Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation

HOLLANDER, Judge. We must decide whether the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act permits recovery of attorney’s fees incurred in connection with a suit instituted to confirm and enforce an arbitration award, necessitated by a refusal to comply with binding arbitration. We must also determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in declining to impose sanctions, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341. Rabbi Marcel Blitz, appellant, and the Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation (“Beth Isaac” or “the Synagogue”), appel-lee, negotiated a binding arbitration agreement to resolve a dispute based on appellant’s service as the Synagogue’s rabbi.

At the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding, the panel awarded Rabbi Blitz the sum of $5,000. When the Synagogue failed to pay, Rabbi Blitz resorted to litigation in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to confirm and enforce the arbitration award. Although the court confirmed the award, it denied Rabbi Blitz’s requests for attorney’s fees and sanctions. He now presents the following questions for our review: I. Did the Circuit Court err when it denied Blitz’s request under Section 3-228 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings ⁴⁶⁷ Code that he be awarded the attorney’s fees he incurred in connection with confirming and enforcing the arbitration award against [Beth Isaac], in light of the clear, unambiguous and broad language in Section 3-228 which authorizes the Circuit Court to award the “costs of the petition, the subsequent proceedings, and disbursements” when the Circuit Court confirms an arbitration award?

II

Did the Circuit Court err when it denied Blitz’s Motion for Sanctions under Maryland Rule 1-341 because of the Court’s personal distaste for Court intervention in a dispute between a Rabbi and a Congregation, in light of the fact that the undisputed evidence before the Court demonstrated that the conduct of [Beth Isaac] and its attorney was without substantial justification and/or in bad faith and that conduct merited the imposition of sanctions?

III

Did the Circuit Court err when it denied Blitz’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, which requested, among other things, that the Court review certain documents, in camera, which would have proven that the conduct of [Beth Isaac] and its attorney was without substantial justification and/or in bad faith and that conduct merited the imposition of sanctions? We conclude that the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (“the Maryland Act”), Maryland Code (1957, 1995 ReplVol.), § 3-228(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”), does not authorize the award of attorney’s fees. We are, however, of the view that the circuit court abused its discretion when it summarily denied appellant’s alternative motion for sanctions. As we shall affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings, we need not address appellant’s remaining question.

Factual Background 1 A unanimous arbitration decision issued by a Beth ⁴⁶⁸ Din, 2 a religious tribunal that arbitrated the parties’ underlying dispute, is the central event underpinning the present controversy. The Beth Din, convened pursuant to an agreement between the parties dated February 27, 1994, was composed of a panel of three rabbis; each party selected one rabbi and the two rabbis then chose the third rabbi. In accordance with the terms of the contract, the decision of the Beth Din was to be “binding on both parties,” as well as “final and with no appeal.” On June 14, 1994, the Beth Din awarded Rabbi Blitz $5,000 in damages, payable in two installments; a $3,000 payment was due before July 9, 1994, and a $2,000 payment was due before July 28, 1995. Although the Synagogue did not contest the validity of the judgment in the period immediately subsequent to the Beth Din’s decision, it failed to make either payment.

In January 1995, Rabbi Blitz filed suit in the District Court for Baltimore County, seeking to recover the money owed by the Synagogue. 3 After the Synagogue filed a Notice of Intention to Defend, Rabbi Blitz appeared for trial with two of the three rabbis who presided at the Beth Din. The Synagogue moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the District Court lacked jurisdiction to confirm and enforce an arbitration award. That motion was granted, without prejudice. Thereafter, in mid March, Rabbi Blitz’s attorney notified the Synagogue that he would seek to enforce the arbitrators’ award in court if the money was not paid.

On March 28,1996, Rabbi Blitz filed in the circuit court a Petition to Confirm and ⁴⁶⁹ Enforce Arbitration Award and Complaint for Damages, as well as a motion for summary judgment, supported by the arbitration agreement, an affidavit from the rabbis who served on the Beth Din, and Rabbi Blitz’s affidavit. He asked, inter alia, for costs and attorneys’ fees, premised on C.J. § 3-228. The Synagogue was served on April 8, 1996, but it did not timely file its answer to the Petition. As a result, on May 14, 1996, the court signed an Order entering judgment in favor of Rabbi Blitz in the amount of $5,000, which was docketed on May 16, 1996.

