Board of Education v. Marks-Sloan

GREENE, J. In the instant case, Stephanie Marks-Sloan (Respondent) was injured in an automobile collision involving Norman Iglehart on September 26, 2007, while both were acting within the scope of their employment with the Board of Education of Prince George’s County (the Board). In the discussion that follows, we will refer to Mr. Iglehart and the Board, collectively, as Petitioners. 1 Respondent thereafter applied for workers’ compensation benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded her compensation for medical expenses, temporary total disability, and attorney’s fees after determining that Respondent had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. The Board, as a self-insured employer, began making the required payments to Respondent.

Subsequently, Respondent filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, naming Mr. Iglehart, the Board, and Prince George’s County (the County) as defendants. In her Complaint, Respondent sought damages for her injuries as a result of Mr. Iglehart’s alleged ordinary negligence and the respondeat superior liability of the Board and the County. The parties ultimately stipulated to the dismissal of the County as a party to the case. Petitioners, as the remaining defendants in the tort suit, filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment.

In their Motion, Petitioners contended that, pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 9-509 of the Labor and Employment Article (LE), Respondent’s exclusive remedy against the Board, her employer, was through the Workers’ Compensation Act. According to Petitioners, because Respondent had received an award from the Workers’ Compensation Commission, she was prohibited from pursuing a tort suit against the Board. In addition, Petitioners claimed ¹² in their Motion that Md.Code (1990, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ) provided immunity for Mr. Iglehart as a county board of education employee acting within the scope of his employment and without malice or gross negligence; thus, Petitioners asserted that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After consideration of Petitioners’ Motion, and Respondent’s opposition thereto, the trial judge denied the Motion with regard to Mr. Iglehart but granted the Motion with regard to the Board.

The judge concluded that the Board was dismissed; however, he directed that it “remain a party in this case for the purposes of any potential indemnification [of Mr. Iglehart] required under Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-518(h) (2006).” Following a series of motions and responses filed by the parties, the trial judge issued an Order entering judgment on behalf of Respondent in the amount of $100,000 against the Board. 2 The judge’s Order also indicated that the parties agreed that Petitioners had not waived their rights to pursue post-judgment relief or to file a timely appeal. In an attempt to further clarify the respective positions of the parties in the suit, the judge later issued an Amended Order, which ordered that judgment be entered against Mr. Iglehart and the Board and added the stipulation that Mr. Iglehart was dismissed from the action. The trial judge denied Petitioners’ Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Petitioners then noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

Bd. of Educ. v. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. 59 , 30 A.3d 1026 (2011). The intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that, similar to the Local Government Tort Claims Act, CJ § 5-518 contains an indemnification provision, rather than an immunity provision, that allows a tort suit to be brought against Mr. Iglehart and requires that the Board be ¹³ joined as a party. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 69-70 , 30 A.3d at 1031-32 . The Court of Special Appeals interpreted CJ § 5-518 as requiring the Board to indemnify Mr. Iglehart by paying any damages entered against him in the negligence suit.

Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 70 , 30 A.3d at 1032 . In addition, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Legislature’s decision to require the Board to indemnify Mr. Iglehart does not violate the exclusivity rule in the Workers’ Compensation Act. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 67-68 , 30 A.3d at 1031 . We granted Petitioners’ petition for writ of certiorari, Bd. of Educ. v. Marks-Sloan, 424 Md. 628 , 37 A.3d 317 (2012), to address the following issues: 1.

Can an employee of a county board of education who receives workers’ compensation benefits for injuries sustained in the course and scope of her employment circumvent the exclusivity rule and sue her co-worker in a negligence action? 2. Does CJ § 5-518 grant employees of county boards of education immunity from suit and judgment absent malice and gross negligence? 3. Did the Court of Special Appeals improperly rely upon the Maryland Tort Claims Act and the Local Government Tort Claims Act to determine that an employee of a county board of education may be sued in his individual capacity in a negligence action? We shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold that CJ § 5-518 contains an indemnification provision that allows an injured party to bring a tort suit against the county board of education employee who caused the injury.

