Blake v. State

William Samuel Blake v. State of Maryland, Misc. No. 2, September Term, 2022, Opinion by Booth, J. CRIMINAL LAW — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — STATE’S OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304, the Supreme Court of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari accepting two certified questions from the Appellate Court of Maryland, which it slightly rephrased as follows: 1. Did the post-conviction court err by ruling that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to compel production of the Internal Affairs Division files and other potential impeachment evidence regarding a State’s witness prior to a pre-trial suppression hearing? 2. In the alternative, did the post-conviction court err by ruling that the State had not violated its Brady obligations by failing to disclose impeachment evidence regarding a State’s witness?

The Court answered no to questions 1 and 2. In answering question 1, the Court held that Mr. Blake failed to prove that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to compel production of Officer Fabien Laronde’s Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) files. Undertaking the analysis required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court concluded that Mr. Blake failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel’s failure to move to compel production of Officer Laronde’s IAD files fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that his performance was therefore deficient. Moreover, even if Mr. Blake had established that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, he failed to demonstrate that the failure to move to compel the disclosure of these files prejudiced him.

In other words, assuming trial counsel erred in failing to move to compel the disclosure of the IAD files, Mr. Blake failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Concerning question 2, given that the same legal standard applies to a Strickland prejudice analysis and the materiality standard to establish a Brady violation, the Court assumed, without deciding, that the State was required to disclose impeachment evidence prior to the suppression hearing. On that basis, the Court determined that Mr. Blake failed to satisfy the Brady materiality standard for the same reasons that he failed to establish prejudice under Strickland. The Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No.: 112222006 Argued: December 6, 2022 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND* Misc. No. 2 September Term, 2022 WILLIAM SAMUEL BLAKE v. STATE OF MARYLAND Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Filed: August 29, 2023 * At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this amendment changing the name of the Court of document is authentic. Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of 2023-08-29 16:23-04:00 Maryland.

The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. Gregory Hilton, Clerk I Introduction William S. Blake1 was arrested by Baltimore City Police Officer Fabien Laronde2 on July 12, 2012, for distribution of heroin. Mr. Blake was searched incident to his arrest, and a bag containing 3.5 grams of heroin was found in his underwear. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Blake was indicted for distribution of heroin and related lesser charges by a Baltimore City grand jury.

Mr. Blake, by counsel, filed a motion to suppress the heroin found on his person. He contended that the recovery of the drugs was the result of an illegal strip search. A hearing was held at which Officer Laronde was the only witness. The court denied Mr. Blake’s motion to suppress.

On October 17, 2013, Mr. Blake entered a plea of not guilty upon an agreed statement of facts, to one count of distribution of heroin, with the understanding that he would be found guilty by the court. The circuit court sentenced Mr. Blake to eight years’ incarceration. Mr. Blake noted a timely appeal, and the Appellate Court of Maryland3 affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in an unreported opinion. Blake v. State, No. 1804, 1 William Samuel Blake is also known as James Blake. 2 Fabien Laronde was fired by the Baltimore City Police Department in 2016.

Because he was a police officer at the time of Mr. Blake’s search, we refer to him as “Officer Laronde.” 3 At the November 8, 2022, general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. Sept. Term 2014 (unreported) (Md. Ct. Spec. App., Sept. 4, 2014), cert. denied 441 Md. 62 (2014).

Mr. Blake filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in July 2015. Thereafter, he filed supplemental petitions through counsel. A post-conviction hearing was held in September 2020. The post-conviction court issued an opinion and order in October 2020 granting Mr. Blake the right to file a belated motion for modification of sentence and denying all other relief.

On November 30, 2020, Mr. Blake filed an application for leave to appeal the order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Thereafter, the Appellate Court of Maryland issued an order granting the application. After the parties submitted their briefs, the Appellate Court of Maryland certified the following questions of law to this Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304, which we have slightly rephrased as follows:4 1. Did the post-conviction court err by ruling that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to compel production of the Internal Affairs Division files and other potential impeachment evidence regarding a State’s witness prior to a pre-trial suppression hearing? 2.