In the Order, the court said that Rabbi Blitz’s attorney’s fees would “be determined by the court upon submission of sufficient evidence in support thereof.” As directed by the court, appellant promptly submitted an affidavit seeking attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $1,615. By order dated May 22, 1996, docketed May 28, 1996, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of appellant in the amount of $415 for costs, but denied appellant’s request for attorney’s fees under C.J. § 3-228. Appellant then filed a “Motion for Reconsideration” on June 25, 1996, seeking to invoke the court’s revisory power under Rule 2-535. After the court denied the motion on July 10, 1996, appellant noted his appeal on July 12, 1996. 4 In the interim, on May 15, 1996, the Synagogue filed its answer, along with a Petition to Modify or Vacate the arbitra ⁴⁷⁰ tion award and a Response to Motion for Summary Judgment.

It contended that “the arbitrators exceeded their authority;” it claimed that the parties had limited the arbitrators to a maximum award of $3,000. Because the order had already been signed when these papers were filed, it is unclear whether the judge revisited the order of May 14 before it was docketed on May 16. Counsel for Rabbi Blitz contacted appellee’s counsel to advise him that the Synagogue’s challenges were untimely, based on C.J. § 3-223 (requiring filing of a petition to modify within 90 days after receipt of the arbitration decision) and C.J. § 3-224 (requiring filing of a petition to vacate within 30 days from receipt of the award). Although appellee’s counsel was aware of the time limitations, he felt that the case of C.W. Jackson & Assocs., Inc. v. Brooks, 289 Md. 658 , 426 A.2d 378 (1981), supported his contention that an arbitration can be vacated or modified after the statutory time limitations. 5 The record also includes a detailed and lengthy letter from Rabbi Blitz’s attorney, confirming the conversation of counsel and containing legal authority to support Rabbi Blitz’s position that the Synagogue’s action lacked merit. .

On May 17, 1996, Rabbi Blitz’s attorney faxed to the Synagogue’s counsel a copy of a sworn affidavit from the three rabbis who served on the Beth Din, attesting that the Synagogue’s Petition violated the terms of the arbitration agreement. Further, the rabbis averred that the parties never agreed to limit the arbitrators’ authority to an award of $3,000. Counsel for Rabbi Blitz also filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Petition to Modify or Vacate, a Motion to Strike Defendant’s Petition to Modify or Vacate, a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Motion for Sanctions against the Synagogue and its lawyer, predicated upon Md. Rule 1-341. By letter dated May 29, 1996, however, appellant agreed to withdraw his ⁴⁷¹ motion for sanctions if the Synagogue would agree to abandon its position.

Meanwhile, on June 5, 1996, Rabbi Blitz served a writ of garnishment on First Union National Bank (“First Union”) to satisfy the judgment from the Synagogue’s cemetery fund. The Synagogue filed an Answer to and Motion to Dismiss Garnishment, asserting that the garnished account “is a trust account as defined in Md. C & J Code Ann., Sec. ll-603(b),” and supported by a copy of a bank statement and an affidavit. It was supplemented by a memorandum in which appellee asserted that the garnished account “is a trust fund that is required by [Maryland Code, Business Regulation Art. (“B.R.”) (1957, 1992 RepLVol.), § 5-303], and is specifically regulated as a trust fund.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thereafter, appellant filed an opposition to the Synagogue’s motion to dismiss the garnishment, and a supplemental legal memorandum, in which he averred that the account was not a “trust account,” but a regular bank account, and that the applicable statutory law and the documentation submitted in support of appellee’s motion did not support the Synagogue’s contention that the account was a trust account. Nonetheless, appellee’s counsel sent a letter to appellant requesting voluntary dismissal of the garnishment.

During a telephone conversation on July 1, 1996, confirmed by a letter of the same date, counsel for appellant advised appellee that B.R. § 5-302(a)(2)(iv), which immediately precedes one of the statutory provisions upon which the Synagogue relied, unequivocally provides that the subtitle does not apply to a cemetery that “is owned and operated by ... a synagogue.” Because appellee’s counsel indicated that he would research the matter, counsel for appellant opted to procure an affidavit from Stephen B. Nestor, a Vice President of First National, to refute the contention of a trust account. It stated, in part: 3. I have reviewed [the account] ... held ... in the name of Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation Cemetery Fund. ⁴⁷² There are no records in the Bank’s possession that would indicate that the Account was established as a trust account. 4. The Bank is not aware of any entity or individual that may be serving as a trustee for the Account. 5.