In accordance with the statute, the injured party must join the employer county board of education as a defendant in the action. Any damages awarded may be executed and levied against the county board of education only and may not be collected from the negligent employee. Furthermore, we hold that, as it pertains to the case sub judice, this statutory scheme does not violate the exclusivity rule in LE ¹⁴ § 9-509, which states that an injured employee’s sole remedy against his or her employer for an accidental personal injury sustained during the course of employment is through the Workers’ Compensation Act. The purpose of the exclusivity rule is to ensure swift compensation to the injured employee and to prevent a double recovery, through a workers’ compensation award and a tort judgment, from an employer by an injured employee.

The Workers’ Compensation Act, Md.Code (1957, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 9-902 of the Labor and Employment Article, provides that in a suit against a third party tortfeasor, brought by an employer or injured employee, 3 the employer is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of any workers’ compensation paid or awarded to the injured employee. Thus, in a situation where, as here, an injured county board of education employee brings a suit in tort against a negligent co-employee, and the county board of education is joined for purposes of indemnification, the county board may set off the amount of workers’ compensation paid or awarded to the injured employee from the amount of damages awarded in the tort action. Such a procedure satisfies the letter and spirit of the statutory provisions at issue by protecting the county board of education from the unfairness of double recovery, while allowing the injured employee to obtain his or her entitlement to compensation for workplace injuries. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The facts of the instant case are relatively simple and undisputed by the parties.

On September 26, 2007, Respondent, while acting in the course and scope of her employment with the Board, was driving a motorcycle on the access road ¹⁵ from a school bus lot in Prince George’s County. At the same time, Mr. Iglehart, also acting in the course and scope of his employment with the Board, was operating a school bus and traveling in the opposite direction on the access road. Due to Mr. Iglehart’s negligent operation of the bus, Respondent was forced off the road and suffered injuries. Respondent filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission for injuries she sustained as a result of the incident.

The Commission determined that Respondent had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with the Board. On February 25, 2008, the Commission awarded Respondent compensation for medical expenses, temporary total disability, and attorney’s fees. At the time of the incident, the Board was a self-insured employer, and it began paying compensation to Respondent in accordance with the Commission’s award. On October 31, 2009, Respondent filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, naming Mr. Iglehart, the Board, and Prince George’s County as defendants.

In her Complaint, Respondent sought damages based on Mr. Iglehart’s negligence and the respondeat superior liability of the Board and the County. Ultimately, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the County as a party to the suit. Petitioners, the remaining defendants, filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. With regard to the claims against Mr. Iglehart, Petitioners asserted that CJ § 5-518(e) provided immunity for Mr. Iglehart as a county board of education employee acting within the scope of his employment, without malice or gross negligence.

Thus, Petitioners claimed that suit could not be brought against Mr. Iglehart under the circumstances alleged by Respondent. With regard to the claims against the Board, Petitioners contended that LE § 9-509 prohibited Respondent from pursuing relief from the Board, her employer, after she sought and received an award from the Commission under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Therefore, according to Petitioners, they were entitled to have the Complaint dismissed or, in the alternative, to have a ¹⁶ judgment entered in their favor as a matter of law. In her opposition to Petitioners’ Motion, Respondent argued that Maryland law allowed her to pursue a tort claim against Mr. Iglehart, her co-employee.

In addition, Respondent asserted that the Board’s statutory requirement to indemnify its employee in a tort suit does not preclude a negligence action against the employee who caused the injury and does not violate the principles of the exclusivity rule for workers’ compensation benefits. After considering Petitioners’ Motion and Respondent’s opposition thereto, the trial judge denied the Motion as to Mr. Iglehart and granted the Motion as to the Board. The trial judge dismissed the Board but required that it remain a party in the case for “purposes of any potential indemnification!].]” Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Leave to Refile Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion for Summary Judgment, based upon the same arguments it had previously submitted, and the trial judge denied both motions. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment.

In their Motion, Petitioners stipulated that Respondent and Mr. Iglehart were employees acting within the scope of their employment with the Board at the time of the motor vehicle collision. Petitioners requested that the trial court issue an order dismissing the suit with prejudice and declaring that county boards of education cannot be held liable for the tortious conduct of their employees in a situation where the injured plaintiff co-employee has already received workers’ compensation benefits from the county board of education as a result of the same incident. Petitioners also contemporaneously filed a Motion to Stay Trial. The trial judge issued an Order denying Petitioners’ Motion to Stay Trial and ruling that Petitioners’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment could be resolved after the trial, if necessary.