In the alternative, did the post-conviction court err by ruling that the State had not violated its Brady obligations by failing to disclose impeachment evidence regarding a State’s witness? We accepted the certification pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304(c)(3) and issued a writ of certiorari that included the entire action. 4 Question 1 in the Certification reads as follows: Did the post-conviction court err by holding that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to compel discoverable impeachment evidence regarding a State’s witness [Officer Laronde]? 2 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we answer no to questions 1 and 2. We hold that Mr. Blake failed to prove that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to compel production of the Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) files. Based upon our independent appraisal of the record and undertaking the analysis required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),5 we conclude that Mr. Blake failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel’s failure to move to compel production of Officer Laronde’s IAD files fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that his performance was therefore deficient.

Additionally, even if Mr. Blake had established that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, he failed to demonstrate that the failure to move to compel the disclosure of these files prejudiced him. In other words, assuming trial counsel erred in failing to move to compel the disclosure of the IAD files, Mr. Blake failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Concerning our holding on question 2, given that the same legal standard applies to the prejudice prong when analyzing an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland and the materiality standard necessary to establish a Brady violation,6 we assume, without 5 As we discuss more fully herein, under Strickland, a criminal defendant may receive a new trial based on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In a typical case involving such a challenge, the defendant is required to demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687 . 6 In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that as part of the Constitution’s “fair trial” guarantee, a defendant has the right to receive exculpatory impeachment material from prosecutors. A Brady violation is a constitutional claim based on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments referring to the 3 deciding, that the State was required to disclose impeachment evidence prior to the suppression hearing and determine that Mr. Blake failed to establish the Brady materiality standard for the same reasons that he failed to establish prejudice under Strickland. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

II Facts and Procedural Background After entering a plea of not guilty upon an agreed statement of facts, Mr. Blake, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress the heroin found on his person. He contended that the recovery of the drugs was the result of an illegal strip search. Mr. Blake’s attorney conceded that Officer Laronde had probable cause to arrest Mr. Blake. Therefore, according to defense counsel, the sole issue to be resolved was whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in light of the place and manner of the search.

Specifically, defense counsel argued that the search was unreasonable because it was conducted in public even though there were no exigent circumstances justifying an immediate search. The suppression hearing occurred on October 16, 2013. Officer Laronde was the sole witness at the suppression hearing. The relevant facts elicited at the hearing are not in dispute.

State’s failure to disclose evidence in a criminal trial where: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; (2) the evidence at issue was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued as a result of the suppression. Yearby v. State, 414 Md. 708 , 717–19 (2010). 4 A. The Suppression Hearing Officer Laronde, at that time a twelve-year veteran of the Baltimore City Police Department, testified that he had extensive training and experience as a narcotics officer. Without objection, the motions judge allowed the officer to testify as an expert in the “identification, packaging, and distribution” of controlled dangerous substances. Officer Laronde testified that around noon on July 25, 2012, he was on foot and in uniform in a covert location.

He observed a vehicle driven by Tavon Wilson pull in front of 5107 Williston Avenue in Baltimore City. Mr. Blake was a front seat passenger in the vehicle. Officer Laronde was familiar with both Mr. Blake and Mr. Wilson as individuals who previously sold narcotics in that area. Officer Laronde observed Mr. Blake enter an apartment building and exit after approximately two minutes with a plastic bag of suspected narcotics.

Mr. Blake reentered Mr. Wilson’s vehicle, and, about five minutes later, a blue Saturn pulled up behind Mr. Wilson’s vehicle. The Saturn was occupied by a man and a woman. Mr. Blake got out of Mr. Wilson’s vehicle and went to the passenger side of the Saturn where he spoke to the female passenger. Officer Laronde observed Mr. Blake hand the woman “small objects” in exchange for currency before returning to Mr. Wilson’s vehicle.

At that point, Officer Laronde, based on his training and experience, believed that he had just witnessed a narcotics transaction. Officer Laronde radioed his “arrest team” and provided descriptions of both vehicles. He instructed the officers to pull their car in front of Mr. Wilson’s vehicle. When they did so, Officer Laronde left his covert location 5 and approached Mr. Wilson’s vehicle on foot.

He asked Mr. Wilson for his keys, and Mr. Wilson complied. Meanwhile, Officer Smith,7 another member of the arrest team, left to pursue the Saturn, which had driven away. Officer Smith stopped the Saturn and recovered from the waistband of the female passenger four gel caps of suspected heroin and a Ziploc bag of suspected cocaine. Officer Smith promptly radioed Officer Laronde and told him that he had found the gel caps of suspected heroin on the female passenger.

Officer Laronde directed Officer Smith to seize the drugs. Once the drugs had been seized from the female, Mr. Blake and Mr. Wilson were handcuffed and arrested. Officer Laronde put Mr. Blake in handcuffs while Officer Benjamin Critzer did the same to Mr. Wilson. Officer Laronde conducted a pat down search of Mr. Blake.

While Officer Laronde stood by, Officer Critzer searched Mr. Wilson’s vehicle. No drugs were recovered as a result of the search. At that point, Officer Laronde decided to search Mr. Blake’s person more carefully. Officer Laronde testified that he made the decision to conduct a more thorough search because no drugs were found in Mr. Wilson’s vehicle, and no drugs were recovered during the pat down.

From his training and experience, Officer Laronde knew that “people selling narcotics on the street . . . will attempt to hide drugs on them in all kinds of different places[,]” including under their testicles. With that in mind, Officer Laronde positioned himself next to the opened driver’s door of Mr. Wilson’s vehicle. The windows of Mr. Wilson’s vehicle were 7 The record does not reveal Officer Smith’s first name. 6 “illegally tinted” a dark color. He placed Mr. Blake between the driver’s door and himself, creating a “triangle” for safety and privacy purposes.

He testified that no one was out on the street when he began the search. With Mr. Blake facing him, Officer Laronde pulled Mr. Blake’s waistband toward him and looked down the front of his pants but did not see anything. Seeing nothing, Officer Laronde asked Mr. Blake to turn around, and when he did, he noticed Mr. Blake move unnaturally, as if he had something “between his butt cheeks” or legs. Officer Laronde pulled the back of Mr. Blake’s pants out to see if he could see anything in Mr. Blake’s pants, and when he could not see anything, Officer Laronde asked Mr. Blake to squat down.

When Mr. Blake squatted, “a large plastic bag fell into his underwear.” Officer Laronde recovered the bag and placed it in a separate evidence bag. The bag that dropped into Mr. Blake’s underpants was later tested and found to contain forty-one gel caps and 3.5 grams of raw heroin. Officer Laronde testified that when he recovered the bag, he “made every attempt not to touch [Mr. Blake].” He denied: (1) putting his hand down Mr. Blake’s pants before the bag fell into his underwear; (2) that at any point he had touched Mr. Blake’s “anus, or his butt cheeks, or anything like that[;]” or (3) that he “manipulate[d] [Mr. Blake’s] genitals.” Officer Laronde said that at no point did he pull Mr. Blake’s “pants down below [Mr. Blake’s] waist,” explaining that when he asked Mr. Blake to turn around, Officer Laronde “still held [Mr. Blake’s] pants so they wouldn’t fall.” He insisted that Mr. Blake’s genitals and buttocks were never exposed. During his testimony, Officer Laronde explained why he positioned Mr. Blake in the above-described manner during the search: first, to prevent Mr. Blake from running; 7 and second, to shield Mr. Blake from public view during the search.

At the point when Mr. Blake was searched, according to Officer Laronde, no one else was around except for himself, Mr. Wilson, and Officer Critzer, who was “six [or] seven feet” in front of Officer Laronde. There were, however, apartment buildings on both sides of the street where Mr. Wilson’s car was parked. Officer Laronde said that “[b]etween me blocking him and the concealment of the door in the vehicle, I knew that no one could see what I was doing . . . in [the center of the triangle].” He also testified that the windows of Mr. Wilson’s car were illegally tinted and therefore, very dark. On cross-examination, Mr. Blake’s trial counsel attempted to create doubt concerning the reasonableness of the search in light of the place and manner of the search.

