Boone v. AMERICAN MANUFACTURE'S MUT. INS. CO.

819 A.2d 1099 (2003) 150 Md. App. 201 Norma BOONE, et. vir. v. AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. No. 1772, Sept. Term, 2001. Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. March 26, 2003. ¹¹⁰⁰ Peter Max Zimmerman (Harry Goldman, Jr., and Goldman & Skeen, P.A. on the brief), Baltimore, for appellants.

Judith C. Ensor (Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, L.L.P. on the brief), Towson, for appellee. Argued before HOLLANDER, KRAUSER and THEODORE G. BLOOM (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ. HOLLANDER, Judge. This appeal has its roots in a vehicular accident involving Earl and Norma Boone, appellants, and Donald Sites, the "at fault" driver.

The case centers on the "underinsurance" provision of the Boones' automobile insurance policy. [1] Although the Boones obtained a monetary settlement from Sites's insurer for the maximum amount available under Sites's liability policy, they were of the view that their damages exceeded the amount of that settlement. Accordingly, they filed suit against their own insurer, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company ("American" or the "Insurer"), appellee, to recover underinsured motorist benefits. [2] Following a two-day trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, appellants counsel asked the jury to award the Boones damages of $150,000, while the Insurer's attorney requested an award of damages in the range of $12,000 to $25,000. The jury heeded American's request and awarded Ms. Boone $10,864.48 for medical expenses and $5,000 for past and future pain and suffering. No damages were awarded with respect to appellants' consortium claim.

Unhappy with the verdict, which appellants characterize as "shockingly low," the Boones unsuccessfully filed various post trial motions. Thereafter, they noted this appeal, in which they present the following six issues for our review: I. Whether the Court erred in failing to give Plaintiffs proposed instruction that Plaintiff's prior recovery against ¹¹⁰¹ the driver would be deducted from the jury's verdict and that the jury should therefore render a verdict for the full amount deemed fair and just, and not just an addition to whatever amount plaintiff had already recovered?

II

Whether the Court erred in failing to give Plaintiff's proposed pattern standard jury instructions on susceptibility to injury and aggravation of a pre-existing condition, where these issues were central to the trial, the examination of witnesses, and the final argument; and whether the Court was wrong to agree with Defendant's objection, based on an answer to interrogatory, where the pre-existing condition issue was explored in depositions, included in documentary production, was the subject of documentary stipulations on authenticity, and fully explored at trial without objection, until the argument on instructions?

III

Whether the Court, in the same vein, wrongfully excluded the York Memorial Hospital records of the earlier accident in 1996?

IV

Whether the Court wrongfully excluded Plaintiff's offer of Dr. Shepherd's [sic] medical records as business records, where there was an agreement of authenticity, and where defense counsel had selectively questioned Dr. Shepherd [sic] about them? V. Whether the Court wrongfully excluded the medical record of October 14, 1998, where questions asked by Defendants counsel on mobility on that visit opened up the subject and made it a fair subject of inquiry on redirect.

VI

Whether the court's illustration, by way of example in connection with its instruction on "mitigation" was prejudicially unfair? For the reasons that follow, we shall vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. FACTUAL SUMMARY On October 9, 1998, Norma Boone was a passenger in a pick up truck driven by her husband, Earl Boone. The Boones were traveling on York Road in northern Baltimore County when their vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle operated by Donald Sites.

The impact caused the Boones' truck to cross the center line and collide with an oncoming car. In addition, Ms. Boone was struck by a gun rack located behind her seat. Ms. Boone, who was 62 years of age at that time, was transported from the scene to York Memorial Hospital in York, Pennsylvania. She subsequently underwent a course of treatment for various injuries and eventually had shoulder surgery in June 2001.

As noted, Sites's liability insurer settled with appellants for the maximum amount available under his policy. [3] Through the Insurer, the Boones had uninsured/underinsured coverage of $100,000. Accordingly, they made a claim under their own policy to recover additional damages. Dissatisfied with American's position, the Boones filed suit against the Insurer on October 16, 2000, claiming breach of contract and loss of consortium. On or about January 5, 2001, American propounded a First Request for Production of Documents to appellants.