The trial judge issued an Order on April 23, 2010, entering judgment on behalf of Respondent in the amount of $100,000 against the Board, pursuant to CJ § 5-518. The Order also indicated that the parties agreed that Petitioners would withdraw their Motion for Declaratory Judgment, without preju ¹⁷ dice, and that Petitioners had not waived their rights to pursue post-judgment relief or to file a timely appeal. On June 4, 2010, the trial judge issued an Amended Order that entered judgment against Mr. Iglehart and the Board and also included a stipulation by the parties to dismiss Mr. Iglehart as a party to the action. Petitioners filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, requesting that the judge enter judgment against the Board only, which the trial judge denied.

Petitioners noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Bd of Educ. v. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. 59 , 30 A.3d 1026 (2011). The intermediate appellate court reviewed the questions posed by Petitioners as issues of statutory construction. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 61 , 30 A.3d at 1027 .

To interpret the provisions of CJ § 5-518, the Court of Special Appeals turned to the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md.Code (2009 Repl.Vol.), § 12-101, et seq. of the State Government Article (MTCA), and the Local Government Tort Claims Act, Md.Code (1987, 2011 Supp.), § 5-301, et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (LGTCA), for guidance. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 65 , 30 A.3d at 1029 . Interpreting the MTCA as an immunity statute and the LGTCA as an indemnification statute, the intermediate appellate court determined that the statutory scheme in CJ § 5-518 was analogous to the LGTCA. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 66-70 , 30 A.3d at 1029-32 .

According to the Court of Special Appeals, the LGTCA includes similar language to CJ § 5-518, providing that a judgment may be entered against an employee, but the employer bears the responsibility for satisfying the judgment. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 66 , 30 A.3d at 1029-30 . In contrast, under the MTCA, claims must be brought directly against the State. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 67 , 30 A.3d at 1030 .

The court reasoned that, under Maryland law, Respondent was entitled to bring a tort suit against her co-employee, Mr. Iglehart, even though she was prohibited from bringing a similar suit against her employer, the Board. Id. With regard to the statutory requirement that the Board indemnify its employee in a negligence suit, the intermediate appellate court concluded that “the exclusivity of the workers’ ¹⁸ compensation remedy does not prevent a contractual obligation to indemnify. Similarly, we see no impediment to the legislature’s ability to provide for indemnification.” Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 67-68 , 30 A.3d at 1031 .

Thus, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 70 , 30 A.3d at 1032 . STANDARD OF REVIEW The facts leading to Respondent’s injury, as stated above, are undisputed by the parties. The parties agree that Mr. Iglehart and Respondent were both acting within the scope of their employment with the Board at the time of the incident.

The parties also agree that Mr. Iglehart was not acting with malice or gross negligence in causing Respondent’s injuries. It is not disputed that the Board has statutory immunity, pursuant to CJ § 5-518(c), for damages in excess of $100,000. In addition, neither party has asserted that Respondent was entitled to bring suit against the Board directly, as the exclusivity rule prohibits an injured employee from instituting a tort suit against an employer who has complied with the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and has not acted to deliberately cause the injury. Therefore, the only issues before us involve questions of statutory interpretation.

The proper interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law, and, thus, we review determinations by lower courts involving statutory construction non-deferentially. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452 , 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005); Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688 , 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004). With respect to statutory construction, we stated in Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Marcas, L.L.C., 415 Md. 676 , 4 A.3d 946 (2010): The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature.

A court’s primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny. ¹⁹ To ascertain the intent of the General Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute. If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction. We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with “forced or subtle interpretations” that limit or extend its application. We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.

Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute. We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope. Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.

In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense. ²⁰ Marcas, 415 Md. at 685-86 , 4 A.3d at 951 -52 (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274-76 , 987 A.2d 18, 28-29 (2010)). Regarding the Workers’ Compensation Act specifically, we have recognized that the Act is a remedial statute. Montgomery Cnty. v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 61 , 31 A.3d 191, 195 (2011); Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 724 , 882 A.2d 817, 821 (2005). This Court has held that the Act must be “ ‘construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.’ ” Deibler, 423 Md. at 61 , 31 A.3d at 195 (quoting Lagos, 388 Md. at 724 , 882 A.2d at 821 ); Harris v. Bd. of Educ., 375 Md. 21, 57 , 825 A.2d 365, 387 (2003).