The Bank is not aware of any trust agreement between any entity or individual and the Judgment Debtor concerning the Account. 6. The Account is not being administered by the Bank as a trust account. On July 9, 1996, the Synagogue’s attorney sought to settle by payment in full of the judgment and costs, exclusive of attorney’s fees. On July 11, 1996, appellee sent Rabbi Blitz a check for $5,587 and an Order of Satisfaction.

When appel-lee’s counsel indicated that the Synagogue would take the position that appellant’s acceptance of the money would render moot the appeal as to the denial of attorney’s fees under C.J. § 3-228, appellant refused to accept the check. Consequently, on July 29, 1996, the Synagogue deposited $5,587 in the registry of the court. On the same day, Beth Isaac filed a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum that appellant had served on First National. Additionally, the Synagogue filed a Motion for Sanctions against appellant, based on appellant’s refusal to accept the money tendered by Beth Israel.

It sought attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,000, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341, although its counsel was representing Beth Isaac on a pro bono basis. On August 2, 1996, appellant’s counsel faxed the Synagogue’s attorney an eighteen page letter recounting the events that had transpired in connection with the litigation. On August 8, 1996, another judge of the circuit court heard the outstanding motions. At that time, appellant submitted updated documentation of attorney’s fees that he had incurred, totalling $2,235.

Before ruling on the motions for sanctions, the court, understandably frustrated, observed: This case is a disgrace. It’s disgraceful. It’s disgraceful that you’ve got — to put it quite frankly, it pains me when I ⁴⁷³ look at this case to see how this case has evolved. This is wrong.

This is, for you to be here in this court over this matter is, in my opinion it’s disgraceful. And I tell you that, both of you, that for this to get to this point, a Rabbi and a congregation to be in this position with appeals to the Court of Special Appeals, with complaints, I want money from him, I want sanctions for him, he was no good, he lied, he lied. I tell you this is, to use the word unseemly is mild, compared to what I would like to use in this matter. * * * * * 5<* Is this really the format that such a complaint should be aired, in a public courtroom? I mean, it — I read through this and, quite frankly, it disturbs me.

It disturbs me as a judge. It disturbs me as a person. During argument, Rabbi Blitz’s attorney submitted a letter from the rabbi chosen by the Synagogue to serve as one of the arbitrators, which urged the court to consider an award of legal fees. The Synagogue’s attorney claimed that “this case has gotten out of hand.” The court thereafter granted the motion to quash, and denied the motions for sanctions.

The court said, in pertinent part: If I were awarding or considering sanctions, quite frankly, I wouldn’t even — it would cause me very little difficulty to deny [the Synagogue’s] request for sanctions because, quite frankly, I don’t think Rabbi Blitz has done anything that is the subject matter of the request for sanctions that’s either unjustified or wrong. So I am, so I would deny it on the merits. If it ever got to that point. I don’t have to get to that point.

It’s been, in fact, said to me here in court today, we are not seeking that. I wouldn’t award them if he was seeking them, to be honest with you, so the record is clear. That motion is denied. In regard to Rabbi Blitz’s motion for sanctions.

I have to get back to what I said at the beginning. I understand your involvement in the case. I understand, [counsel for Rabbi Blitz], your passion based on what you perceive to be wrongful conduct on the part of the congregation. I under ⁴⁷⁴ stand that.

I appreciate your doing what you think the law provides for you to do to protect your client. I don’t think there is any question that if we were operating sometime ago, not too much in the past, that the idea that this kind of a case could wind up in a civil court subject to the publicity it’s gotten, subject to the public airing that it’s received, would be unthinkable. I wonder, whether our practice now to have these kind of disputes subject to the rumor innuendo [sic], the articles, the publicity, I wonder whether that’s a step forward, so to speak. Or whether that rule that existed previously made a lot more sense. ****** I just, my thoughts are just, my feeling in regard to the matter, let’s assume that I find as a fact that the, that [sic] some of the actions on the part of the congregation were in bad faith, and were without substantial justification....