According to appellee, appellants produced documents responsive to the discovery request in "drips and drabs," as late as August 7, 2001, which was just prior to the trial that began on August 14, 2001. In January 2001, appellee also propounded interrogatories to appellants. Interrogatory No. 6, directed to both plaintiffs, ¹¹⁰² was the subject of much controversy at trial. It asked: If you contend that you suffered injuries and/or damages as a result of the occurrence alleged in the complaint, state with precision the nature of those injuries and/or damages and the nature of any present complaints, whether you contend the injuries are permanent, whether you had at any time either prior to or subsequent to the alleged incident ever injured those areas of your body (and, if so, under what circumstances) and whether you contend any previous injury or condition was aggravated by the occurrence alleged in the Complaint.

Approximately one month before trial, on or about July 12, 2001, appellants responded to the Interrogatories. In response to Interrogatory 6, appellants said: 1983 auto accident—knee and head, neck 1996 auto accident—left shoulder, soft tissue injury causing no bony abnormality 1998 auto accident—neck and left shoulder Appellee's Interrogatory 11 was also at issue at trial. It asked appellants whether they contended "that a previous injury or condition was aggravated by the occurrence for which this suit had been brought." In answer to Interrogatory 11, appellants expressly answered: "No such contention." Moreover, appellants never supplemented any of their answers to interrogatories. During voir dire, the court introduced appellee by name and set out to explain the concept of underinsurance coverage, stating: I'll explain that there is a concept in coverage, insurance coverage—some of you may be familiar with it—called under insurance so that when a claim is made under certain circumstances it does permit this case to proceed in the form that it is.

And that's what the defendant company is in this case for, what we call under insurance, but it's not something that should be of great interest to you except unless you've had some experience with what we call under insurance in the past. Has anyone had any such experience and, of course, has anyone had any contact for any reason with American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company? Ok. Now, I want to say at this point, I don't want to cause you to lose focus when I talk about insurance and all that business.

Your focus is solely upon what happened on that day, October 9, 1998, whose fault was it if anyone's? Was there injury to the Boones? If so, what it was and what the compensation should be? And that's all you have to be concerned about and that's all I ask you to be concerned about in this case.

After the jury was selected, the trial court gave a preliminary outline to the jurors with respect to how the trial would proceed. The court said: [Y]ou're looking to see if there was reasonable conduct in the operation of a motor vehicle [by Mr. Sites].... Was there fault, was there injury occasioned by that fault and what are the damages, if any, that you award for that fault or negligence as we sometimes call it. In his opening argument, appellants' attorney said, without objection: Mr. Sites' insurance which was paid is insufficient in our view to fully compensating [sic] her for this injury and she has a paid American Mutual Manufacturers Liability insurance policy with an under insurance clause so she has the right to bring a suit which, technically, is a breach of contract.

We say that American Mutual Liability isn't paying what it should because we've got damages more than Mr. Sites' policy. ¹¹⁰³ In her opening statement, appellee's counsel expressly conceded that there was "absolutely no question that Donald Sites was at fault for that accident." Therefore, she admonished the jurors not to "concern yourselves" with the issue of fault. Defense counsel also acknowledged that the accident was "pretty bad," and conceded that Ms. Boone injured her left shoulder. But, appellee's attorney explained that the disagreement was with regard to the amount of compensation: They are absolutely entitled to insurance coverage. They have purchased what's called under insured motorist protection.

That means, if they are in an accident where it is not their fault, where they are hit by someone else and they are not properly compensated, they are not sufficiently compensated, they have a right as [appellant's counsel] told you, they have a right to bring a law suit and seek money damages from their own insurance carrier, even though the accident was not my client's fault, certainly, even though my client has absolutely no affiliation with Mr. Sites at all. I've never even met the man. Doesn't matter. If they were not fairly compensated, they have a right to come to my company, my client, and ask for additional compensation.

That's what underinsured motorist protection is all about. Now, you don't need to concern yourselves with how much money they've already received. That's irrelevant for your purposes. What you have to do today and perhaps tomorrow, you have to decide the case before you fairly, impartially.