Importantly, we have also noted that, in construing the provisions in the Act, we “may not stifle the plain meaning of the Act, or exceed its purposes, so that the injured worker may prevail.” Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 473 , 784 A.2d 569, 573 (2001). DISCUSSION I. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-518 Petitioners and Respondent disagree over the proper interpretation of Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-518. The statute, on its face, is ambiguous with regard to whether it provides for indemnification or immunity for county board of education employees. Thus, we look to the legislative history of the statute to determine the Legislature’s intent.

We also consider the statutory scheme as a whole so that our interpretation of a particular provision, in isolation, is not irrational or illogical. Additionally, similar to the analysis conducted by the Court of Special Appeals, we find it helpful to compare CJ § 5-518 to the MTCA and the LGTCA. Viewing the statute in this manner, we conclude that CJ § 5-518 contains an indemnification provision that allows for a negligence action to be brought against a county board of education employee and for a judgment to be entered against that negligent employee; however, the statute expressly provides ²¹ the circumstances under which an employee may not be held personally liable for damages. The statute also requires the county board of education to be joined as a party in the suit to satisfy any judgment entered against the employee.

Petitioners contend that CJ § 5-518 is an immunity statute that precludes any tort suit against a county board of education employee acting within the course and scope of employment, without malice or gross negligence. According to Petitioners, the purpose of CJ § 5-518 is “to limit liability for simple negligence solely against a county board of education [employee] and the lower court erred in not dismissing Mr. Iglehart with prejudice.” Petitioners assert that if the Legislature had intended to provide indemnity for county board of education employees, as opposed to immunity, there would be a clear indication of such an intention in the statute; in Petitioners’ view, because there is no express mention of “indemnification” in the statute, the Legislature clearly intended that county board of education employees receive immunity for their negligent acts committed in the course and scope of their employment. Additionally, Petitioners claim that the language and legislative history of Education Article § 4-106 support their position that CJ § 5-518(e), offering protection for county board of education employees, is an immunity provision. Petitioners also claim that the Court of Special Appeals improperly relied upon the MTCA and the LGTCA in its interpretation of CJ § 5-518, stating that “[t]he appellate court’s focus on statutory provisions that have no application to county boards of education to support its conclusion was neither necessary nor appropriate.” In contrast to Petitioners’ assertions, Respondent contends that CJ § 5-518 contains an indemnification provision that requires a county board of education to be joined in an action alleging negligence of its employee acting in the course and scope of employment.

According to Respondent, the reason for requiring a county board of education to be joined is to secure indemnification of the employee against any damages awarded to the injured party in the same action. Respondent claims that an interpretation of CJ § 5-518 allowing for ²² complete immunity from liability for county board of education employees is contrary to the plain language and meaning of the statute. Respondent reads the statute to mean that “although County Board employees can be held liable in tort for their negligent acts, the County Board of Education is responsible for the payrrient of such awards.” In other words, “the County [Board of Education] shall be joined as [it is] the party who will be responsible for the payment of any judgment levied against an employee who commits a tortious act without malice and gross negligence.” Several statutory provisions in the Education Article of the Maryland Code, discussing protection for county boards of education and county board employees, direct us to Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-518. Maryland Code (1957, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 4-105(d) of the Education Article provides, “[a] county board shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” Similarly, Md.Code (1985, 2008 Repl.

Vol.), § 4-106(a) of the Education Article provides, “[a] county board employee shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-518 of the Courts Article.” Md.Code (1990, 2006 RepLVol.), § 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: (a) (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. (2) “Compensation” does not include actual and necessary expenses that are incurred by a volunteer in connection with the services provided or duties performed by the volunteer for a county board of education, and that are reimbursed to the volunteer or otherwise paid. (3) “County board employee” means: (i) Any employee whose compensation is paid in whole or in part by a county board of education; or (ii) A student teacher. ²³ (4) “County board member” means a duly elected or appointed member of a county board of education. (5) “Volunteer” means an individual who, at the request of the county board and under its control and direction, provides services or performs duties for the county board without compensation.

