Bowen v. City of Annapolis

GREENE, J. This is principally a case of statutory interpretation involving our construction of Section 3.36.150A1 of the Code of the City of Annapolis (“City Code”). 1 Fifty-nine retired police officers and firefighters for the City of Annapolis (“Petitioners”) challenge the City’s interpretation of Section 3.36.150A1 which would deny them increased pension benefits in tandem with raises given to their active duty counterparts. Each Petitioner had filed a separate claim with the City’s Director of Human Resources requesting a pension increase after the City modified the pay scale for active duty city employees. 2 ⁵⁹² When the Director denied their individual claims on the same basis, Petitioners and other retired employees collectively appealed to the City’s Civil Service Board. 3 Preliminarily, the Board decided it would not consider sixty-one of the sixty-two claims, finding the retired employees’ collective appeal improper under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23. 4 The Board then denied the only claim pending before it—that of Edgar A. Bowen, Jr. (“Bowen”)—on its merits. Thereafter, dissatisfied with the decisions of the Director of Human Resources and the Civil Service Board, Bowen and fifty-eight other retired employees filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and judgment in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Specifically, Petitioners requested that the Circuit Court make the following declaration, pursu ⁵⁹³ ant to Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 3-403 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article: a.

That pursuant to the “equalization provision” of the Code of the City of Annapolis § 3.36.150A1, plaintiffs are entitled to an increase in their pension payments equal to the percentage of pay scale increase received by active members of the same rank and years of service pursuant to the pay plans adopted by the City of Annapolis effective July 1,1995 and July 1, 2001 to implement the recommendations of the Yarger Study and the Hendricks Study; b. That plaintiffs are entitled to an adjustment in their pensions retroactive to July 1, 1995 and July 1, 2001, the dates that pay scales were increased for active members pursuant to Resolution R-26-95 and R-12-01 implementing the recommendations of the Yarger Study and the Hendricks Study. In addition, Petitioners sought a judgment “increasing their pensions both prospectively and retroactively pursuant to the ‘equalization provision’ of the City of Annapolis Code § 3.36.150A1 by a percentage increase equal to the pay scale increase received by active members of the Police and Fire Department pursuant to Resolution R-26-95 and R-12-01 implementing the recommendations of the Yarger Study and the Hendricks Study, [and] for interest on the retroactive payments.” The Circuit Court heard the matter and reversed the Board’s decision. The City noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

In a reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court held that the so-called “equalization provision” contained in Section 3.36.150A1 applied only to cost-of-living adjustments made in the active duty employees’ pay scale. City of Annapolis v. Bowen, 173 Md.App. 522, 537 , 920 A.2d 54, 63 (2007). On June 13, 2007, we granted Petitioners’ request for a writ of certiorari, Bowen v. Annapolis, 399 Md. 595 , 925 A.2d 634 (2007), to review the following three questions: ⁵⁹⁴ 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err as a matter of law by denying [Petitioners]’ motion to dismiss the City’s appeal, on the grounds that the Circuit Court’s review of the stipulated record of the Civil Service Board’s decision was an action in the nature of mandamus? 2.

Did the Court of Special Appeals and the Civil Service Board err as a matter of law by ruling that each [Petitioner] was not entitled to have his pension increased by the same percentage as the pay scale increases granted to active members of the Annapolis Police and Fire Departments who had the same rank and years of service as each [Petitioner], pursuant to Code § 3.36.150A1? 3. Did the Civil Service Board err as a matter of law when it summarily dismissed 61 of 62 grievance appeals of [Petitioners]? We answer questions two and three in the affirmative and question one in the negative; therefore, we shall affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. BACKGROUND I. Retirement System Like other cities across Maryland, the City of Annapolis maintains a retirement system for its police officers and fire fighters.

The retirement system is codified at Section 3.36 of the City Code. Of pertinent interest to this appeal is Section 3.36.150A, entitled “Cost-of-Living Adjustments,” which discusses, in part, the adjustment of retirement pension benefits for retired employees. It reads in pertinent part: The retirement pension benefits of any member, and the annuity benefits of any eligible survivor of a deceased member, shall be adjusted according to the following: A. For (1) any member hired prior to August 1, 1972, (2) any member hired on or after August 1, 1972 and prior to August 1, 1979 who does not elect to be covered by Section ⁵⁹⁵ 3.36.020(A)(11)(c)(ii) (pertaining to normal service retirement after twenty-five years of active service), and (3) the eligible survivors of a deceased member falling into category (1) or (2), the pension benefits for service retirement or disability retirement being paid to the member, or the annuity benefits being paid to eligible survivor(s) of such a deceased member, shall be adjusted according to the following: 1. Each retired member’s pension shall be increased by the same percentage as any increase in the pay scale for members of the same rank and years of service who are on active duty.

If no increase in the pay scale for members of the same rank and years of service who are on active duty is provided in the annual budget, then the member’s pension shall be increased, effective July 1st of that year, by such cost of living adjustment as the City Council, in its discretion, shall provide by resolution. If the member had elected to be covered under the normal service retirement benefit formula described in Section 3.36.040(A)(2), the annual adjustment to the member’s retirement benefit shall not exceed four percent of the amount of the annuity the member was receiving immediately before the date the adjustment is made. (Emphasis added.) II. Changes in the City’s Pay Scale Structure The City also retains a pay scale structure similar to many other governmental jurisdictions.

The pay scale is divided into a hierarchy of grades and, within each grade, a hierarchy of steps. In 1993, the City hired Yarger and Associates, Inc. to review salaries and job classifications within the City’s civil service structure and provide recommendations on a reclassification that would “make the City’s pay level reasonably comparable to the appropriate labor market pay levels.” The firm provided the City with a report (the “Yarger Study”) that ⁵⁹⁶ recommended that the City increase its current pay level by ten percent or two grades. In 1995, the City Council adopted the recommendations set forth in the Yarger Study. Annapolis, Md., Resolution No. R-26-95 (May 22, 1995).

As a result of this adoption, all active employees, including active duty police officers and fire fighters moved up two pay grades, but back two steps within the pay scale structure. This change left all active employees earning relatively the same salary as they were earning prior to the change. 5 The adoption of the Yarger Study, according to the City, resulted in employees receiving increased opportunities for “additional in-grade increases, through the merit system.” Under this plan, an active duty employee could receive an increase in pay equal to approximately five percent on his or her anniversary date of employment with the City if he/she achieved a “satisfactory rating” on a review from his or her superior(s). In addition, the City Council granted active City employees a two percent cost-of-living adjustment (“COLA”) or increase in their salaries. The City also granted retired employees, including Petitioners, a two percent COLA increase in their pension benefits.

Thereafter, in 2001, the City hired Hendricks and Associates, Inc., to conduct a subsequent review of the City’s job classifications and pay scale structure. The firm issued a report (“the Hendricks Study”) recommending an entirely new classification system. The Hendricks Study proposed compressing the then-current pay scale from forty grades to ⁵⁹⁷ twenty grades and compressing the number of steps within each grade from eleven to ten. The study also proposed increasing the increment between in-grade steps from 5 percent to 5.36 percent.

In addition, the Hendricks Study proposed the reassignment of all City positions to grades based upon job evaluations to be completed. The City Council adopted the proposed plan on June 11, 2001, to be effective on July 1, 2001. Annapolis, Md., Resolution No. R-12-01 (June 11, 2001). As a result of the adoption, “[ejmployees were placed in whatever step within a newly assigned grade [that] would bring them closest to, but not less than, 102% of their current salaries.” Employees were still eligible to receive merit-based salary increases on the “anniversary date” of their employment with the City.

In addition to the significant pay scale structure change for active duty City employees, the City Council awarded retired employees a two-percent COLA increase, effective July 1, 2001. Annapolis, Md., Resolution No. R-14-01 (June 11, 2001).

III

Petitioners Seek Increases in Pension Benefits From The City On October 1, 2002, Petitioners filed a “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Retroactive and Prospective Increases in Annuity Payments” in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In the complaint, Petitioners requested that the Circuit Court force the City to give Petitioners retroactive and prospective increases in their pension benefits in tandem with those salary increases given to their active duty counterparts. Upon a motion to dismiss filed by the City, the Circuit Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, finding that Petitioners had not exhausted their administrative remedies under the City Code. The Circuit Court found that the overall statutory scheme of the City Code and Charter, as well as the language of Section 3.36.170A, required that Petitioners first seek resolution of their pension disputes with the City’s Director of Human ⁵⁹⁸ Resources and then, if necessary, the City’s Civil Service Board.

Intending to follow the administrative procedures set forth in the City Code, on or about March 6, 2003, Bowen submitted a memorandum to the City’s Director of Human Resources requesting that his retirement pension benefits be increased. According to Bowen, he was entitled to an increase in pension benefits equal to the same increase in percentage given in 2001 to an active employee of the same rank and years of service as he was at his retirement. Sixty-one other retired employees, also believing that they were entitled to increases in pension benefits, filed individual claims with the Director of Human Resources requesting that their individual pension benefits be increased in tandem with the salary increases received by active duty police officers and firefighters. Some requested retroactive increases from the 1995 and 2001 changes in the pay scale structure; others requested only an increase from the 2001 change in the pay scale.

By individual letters dated July 29, 2003, the Director of Human Resources denied each Petitioner’s claim. By one letter dated August 27, 2003, Bowen and the other sixty-one retired employees appealed the decision of the Director of Human Resources to the City’s Civil Service Board. On October 8, 2003, the Civil Service Board held a hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, the City requested that the Civil Service Board “try each one of these individuals, these plaintiffs, separately.” The City contended that the August 27, 2003, collective appeal “was an improper joinder pursuant to the Federal Rules” for two reasons: one, “each member’s name and address is known to the plaintiff in this action, therefore the class is not too large which [sic] cannot be represented;” and, two, “there are specific fact-related claims that are involved,” including the differing years in service and rank of each retired employee.

The Board agreed with the City and determined that it would, at that time, “decide [ ] on a hearing involving Mr. Bowen only.” Upon conclusion of the hearing, the Board took the matter under advisement. ⁵⁹⁹ On or about January 16, 2004, the Board issued a written opinion denying Mr. Bowen’s appeal. The opinion stated in relevant part: [The Board] is persuaded by the consistent and uniform past practice of the City of Annapolis in the administration of the Plan over a span of many years; by its own empirical experience in the intent, structure and implementation of the reclassification studies; by the opinions of experienced experts which have considered and decided the issues under review; and by the argument of counsel for the City. Thus the Board is not inclined to reject this long-standing interpretation of Section 3.36.150A1 as articulated herein. There is no credible evidence in the record of an analytical, legislative, judicial, or administrative nature or of any precedent or pattern of past practice to demonstrate a nexus between the structural reclassification of positions pursuant to Chapter 3 subsection 3.12.050B of the Civil Service Administration provisions of the City Code and the subsection 3.36.150A1 “Cost-of-living” provisions of the POLICE AND FIRE RETIREMENT PLAN.

Thus, this Board cannot conclude that an intentional structural reclassification of on-going active duty positions within its salary structure under subsection 3.12.050B generates the unintentional consequences of an additional windfall cost-of-living adjustment to pension benefits for inactive ex-employees who have been retired from service for many years, under a separate unrelated Chapter of the Annapolis City Code. Thereafter, on February 9, 2004, fifty-nine retired employees filed a “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Retroactive and Prospective Increases in Annuity Payments” in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. 6 On June 17, 2004, the parties filed a joint stipulation indicating the issues they wished the Circuit Court to review. Cross- ⁶⁰⁰ motions for summary judgment were then filed. The Circuit Court held a hearing on the motions on February 28, 2005.

On December 23, 2005, the Circuit Court issued its written opinion, reversing the Board’s decision and remanding the case back to the Civil Service Board for further proceedings. The Circuit Court held that the Board’s interpretation of Section 3.36.150A1 was erroneous. According to the court, the City Code required Petitioners’ pensions to be increased in tandem with increases given to their active duty counterparts. The Circuit Court stated in its written opinion: The plain meaning of the statute in the case at bar is clear and unambiguous, dictating that retirees are entitled to “any increase in the pay scale for members of the same rank and years of service who are on active duty.” (Emphasis added.) There is no other way to interpret this sentence but that the retirees are entitled to increases such as those from the Yarger and Hendricks studies.

The statute even provides an alternative method for an increase in retirees’ pension, by providing that the City Council may pass a resolution to increase the retirees’ pension, in the event no increase in the pay scale of active members was given in á particular year. An increase in pension to which retirees are entitled is not limited by the second sentence of the ordinance, which allows a cost of living increase by resolution, but rather, the cost of living increase by resolution is an alternative method whereby retirees may still receive an annual pension increase, despite there being no increase in the pay scale for active members. Furthermore, the common and everyday meaning of the word “any” does not imply limitation unless the author or speaker explicitly indicates, “any, but” or “any, except.” In this situation, no such indication is made in the Code that “any” pay scale increase depends on the purpose for which it is given to the active duty members. The Circuit Court also held that the Board’s decision to consider only Mr. Bowen’s claim at the October 8, 2003 hearing was erroneous as a matter of law.

The Circuit Court then disposed of the case by a written order stating: ⁶⁰¹ In accordance with the foregoing memorandum opinion, and upon consideration of the arguments of the parties and the record from the administrative agency below, it is on this 23rd day of December, 2005, by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, ORDERED, that the decision of the Civil Service Board of the City of Annapolis be and hereby is REVERSED; and it is further, ORDERED, that the case be and hereby is REMANDED to the Annapolis City [sic] Service Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The City noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In a reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, holding that what had been referred to as the “equalization clause” of Section 3.36.150A 1 applied only to discretionary cost-of-living adjustments granted by the City Council. Bowen, 173 Md. App. at 537 , 920 A.2d at 63 .

Prior to reaching the merits of the appeal, however, the court denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, wherein Petitioners argued that the intermediate appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the City Code did not provide a right to appeal the Circuit Court’s review of a local administrative decision. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 530-35 , 920 A.2d at 59-62 . The court held that Petitioners’ complaint in the Circuit Court “was in substance an action for a writ of mandamus,” which is subject to review by the state appellate courts. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 534 , 920 A.2d at 61 .

We granted Petitioners’ request for certiorari. DISCUSSION I. The Court of Special Appeals’ Denial of Petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss Petitioners first contend that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it failed to grant their motion to dismiss. ⁶⁰² In their motion before the intermediate appellate court, Petitioners argued that the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the City’s appeal because, under Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, an aggrieved party may not seek appellate review of a circuit court’s decision when that decision was made in the exercise of the circuit court’s appellate jurisdiction. Petitioners contended that the Circuit Court undertook an appellate review of the Civil Service Board’s decision because Section 3.36.150F explicitly provides for judicial review of a Civil Service Board decision. Petitioners then asserted that the City is not permitted to seek appellate relief in the Court of Special Appeals because the City Code does not provide such a right to an aggrieved party.

In rejecting Petitioners’ argument and denying their motion, the Court of Special Appeals held that the City could appeal the Circuit Court’s judgment because the Circuit Court’s review of the Civil Service Board was by way of a writ of mandamus filed by Petitioners. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 532-34 , 920 A.2d at 60-62 . The court first dismissed Petitioners’ argument that Section 3.16.150F, which permits an appeal to the Circuit Court, applies to the instant case. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 532 , 920 A.2d at 60 .

The court held that the plain language of Section 3.16.150 discloses that it only applies to “permanent status employees” and “their right to contest adverse disciplinary actions first before the City’s Civil Service Board and then before the [Circuit Court for] Anne Arundel.” Id. The intermediate appellate court stated: “[N]either [Section] 3.16.150 nor any of its subsections, including [Section] 3.16.150F, have any bearing whatsoever on police or fire retirees or their pension benefit claims.” Id. The court then explained that “the [C]ircuit [C]ourt has the authority to review the Board’s decision pursuant to a complaint for a writ of mandamus,” which it found to be the essence of Petitioners’ complaint. Id.

Petitioners argue, in this Court, that the Court of Special Appeals’ denial was in error because “an appellate right is entirely statutory in origin, [so that] no appeal may be prose ⁶⁰³ cuted unless the right is conferred by statute.” Petitioners further assert that because Section 3.16.150F expressly authorizes only a circuit court’s review of the decision of the Civil Service Board, the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the instant case. The City asserts that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in denying the motion to dismiss because the Circuit Court was not exercising appellate jurisdiction when it reviewed the Civil Service Board’s decision. Rather than a petition for judicial review, the City contends that the complaint filed by Petitioners was substantively a common law writ of mandamus, which is subject to appellate review. The City maintains that the complaint could not have been a petition for judicial review because the City Code does not provide a statutory right to appeal to the Circuit Court for retired employees who have been aggrieved by a decision of the Civil Service Board.