You have to decide what you think Ms. Boone's and perhaps Mr. Boone's, because I know they're making a claim for loss of consortium, what would fairly compensate them. Whatever that number is, my client is prepared to live with. At trial, the parties hotly disputed the extent of injuries that Ms. Boone suffered as a result of the accident in issue. The court restricted appellants to the precise information contained in their answers to interrogatories.

Appellants called Dr. Douglas Shepard, an orthopedic surgeon, as their first witness and their only expert. A graduate of Johns Hopkins University and Baylor College of Medicine, Dr. Shepard is a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon. He began to treat Ms. Boone for her injuries on November 20, 1998, upon referral by Dr. Eric Fisher, an internist. Dr. Fisher, who initially treated Ms. Boone after the accident, practiced in the same office as Dr. Shepard.

Dr. Shepard recounted Ms. Boone's history and course of treatment, noting that she was first seen by Dr. Fisher on October 14, 1998. Dr. Shepard explained from the medical notes that Dr. Fisher requested an orthopedic consult because "some of her pain, like in her lower back, got better but her shoulder [pain] persisted...." According to Dr. Shepard, Ms. Boone's "chief complaint" when he first saw her was pain in the side of her neck, radiating to the left "shoulder blade in the back and pain in these muscles ... between your shoulder blade and neck and that pain radiated down to ... the mid-part of the arm, and she had occasional numbness and tingling in the fingers." Initially, he arrived at three "impressions": "whip lash"; an inflammation of the trapezium muscle; and "subacromial impingement syndrome" or "pinching" of the "muscles that go from her shoulder blade to ... the rotator cuff...." Further diagnostic testing showed an inflamation and "partial fraying or tear" of the rotator cuff (i.e., muscle and tendon), and a torn glenoid labrum (cartilage). Because Ms. Boone's shoulder problem did not resolve, Dr. Shepard performed arthroscopic shoulder surgery, or "shoulder shaving," on Ms. Boone on June 25, ¹¹⁰⁴ 2001. The doctor opined that Ms. Boone was still impaired, post-operatively.

Further, he opined that, as a result of the accident of October 9, 1998, Ms. Boone suffered a 25% permanent disability to her "normal neck function," and a 30-35% permanent disability of the shoulder. The doctor testified on direct, in part: [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: Doctor, do you have an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical probability as to whether the conditions for which you operated on Ms. Boone in June of 2001 were causally related to the accident of October 9, 1998? [DR. SHEPARD]: Yes I do. [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: And what is your opinion please? [DR. SHEPARD]: My opinion is that her shoulder injury was related to the car accident—I mean, the motor vehicle accident and her neck problem was made worse by the car accident. [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: When you say made worse, what was it in the neck that was worse as a result of the injury she received in the motor vehicle accident? [DR.

SHEPARD]: Well, she had some arthritis demonstrated on her X-rays and she didn't have perfect neck function. It was only functional but the accident made her stiffness and loss of motion, pain and spasm in this area significantly worse and more constant. [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: Do you have an opinion, in other words, did that arthritis flared [sic] up and became aggravated as a result of the injury? [DR. SHEPARD]: That's my opinion. According to Dr. Shepard, on November 12, 1999, appellant completed a form for a medical visit with him, in which she was asked if she had ever had a prior injury to her body.

The doctor testified that appellant wrote that in "April, 1996 she jammed her left shoulder by catching a dash board with hands when we were hit at a stop light." At the conclusion of Dr. Shepard's direct testimony, appellants' counsel offered into evidence Dr. Shepard's medical records, reports, and notes pertaining to Ms. Boone, asserting that defense counsel had stipulated to their authenticity. The following colloquy ensued: [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: Just very quickly, Plaintiffs 6 are all the bills, 5A is the York Hospital, 5B is the complete chart including Dr. Shepard's notes, 5C is the physical therapy chart and 5D is the MRI and 5E is a follow up report. * * * [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I said I would stipulate to the bills. I didn't say I was going to let all this stuff come in.... I stipulated that it was genuine and that it was authentic and I specifically said in my letter that I reserve all rights with respect to admissibility. * * * [THE COURT]: The point is, you cannot use substantive medical reports and put them into evidence.