(b) A county board of education, described under Title 4, Subtitle 1 of the Education Article, may raise the defense of sovereign immunity to any amount claimed above the limit of its insurance policy or, if self-insured or a member of a pool described under § 4—10A(c)(1)(ii) of the Education Article, above $100,000. (c) A county board of education may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity to any claim of $100,000 or less. (d) (1) The county board shall be joined as a party to an action against a county board employee, county board member, or volunteer that alleges damages resulting from a tortious act or omission committed by the employee in the scope of employment, by the county board member within the scope of the member’s authority, or by the volunteer within the scope of the volunteer’s services or duties. (2) The issue of whether the county board employee acted within the scope of employment may be litigated separately.

(3) The issue of whether the county board member acted within the scope of the member’s authority may be litigated separately. (4) The issue of whether the volunteer acted within the scope of the volunteer’s services or duties may be litigated separately. (e) A county board employee acting within the scope of employment, without malice and gross negligence, is not personally liable for damages resulting from a tortious act or omission for which a limitation of liability is provided for the county board under subsection (b) of this section, includ ²⁴ ing damages that exceed the limitation on the county-board’s liability. (f) (1) A county board member, acting within the scope of the member’s authority, without malice and gross negligence, is not personally liable for damages resulting from a tortious act or omission for which a limitation of liability is provided for the county board under subsection (b) of this section, including damages that exceed the limitation on the county board’s liability.

(2) In addition to the immunity provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection, a county board member is immune as an individual from civil liability for an act or omission if the member is acting: (i) Within the scope of the member’s authority; (ii) Without malice; and (iii) In a discretionary capacity. (g) (1) The provisions of this subsection apply only to a volunteer. (2) A volunteer who acts within the scope of the volunteer’s services or duties is not personally liable for damages resulting from a tortious act or omission beyond the limits of any personal insurance the volunteer may have unless: (i) The damages were the result of the volunteer’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle; or (ii) The damages were the result of the volunteer’s willful, wanton, malicious, reckless, or grossly negligent act or omission. (3) The limitations on liability contained in this subsection may not be construed or applied to affect any immunities from civil liability or defenses established by any other provision of the Code or available at common law to which the volunteer may be entitled.

(h) Except as provided in subsection (e), (f), or (g) of this section, a judgment in tort for damages against a county board employee acting within the scope of employment, a ²⁵ county board member acting within the scope of the member’s authority, or a volunteer acting within the scope of the volunteer’s services or duties shall be levied against the county board only and may not be executed against the county board employee, the county board member, or the volunteer personally. The statutory provision at issue, namely Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-518, is ambiguous with regard to the protection given to county board of education employees. A plain reading of the statute does not clarify, for us, the issue of whether the Legislature intended to afford immunity or indemnity to county board of education employees. Therefore, to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, we look to the legislative history of this statutory scheme.

We also read the statute as a whole, and in conjunction with the relevant provisions in the Education Article, so that our interpretation is not inconsistent or illogical. In 1978, Senate Bill 222 was signed into law, creating the Education Article (ED) of the Maryland Code.1978 Md. Laws, ch. 22. When originally enacted, ED § 4-105, governing the ability of County Boards of Education to raise the defense of sovereign immunity, included substantially the same language as the current statute. 1978 Md. Laws, ch. 22. In 1985, House Bill 940 created ED § 4-105.1, which contained provisions regarding protection for county board of education employees. 1985 Md. Laws, ch. 666.

