Board of County School Commissioners v. Board of County School Commissioners

Bryan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. By the Act of 1892, chapter 341, the Legislature made important changes in the School Law. This Act authorized the appointment of the boards of County School Commissioners by the Governor; thus taking the appointment out of the hands of the Judges of the Circuit Court to whom it had been confided by the Act of 1812. The Governor appointed six School Commissioners for Washington County, and they in due time qualified according to law, and elected a person to fill the office of secretary, treasurer and examiner.

The School Commissioners who were in office at the time of the passage of the Act above-mentioned, and whom for convenience we shall designate as the Old Board, refused to surrender to their successors the books, papers and official seal of the Board, and have appointed trustees for the school districts, and school teachers, wherever necessary, and have retained control of the public schools in Washington County. The Commissioners appointed by the Governor, whom we shall call the New Board, have taken no steps to obtain, by the aid of the law, possession of the offices to which they have been appointed. The Old Board filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court for Washington County against the County ²⁸⁹ Commissioners, praying for an injunction to restrain them from paying to any person other than their secretary and treasurer any money due and payable to the Board of County School Commissioners of Washington County. On petition of the New Board and their secretary, treasurer and examiner, they were by order of Court admitted to appear in the suit as parties defendant.

They as well as the County Commissioners answered the bill of complaint. When the cause was heard, the Court passed a decree enjoining the County Commissioners from paying to the treasurer of the New Board, or to any other person than the treasurer of the Old Board, any money which was payable to the Board of County School Commissioners, and also enjoining them from interfering with the Old Board in the performance of its duties, and also enjoining them from refusing to pay to the treasurer of the Old Board any money due to the Board of School Commissioners. Appeals were taken by the County Commissioners and by the New Board. When a person has been duly appointed to public office, and has taken the prescribed oath, and done such other things as are made prerequisites by law, he has a right to enter upon the discharge of his duties.

If he is prevented by a former incumbent from obtaining possession of the office, the law affords a perfectly adequate and complete remedy. In this State the usual and appropriate proceeding is by writ of mandamus, of which a great many instances are found in our reports. It is a legal remedy, that is to say, it is administered on the law side of the Court, as contradistinguished from its equitable jurisdiction. Hence it is held, as there is a complete, perfect, and adequate remedy at law, that a Court of equity is debarred from determining the title to an office disputed betweexx conflicting claimants.

It will be thus seexx that it was not within the power of ²⁹⁰ the Oourt below to adjudicate which of the rival Boards was the lawful Board of School Commissioners, and consequently it is not within the power of this Court on appeal in this case. This Court has on rare occasions expressed an opinion on a question not presented by the record; but it has always been in a case where it was seen that it would terminate the existing controversy. If we were to express an opinion in this case, we have not the power to give effect to it by putting either Board in possession of the office; and we do not see how we would in any way promote the public interest by a departure from the usual course of confining our opinion to the matters presented for decision by the record. The Old Board were appointed many years ago by the Judges of the Circuit Court, and by virtue of that appointment are now in possession of their office, and are exercising its functions, and discharging its duties.

We cannot recognize them as officers de jure; because by the terms of the statute of 1892 the appointment and qualification of their successors put an end to their official term. As we have said, we have not the power in this case to adjudicate the validity of the title thus acquired; and likewise we have not the power to adjudicate the validity of the title of the old incumbents. But it is our duty to recognize the visible facts