To that end, trial counsel pointed out that Officer Laronde never mentioned tinted windows in the statement of probable cause, which he had authored. Trial counsel attempted to raise doubt as to whether Officer Laronde actually observed Mr. Blake sell narcotics to the female passenger of the Saturn based upon the fact that the woman was never arrested or charged with possession of narcotics. Defense counsel also attempted to suggest that the “triangle” shape formed by the car, the door, and Officer Laronde did not block the search from view as well as Officer Laronde suggested, noting that the search took place on the street “in broad daylight.” After Officer Laronde testified, Mr. Blake was advised of his right to testify and that his testimony would not be used against him in any subsequent related trial unless he 8 perjured himself. Mr. Blake affirmed he understood but ultimately declined his right to testify.

The State and Mr. Blake’s trial counsel presented competing legal arguments to the motions judge concerning the reasonableness of the search. Mr. Blake’s trial counsel argued that it was an impermissible visual body cavity search, a strip search similar to the search that this Court found to be unconstitutional in Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341 (2007).8 According to the defense, under Paulino, the search of Mr. Blake was unreasonable because it was conducted in public even though there were no exigent circumstances justifying an immediate search. The State argued that the search was a permissible “reach- “The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the reasonableness of a strip 8 search incident to an arrest.” Allen v. State, 197 Md. App. 308, 320 (2011) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has, however, addressed the reasonableness of a strip search in connection with pre-trial detention.

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). In Bell, the Court set forth the following factors to determine whether a strip search in connection with pre-trial detention is reasonable: (1) the scope of the intrusion; (2) the manner in which the search was conducted; (3) the justification for initiating the search; and (4) the place in which the search was conducted. Id. at 559 . The Bell factors balance “the need for a particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Id.

In Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341 (2007), this Court held that a visual body cavity search was unreasonable when conducted in a well-lit public car wash. During the search at issue, Mr. Paulino was placed on the ground, his pants “were pretty much . . . below his butt,” id. at 346 , and one of the detectives put on gloves “and manipulated his buttocks to allow for a better view of his anal cavity.” Id. at 353 . The Court held that the search was both a strip search and a visual body cavity search, and there was no evidence that Mr. Paulino’s privacy was protected in any way. Id. at 359–60.

The Court held that exigent circumstances are required before such an invasive search in a public place is reasonable. Id. at 359–61. 9 in” search and was conducted in a manner similar to the search that was upheld in Allen v. State, 197 Md. App. 308 (2011).9 The motions judge ruled in favor of the State, concluding that Mr. Blake’s right to privacy was not abridged because the search was performed in a manner that avoided any unnecessary embarrassment to Mr. Blake. The motions judge determined that, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the search was reasonable. B. The State’s Motion in Limine After the court ruled on the motion to suppress, the State made a motion in limine to exclude trial counsel from “asking Officer Laronde any questions regarding” a civil judgment against Officer Laronde for false imprisonment, which the State had disclosed in 9 In Allen v. State, 197 Md. App. 308 (2011), the Appellate Court determined that the search incident to an arrest was not a strip search or a visual body cavity search like the one described in Paulino, but was, instead, a “reach-in search[,]” which is defined as a search that “involves a manipulation of the arrestee’s clothes such that the police are able to reach in and retrieve the contraband without exposing the arrestee’s private areas.” Allen, 197 Md. App. at 321 (quoting Paulino, 399 Md. at 360 n.6).

In Allen, the Appellate Court held that, although a “reach-in” search is less invasive, it still “permits the officer to view a suspect’s private areas, [and] is not the type of search that automatically is allowed as a search incident to an arrest.” Id. at 323. The Appellate Court held that the Supreme Court’s Bell factors apply. Id. Applying those factors, the Appellate Court determined that the reach-in search was reasonable under the circumstances.