House Bill 940 contained language in the purpose clause indicating the following: “requiring a county board of education to be joined in any tort claim against a county board of education employee; providing that certain issues may be tried separately in certain actions against a county board employee; providing that a county board employee is not liable for damages in certain situations; and generally relating to the tortious acts or omissions of employees of county boards of education.” 1985 Md. Laws, ch. 666. The language that appeared in former ED § 4-105.1 is the functional equivalent of the portion of current CJ § 5-518 addressing protection for county board of education employees. ²⁶ A letter submitted by Prince George’s County Public Schools in support of House Bill 940 stated, “This bill seeks to provide a needed protection for employees of public school systems by bringing them under the Board’s limit of liability provision.” A letter submitted by The Mayor’s Task Force for Liaison with the General Assembly claimed, “The essence of this bill is to provide indemnification of employees of county boards against damages for tort liability provided that the employee is acting within the scope of his employment and without malice or gross negligence.” Montgomery County submitted a statement in support of House Bill 940 expressing concerns about exposing local boards of education to liability for damages in excess of $100,000. The statement posited that “it was the intention of the General Assembly that the entity, Board of Education[,] and its employees both be covered by the $100,000 limitation of liability.” In its statement, Montgomery County representatives asserted that the statute’s “policy of indemnification” for county board of education employees “is good public policy and should not be discouraged.” In response to the statement, House Bill 940 was amended to include a provision that the statute did not waive sovereign immunity for local boards of education above $100,000. A Summary of Committee Report drafted by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee indicated that House Bill 940 was proposed to address the issue of board of education employees who are “fully exposed to tort liability without limit.” The Summary included the following language with regard to legislative intent behind the Bill: “The intent of House Bill 940 is to provide a needed protection for employees of public school systems by bringing them under the Board’s limit of liability provision and consolidating the employees^] position with that of the present position of the Boards of Education.” A Bill Analysis by the Committee Report System noted that House Bill 940 “[prohibits a judgment in tort from being executed against the county employee individually.” In 1990, House Bill 206 was signed into law, creating CJ § 5-353. 1990 Md. Laws, ch. 546.

Thereafter, much of the language in ED § 4-105.1 was moved to CJ § 5-353. In 1996, ²⁷ Senate Bill 11 was signed into law and redesignated ED § 4-105.1 as ED § 4-106. 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 10. In 1997, Senate Bill 114 renumbered CJ § 5-353 to its present codification at CJ § 5-518. 1997 Md. Laws, ch. 14. Today, ED §§ 4-105 and 4-106 direct the reader to CJ § 5-518 for an explanation of the protection given to county boards of education and county board of education employees.

The intent of the Legislature in enacting ED § 4-106 and CJ § 5-518 was to offer some protection from tort liability to county board of education employees. When these statutory provisions are read together, in their entirety, taking into consideration legislative history, it becomes clearer that the protection given to county board employees is in the form of indemnification, not complete immunity from liability. ED §§ 4-105 and 4-106 contain nearly identical language, indicating that CJ § 5-518 describes the “immunity from liability” given to county boards of education and county board employees, respectively. The immunity given to county boards of education under CJ § 5-518(c) is an immunity from damages in excess of $100,000.

The similar language and structure of ED § 4-105 and ED § 4-106 lead us to conclude that the protection given to county board of education employees is also an immunity from damages, which is distinct from the concept of complete immunity from liability. Petitioners argue that the protection given to county board employees is complete immunity that does not allow for a tort suit to be brought against a county board employee acting within the scope of employment without malice or gross negligence. In Petitioners’ view, CJ § 5-518 precludes not just recovery from such an employee, but the initiation of any tort action. The language in the statute does not support Petitioners’ interpretation.

Section 5-518(e) provides that “[a] county board employee acting within the scope of employment, without malice and gross negligence, is not personally liable far damages resulting from a tortious act or omission[.]” CJ § 5-518(e) (emphasis added). Section 5-518(h) discusses the process for entering “a judgment in tort for damages against a ²⁸ county board employee acting within the scope of employment!.]” CJ § 5-518(h). Subsection (h) further provides that such a judgment “shall be levied against the county board only and may not be executed against the county board employee!.]” The statute does not define the terms “levied” and “executed!.]” To determine the ordinary meanings of those words, we find it helpful to consult their dictionary definitions. See Montgomery Cnty. v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 67 , 31 A.3d 191, 198 (2011) (determining that “[a]lthough dictionary definitions do not provide dispositive resolutions of the meaning of statutory terms, it is proper to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for a term’s ordinary and popular meaning” (internal quotations omitted)).

