Blinken v. State

Couch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Neal Blinken, was charged in a thirty-one count indictment with multiple violations of the Controlled Dangerous Substances law of Maryland. On November 1, 1979 he appeared before the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County and entered pleas of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the indictment. These pleas were provisionally accepted 1 and a pre-sentence investigation was ordered.

The appellant appeared for sentencing on January 3, 1980 and moved to withdraw his guilty plea. This motion was denied, and the Circuit Court finally accepted the guilty plea. The appellant was then sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ten years and fined $50,000.00. By this appeal the appellant presents three questions: "1.

Did the Court abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing? 2. Was the appellant fully advised of the nature of the charges against him? 3. Was the appellant’s plea of guilty free and voluntary?” In view of the particular issues raised in this appeal, only a brief statement of the factual background of the case is necessary. Supplementary facts will be provided with our discussion of the issues.

When the appellant and his co-defendant, Kari Lou Pfau, appeared before the Circuit Court on November 1, 1979, they entered pleas of guilty to charges of (1) possession of marijuana in sufficient quantity to indicate an intent to distribute, (2) possession of marijuana, (3) possession of ⁵⁸¹ cocaine, and (4) keeping and maintaining a public nuisance, that is, a dwelling house used by drug abusers as a location in which to administer controlled dangerous substances. Miss Pfau also pleaded guilty to a fifth count of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The court concurrently asked both Pfau and Blinken if they had been furnished with the charging document, if they had read it, and discussed it with their attorney and if they understood every charge. They separately indicated their understanding of their charges.

The court recited the five counts against Pfau, and then received Blinken’s statement that he understood that the first four counts of his indictment were the same as those indicated in the case against Pfau. The appellant stated his version of the plea agreement between himself and the State. This agreement included the sentencing of Pfau to an agreed ten year suspended sentence, five years probation, a $10,000 fine, and the State’s entering a nolle prosequi on the additional conspiracy charges. 2 Additionally, the appellant indicated his understanding that in return for his pleading guilty to four charges, the remaining charges would not be pursued by the State and that he would be sentenced to ten years imprisonment and a $50,000.00 fine. The appellant was . advised of his right to plead not guilty to the charges, to elect to be tried by a judge or a jury of twelve persons, and to require the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt to the judge or to a unanimous jury.

The factual basis of the pleas was then presented by a Sergeant of the Maryland State Police. The guilty pleas were tentatively accepted pending the receipt of pre-sentence investigations. On December 12,1979, the Circuit Court received a letter from the appellant indicating that he did not wish to pursue his guilty plea, and that he wished to preserve his right to appeal. When he appeared for sentencing on January 3, 1980, the appellant moved through counsel to withdraw the ⁵⁸² guilty plea.

The appellant testified that he originally pleaded guilty because of certain mental and psychological pressure on him. He stated that the only reason for his guilty plea was the consideration given to Miss Pfau in the plea agreement, and that he was in a state of shock when he entered the plea. In that condition he claimed that he would have sold his life in order to spare Miss Pfau any unnecessary pain. Miss Pfau testified as to her own belief that her plea agreement was linked with the plea of Blinken.

After hearing the State’s Attorney express his opposition to the appellant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the court overruled the motion, and sentenced the appellant. I. Withdrawal of the Guilty Plea Maryland Rule 731 f. 1. states: "When justice requires, the court may permit a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty at any time before sentencing.” On appeal, Blinken contends that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in refusing his request to withdraw his guilty plea. The appellant argues that his plea and that of his co-defendant were not "mutually dependent”, and thus the court could have accepted Miss Pfau’s plea while not necessarily accepting Blinken’s plea. The appellant further maintains that justice required the court to permit the guilty plea to be withdrawn because the State failed to show that it would be prejudiced by the plea’s withdrawal.