Id. The court noted that “the police officers merely pulled the [defendants’] pants and underwear away from their waist, at which point the police observed a plastic bag protruding from the [defendants’] buttocks.” Id. at 324. The Appellate Court observed that the defendants’ “clothing was not removed, and the private areas of their bodies were not publicly exposed. The officers took steps to protect the [defendants’] privacy.” Id.

The court further noted that the “officer stood directly behind the [defendant], and he was the only one who could see the [defendants’] buttocks during the search.” Id. at 324–25. Moreover, even though the search occurred in a public area, “there were ‘no civilians in the area.’” Id. at 325. The Appellate Court determined that “[a]fter balancing the four factors set forth in Bell, [] the searches in this case were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 327. 10 discovery. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the false imprisonment judgment was “an issue of credibility,” but the court granted the State’s motion.

C. Mr. Blake’s Plea of Not Guilty Upon an Agreed Statement of Facts The following morning, the parties informed the court that they had agreed to proceed by way of a not guilty plea upon an agreed statement of facts for the purpose of preserving the appealability of the court’s ruling on the suppression motion.10 The State recommended a sentence of eight years for the count of distribution of heroin. Mr. Blake indicated that he understood that he would be found guilty. The following agreed statement of facts was read into the record: On July 25th, 2012, at approximately [11:45] hours in the area of Coventry and Williston (phonetic spelling) officers observed the Defendant James Blake, who is presently seated at defense table with defense counsel, and an individual by the name of Tavon Wilson pull into the block in front of 5107 Williston. Once parked, passenger Blake exited and entered into the apartment building.

Once he emerged he was holding a plastic bag of suspected [controlled dangerous substances] and entered Wilson’s car. 10 In Bishop v. State, 417 Md. 1, 20 (2010), this Court discussed the difference between a not guilty agreed statement of facts and a stipulation to facts: Amidst the spectrum between not guilty pleas and guilty pleas, there exists the hybrid plea, one in which an individual retains the right to appellate review of evidence subject to a suppression motion but avoids going through the time and expense of a full trial. By pleading not guilty and agreeing to the proffer of stipulated evidence or an agreed statement of facts, an individual, like with a guilty plea, waives a jury trial and the right to confront witnesses but retains appellate review of the suppression decision. In the instant case, the parties submitted an agreed statement of facts. The transcript reflects that, at the time the plea was entered and the statement of facts was submitted, there was no dispute over the ultimate facts of the case, and Mr. Blake understood that he would be found guilty.

The parties do not dispute this characterization. 11 Both Wilson and Blake waited in the car for several minutes until a Saturn parked behind them. Once parked, Blake exited the car and approached the passenger of the Saturn. Blake handed, engaged in a conversation with the buyer Lonna White (phonetic spelling), and handed her suspected [controlled dangerous substances] in exchange for U.S. currency. The Saturn pulled off and was later stopped by police officers.

Officers approached White and asked her if she had any drugs on her person, she advised that she did and removed four gel caps of suspected heroin and a ziplock of suspected cocaine. Blake and Wilson were placed under arrest. The car was searched, no drugs were found. Blake was never seen tossing any items by the police officers.

A search incident to arrest was then conducted on Blake. Officers shielded Blake between the car and the door to the car forming a triangle of sorts. There were no other individuals on the street. Officers pulled the waistband area of Blake’s pants away from the front of him and peered into his pants checking for contraband.

Officers then asked Blake to turn around so that the same could be done to his rear side. When turning around Blake moved unnaturally, leading officers to believe that he was concealing the contraband somewhere in his rear. Officers asked Blake to squat and when he did so a plastic bag fell into his underwear. The bag contained 41 gel caps of heroin identical to what was recovered from White, the buyer.

The bag also contained approximately 3.5 grams of suspected raw heroin. Prior to the bag falling into Blake’s underwear, officers did not reach into Blake’s underwear. At no time did officers touch Blake’s genitals or anus. Also recovered was $28 from Blake.

