Bond v. State

DEBORAH S. EYLER, Judge. In this case we must decide whether Richard Bond, the appellant, was in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), when three police officers entered his bedroom late at night and questioned him about a crime that had taken place a few hours before, and that witnesses said he had committed. In re-. sponding to the officers, the appellant made incriminating statements that ultimately were admitted into evidence by the State at his jury trial in the Circuit Court for Harford County, on charges of driving on a revoked license and failing to stop at the scene of an accident. After the appellant was found guilty on both counts, and was sentenced, he noted this appeal, contending that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the incriminating statements.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The central events in this case took place on the night of April 20, 2000. That evening, the appellant was on the parking lot of the Perryman YFW in Harford County. He approached the entertainment director of the facility, Lewis Fletcher, and asked him to have some people move their cars so he could maneuver his large, white tractor trailer out of the parking lot. Fletcher went inside the club and asked the disc jockey to make an announcement.

A short while later, a woman ran inside the club from the parking lot, reporting that she had heard a crash. Fletcher returned to the parking lot where he ²²³ encountered witnesses who said the appellant had driven his tractor trailer out of the parking lot and had struck two vehicles in the process. Fletcher found two damaged cars, both of which were green. One of the cars had white and black paint transfeired onto it.

Fletcher then called the police. Deputy Paul Neikirk responded to Fletcher’s call. At the suppression hearing in this case, Deputy Neikirk was the sole witness. The following facts are gleaned from his testimony at that hearing.

The call from Fletcher to the police came in at 10:29 p.m., and was a report of a hit and run accident at the Perryman VFW. Deputy Neikirk went to the scene and upon arriving spoke with several victims and witnesses, including Fletcher. He also inspected the damaged vehicles on the parking lot and took photographs of them. Some of the witnesses told Deputy Neikirk that the appellant had struck the vehicles as he was driving his tractor trailer off the parking lot.

Fletcher supplied Deputy Neikirk with the appellant’s name and the license tag number of his tractor trailer. Deputy Neikirk ran a driver’s license check and found an address for the appellant in Aberdeen. Deputy Neikirk and several other uniformed police officers then went to the appellant’s address, which was in a trailer park. They located the tractor trailer in a common area of the cul-de-sac near the appellant’s trailer home.

Deputy Neikirk inspected the tractor trailer and saw green paint transfer consistent with the damaged vehicles in the VFW parking lot. He also observed damage to both tires of the truck, also consistent with it having been involved in the collision. Deputy Neikirk took photographs of the damage to the tractor trailer. Deputy Neikirk, another deputy sheriff, and an Aberdeen police officer then went to the appellant’s trailer home and knocked on the door.

It is not clear precisely when this occurred; when asked whether they went to the appellant’s trailer before or after midnight, Deputy Neikirk responded that he could not remember. In any event, the officers ²²⁴ knocked on the appellant’s door either late on the same night as the incident or in the early morning hours of the next day. The appellant’s eleven year old nephew answered the door. Deputy Neikirk asked if the appellant was home, and the youth said he was in the bedroom.

Deputy Neikirk then asked whether he could speak to the appellant and the youth responded by letting the officers in the trailer and walking them back to the bedroom. The officers entered the doorway of the appellant’s bedroom, and the appellant sat up in bed. The bedroom was lighted when the officers entered, although Deputy Neikirk could not recall whether the light already was on or whether the appellant turned it on. The appellant was in bed with his shirt off.

He was not asleep. Deputy Neikirk identified himself and stood inside the doorway of the bedroom, at the foot of the bed. (The bedroom had one door.) The other officers stood one to the side of Deputy Neikirk and one-behind him. Deputy Neikirk told the appellant the officers were there “due to a hit and run accident that occurred at the Perryman VFW which [they were] advised that he was involved in.” At first, the appellant denied any knowledge of the incident.

The officers then said that witnesses at the scene had described the accident and had identified him as the driver. The officers also told the appellant about the damage they had observed to his tractor trailer. Eventually, the appellant admitted to having been present at the VFW parking lot that night and to driving away through the side lot of the establishment. He told the officers that if he hit any parked vehicles while exiting, he had not known it.

Throughout most of the period of questioning, the appellant remained in bed. According to Deputy Neikirk, at one point the appellant stood up to put on his shirt and perhaps a pair of pants; he then sat back down on the bed. The appellant and his nephew were the only people in the trailer. The appellant told the officers he was responsible for his nephew, and that the boy’s mother was at work.

