Bowie v. Evening News

Oeeftt, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On' October 20th, 1924, the following article' was published in the several editions of the Baltimore News, a newspaper published in the city of Baltimore: “Special Dispatch to the News., Annapolis, Oct. 20. — Corruption in official circles of Annapolis and ⁵⁷¹ Anne Arundel County was strongly hinted at by Judge Kobert Moss of the circuit court in Ms charge to the grand jury this morning. The judge’s charge also included a stinging rebuke to Sheriff Bowie of the county. After declaring the increase of bootlegging was a disgrace to the county, Judge Moss said a clean up of conditions was in order.

He referred to Garfield Chase (colored), who was employed as a ‘stool pigeon’ by the sheriff’s office in running down bootlegs, and said repeated attempts to tamper with Chase and make him useless ás a state’s witness had been made. He blamed Sheriff Bowie for permitting these attempts and intimated that a member of the city police force was responsible for them. The court insisted that Chase he indicted either for bootlegging or for perjury, and urged the jury to go to the bottom of the plot to save those against whom Chase was to testify.” The text of the article was the same in each of the editions, but the headlines describing it varied; in the “Home Einal” edition the headlines were as. follows: “Jurist Hints at 'Scandal in Anne Arundel. Scandal in A. A. County'is Scented.

Increase of Bootlegging is called Disgrace in Charge to Jury.” In the “Financial” edition they were in this form: “County Scandal. Hinted. Scandal in A. A. County is Hinted. Increase of Bootlegging is called Disgrace in -Charge to Jury”; and in the “Peach” and “Night” editions they were identical and in this form: “Jurist Kebuke-s Anne Arundel Sheriff.

Sheriff is rebuked by Judge, Increase of Bootlegging is Called Disgrace in Charge of Jury,” except that in the “Night” edition, the concluding lines read “Increase of Bootlegging is Called a Disgrace in Charge to Jury” instead of “Increase of Bootlegging is Called Disgrace in Charge of Jury,” as they appeared in the “Peach” edition. Following these publications, the appellant, who is the John Bowie- mentioned in the article, brought this action in the Superior Court of Baltimore- City, against the- ap-pellees., and successively filed therein four complete declarations, ret ⁵⁷² ferred to as the original, and the first, second and third ■amended declarations. Demurrers were filed hy the defendants and sustained by the court to each of those declarations, and after the demurrer to the third amended declaration had been sustained, a judgment for the defendants for costs was entered, and from that judgment this appeal was taken. The principal questions which the appeal presents are, first, whether, assuming, as we must upon the demurr&r, that Judge Moss never made the -statements imputed to him by the article, and assuming that the statements wére moreover false and malicious, are they actionable, and second, if they are, does any one of the four counts of the- ncurr. properly state a cause of action.

The first question is -one of -substantive law, the second one of pleading. Before 'attempting to- analyze the alleged libelous publication, in -connection with the first -of these questions, we will refer briefly to- the legal principles applicable to- eases of this character, as they have been stated and applied in this Court. It may be stated generally that the right of the individual citizen to rest secure in the possession of his good name, fame and reputation is a valuable privilege, of which no- one may deprive him through falsehood and malice without liability io him for the injury. In theory that principle is practically universally recognized, but its -application to the facts of particular -eases has -often been so forced, unnatural, and confused, that it has become exceedingly difficult to formulate any general-rule for its application which will afford the citizen adequate protection in the enjoyment of a privilege, and a right which are concqdely his.

Nowhere are the general principles of the law of libel as recognized in this- State more clearly or accurately -stated than in the case of Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158 , where the question before the Court wa-s whether the publication of a charge intimating that a state senator had sold his vote for private gain was libelous per se. In considering that question the Court said: “It can hardly be necessary to say that ⁵⁷³ sucli charges as these, against the official conduct of the plaintiff, and the imputation of the base and sordid motives by which such conduct was governed, were calculated to- injure his reputation and expose him to the contempt of all honorable men. Independent altogether of the innuendoes, the article on its face shows that these charges were made against the plaintiff, and we have no hesitation, therefore, in saying that the publication is in itself libellous. * * * No one denies the right of the defendants to discuss and criticise boldly and fearlessly the official conduct of the plaintiff. It is a right, which, in every free- country belongs to the citizen, and the exercise of it, within lawful and proper limits, affords some protection at least against official abuse and corruption.