You know that, because he's testified to it.... [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: Well, his whole office char[t] is a record made and kept in the regular course of his profession. It's admissible under the business records statute. Further, appellants' attorney indicated that he had "cut" the doctors examination "short," which he would not have done if he had known that he would not be allowed to introduce the various medical records and reports. The trial judge inquired: "What have you not asked him about?" Appellants' lawyer responded: "Well ...

I didn't get all the complaints...." The ¹¹⁰⁵ trial judge said that he would allow appellants' counsel to reopen the examination of Dr. Shepard in order to elicit additional testimony that appellants felt was necessary. After a lengthy exchange with the court about the admissibility of certain medical records, appellants' counsel said that "there's another doctor in the office by the name of Fisher. I would like Fisher's notes in." The court refused to admit Dr. Fisher's notes, saying: "It's going from bad to worse." The court quipped: How about a doctor in Canada that we haven't heard of? Why don't we get those in too? [4] Shortly thereafter, the forelady of the jury posed a question to the court.

The following colloquy is noteworthy: [FORELADY]: We were wondering how long the couple had been insured with this insurance company for the under insurance policy. [THE COURT]: Well, we don't know the answer and I don't think we are going to know it in this case because it really is not an issue. [FORELADY]: Ok. [THE COURT]: I have to add. Were going to focus just on whether or not there's been injury to the person and caused by the negligence of someone else and if so, what damages if any? They're the only the [sic] question and I thank you very much for your good intentions. On cross-examination, the doctor was questioned about Ms. Boone's prior injuries to her neck and shoulder.

Dr. Shepard opined that the injury to Ms. Boone's rotator cuff was "clearly a result of the 1998 accident." Although the doctor could not rule out a tear to the glenoid labrum in 1996, when Ms. Boone was involved in another accident, he noted that Ms. Boone had not sought "medical attention" for it and it was "not symptomatic ... for two years." Therefore, he reasoned that any earlier problem was "either ... [a] minimal problem or not symptomatic." The doctor explained: [T]he 1998 accident made it painful enough that then she sought medical attention. A lot of people have arthritis in their neck and back. They will take an Advil and they do fine. They then get an injury and whatever was there pre-existent flares.

Then they seek medical attention. ¹¹⁰⁶ Although Dr. Shepard acknowledged that he had no idea whether Ms. Boone had sought any medical attention after the 1996 car accident, he maintained that the 1996 accident was "irrelevant" to "this patient's injury in this case." He said: "The findings at surgery are all relevant to this accident ... not the fact she hit a dash board two years ago to brace herself in a[n] accident." Defense counsel also discussed Ms. Boone's pre-existing condition by reference to portions of Dr. Shepard's records. For example, defense counsel asked about a letter of September 8, 1999, from Neil Novin, M.D. to Dr. Shepard, which mentioned a prior accident in which plaintiff's neck was injured, and sought an opinion as to whether there were "objective changes" due to an accident in 1998. Dr. Shepard agreed that, in his ratings of Ms. Boone's disabilities, he did not "take into account at all any prior injuries" to Ms. Boone's neck or shoulder. The following colloquy is relevant: [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: You specifically asked Ms. Boone if she had any prior injuries, didn't you Dr. Shepard? [DR.

SHEPARD]: Yes. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: And you asked her that when you saw her on November 20, 1998, right? [DR. SHEPARD]: Yes. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: And you specifically asked her about injuries to her neck or to her shoulder? [DR. SHEPARD]: Yes. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: And she told you that she hadn't had any, didn't [she] Doctor? [DR. SHEPARD]: Yes. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Now since then you found out that that's not true? [DR.

SHEPARD]: Yes. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: She has had prior injuries hasn't she Doctor? [DR. SHEPARD]: Yes. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: And she has, in fact, had prior injuries to her neck and to her left shoulder. Isn't that right? [DR. SHEPARD]: Yes. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: And, in fact, those are the same areas of her body about which she makes complaint in this law suit? [DR.