The State moved to admit as evidence a copy of the report showing that the controlled dangerous substance recovered was heroin. Trial counsel submitted on the agreement, and the court found Mr. Blake guilty of distribution of heroin and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. D. Mr. Blake’s Direct Appeal On October 22, 2013, Mr. Blake filed a notice of appeal, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed his conviction in an unreported opinion. The Appellate Court applied the reasonableness factors the United States Supreme Court articulated in Bell v. Wolfish, 12 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), addressing the reasonableness of a strip search in connection with pre-trial detention, and concluding that the particular facts and circumstances of the search were “closely analogous” to the search in Allen v. State and were distinguishable from the search in Paulino v. State.

Accordingly, the court determined that the search of Mr. Blake incident to his arrest was reasonable. E. Mr. Blake’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief On July 20, 2015, Mr. Blake filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. On October 9, 2019, and September 23, 2020, he filed supplemental petitions through counsel. On September 25, 2020, a post-conviction hearing was held, at which Mr. Blake raised several allegations of error.

Relevant to the questions before us, Mr. Blake alleged that: (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to demand the pre-trial disclosure of Officer Laronde’s IAD files; and (2) he was denied due process of law because the State withheld favorable material impeachment information related to Officer Laronde in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 1. The Post-Conviction Hearing At the post-conviction hearing, Mr. Blake entered into evidence, under seal, IAD files and other documents containing ten allegations of misconduct involving Officer Laronde spanning from 2001 until October 16, 2013—the day he was called as a witness at Mr. Blake’s suppression hearing. Mr. Blake was granted access to the documents as a result of a judicial ruling in February 2019. Mr. Blake argued that the allegations in the files were relevant to Officer Laronde’s credibility and his alleged propensity for 13 conducting strip searches and planting narcotics to justify arrests.

Nine of the allegations were in the form of complaints made to the IAD of the Baltimore Police Department.11 The general nature of the complaints and the disposition of each complaint in chronological order, are described below: 1. September 2006: Complaint alleging neglect of duty based upon a failure to adequately supervise another officer. Disposition: Sustained. 2. May 2008: Complaint alleging assault and planting of evidence.

Disposition: The file was administratively closed after no complainant contact.12 3. August 2008: Complaint alleging planting of evidence. Disposition: The file was administratively closed after no complainant contact. 4. September 2009: Complaint alleging planting of evidence.

Disposition: The file was closed as unfounded. 5. August 2010: Complaint alleging theft. Disposition: The file was administratively closed after no complainant contact. 6. March 2011: Complaint alleging: (1) planting of evidence and theft; and (2) neglect of duty for failure to follow proper procedure for submission of evidence.

Disposition: (1) The planting evidence and theft charges were found “not sustained.” (2) The neglect of duty charge based upon failure to follow procedure for submission of evidence was sustained. 7. July 2011: Complaint alleging planting of evidence and theft. Disposition: The file was administratively closed after no complainant contact. 11 For ease of discussion, we collectively refer to all of the misconduct allegations as the “IAD files.” 12 The complainant later sued Officer Laronde and other officers in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland alleging battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and related claims. The suit was settled in 2012 for $155,000.

In discovery, the State disclosed the civil judgment that had been entered against Officer Laronde for false imprisonment, which was the subject of the State’s motion in limine described in part II.B. of this opinion. The motions judge granted the State’s motion. As part of his direct appeal, Mr. Blake did not appeal that ruling. 14 8. October 2011: Complaint alleging planting of evidence and assault.

Disposition: The file was administratively closed after no complainant contact. 9. December 2011: Complaint alleging theft. Disposition: Not sustained. In addition to the conduct documented in the IAD files, Mr. Blake introduced into evidence a Final Report of the Baltimore City Police Department regarding a nonfatal police-involved shooting that occurred in January 2013 (the “Final Report”).