While acknowledging that there is no well-defined standard for whether a trial judge should accept or deny a motion for withdrawal, the appellant believes that the facts of Fontana v. State, 42 Md. App. 203 , 399 A.2d 950 (1979), cert. denied, 285 Md. 729 (1979), create such a standard. We disagree with the appellant’s contentions, and with his interpretation of the Fontana decision. In Fontana we held that a trial judge had not abused his discretion in denying the withdrawal of a guilty plea. In the facts of that case we ⁵⁸³ found very strong reasons for upholding the presumption that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion.

We did not hold in Fontana , and we will not hold in the present case, that the presumption favoring a trial judge’s ruling will be rebutted by the absence of prejudice to the State or delays in the case. The validity of a judge’s discretionary ruling may be enhanced by evidence such as that in Fontana , but the absence of such evidence does not invalidate the ruling. Rather, such a rebuttal requires evidence on the record indicating that the State or the court acted to prejudice the appellant, or that the appellant was harmed by the failure of the court to follow guidelines of constitutional magnitude. See Kisamore v. State, 286 Md. 654, 664 , 409 A.2d 719, 725 (1980), in which the Court of Appeals held that justice required that a defendant be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea after the State repudiated part of a plea agreement, and where the plea did not meet the constitutional test for voluntariness.

We hold that the granting of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and unless there is a manifest abuse of that discretion, the denial of the motion will not be disturbed by this Court. Palacorolle v. State, 239 Md. 416, 420 , 211 A.2d 828 (1965); Watson v. State, 17 Md. App. 263, 268 , 301 A.2d 26 (1973). Our examination of the record uncovers none of the egregious circumstances which have previously warranted an overturning of a judge’s discretionary ruling. Instead, we find that the trial judge carefully examined the appellant at the time that the guilty plea was entered, and at the time when its withdrawal was requested.

The judge allowed the appellant to explain the request for the withdrawal. During this inquiry the appellant, responding to questions from the State’s Attorney, stated: "A The reason I felt it was, I plead guilty or agreed to plead guilty was because, while I believe I stated there was no physical coercion involved I thought there was a great deal of mental and psychological pressure on me. I just thought that I had a very, in my mind, that I had a valid appeal ⁵⁸⁴ position and I felt that my rights to appeal were certainly being extorted from me. I hope that’s not too strong a word, but I felt my appeal right was being denied me by using Miss Pfau as a lever against me, so to speak, or a pawn in the game as opposed to her being her ownself, her own person.

Q Well, go back to my original question, what other reasons, if any, exist for your pleading guilty in this case other than the consideration given to Miss Pfau? A Other than the reasons I had just stated that would be it. Q That’s the only reason you pled guilty on that day? A Yes. ...

I know it may sound difficult for you all to believe because you’re in contact with this type of atmosphere all of the time. I mean it is your job, but my experience in this matter is very limited so, you know, maybe that’s why I was a little hesitant to realize exactly what was happening. Just in principle alone, I don’t think it is right to use another individual who has their own constitutional right and their own personality, their own life, their own being, I don’t think it is right to use that person against another person as a force to take out the State’s will on another person. Q You knew when you were here November 1st if you proceeded to trial before that jury you would have preserved your appellate rights, didn’t you?

A I knew, yes, that I would, but at the time — Q Why did you enter a plea of guilty in view of that right available on November 1st? A As I just finished explaining, it was like a state, I was in like a state of shock. I mean I was just forced emotionally, intellectually and physically by the repetity of the events taking place. I really didn’t have a chance to realize the entire scope of what was happening and delve into my feelings.” ⁵⁸⁵ The judge himself questioned the appellant concerning the claim that Miss Pfau was "held hostage” to coerce the appellant.

The appellant discussed his situation directly with the judge on the record. Before denying the appellant’s request to withdraw the guilty plea, and finally accepting that plea, the trial judge discussed the applicable case law and determined that the appellant’s guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The examination of the record indicates only sparse and vague allegations concerning the judge’s exercise of his discretionary authority. These allegations do not overcome the "presumption of verity” which the judge’s ruling possesses.

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 , 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977). Therefore, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

II

The Charges Against the Appellant During the proceedings of November 1, 1979, the following colloquy took place between the trial judge and the two co-defendants: