Bourne v. Center on Children, Inc.

JAMES R. EYLER, Judge. This case arises out of an employment dispute between Hayden Bourne, appellant, a former church pastor, and appel-lees, who are part of the Church of the Nazarene, an international Christian religious denomination (the Church). Hayden Bourne’s spouse, Rhonda L. Bourne, is also an appellant. 1 Appellees are the Washington District Church of the Nazarene, Inc. (Washington District Church), which employed appellant; Center on Children, Inc., a non-profit day care center associated with the Church (Center on Children); and Donald Allison (Reverend Allison) and Kenneth Mills (Dr. Mills), Church leaders and appellant’s former supervisors. In October of 2001, following a disagreement with Church leaders, appellant filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, claiming breach of employment contract, defamation, and false light.

The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of appellees, on the ground that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case based on First Amendment religious freedom provisions. On appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred because (1) the First Amendment does not bar litigation by or against a church on secular matters like contract and tort claims; (2) the appellees who are not churches are not protect ⁴⁶ ed by the First Amendment; and (3) summary judgment was not appropriate because there are material facts in dispute. We hold that the circuit court correctly interpreted First Amendment jurisprudence in ruling that appellant’s claims were barred for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Background on Church Organization Initially, it is helpful to understand the organization of the Church, so as to comprehend how each party became involved in this case. The Washington District Church is the regional supervisory body of the Church, overseeing the denomination’s churches, ministers, and ministries within the region, including Baltimore. The Lighthouse Community Church (LCC), where appellant was employed during the time in question, is located within the Washington District’s region. The Center on Children is a non-profit organization established to form a ministry of daycare centers affiliated with the Church.

Reverend Allison and Dr. Mills are both ordained ministers in the Church. Reverend Allison founded the Center on Children and served in numerous leadership roles with the Church, including president and CEO of the Center on Children and supervisory pastor at the Parkville Church of the Nazarene, where appellant briefly worked before he became pastor at the LCC. Additionally, Reverend Allison was appointed as a special liaison for the Washington District Church to handle matters associated with appellant once a problem arose. Dr. Mills served as the District Superintendent of the Washington District Church, overseeing all the churches and ministers within the district, including the LCC.

Dr. Mills also served on the board of directors of the Center on Children. Factual Background 2 3 Appellant is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, and he entered the United States in 1999 on a six month visitor’s ⁴⁷ visa. 3 Prior to coming to the United States, appellant was a licensed minister at several Nazarene churches in Trinidad and Tobago. In March of 1999, appellant attended a revival hosted by the Church in Washington, D.C., where he expressed interest in becoming involved in an urban ministry in Baltimore. Thereafter, appellant accepted an offer to organize and form a Nazarene church in Baltimore City.

Appellant’s mission to start a Baltimore City church was sponsored by the Parkville Church of the Nazarene (Parkville Church), located in Baltimore County and led by senior pastor Reverend Allison. Appellant began this mission by working as an assistant pastor at the Parkville Church. 4 As an assistant pastor, appellant spent the majority of his time in the Patterson Park Avenue area of Baltimore City, working to start a new church, which ultimately became the LCC. Reverend Allison acted as appellant’s pastoral supervisor while he was with the Parkville Church. Sometime after April of 2001, appellant ceased working at the Parkville Church and became the senior pastor of the ⁴⁸ LCC. 5 Prior to the founding of the LCC, the Center on Children purchased a number of buildings in the Patterson Park area and prepared them for use as a church and a daycare center.

One of these buildings was designated for use as the LCC’s pastor’s residence. At some point after he became senior pastor, appellant moved into this residence, and lived there without paying for rent or utilities. Appellant was a licensed minister with the Church, but he was not an “ordained” minister. Appellant applied for ordination in February of 2001.

Ordination is ultimately determined by the General Board of the Church of the Nazarene, after receiving the local district’s recommendation. 6 As part of the application process, the Washington District’s Board of Credentials (Board of Credentials) interviewed appellant. Dr. Mills is a member of the Board of Credentials, but Reverend Allison is not. Initially, the Board of Credentials was in favor of recommending appellant for ordination. In March or April of 2001, a member of the LCC complained to Reverend Allison concerning appellant’s ministerial style.

Reverend Allison discussed the complaint with Dr. Mills, who then advised the Board of Credentials of the complaint. Dr. Mills frequently received and dealt with such complaints, and he had the authority to investigate the matter. Choosing to do so informally, without the involvement of any board or church tribunal, Dr. Mills brought the matter to appellant’s attention. Upon hearing about the complaint, appellant became upset.

He was particularly displeased with Dr. Mills’s refusal to identify who had lodged the complaint against him. Appellant believed that, under the manual of the Church, he had a right to confront his accuser. Dr. Mills felt such confrontation was inappropriate in a small congregation ⁴⁹ and felt that the complaint in question was not significant enough to warrant such a confrontation. Dr. Mills was not initially concerned about the complaint lodged against appellant, as it was typical of complaints he received regarding other pastors.

He became concerned, however, as a result of appellant’s reaction to the situation. 7 Thereafter, the Board of Credentials decided that it was in appellant’s best interest to wait an additional year for ordination. During that year, the Board of Credentials recommended that appellant undergo counseling. Appellant rejected this recommendation, and by September of 2001, appellant’s relationship with Church leaders had significantly deteriorated. LCC’s secretary resigned because of complaints about appellant’s “dictator leadership.” Dr. Mills declared the LCC “a church in crisis,” meaning there was a moral, financial, or similar problem adversely affecting the ministry of the church.

