502 , 587 A.2d 551 (1991); Hadid v. Alexander, 55 Md.App. 344, 355 , 462 A.2d 1216 (1983). Mutual discovery of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has within his possession ... [MJodern discovery statutes or rules are intended to facilitate discovery, not to stimulate the ingenuity of lawyers and judges to make the pursuit of discovery an obstacle race ... No longer can the time honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiry into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.

Shenk, 86 Md.App. at 502 , 587 A.2d 551 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 , 67 S.Ct. 385, 392 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1946)). One of the fundamental and principal objectives [of discovery] is to require the disclosure of facts by a party litigant to all of his adversaries ... If all of the parties have knowledge of all of the relevant, pertinent and non-privileged facts, or the knowledge of the existence or whereabouts of such facts, the parties should be able to properly prepare their claims and defenses, thereby advancing the sound and expeditious administration of justice. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. at 13 , 174 A.2d 768 (emphasis in original).

Accord Kelch, 287 Md. at 229 , 411 A.2d 449 ; Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 55 , 395 A.2d 126 (1978). Facts entirely within the knowledge of the opposing party may be especially appropriate for