SHEPARD]: Yes. During the re-direct examination of Dr. Shepard, appellants unsuccessfully attempted to introduce into evidence Ms. Boone's medical records from York Memorial Hospital relating to treatment she received in connection with the 1996 accident. The court responded: "You want to try that case, too." Appellants' counsel explained: "[T]he point is, [defense counsel]... is trying to lay some of the blame for [the current injuries] on the 1996 injury...." Appellants' counsel argued that the 1996 hospital record showed only a "slight" injury and a "superficial examination." In her testimony, Ms. Boone attempted to discuss a hand injury that she allegedly suffered in the accident. The court sustained appellee's objection, stating: [Appellants' counsel] submitted for the first time in this case a hand injury as opposed to shoulder and arm and I have a rule that it is too late.

It was not referenced in the interrogatory answers. No. 6 (indiscernible), and therefore, it is simply too late as being the day of trial. Appellants' attorney later asked the court to "revisit" it's decision as to the hand injury, claiming the matter had been disclosed at Ms. Boone's deposition on August 2, 2001. The court said: Well, the issue is whether or not you were telling the Defense in discovery that you are claiming something that ¹¹⁰⁷ triggers the defense.

If you say you're claiming a hand deficit it causes the defense to become defensive, so to speak, and to perhaps look to that in greater depth in deposition. To look for medical substantiation. To contact an expert, perhaps, to question the medical experts about it, and all those things are tripped into action by the interrogatory answer which is very important in my view, because they are what you intend. So, putting it in reverse, silence on an issue; what you are claiming, right ear, left ear, left eye and no mention of the right eye.

And then here you say, oh, also the right eye. I think it's fair for a reasonable defense attorney to assume your silence means you are not claiming something. You said nothing about the right knee caps either, right? Ms. Boone also attempted to testify about a back injury she sustained in the accident involving Mr. Sites.

During her direct examination, in response to an inquiry regarding physical therapy, Ms. Boone stated: The first visit was an examination and just sort of a rub down and stretching. When he had pulled on my head and neck in that it took the weight off of my back. It just felt like my head was too heavy for the rest of me. When he pulled on me it eased the pain in my back and my neck so he decided on the second visit, besides the moist heat that they use, the heating pads, they would add traction to it to help straighten out the pain in my back because I was bruised and my entire back was swelled from where I had hit the seat.

Defense counsel immediately asked to approach the bench. In response to the court's inquiry as to the "problem," defense counsel said: "Your Honor, answer to interrogatory no. 6 is my problem. The woman claimed injury to her neck and her shoulder." The court then took a recess. The next day, during direct examination of Ms. Boone, her lawyer showed her a heating pad and asked if it was "the heating pad that [she] used." Ms. Boone responded that it was the heating pad "for the back," adding that she had another heating pad for her neck.

At that point, defense counsel asserted: "Your honor, the only damage that's being claimed in this case are to the neck and shoulder." Appellant's attorney objected to defense counsel's assertion in the jury's presence, which was sustained. Nevertheless, the following discussion ensued in the jury's presence: [COURT]: ... I think it's fair to tell the jury that the damages claimed here are limited to the neck and the shoulder and somewhat in the back. [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: Well, there were injuries to the back recorded at York Hospital about that. [COURT]: The same problem. It's neck and shoulder according to the interrogatory, correct? [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: That's always the— [COURT]: When I spoke about the back, I only refer to where the shoulder forms a part of the back.

That's all I met [sic]. But it's shoulder and neck ladies and gentlemen, and that's because that's the standard of this trial. And there is no other injury to be considered. On direct examination, Ms. Boone denied any use of a neck pad in regard to a prior accident that occurred in April 1996.

She also claimed "there were no treatments" with respect to the 1996 accident. The following colloquy from cross-examination is also relevant: [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: And your biggest complaint when you saw Dr. ¹¹⁰⁸ Fisher was a pain in your left shoulder, right? [MS. BOONE]: I think it was more than that. I wasn't walking upright at the time.

I couldn't straighten up. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Well, if Dr. Fishers note says you were walking fine, would you have a quarrel with that? [MS. BOONE]: Yes, I think I would. During the redirect examination of Ms. Boone, appellee's counsel again objected to appellants' attempt to show that Ms. Boone sustained an injury to her back as a result of the accident in issue, because it had not been disclosed in Ms. Boone's answers to interrogatories. The following colloquy is relevant: [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, may I please object?