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “levy” as “[t]o take or seize property in execution of a judgment!.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 927 (8th ed. 2004). The term “execute” is defined as “[t]o enforce and collect on (a monetary judgment)!.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 609 (8th ed. 2004). The import of these words, read in connection with CJ § 5-518(h), is that a judgment may be entered against a county board employee, but the collection of that judgment may be against the county board only. That interpretation is consistent with CJ § 5-518(e), which indicates that a county board employee is not personally hable for damages in tort.

Furthermore, CJ § 5-518(d) requires that a county board of education must be joined as a party to an action against a county board employee who has committed a tortious act or omission within the scope of his or her employment. If we interpret the statute as Petitioners suggest, a negligence action could not be brought against a county board employee, as the employee would be entitled to complete immunity from liability. It would be irrational for us to conclude that the statute requires a county board of education to be joined as a party to a suit that could never be filed. It is a more logical interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue to conclude that the statute allows a suit in tort to be brought against a county board employee, and if the employee ²⁹ was acting in the scope of his or her employment without malice or gross negligence, the county board must be joined as a party.

A judgment may then be entered against both the employee and the county board of education, but the judgment may be levied and executed against the county board of education only. We also find it useful to compare CJ § 5-518 to the MTCA and the LGTCA for guidance in the proper interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue. Prior to the enactment of the MTCA, “ ‘the State and its agencies could not be sued unless the General Assembly authorized suit and enabled State agencies to obtain funds necessary to satisfy judgments.’ ” Proctor v. Wash. Metro.

Area Transit Auth., 412 Md. 691, 711 , 990 A.2d 1048, 1059 (2010) (quoting Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 492 , 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993)). In 1981, the Legislature enacted the MTCA with the purpose of “ensuring] that an individual who is injured by the tortious conduct of the State or state employees has a remedy for his or her injury.” Proctor, 412 Md. at 710-11 , 990 A.2d at 1059 (citation omitted). The MTCA was intended to serve as a “ ‘gap-filler’ to waive the immunity of State agencies in tort when no other statute expressly waived the agency’s immunity.” Proctor, 412 Md. at 712 , 990 A.2d at 1060 . Md.Code (1985, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 12-105 of the State Government Article provides that “[s]tate personnel shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” Md. Code (1990, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: State personnel ... are immune from suit in courts of the State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the State or its units have waived immunity under Title 12, Subtitle 1 of the State Government Article, even if the damages exceed the limits of that waiver. ³⁰ In general, the MTCA “provides statutory immunity ‘to insulate State employees generally from tort liability if their actions are within the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence.’ ” Higginbotham v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n, 412 Md. 112, 130-31 , 985 A.2d 1183, 1193 (2009) (quoting Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 261 , 863 A.2d 297, 307 (2004)). Thus, “[w]here state personnel are negligent, the statute generally waives sovereign or governmental immunity and substitutes the liability of the State for the liability of the state employee committing the tort.” Menefee v. State, 417 Md. 740, 752 , 12 A.3d 153, 160 (2011) (internal quotation omitted). The immunity provided to State employees under the MTCA also encompasses immunity for constitutional torts and intentional torts.

Higginbotham, 412 Md. at 131 , 985 A.2d at 1193 . Prior to enactment of the LGTCA, “local governments enjoyed immunity from tort liability only with respect to non-constitutional torts based on activity classified as ‘governmental,’ and such immunity could be waived by the General Assembly or local enactments.” Rios v. Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 125 , 872 A.2d 1, 13 (2005). In 1987, the General Assembly enacted the LGTCA, 1987 Md. Laws, ch. 594, with the purpose of “affording] a remedy to those injured by acts of local government officers and employees, while ‘ensuring that the financial burden of compensation is carried by the local government ultimately responsible for the public officials’ acts.’” Rios, 386 Md. at 125-26 , 872 A.2d at 13 (quoting Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 108 , 660 A.2d 447, 466 (1995)). In general, “[t]he LGTCA limits liability, provides for indemnification, and establishes procedural requirements relating to suits against officials of local government employees.” Houghton v. Forrest, 412 Md. 578, 591 , 989 A.2d 223, 231 (2010).

Md.Code (1987, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 5-302(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person may not execute against an employee on a judgment rendered for tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment with a local government. ³¹ (2) (i) An employee shall be fully liable for all damages awarded in an action in which it is found that the employee acted with actual