That finding doesn’t entitle Rabbi Blitz to sanctions. That finding doesn’t require the court to impose sanctions. The rule, Rule 1-341, specifically says that the court may award sanctions. ****** I am troubled by some of the things that have occurred in this case reading this file---- But, quite frankly, to have sanctions imposed in a case like this, to have this case continue on, to have this be now the further matter for debate of, with the appellate courts of this State I don’t think makes a bit of sense. I think when we talk about the amount of money involved, the amount of money that is being asked for sanctions, the kind of conduct that was engaged in, whether I ultimately come down with the decision that, yes, the scales have been tipped to show me that it was without substantial justification, even if I do that, even if I make those findings of fact, I can tell you, quite frankly, that in this kind of case the most just thing that I think a court can do, the proper thing is to try to put this case to rest.

This has to end. It has to ⁴⁷⁵ end. This isn’t worth this. It is not worth a few thousand dollars to have this continue.

It truly isn’t. It’s for those reasons that the motion for sanctions filed by the Plaintiff are denied. (Emphasis added.) Appellant’s subsequent Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was denied on August 23, 1996, and appellant timely lodged another appeal. Discussion I. “ ‘Arbitration is the process whereby parties voluntarily agree to substitute a private tribunal for the public tribunal otherwise available to them.

Arbitration is a matter of contract which the parties should be allowed to conduct in accordance with their agreement.’” Kovacs v. Kovacs, 98 Md.App. 289, 300 , 633 A.2d 425 (1993), cert. denied, 334 Md. 211 , 638 A.2d 753 (1994) (quoting Gold Coast Mall Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 103 , 468 A.2d 91 (1983)). It is often favored because it usually provides a speedy, informal, and less expensive alternative to litigation. Birkey Design Group v. Egle Nursing Home, Inc., 113 Md.App. 261, 265 , 687 A.2d 256 (1997); Marsh v. Loffler Housing Corp., 102 Md. App. 116 , 648 A.2d 1081 (1994). As an added benefit, arbitration facilitates the reduction of the court’s docket.

Birkey, 113 Md.App. at 265 , 687 A.2d 256 . The court’s power to vacate an arbitration award is narrowly circumscribed; it can be exercised only to correct mistakes, C.J. § 3-223(b)(l), (3), or to provide relief when fraud, corruption, or denial of due process has tainted the legitimacy of the award. C.J. § 3-224(b)(l)-(4). The Maryland Act, C.J. § 3-224(c), specifically limits the court’s powers in this regard: “When award not to be vacated. — The court shall not vacate the award or refuse to confirm the award on the ground that a court of law or equity could not or would not grant the same relief.” See Birkey Design, 113 Md.App. at 265-66 , 687 A.2d 256 ; Marsh, 102 Md.App. at 124 , 648 A.2d 1081 .

Thus, the court’s role with regard to the merits of an ⁴⁷⁶ arbitration decision is a deferential one, resembling the substantial evidence test employed by appellate courts in the review of administrative appeals. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 576 , 650 A.2d 226 (1994) (“Judicial review of administrative agency action is narrow.”); Moseman v. County Council, 99 Md.App. 258 , 636 A.2d 499 , cert. denied, 335 Md. 229 , 643 A.2d 383 (1994). At the heart of this case is appellant’s request, based on the Maryland Act, for attorney’s fees in connection with his efforts to confirm and enforce the arbitration award, based on his claim that the Synagogue was unjustified in its refusal to comply with the award. It is well settled that the “American Rule” ordinarily does not permit recovery by the prevailing party of litigation expenses, including attorney’s fees.

Hess Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 341 Md. 155, 159 , 669 A.2d 1352 (1996); Empire Realty Co. v. Fleisher, 269 Md. 278, 285 , 305 A.2d 144 (1973); Bresnahan v. Bresnahan, 115 Md.App. 226, 244 , 693 A.2d 1 (1997). See also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 263-64 , 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1616-17, 1624-25 , 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (holding that in the absence of statutory authorization or contractual agreement, under the American rule, each party in federal litigation must pay its own attorney’s fees; when Congress has not explicitly authorized such fees, courts should not award them simply to further public policy.) “As a general rule, a trial court may award attorneys’ fees only in the unusual situation where the trial court is [statutorily] authorized to award the prevailing litigant reasonable attorneys’ fees or where, as [sic] more common, a contract between the parties specifically authorizes attorneys’ fees.” Maxima Corp. v. 6933 Arlington Dev.

Ltd. Partnership, 100 Md.App. 441, 452 , 641 A.2d 977 (1994); see also Hess, 341 Md. at 160 , 669 A.2d 1352 ; Bresnahan, 115 Md.App. at 244 , 693 A.2d at 9 . In contrast, usual and ordinary court costs are generally recoverable. Hess, 341 Md. at 159 , 669 A.2d 1352 ; Bresnahan, 115 Md.App. at 244 , 693 A.2d at 9 . ⁴⁷⁷ It is clear that the parties here did not contractually provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees. We consider, therefore, whether the Act authorizes the award of attorney’s fees incurred in confirming and enforcing an arbitration award.

We conclude that it does not. In reaching our decision in this case, we must reconcile two conflicting canons of statutory construction. The first is the dictate that we may not read into a statute a meaning that is not expressly stated or clearly implied. Amalgamated Cas.

Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529, 535-36 , 212 A.2d 311 (1965); Dep’t. of Econ. and Employ. Development v. Taylor, 108 Md.App. 250, 277 , 671 A.2d 523 (1996), aff'd, 344 Md. 687 , 690 A.2d 508 (1997) (per curiam). The second is the precept that we strive to construe a Uniform Act, such as this one, so as to conform with other jurisdictions.

Continental Oil Co. v. Horsey, 177 Md. 383 , 9 A.2d 607 (1939). Appellant relies on C.J. § 3-228(b) which, as we shall see, does not expressly authorize recovery of attorney’s fees. He also points to C.J. § 3-232, which provides: “This subtitle shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the states which enact it.” Because other jurisdictions have permitted the recovery of attorney’s fees incurred in actions instituted under their respective versions of the Uniform Arbitration Act (“the UAA”), appellant urges that C.J. § 3-232 requires us to construe C.J. § 3-228 to effect the same result. See Anchorage Medical and Surgical Clinic v. James, 555 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1976), overruled in part on other grounds, Ahtna, Inc. v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 894 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1995); Canon Sch.

Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Construction Co., 180 Ariz. 148 , 882 P.2d 1274 (1994); County of Clark v. Blanchard Constr. Co., 98 Nev. 488 , 653 P.2d 1217 (1982); Wachtel v. Shoney’s, Inc., 830 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn.App.1991). C.J. § 3-228 provides: Judgment, costs and disbursements.

(a) Entering of judgment; enforcement of judgment. — (1) If an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award is ⁴⁷⁸ granted, a judgment shall be entered in conformity with the order. (2) The judgment may be enforced as any other judgment. (b) Costs and disbursements. — A court may award costs of the petition, the subsequent proceedings, and disbursements.[ 6 ] (Italics in original; boldface supplied.) Appellant concedes, as he must, that C.J. § 3-228 does not specifically provide for attorney’s fees. He contends, however, that the provision implicitly permits recovery of legal fees, because such expenses are subsumed in the “costs” of “subsequent proceedings” and “disbursements,” for which recovery is permitted under C.J. § 3-228.

The construction we have been asked to give to the Maryland Act would engraft upon the statute a meaning not evident from its plain language or legislative intent. Further, such an interpretation would require us to ignore well honed principles of statutory construction. It is beyond question that the “cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intention.” Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738, 744 , 580 A.2d 188 (1990); see also Klingenberg v. Klingenberg, 342 Md. 315, 327 , 675 A.2d 551 (1996); Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995). Thus, in interpreting a statute, we endeavor to “ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature.” Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523 , 636 A.2d 448 (1994); see also Bowen v. Smith, 342 Md. 449, 454 , 677 A.2d 81 (1996); Stapleford Hall Joint Venture v. Hyatt, 330 Md. 388, 400 , 624 A.2d 526 (1993); Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 ⁴⁷⁹ Md. 471, 480, 578 A.2d 761 (1990).