On September 14, 2001, by letter, appellant was reassigned back to Trinidad, where he was a lawful citizen. Appellant declined this reassignment and stopped working for the Church altogether. He refused to vacate the pastor’s residence, however, which was still owned by the Center for Children, despite not performing any ministry or other activities for the LCC. 8 Appellant filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in October of 2001 and filed two amendments by ⁵⁰ interlineation soon thereafter. With regard to breach of contract, appellant claimed that appellees, individually and collectively, refused to honor their commitment to provide for his continued maintenance and support, in contravention of an alleged employment agreement.

Specifically, the Center on Children agreed to provide appellant the necessary support to regularize his immigration status, in exchange for appellant raising funds for the Center on Children and moving into the Center on Children’s property to renovate, repair, and provide security for the property. In an effort to force him to leave Baltimore, appellant claimed that appellees defamed him and published information about him that placed him in a false light. Specifically, appellant referenced a letter written by Reverend Allison on Center for Children stationary to various members of the Church containing defamatory statements concerning the status of appellant’s paid vacation time. Appellees thereafter filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to, among other things, constitutional religious freedom provisions.

That motion was initially denied because the court felt discovery was necessary to ascertain whether appellant’s claims were purely secular. On October 30, 2002, following the completion of discovery, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that discovery demonstrated clearly that appellant’s claims “inescapably involve the court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over a religious matter and not a ‘purely’ secular matter.” The circuit court agreed, and on December 30, 2002, entered an order for summary judgment in favor of appellees on all claims. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to amend or alter that judgment, which was denied. A timely appeal was filed.

Contentions of the Parties Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment because his secular ⁵¹ contract and tort claims are not barred by First Amendment religious protections. Furthermore, because the Center for Children and the two individual appellees are not churches, appellant argues that they are not protected by the First Amendment. Finally, appellant states that summary judgment was inappropriate because some facts remain in dispute. He sets forth no facts, material or otherwise, however, to support this assertion.

Appellees respond that the circuit court correctly acknowledged that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this lawsuit, as it necessarily involves the court’s review of church doctrine, discretion, and procedure. As this case is unavoidably and inextricably intertwined with the administration and governance of a religious organization, appellees argue the First Amendment bars it from government review. Finally, appellees argue, because jurisdiction is precluded as to appellant’s claims, appellant’s wife’s derivative suit for loss of consortium is likewise barred. Standard of Review “[A]n appellate court’s review of the grant of summary judgment involves the determination whether a dispute of material fact exists, and whether the trial court was legally correct.” Frederick Rd.

Ltd. Pshp. v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 93 , 756 A.2d 963 (2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Md. Rule 2-501 (providing that a court shall enter summary judgment in favor of the moving party if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and “the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). We must review the facts, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., DiGrazia v. County Executive for Montgomery County, 288 Md. 437, 445 , 418 A.2d 1191 (1980). Discussion Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment because the First ⁵² Amendment does not bar all litigation by or against a church.

Specifically, when the issues are secular questions of contract and tort law, as in the instant case, appellant contends that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, because several appellees are not churches, appellant argues, they should not be protected by the First Amendment religious freedom provisions. The test for determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim is “[i]f by that law which defines the authority of the court, a judicial body is given the power to render a judgment over that class of cases within which a particular one falls, then its action cannot be assailed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.” Engineering Mgmt. Servs. v. Md. State Highway Admin., 375 Md. 211, 242 , 825 A.2d 966 (2003).

In other words, “(sjubject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a case.” Grindstaff v. State, 57 Md.App. 412, 416 , 470 A.2d 809 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the instant case rests on a determination of whether the circuit court maintained the power to decide appellant’s contract and tort claims, even if they were intertwined with appellees’ right to First Amendment religious freedom. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const, amend. I. The First Amendment religious clauses are applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

See, e.g., Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 585 , 770 A.2d 111 (2001). Similarly, the Maryland Declaration of Rights contains a guarantee of the free exercise of religion. Md. Declaration of Rights, art. 36. In interpreting the First Amendment freedom of religion provision, the United States Supreme Court noted that religious organizations require “an independence from secular control or manipulation — in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church govern ⁵³ ment as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 , 73 S.Ct. 143 , 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952).

As a result, religious organizations must be allowed to select their own clergy, free from government interference. Id. Similarly, this Court has recognized that the First Amendment provides religious institutions with significant freedoms with regard to matters concerning “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 111 Md.App. 616, 622 , 683 A.2d 808 (1996) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 , 80 U.S. 679, 733 , 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871)). The purpose of this exclusion is to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.

Even where the dispute actually presented to the court is one that, if presented by any other set of litigants, would clearly be justiciable, if the resolution of that dispute between the litigants at hand would require the court to adjudicate matters of church doctrine or governance, or to second-guess ecclesiastical decisions made by a church body created to make those decisions, the matter falls outside the court’s authority. Downs, 111 Md.App. at 622 , 683 A.2d 808 (citations omitted). In Downs , this Court held that decisions regarding appointment and employment of a church minister must be left to the discretion of the religious organization, and it may not be second-guessed by a civil court. 111 Md.App. at 624-25 , 683 A.2d 808 .