But there is a, broad distinction between fair and legitimate discussion in regard to the conduct of a public man, and tbe imputation of corrupt motives-, by which that conduct may be supposed to be governed. And if one goes out of his way to asperse the personal character of a public man, and to ascribe to him base and corrupt motives, he must do so- at his peril; and must either prove the truth of what he- says, or answer in damages to the- party injured.” In Shepherd v. Baer, 96 Md. 152 ; and in Kilgour v. Evening Star, 96 Md. 16 , these principles were restated and approved. In the case last cited the plaintiff was the State’s Attorney -o-f Montgomery County, and the publication complained of charged that he had ordered the release of a colored woman who was under arrest on some- charge growing out -of the. death of a negro baby, and that “this action of the State’s Attorney produced mingled feelings of indignation and resentment on the part of white and colored residents; also- what Mr. Thompson had to s-ay about it, to- the effect, that ‘he denounced it as an outrage on Kilgo-ur5s part’; had it been a white- man who was charged etc., he would in all probability have been strung up to one of the trees etc., and that he intended ‘to leave- no stone unturned to sift the whole- affair’; and, further that the justice of the peace expressed ‘similar views’ etc * * *. In the opening sentences of the publication, it is stated that ⁵⁷⁴ many prominent citizens were greatly agitated, ‘on account of the alleged 'stifling by the State’s Attorney of an investigation of the mysterious death etc.’ ” To- quote from the opinion, there was nothing in that charge which “imputes corrupt motives to the appellant, or that he prevented any inquiry into the death of the child, or that he did anything ‘by malfeasance in the discharge of his official duties.’ ” In Weeks v. News Publishing Company, 117 Md. 130 , in connection with an elaborate review of the authorities, that principle was again approved and restated, as it was also1 in Goldsborough v. Orem, 103 Md. 681 , and Stannard v. Gibbs, 118 Md. 151 .

While these cases all recognize the principle tli at no one may by falsely and maliciously defaming him deprive another of his good name without liability, it is nevertheless often difficult to determine just what amounts to actionable defamation. It has been said that there is no definition of the term “libel” sufficiently comprehensive to include all eases, and a very great number of instances in which attempts have been made to define it, collected in note 44a, 36 O. J. 1143, illustrate the force of that comment. There is, however, a distinction between oral and written or printed defamation, and “the presumption that words are defamatory arises much more readily in cases of libel than in eases of slander.” Ibid. 1152. And the courts seem to be in general accord at least upon this, that any unprivileged, false, and malicious publication which by printing, writing, signs or pictures tends to expose a person to public scorn, hatred, contempt, or ridicule, constitutes an actionable libel. 36 C. J. 1145 etc. And in determining whether an alleged defamatory statement is to be given that effect the whole publication is to be considered and it is not necessary that the supposed defamatory charge be made directly; it is sufficient if it may naturally be implied and understood according to the common and ordinary meaning given to the words in the sense in which they are used by people generally.

Ibid. 1154. Reverting to the question immediately before us, it ap ⁵⁷⁵ pears that no special damages are charged in any one of the four counts of the third amended declaration which, under the case of Ellinger v. Baltimore City, 96 Md. 698 et seq., is the only one which we can consider on this appeal. And since general damages cannot he recovered for a libel actionable per quod (36 C. J. 1150) it follows that if the alleged defamatory publication is actionable at all, it must be actionable per se. Kilgour v. Evening News Company, 96 Md. 16 ; 36 C. J. 1151.

It has been said that words actionable per se require1 m> innuendo to make their1 defamatory nature apparent, and words, which do require such an innuendo are not actionable per se. 36 C. J. 1151. And while that role has not been stated in that precise form in tills State, nevertheless it was substantively approved in Brinsfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 284 , where the court said: “If the declaration is not otherwise good, the innuendoes cannot make it good. They cannot add to or enlarge the sense •of the words used, and if the alleged defamatory words do not constitute slander in themselves, the innuendoes cannot enlarge or add to their legal meaning and effect. The innuendo is merely a form, or mode of introducing explanation ; it serves, to point out some matter already expressed, it may apply what is already expressed, but cannot enlarge the sense of the