The Final Report includes a description of the agency’s interview with Officer Laronde, who was a witness to the shooting. The victim of that shooting filed a lawsuit against the Baltimore City Police Department. Mr. Blake also included an article from The Guardian newspaper dated January 16, 2016, which reported that the victim’s defense attorney had obtained video surveillance of the shooting that contradicted Officer Laronde’s statement about the incident. A year later, in 2017, the lawsuit was settled for $400,000.

In addition to the misconduct allegations entered into evidence, Mr. Blake’s trial counsel testified. Trial counsel stated that the State had not disclosed any exculpatory evidence or impeachment evidence related to Officer Laronde before Mr. Blake’s trial date, except for a summary of the City’s settlement of the false imprisonment lawsuit against Officer Laronde. Counsel acknowledged that, at the time of Mr. Blake’s trial, he had “heard allegations about Officer Laronde’s inappropriate strip searching of civilians on the street[,]” but testified that he was not aware of any lawsuits or settlements in which plaintiffs had made such a claim. He testified that if he had had information about a lawsuit against Officer Laronde pertaining to an illegal strip search, he would have “attempted to 15 use that information at the [suppression hearing] and buttress [the] argument that [he] was making, and also, [he] may have decided to go to trial with that information.” Trial counsel also testified that he did not have any information about a lawsuit against Officer Laronde pertaining to planting narcotics on people and that, if he had, he would have used that information at the motions hearing and possibly at trial.

Counsel also testified that he did not consider moving to compel the disclosure of Officer Laronde’s IAD records because he “assumed that if there was additional exculpatory information, they would have sent it along with what they believed to be exculpatory at the time.” On cross-examination, the State questioned trial counsel about the prevailing process at the time of Mr. Blake’s suppression hearing for transferring disclosures and personnel records. The State specifically asked if trial counsel was aware that “at the point of the trial that the [Supreme Court of Maryland] had just issued a very detailed opinion relating [to] the disclosure of confidential Internal Affairs records” in Fields & Colkley v. State, 432 Md. 650 (2013),13 in which this Court outlined the procedure for obtaining 13 In Fields & Colkley v. State, this Court clarified the process for defendants seeking access to confidential records, like the IAD files at issue here. 432 Md. 650 (2013). The Court held that “a defendant in a criminal case who, for purposes of confronting an adverse witness, seeks discovery of otherwise confidential information about that witness has the initial burden to demonstrate a ‘need to inspect,’ that is, demonstrate ‘a reasonable possibility that review of the records would result in discovery of usable evidence.’” Id. at 667 (quoting Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 81 (1992)). This Court went on to explain that “[t]he sufficiency of the need to inspect depends upon factors such as ‘[t]he nature of the charges brought against the defendant,’ ‘[t]he issue before the court,’ and the ‘relationship . . . between the charges, the information sought, and the likelihood that relevant information will be obtained as a result of reviewing the records.’” Id.

(quoting Zaal, 326 Md. at 81–82). 16 confidential personnel records. Trial counsel stated that he may not have been aware of the Fields decision at the time of the motions hearing.14 The State attempted to show that, because trial counsel had personal knowledge of misconduct by Officer Laronde at the time of the trial and the State had disclosed the civil judgment against Officer Laronde, trial counsel had enough information to show a need to inspect Officer Laronde’s personnel files pursuant to Fields. Mr. Blake’s post-conviction counsel argued that Mr. Blake’s defense was prejudiced because if the State had disclosed the IAD files, then Mr. Blake would not have agreed to enter a plea of not guilty upon the agreed statement of facts. Mr. Blake testified at the post-conviction hearing but said only that he asked trial counsel to file a motion to modify on his behalf.

Notably, Mr. Blake did not say that he would have rejected the State’s plea offer and gone to trial had he known about Officer Laronde’s IAD files. Nor did he claim that Officer Laronde’s testimony at the suppression hearing was false. Additionally, Mr. Blake did not claim that the facts proffered by the State in support of the not-guilty statement of facts were inaccurate. Once a defendant has established a need to inspect, the court may elect to review the material alone, conduct review in the presence of counsel, or permit review by counsel alone.

Id. In Fields, this Court held that the motions court erred by reviewing only the summary of the files at issue