Blake v. State

Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, on an indictment charging that he “did commit a certain unnatural and perverted sexual practice on an adult male, to wit, Kenneth King * * Code (1951), Art. 27, sec. 627, prohibits any person from engaging in certain acts of oral perversion or from “committing any other unnatural or perverted sexual practice with any other person or animal, * * There was a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional, but it was stipulated before the hearing that the appellant did not complain that the indictment was not “sufficiently in detail to describe the offense, or that the defendant could not plead autre fois acquit in case of any subsequent attempt at prospective prosecution.” The appellant contends that the statute is vague and uncertain and fails to fix an ascertainable standard of guilt. ⁴⁶² We find no merit in the contention. Penal statutes should be expressed in language as specific as the subject matter will permit, but it is obviously impossible to define some types of crime by a detailed description of all possible cases that may arise. State v. Magaha, 182 Md. 122 .

The words of a statute must be accorded the meaning naturally given them in ordinary usage. Glickfield v. State, 203 Md. 400, 403 ; Jones v. State, 207 Md. 481, 488. It is true that section 627 has not heretofore been, attacked on this particular ground, although there have been convictions under it. See Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410 , and Haley v. State, 200 Md. 72 .

But it would appear that similar statutes in other states have been universally sustained. See Jaquith v. Commonwealth, 120 N. E. 2d 189 (Mass.); State v. Anthony, 169 P. 2d 587 (Ore.); State v. Brazell, 269 P. 884 (Ore.); People v. Coleman, 127 P. 2d 309 (Cal. App.); State v. Farmer, 148 P. 2d 1002 (Ariz.). The appellant contends that because the statute begins with a prohibition against “oral” perversion, the words “any other unnatural or perverted sexual practice” must be restricted accordingly, under the rule of ejusdem generis.

There was no evidence of oral perversion, but there was undisputed testimony of other sexual activities. The rule of ejusdem generis, however, is merely a rule of construction, and cannot be invoked to restrict the meaning of words within narrower limits than the statute intends, so as to subvert its obvious purpose. Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 130 . See also Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124 . “Where the particular words exhaust the class, the general words must be construed as embracing something outside of that class.” American Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382, 388 .

We find in the language employed a clear legislative intention to cover the whole field of unnatural and perverted sexual practices. We think it was unnecessary to describe in detail practices which are matters of common knowledge. Moreover, the section provides that “in any indictment for the commission of any of the acts, hereby declared to be offenses, it shall not be necessary to set forth the particular unnatural or perverted sexual practice with the commission of which the defendant may be charged, ⁴⁶³ nor to set forth the particular manner in which said unnatural or perverted sexual