The City takes issue with Petitioners’ view that Section 3.16.150F provides a right to appeal, arguing that the express words of Section 3.16.150A limit the applicability of the appeal provisions of Section 3.16.150, including Subsection F, to “permanent status civil service employees,” which Petitioners are not. The City contends that because the appeal provisions of Section 3.16.150 do not apply to retired employees, and because there are no other applicable City Code sections pertaining to appeals before the Civil Service Board, “there [could have been] no statutory authorization for an appeal to the circuit court for judicial review of the Civil Service Board’s decision.” Therefore, the City asserts, “[t]he only basis for circuit court jurisdiction was the ‘inherent power to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable,’ ” which is undertaken by the circuit court through a writ of mandamus filed by the aggrieved party. We hold that the Court of Specials Appeals did not err in denying Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. While we reach the same end result, we disagree with the Court of Special Appeals’ labeling of Petitioners’ complaint as a common law writ of mandamus.

Petitioners’ complaint clearly and explicitly ⁶⁰⁴ requests both declaratory and injunctive relief from the Circuit Court. We explain. Section 3.16.150 of the City Code states: A. A permanent status civil service employee may appeal to the Civil Service Board a disciplinary action consisting of a suspension without pay of any length, demotion or dismissal. Intolerable working conditions, administrative leave without pay pursuant to Section 3.16.120(E) and other complaints enumerated in the civil service rules may also be appealed to the Civil Service Board by permanent status employees.

B. An aggrieved employee shall file an appeal with the Civil Service Board not later than five working days after the date of notice of the disciplinary action under Section 3.16.120(D). If the employee files a timely request for an informal hearing under Section 3.16.120(F), the appeal with the Civil Service Board shall be filed not later than five working days after the date of the appointing authority’s reply under that section. The employee’s right to an appeal to the Civil Service Board shall be waived if not timely filed. If the employee files a timely request for a Civil Service Board hearing pursuant to this section, the imposition of discipline shall be suspended pending the decision of the board.

Leave pursuant to Section 3.16.120(E) shall not be suspended pending the decision of the board. C. The Civil Service Board shall schedule a hearing within a reasonable time not exceeding forty-five days following the date the appeal was filed. The hearing shall be open to the general public. The employee may be represented by counsel, present witnesses in the employee’s behalf and examine and cross-examine all witnesses.

During the course of any investigation or hearing the Civil Service Board may request any employee of the City to give testimony. Notwithstanding any provision of the Charter or this code authorizing the City Attorney to serve as legal counsel to the Civil Service Board, in contested cases before the board, the City Attorney shall represent the interest of ⁶⁰⁵ the City and the appointing authority and shall not render legal advice to the board. D. The Civil Service Board shall issue a written decision within forty-five days after the conclusion of the hearing. If the Civil Service Board finds that the action of the appointing authority was in error, contrary to the personnel provisions of this code, or that the appointing authority failed to follow the proper procedure, the Civil Service Board may reverse or modify the action and, if appropriate, may order reinstatement of the employee with or without loss of pay.

Decisions of the Civil Service Board on all appeals shall be in writing, shall contain the reasons for the decision, and are final. E. A failure by the appointing authority or the Civil Service Board to timely conduct a hearing or to timely issue a determination following a hearing shall not constitute a basis to reverse or modify any disciplinary action taken pursuant to this chapter. F. A party aggrieved by a decision of the Civil Service Board made pursuant to this section may appeal that decision to the circuit court for Anne Arundel County pursuant to Maryland Rule Title 7, Chapter 200 or its successor. For purposes of this subsection, an employee shall be considered “aggrieved by a decision of the Civil Service Board” if and only if the decision is to suspend the employee for thirty or more consecutive days, to demote or to dismiss the employee.