The injuries in this case, the injuries claimed are to the neck and the shoulder. [Appellants' counsel] repeated [sic] brings up other injuries, other accidents, and it's just not fair [Y]our Honor. [THE COURT]: Yeah, there are no other injuries that's [sic] before this jury. Appellants' attorney insisted that "the first question that [defense] Counsel asked had to do with the mobility of [appellant's] back and the fact that she could walk well according to Dr. Fisher's note." Appellants' counsel then referred to "Dr. Fisher's note" of October 14, 1998, which he claimed was contrary to defense counsel's representation. Appellee's counsel objected to the admission of the note, and the following discussion transpired at the bench: [THE COURT]: The question is what is this piece of paper? [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: This is the record of Dr. Fisher to which Counsel referred on cross-examination [of Ms. Boone] on the first consultation. And [the defense attorney] said; you were moving your back well, you were walking well or something like that.

And it's completely contrary. [THE COURT]: So he did refer to it. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, he's not suppose [sic] to be talking about any injuries to the back.... There is no injury to the back. She can not make any complaints about injury to the back from this accident. [THE COURT]: Is this all about the back? [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: Exactly. It's all about the back, and her question was about the back. [THE COURT]: Well its too bad she didn't tell us about the back injury.

Maybe the next case. Appellants also introduced testimony of Officer Donovan, who investigated the 1998 accident. Prior to closing, plaintiffs counsel again sought to introduce the "actual hospital records" of Ms. Boone from "the various health care facilities." The judge excluded them, on the basis that "the jury has heard testimony live from a doctor and from Ms. Boone as to her treatment...." Appellee did not present any witnesses. At the end of trial, appellants requested the following jury instructions, among others: MPJI 10:3 SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INJURY The effect that an injury might have upon a particular person depends upon the susceptibility to injury of the plaintiff.

In other words, the fact that the injury would have been less serious if inflicted upon another person should not affect the amount of damages to which the plaintiff may be entitled. ¹¹⁰⁹ MPJI 10:4 AGGRAVATION OF PREVIOUS CONDITION A person who had a particular condition before the accident may be awarded damages for the aggravation or worsening of that condition. The following discussion ensued: [COURT]: What's the susceptibility to injury? Your [instructions] 9 and 10, aggravation? [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: Well, it's obvious that she had trouble to her neck which she admits ... [COURT]: You don't have any medical [evidence] here to support that. [APPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: That's exactly what Dr. Shepard said from the stand. [COURT]: Right. That it was—he did say that as to the neck, did he not?

At that point, defense counsel asserted that although the doctor had so stated, appellants did not claim any aggravation in their answers to appellee's interrogatories. Counsel for appellants then responded that appellee's lawyer "should have objected. It's too late." Later, appellants' lawyer reiterated that "the evidence [of aggravation] went in without objection." Appellants' attorney added: "Well, then you should have objected. It's too late.

We've been beaten about the head with that interrogatory [answer] and that interrogatory referred only to permanent injury...." Nevertheless, the judge agreed with the defense and declined to give the instructions requested by appellants concerning aggravation of a pre-existing condition. The Boones also requested that the court give their proposed jury instruction 7B, concerning underinsurance. The instruction stated: Members of the jury in finding a verdict for Mrs. Boone in this case, you are instructed that the amount which Mrs. Boone received from the underinsured driver, Mr. Sites, will be subtracted from the total amount of money which you award Mrs. Bone. In other words, there will be no double recovery by Mrs. Boone.

Appellants' counsel argued strenuously that the proposed underinsurance instruction was needed to avoid a misperception by the jury that appellants would obtain a "double recovery" or otherwise benefit from double-dipping. Citing Farley v. Allstate Insurance Co., 355 Md. 34 , 733 A.2d 1014 (1999), appellants claimed the case did not bar the court "from straightening the jury out." In urging the court to instruct the jury about underinsurance, appellants' counsel said: Judge, I can practically tell you right now that there are going to be people on that jury who think that my client is double dipping and she's getting