In this regard, we consider the legislative objective, including the statutory purpose and the problem that the statute was intended to remedy. See Mustafa v. State, 328 Md. 65, 72 , 591 A.2d 481 (1991); Sinai Hosp. v. Dept. of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28, 40 , 522 A.2d 382 (1987); Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. State Dep’t of Assessments and Taxation, 110 Md.App. 677, 689 , 678 A,2d 602 , cert. granted, 344 Md. 52 , 684 A.2d 1327 (1996); Gunpowder Horse Stables v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 108 Md.App. 612, 617 , 673 A.2d 721 (1996).

We look to the statutory language as the “primary source” to determine legislative intent. Klingenberg, 342 Md. at 327 , 675 A.2d 551 ; Privette, 320 Md. at 744 , 580 A.2d 188 . The words used in the statute are accorded “ ‘their ordinary and popularly understood meaning, absent a manifest contrary legislative intention.’ ” Klingenberg, 342 Md. at 327 , 675 A.2d 551 (quoting In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 520 , 471 A.2d 313 (1984)); see also Buckman, 333 Md. at 523, 636 A.2d 448 ; Privette, 320 Md. at 744 , 580 A.2d 188 ; Hanford County v. University of Maryland Medical Sys. Corp., 318 Md. 525, 529 , 569 A.2d 649 (1990); NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 313 Md. 118 , 544 A.2d 764 (1988).

When a statute is unambiguous, the “courts may not disregard the natural import of the words used in order to extend or limit its meaning.” Privette, 320 Md. at 745 , 580 A.2d 188 ; see also Board of Trustees of Md. State Retirement & Pension Sys. v. Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7-8 , 664 A.2d 1250 (1995); Buckman, 333 Md. at 523 , 636 A.2d 448 ; In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 685 , 516 A.2d 976 (1986); Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418 , 379 A.2d 1007 (1977). Therefore, “[i]f the statutory language is plain and free of ambiguity and has a definite and sensible meaning, it is conclusively presumed to be the meaning of the legislative body in enacting the statute.” Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Fid. 52, 71, 225 A.2d 294 (1966). Further, “under the guise of construction, [we may not] supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the stat ⁴⁸⁰ ute, or ... insert exceptions not made by the Legislature.” Amalgamated Cas. Ins.

Co., 239 Md. at 536 , 212 A.2d 311 ; see McNeil v. State, 112 Md.App. 434, 451-52 , 685 A.2d 839 (1996). Nor may we embellish a statutory provision so as to enlarge its meaning. Taylor, 108 Md.App. at 277 , 671 A.2d 523 ; Taylor v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 51 Md.App. 435, 447 , 443 A.2d 657 (1982). Instead, we must “give effect to that intention regardless of the consequences, even though such effect may cause a hardship.

Simply put, a court construing an unambiguous statute must view the law as it is, and not as it might wish it to be.” Brzowski v. Maryland Home Improvement Comm’n, 114 Md.App. 615, 627 , 691 A.2d 699 (1997) (citations omitted). To glean the Legislature’s intent, a statute must also be read as a whole, so that all provisions are considered together and, to the extent possible, reconciled, and harmonized. See Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 172 , 638 A.2d 93 (1994); Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993); Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins.

Co., 322 Md. 689 , 589 A.2d 944 (1991); Brzowski, 114 Md.App. at 627 , 691 A.2d 699 ; Boyd v. Hickman, 114 Md.App. 108 , 122 n. 9, 689 A.2d 106 (1997). With this principle in mind, we observe that, in contrast to C.J. § 3-228(b), C.J. § 3-221 expressly addresses attorney’s fees. It states: Expenses and fees. (a) Arbitrators. —Unless the arbitration agreement provides otherwise, the award shall provide for payment of the arbitrators’ expenses, fees, and any other expense incurred in the conduct of the arbitration.

(b) Counsel fees. — Unless the arbitration agreement provides otherwise, the award may not include counsel fees. (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, the Legislature contemplated the issue of attorney’s fees in C.J. § 3-221, yet declined to authorize them in that section, absent a contractual provision. See Birkey, 113 Md.App. at 266 , 687 A.2d 256 . While we are unaware of any legislative history in connection with the use of the terms ⁴⁸¹ “costs and disbursements” in C.J. § 3-228, we recognize that the “power to award attorney’s fees, being contrary to the established practice in this country, may be expressly conferred but will not be presumed from