An appeal under this section must be taken within thirty days of the date of the decision appealed and shall be the exclusive remedy of the aggrieved party from that decision. It is clear from the plain language of the City Code that the provisions of Section 3.16.150 do not apply to the instant case. 7 The plain language of Section 3.16.150A limits the applicability ⁶⁰⁶ of these appeal provisions, including the right to seek judicial review of the Civil Service Board’s decision in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, solely to “permanent status civil service employees.” A prior section of the Code, Section 3,04.010, defines “employee,” as “the person employed to perform the work of a position.” This section also defines “permanent status” as “the status given to a civil service employee who has successfully completed the probation period.” There is no dispute that Petitioners are non-active, retired persons. As such, they are no longer employed by the City to perform the work of any position; therefore, Petitioners cannot be considered “permanent status employees” and Section 3.16.150F cannot apply to Petitioners’ claims. In addition, Chapter 3.36, entitled “Police and Fire Retirement,” provides no authorization for “retired members” to seek a direct review of the Civil Service Board’s decision in the Court of Special Appeals or even the Circuit Court.

In the absence of a statutory authorization for judicial review of this administrative proceeding, the Circuit Court could have only acted on Petitioners’ complaint to review the Civil Service Board’s actions by way of a common law or equity writ (e.g., mandamus, injunction, certiorari, or declaratory judgment). Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 296 , 884 A.2d 1171, 1203 (2005); Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500-01 , 331 A.2d 55, 65 (1975). In the case sub judice, the Court of Special Appeals held that the complaint was “in essence an action for a writ of mandamus,” explaining that the complaint “specifically requested that the court direct [the City] to pay [Petitioners] all prospective and retroactive increases in their pension payments that they ⁶⁰⁷ believed were due to them pursuant to [Section] 3.36.150A1.” Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 534-35 , 920 A.2d at 61 . Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner’s complaint was in the nature of a writ of mandamus, the complaint, nonetheless, specifically sought other relief.

Indeed, the complaint is titled “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Retroactive and Prospective Increases in Annuity Payments” and clearly and explicitly requests both declaratory and injunctive relief from the Circuit Court. The difference in the labeling of the subject matter of the complaint, whether as a writ of mandamus or a declaratory judgment or a request for injunctive relief, results in no change to the outcome of Court of Special Appeals’ decision. The Court of Special Appeals was correct in holding that it had the jurisdiction to review the Circuit Court judgment as, under our jurisprudence, actions for declaratory and injunctive relief filed in the Circuit Court are reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219 , 932 A.2d 571 (2007); Baltimore Imp.

Car Serv. & Storage, Inc. v. Maryland Port Auth., 258 Md. 335 , 265 A.2d 866 (1970). Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals’ denial of Petitioners’ motion to dismiss was proper.

II

The Circuit Court’s Failure To Enter A Declaratory Judgment Before reaching the substantive issues of this case, we must first address an important procedural matter. This case came before this Court, in part, as an appeal of a declaratory action. In issuing its written opinion on or about December 23, 2005, the Circuit Court disposed of the case by stating: In accordance with the foregoing memorandum opinion, and upon consideration of the arguments of the parties and the record from the administrative agency below, it is on this 23rd day of December, 2005, by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, ORDERED, that the decision of the Civil Service Board of the City of Annapolis be and hereby is REVERSED; and it is further, ⁶⁰⁸ ORDERED, that the ease be and hereby is REMANDED to the Annapolis City [sic] Service Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We hold the Circuit Court failed to enter a written declaration of the rights of the parties, as required by Maryland law.

This Court, on numerous occasions, has reiterated that “whether a declaratory judgment action is decided for or against the plaintiff, there should be a declaration in the judgment or decree defining the rights of the parties under the issues made.” Case v. Comptroller, 219 Md. 282, 288 , 149 A.2d 6, 9 (1959); accord Bushey v. Northern Assurance Company of America, 362 Md. 626, 651 , 766 A.2d 598, 611 (2001); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 87 , 660 A.2d 447, 455 (1995); Christ v. Maryland Dep’t of Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 436 , 644 A.2d 34, 38 (1994). To do otherwise, we have held is error. See Ashton, 339 Md. at 87 , 660 A.2d at 455 , and cases cited therein. In Allstate Ins.

Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 363 Md. 106 , 117 n. 1, 767 A.2d 831 , 837 n. 1 (2001), we explained this requirement further: [W]hen a declaratory judgment