Officer ²²⁵ Neikirk told the appellant he was going to bring charges against him but was not going to arrest him right then because there would be no place to put the nephew and the child was too young to be left alone. Deputy Neikirk and the other officers did not tell the appellant he was under arrest at the outset of the interview or as it was occurring. They did not advise the appellant of his Miranda rights, either orally or in writing, and did not tell him he was free to leave or did not have to speak with them. The appellant did not indicate that he wanted to leave and did not tell the officers he did not wish to hear what they had to say.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court denied the suppression motion, ruling as follows: Frankly, I have had this kind of a situation before. I think the last time I had it was a six year old who let the police in. In that situation the individual had no problem telling the police, using some expletives deleted, to get the blank out of his house at which point the police turned around and left the house. To decide whether this is a voluntary statement or not, whether this was custodial or not, the standard is to look at the totality of the circumstances.

There is nothing wrong about an eleven year old allowing the police in. I understand that I wouldn’t particularly care to be sitting in my bed and being interviewed by three policemen. But the testimony in this case is that the eleven year old let the policemen in, they went back and were investigating this incident, the lights were on in the bedroom, the Defendant is awake and sitting up in bed, he answers the questions, he doesn’t tell them to leave. Taking a look at all of this I do not see this as a custodial inteiTogation.

I do not see where Miranda is applicable and I don’t see anything that makes it involuntary. The Court will deny the motion. The appellant was tried by a jury and found guilty of driving on a revoked license and failing to stop at the scene of ²²⁶ an accident. The court sentenced him to a term of two years with all but one year suspended, for the driving while revoked conviction, and to a consecutive, suspended, sixty-day sentence for the failure to stop at the scene of an accident conviction.

The court also imposed four years’ probation, $1,500 in fines, and $250 in restitution. The appellant then noted a timely appeal. DISCUSSION The appellant contends that, on the undisputed facts as related by Deputy Neikirk at the suppression hearing, he was in custody, for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, when the officers questioned him in his bedroom, and therefore the officers were required to advise him of his rights. Because the incriminating statements he made were elicited without his having been advised of his rights, they should have been excluded from evidence, and it was error by the motion court to rule otherwise.

In advancing his contention, the appellant primarily relies on Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 , 89 S.Ct. 1095 , 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969). The State counters that Orozco is distinguishable, and that this Court’s decisions in Gantt v. State, 109 Md.App. 590 , 675 A.2d 581 (1996); Reynolds v. State, 88 Md.App. 197 , 594 A.2d 609 , aff'd, 327 Md. 494 , 610 A.2d 782 , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1054 , 113 S.Ct. 981 , 122 L.Ed.2d 134 (1993); and In re Shannon A., 60 Md.App. 399 , 483 A.2d 363 (1984), cert. denied, 302 Md. 570 , 489 A.2d 1129 (1985), support the motion court’s ruling in this case. It also argues that if the motion court erred, the error was harmless. Our review of a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence is limited to the record developed at the suppression hearing.

Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 84 , 771 A.2d 389 (2001). We consider the facts as found by the motion court and the reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the State, as the prevailing party. Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282 , 753 A.2d 519 (2000); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999). Issues ²²⁷ of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.

Cartnail, supra, at 282, 753 A.2d 519 . In addition, whether, on the facts as found by the motion court, or on the undisputed facts, the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, is a question of law. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (holding that on the facts as stipulated by the parties, the defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when he was questioned by the police). When the request to suppress evidence was based on an allegation of the violation of a constitutional right, we perform our own constitutional appraisal.

See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-99 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). In the landmark Miranda v. Arizona case, the Supreme Court held that an accused’s statement, made during “custodial interrogation,” may not be used against him at trial unless he first was advised of his right to remain silent, that any statement by him could be used against him in court, that he was entitled to the presence of an attorney, and that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him if he so desired. While the Court did not interpret the Fifth Amendment in reaching its decision, the objective of the decision was to guard the accused’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in a particular situation — “custodial interrogation” — that by its nature tends to compel self-incrimination. The Court sought to accomplish that goal pragmatically, by establishing as a procedural safeguard a rule of advisement or exclusion that must be employed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege, unless other fully effective means are adopted to do so.

Argueta v. State, 136 Md.App. 273, 279 , 764 A.2d 863 , cert. denied, 364 Md. 142 , 771 A.2d 1071 (2001). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the interaction between the three officers and the appellant was an interrogation. The dispute is over whether the appellant was “in custody” when the interrogation took place, and therefore, under the rule of Miranda, had to be advised of his rights for any statement elicited in the interrogation to be admissible into evidence. ²²⁸ In Miranda, the Court explained that a person is in custody either when he actually has been taken into custody by the police or there has been such a restriction on his freedom as to amount to being in custody. 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 . “In determining whether an individual was in custody [when he was questioned], a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a “formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ ” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977))). Accordingly, the issue of custody is to be decided under an objective standard, i.e., “how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

Furthermore, the decision whether the accused was in custody “depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, supra, at 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526 . Recently, in Argueta v. State, we explained, for purposes of Miranda: [C]ustody occurs if a suspect is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is being deprived or restricted of his freedom of action or movement under pressures of official authority. * * * The custody requirement of Miranda does not depend on the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer-interrogator but upon whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by such interrogation. 136 Md.App. at 283 , 764 A.2d 863 (quoting Myers v. State, 3 Md.App. 534, 537 , 240 A.2d 288 (1968) (quoting People v. ²²⁹ Hazel, 252 Cal.App.2d 412 , 60 Cal.Rptr. 437 (1967))). Factors relevant to whether a person was in custody when he was interrogated by the police include when and where the interrogation occurred, its length, the number of police officers present, what the officers and the suspect said and did, whether the suspect was physically restrained, whether there was a show of force, i.e., weapons drawn or a guard at the door, and whether the suspect was being questioned as a suspect or as a witness. Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 , 411 A.2d 415 (1980).

Events preceding and following the interrogation also are relevant to whether it was custodial: how the suspect got to the place of questioning, and whether he left freely thereafter or was detained or arrested. Id. These factors “may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning.” Id. See also Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 10 , 109 S.Ct. 205 , 102 L.Ed.2d 172 (1988) (noting that factors relevant to whether questioning amounts to “custodial interrogation” are the location of the interrogation, whether the suspect is sequestered or held incommunicado, the number of police officers present, and the duration of the interrogation).

In Orozco v. Texas, supra, 394 U.S. 324 , 89 S.Ct. 1095 , 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969), the Court addressed, for the first time, whether an accused individual was in custody, for purposes of Miranda, when he was interrogated by police officers in his home. In that case, witnesses reported that late on the night in question, the defendant shot the victim and killed him in the course of an argument. The defendant left the scene of the crime and returned to the boardinghouse where he was living, to sleep. At about 4 a.m., four police officers arrived at the boardinghouse and were let in by an unidentified woman.

They were told the defendant was asleep in his bedroom, and were shown where it was. The officers all entered the defendant’s bedroom, and began to question him. According to the officers, from the moment the defendant stated his name, he was not free to go where he pleased and was “under arrest.” Id. at 325, 89 S.Ct. 1095 . The defendant gave incriminating ²³⁰ answers to the officers’ questions.

At the defendant’s trial, he sought to exclude from evidence the statements he had made to the police, on the ground that he had not been given the Miranda advisements. The trial court denied his motion. A majority of the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant had been in custody when he was questioned by the police in his boardinghouse bedroom, and the statements he gave them therefore were not admissible into evidence because he had not been given his Miranda warnings. The majority explained: It is true that the Court did say in Miranda that “compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.” 384 U.S., at 461 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 .

But the opinion iterated and reiterated the absolute necessity for officers interrogating people “in custody” to give the described warnings. According to the officer’s testimony, [the defendant] was under arrest and not free to leave when he was questioned in his bedroom in the early hours of the morning. The Miranda opinion declared that the warnings were required when the person being interrogated was “in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U.S., at 477 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . (Emphasis supplied). 394 U.S. at 326-27 , 89 S.Ct. 1095 (internal citation omitted).

Two dissenters argued that the decision “carriefd] the rule of Miranda ... to a new and unwarranted extreme,” id. at 328, 89 S.Ct. 1095 , by applying it outside the stationhouse and in the familiar surroundings of a person’s home. Id. at 328-30 , 89 S.Ct. 1095 . The Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether a person questioned in his own home can be “in custody,” for purposes of Miranda, in Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 , 96 S.Ct. 1612 , 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). In